From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. 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URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 1 08:04:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 2 20:02:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 23:02:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: <20190403030202.GA11519@aishdas.org> It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon untik the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified. I passed it in AhS Yomi (which finished its cycle today, Tues Apr 2). The context is boshes, among the 5 payments in neziqin. After discussing ona'ase devarm, CM 420. Around se'if 50 the AhS discusses LH and rechilus, and continues in following se'ifim like how to do teshuvah when the person it's about was dead. Not much, but it's there. Most insterestingly is the linkage between these issurim and neziqin. LH is a nezeq that's boshes but none of the other 4. So then I turned to the SA. Se'ifim 38-40 deal with ona'ah, and within them, the Rama talks about the bushah caused by talking about someone to a third party. The neared I could find. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:56:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:56:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sociology of pizza shops? Message-ID: Interesting development in Bnai Brak. https://lifeinisrael.blogspot.com/2019/02/pizza-and-bnei-braq-to-meet-halfway.html Seems like an example of the delicate dance between the laity and rabbinic leadership. (If no one went to those pizza shops, they wouldn't have remained open.) I wonder who gave them their original supervision against local leadership and why? Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 3 05:58:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices Message-ID: Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO community. Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 3 23:17:42 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 02:17:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion In-Reply-To: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> References: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190404061742.GA22308@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 02:37:22PM -0500, I wrote R' Korbin of Toronto's BAYT, and CC-ed y'all: : I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on : Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" : : What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on : this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) ... : You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is : murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. : What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left : to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is : retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never : says anything about murder. Well, I got to a couple of relevant se'ifim of AhS. CM 423:6. R YM Epstein ends the se'if (and siman), emphasis mine: ...And why don't we judge the laws of ason on the fetus? Because one is not chayav misah for an ubar, even if killed intntionally. For even on a neifel we aren't chayav [misah], as it says "and for every nefesh adam he shall suerly die, and an ubar IS NOT A NEFESH. (Nissah 44) And similarly 425:7 quotes the famous Rambam about abortion to save the mother vs "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh" once the baby crowns. His explanation as to the difference (citing the mishnah in Ohalos 7): Because he life comes before [the fetus]'s life. For the fetus isn't yet a nefesh. And not because he is a rodeif, because that's the nature of the world! And more, if it were because of rodeif, what would be the difference between one who emerged his head to one who didn't emerge? As I noted when citing the Bach, the Rambam does not call the ubar a rodeif, but says he is to be killed to save the mother "kerodeif". But in any case, another acharon who says that fetuses aren't "unborn chidren", that there is no "life" (eino nefesh) to be Pro-Life about. The issur -- in their opinion (and I'm convinced it's the majority) -- is rooted elsewhere. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il Sun Apr 7 00:35:49 2019 From: Ari.Kahn at biu.ac.il (Ari Kahn) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 07:35:49 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name> Message-ID: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 From: Zev Sero > Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary > American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American > who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other > day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon > Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to > pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists From zev at sero.name Sun Apr 7 08:44:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 11:44:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: <5b1bd819-371d-d8b4-0017-6760c7c5ddb9@sero.name> On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah wrote: > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 11:04:14 -0400 > From: Zev Sero >> Does anyone know whether there's a general consensus among contemporary >> American rabbonim about showering during shiva, for the average American >> who is used to showering every day, or at the very least every other >> day? Surely we are not less astheneses in this regard than Rabbon >> Gamliel. During the 9 days most if not all American rabbonim seem to >> pasken this way, but do they do the same for shiva? > Regarding showering during the Shiva -- this post may be of interest > -- especially footnote 8 -- citing Rav Moshe Soloveitchik -- who > according to the Rav -- felt not such custom or law currently exists > I don't see it. He says there is currently no minhag not to bathe during *shloshim*, and therefore also the nine days. I don't see where he says anything about shiva. Everyone agrees that in principle bathing is forbidden during shiva -- except for an istenis. The question is whether we all fall into that exception. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:04:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shiva Message-ID: <9404915D-241A-485A-931F-43EF0E7903CF@tenzerlunin.com> I?ve been told by students of the Rav, RYBS, that he was very adamant that showering was permitted for that very reason. My rabbi, such a student, was out of town when my wife started sitting shiva, and called to specifically tell her she could shower. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 7 15:11:10 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 22:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch Message-ID: ?It is often asked why no one tackled hilkhos shemiras halashon until the CC. Or more pointedly, what changed in the early 20th cent that we suddenly needed those laws codified.? It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply about and found that there wasn?t as much halachic discussion about it as he thought there should be. IOW, had the CC lived 200 years earlier, he might have done the same thing then. There isn?t always an outside reason why something interests individuals. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sun Apr 7 05:35:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2019 08:35:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan Message-ID: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently wrote a teshuvah about counting a man who has Down or Autism toward a minyan. A translation, paraphrase or summary appeared on the web site run by his talmidim . I am hoping it's a summary, because what is in the post is too brief to be applied. Question: Do autistic men or men with down syndrome count for a minyan with regard to Tefilla or Zimun. Regarding Zimun is there any distinction between 3 or 10? Answer: There is a wide range within these conditions, from very severe dysfunction to very highly functioning relative to the illness. If he displays basic understanding and communicates with others, and he participates in the davening on a basic level, there would be room to include him in a minyan or zimun when necessary [i.e. if you can easily complete the minyan without him that would be preferable]. See Shu"t Minchas Asher Vol. 2 Siman 48 For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate them. Although he does follow my lead. "Vea'ahavta" "hava"... If he can recognize that Adon Olam is being sung (despite not being the tune he learned), he will try to since along. Not necessarily get the poem right, but he'll try. So Shuby does "displays basic understanding and communicates with others", but is this what RAW means by "participates in the davening on a basic level"? Does anyone have Minchas Asher vol 2 and can look up #48 for me? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Between stimulus & response, there is a space. micha at aishdas.org In that space is our power to choose our http://www.aishdas.org response. In our response lies our growth Fax: (270) 514-1507 and our freedom. - Victor Frankl, (MSfM) From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 8 00:24:53 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 03:24:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it : as he thought there should be... My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior to him. R/Dr Chaim Soloveitchik wrote about the post-rupture textualism caused by WWII. Kayadua to long timers here, I didn't fully buy into his model. (Which is kind of scary, disagreeing with a genius on his home turf.) After all, his own namesake was a textualist well before the Shoah. And he himself writes about the contrast between the AhS and the MB, noting that it's indicative of our textualism that the MB won out (in nearly all Ashkenazi circles) over the AhS. But still, lemaaseh, that makes the MB out to be a pre-rupture textualist. Even if as an indivual, and thus not a counter-indication to his description of trends. And I think R/DCS's "mimeticism" conflates two different things: 1- the imbibing of emotional landmarks, like growing up knowing the feeling of Elul or the Erev Shabbos Jew. 2- norms of practice; like his textbook example of needing to study what a kezayis is rather than just knowing what one's parents, grandparents and everyone else around them eats. And I think that the writing of the CC is a data point in all this. I'm not sure how. My instinct is that the reason why no one tackled the subject before the CC is because no one felt a deep need to put rigorous halachic formalisms (mimeticim type 2) around an ethical issue until then. Or maybe it's an issue of value (mimeticism type 1) erosion. Not that I think LH socially unaccaptable in too much of our history. But maybe people knew enough to know that conversation about other people was not their highest behavior. And when people started thinking "but it's strue" is a good defense... I think that it wasn't until the CC's era that we got to the point that the only way to say X was wrong with any hope of reducing violations of it was by putting it in SA-style black-letter-legal terms. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Brains to the lazy micha at aishdas.org are like a torch to the blind -- http://www.aishdas.org a useless burden. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Bechinas haOlam From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 8 08:23:19 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2019 11:23:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Downs and Minyan In-Reply-To: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> References: <20190407123544.GB18528@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1f7e7b94-aa54-6507-5f63-5558aa1111b1@sero.name> On 7/4/19 8:35 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For example... Shuby says Shema with me every morning. Or tries to... his > limitation isn't his ability to remember the words, but to articulate > them. I don't understand why this should be a criterion for counting in a minyan at all. Surely even someone who is completely incapable of `akimas sefosayim still counts in a minyan to hear the things that he can't say. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mgluck at gmail.com Tue Apr 9 21:08:19 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 00:08:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 3:31 AM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 07, 2019 at 10:11:10PM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: > : It may, indeed, be that something changed. Or possibly not and it > : may have been simply that this was an issue that the CC cared deeply > : about and found that there wasn't as much halachic discussion about it > : as he thought there should be... > > R' MB: > My question is less about the CC and more about the lack of anyone prior > to him. > R' MB and R' JK put forward interesting arguments. A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il Tue Apr 9 03:38:43 2019 From: Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il (Aryeh Frimer) Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? Chag Sameach Aryeh Frimer -------------------------------------------------- Prof. Aryeh A. Frimer Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002, ISRAEL E-mail (office): Aryeh.Frimer at biu.ac.il From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 9 22:52:35 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 01:52:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: <20190408072453.GA8623@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1e5a4743-2d73-0d81-ed6e-67c756c09211@sero.name> On 10/4/19 12:08 am, Moshe Y. Gluck via Avodah wrote: > A point occurred to me but I have no idea if it's correct. When did it > become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It > may just be too late at night, but I can't think of a single example > offhand. Simlo Chadosho, Zivchei Tzedek, Gevuras Anoshim Is Kesses Hasofer too modern for your question? Does the Baal Hatanya's Hilchos Talmud Torah count, since it takes the form of a commentary on the relevant siman in SA? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 10 06:16:54 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:16:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory Message-ID: My comments to a magid shiur: While I can certainly construct a logic , it's hard to see why an umdena as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground (although I know we have the same debate by maiz panav) rather than setting the umdena in stone at an arbitrary point in time. (not to say that they should change frequently) I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Lhavdil It may be like machine learning today where the artificial intelligence result is not necessarily explainable even to the original programmers but rather based on all the data that the machines have scooped up. Since you can't know exactly what they have intuited from the data you may very well get contradictory results from two different machine systems Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From laser at ieee.org Wed Apr 10 00:48:22 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 10:48:22 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> At 02:32 10-04-19 -0400, Micha stated: >In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because >Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and >shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. >Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the >rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. And from the use of aseret you can know that dibber is a masculine noun. HTH ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org Wed Apr 10 12:01:25 2019 From: SGertzulin at agudathisrael.org (Shlomo Gertzulin) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 19:01:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. Sent from my Sprint Samsung Galaxy S9. -------- Original message -------- From: "Professor L. Levine" Date: 4/10/19 2:57 PM (GMT-05:00) To: avodah Subject: Making Gebrokts This Year As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Wed Apr 10 14:16:37 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:16:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Lashon haRa in the Shulchan Aruch In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <14a041b2912bfbc8d8b043eab8eb8357@aishdas.org> > When did it become common for people to write halachah seforim on a single topic? It may just be too late at night, > but I can't think of a single example offhand. Is it possible that the CC's > pioneering look at Lashon Hara was not only that he pioneered looking at > it, but that he was a pioneer of what we would call today (in Lakewood, at > least), "specializing in a miktzo'a"? I could easily be mistaken, but I thought this was not uncommon at all during the pre-S"A days. Whether common or not, the Ramban wrotes some. Encyclopedia Judaica notes: "Na?manides' known halakic works are: "Mishpe?e ha-?erem," the laws concerning excommunication, reproduced in "Kol Bo"; "Hilkot Bedi?ah," on the examination of the lungs of slaughtered animals, cited by Simeon ben ?ema? Duran in his "Yabin Shemu'ah"; "Torat ha-Adam," on the laws of mourning and burial ceremonies, in thirty chapters, the last of which, entitled "Sha'ar ha-Gemul," deals with eschatology" FWIW, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Apr 10 11:56:41 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 18:56:41 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: As I am sure you know I eat Gebrokts on Pesach. Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last day this year. I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? My wife and I have raised this issue with some Chassidim, but to us there does not appear to be an answer to this question. If you can can shed light on this issue, please email me. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed Apr 10 04:04:58 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 11:04:58 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] Xad Gadya In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Apr 10, 2019 07:07:25 am Message-ID: <15549122980.4BB7c31Eb.38894@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot > because Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara > Dibraya and shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and > Mida/Midot are female. Has any one seen a discussion related to > this Dikduk Problem? Are the rules in Aramaic different? In Hebrew, dibbroth is strictly a post-Biblical form. In the Torah it is always dvarim, which is both grammatically and morphologically masculine. As for Aramaic, I do not know whether dibbrayya or middayya are grammatically masculine, but they are clearly morphologically masculine. More precisely, they are in the form of a masculine plural with the definite article. If they were feminine plurals with the definite article, they would be dibbratha and middatha. Look at the Targum to, e.g., Exodus 37:5, where there is a masculine plural with the definite article, right next to a feminine plural with the definite article -- "w'a`al yath arixayya b`izqatha" -- and observe the difference in the form of the two words. So it is likely that your grammatical assumptions are incorrect, and that dibbrayya and middayya are both masculine. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From mandels at ou.org Thu Apr 11 08:35:30 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 15:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> References: , <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I wish to briefly comment on something that Toby said, because it is relevant also for a discussion we are having on Mesorah. Toby says," He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English." And she is basically correct, but she misses one point that is implicit in what she says: HQBH not only implanted in people the kind of speech to express ideas (as opposed to the way animals communicate through sounds or songs), He also created it in a very complex way (as He did everything). One of the features of all human languages is that they change over time. Sometimes they change rapidly, other times slowly, but they always change. Sometimes the changes involved borrowing lexical elements from another language, but that also is change. That is fact. There is no language that ever existed that does not change over time. A corollary of that is that what a person speaks or writes dates him. Another very interesting fact is that HQBH implanted in humans the ability to learn languages and learn the grammatical rules of a language at a certain stage in their development. From the point of view of psycholinguistics, languages are learned in certain stages that are exactly like Piaget stages or other developmental stages in that one must always precede the other, and once it is "learned" it is set, not like one can learn a date and then forget it. Once the bases of the language are set in a child, they influence everything he speaks or writes later. The assortment of sounds, for instance. English speakers learn to pronounce the eth and edh sounds without to much trouble; speakers who do not have those sounds in their native language struggle to learn them. Speakers of English and European languages do not have the 'ayin sound, and they struggle to learn it. And that is the cause of a "foreign accent." Some people are better at learning new sounds, but all struggle with them. Which is all a long introduction to introducing the idea of forensic linguistics. One can find enough items in anything a person says or writes to be able to date him. Not to the year, usually not to the decade, but certainly to the century. Sometimes we do not know enough about how people spoke historically to be able to date something. We establish the date for linguistic changes by getting data from other examples in the language. Leshon Chazal is different from Biblical Hebrew, even late Biblical Hebrew as in the Book of Esther. It differs in vocabularym morphology, syntax and in the few elements of pronunciation that were indicated. After the time of Chazal, no one spoke Hebrew as a native language. Jews learned it in school, but they spoke Aramaic. By the time of the Geonim, Jews spoke later Aramaic and Arabic (or Farsi or Moroccan). The Rambam spoke Arabic as a native language. And even as great of a stylist as he was, one can find clear traces in his Hebrew of his underlying Arabic. Back to our subject: how do we date something like Chad Gadya or Echad mi Yodea'? Both were clearly written after the time when Aramaic or Hebrew were spoken, and so mix up some things. The items counted are half in Hebrew, half in Aramaic. That was also true in the time of the G'moro. But in time of the G'moro, no one mixed up masculine a feminine forms of numbers. No English speaker would say "I saw Paul today; she was rushing to school." No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." No Spanish speaker would say "la problema es..." No one whose native language distinguished between classes of nouns, such as mascuiline and feminine, or the 9 classes in Swahili, would ever use adjectives or verbs that did not match the class. No native speaker of Hebrew would ever say "Shalosh avot," even though the form avot has what looks to be a :feminine plural. And no native Hebrew or Aramaic speaker would say "shlosha asar middayya." So the person who composed it did not know to carefully distinguish the gender of the numerals. No native speaker would have used the form "middayya," either. The root m-d-d does not exist in Aramaic, nor does any word like middah. The G'moro used the word middah when speaking Aramaic, as in Sanhedring 38b, ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? but the word is a borrowing from Hebrew. And, if an Aramaic speaker borrowed a word like middah, he would form the plural either by using the Hebrew plural, middot, or would use an Aramaic feminine Hebrew, middata. So: the poem was written after the time when people spoke Aramaic. As Toby says, the poet wanted to use forms that flow mellifluously off the tongue. So he invents forms that anyone would understand, even though no native speaker would use such a form. The form d'zabben abba in Chad Gadya also shows ignorance of Aramaic,where z'van (in the "Kal" binyan) means to buy, and zabben (in the "Piel" binyan means sell. Both forms are used many times in the Targum. So whoever wrote a form like d'zabbin abba here is ignorant of the Aramaic of the Targum as well. That is one of the marks of the Jews who lived in the Christian medieval society. They had dropped the Targum from the Torah reading in shul already in the 10th or 11th Century, and no longer knew Aramaic other than the words they saw in the G'moro. [Email #2.] Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 10:38:43 +0000 From: Aryeh Frimer via Avodah > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba (not Arba'a) Imahot because > Avot is male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya and > shlosha Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female. > Has any one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are the > rules in Aramaic different? The rules in Aramaic are the same, although the form of the numerals are different. To be consistent, one should be saying t'loth 'asre middayya and tarte 'esre kokhvayya. But the question is incorrect in two points: 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -- a is the definite article. Even in Hebrew, the old singular of dibb'rot is NOT dibb'rah, but dibber. That word is masculine, but with the -- ot plural, which is quite common in Hebrew for masculine nouns. Maqom-m'qomot. Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. 2) The questioner should have first asked why are we counting some things in Aramaic and some in Hebrew? Why not 'arba immahata and t'lata avahata? The answer is that all the songs after the Haggodo were medieval compositions, most originally in German. Old haggodos still have "nun boy," even if they have the Hebrew "Qel b'neh." To make it sound more authentic, the songs were rewritten in a mixture of Hebrew and Aramaic, but the knowledge of Aramaic in medieval Ashk'naz was near nill. They had long ago abandoned reading the Targum on Shabbos in shul, and all of the medieval compositions from Ashk'naz in Aramaic have basic, sometimes toxic errors. No one even really knew the Aramaic parts of Daniyyel and Ezra. The song "Qoh Ribbon" is mostly based on Daniyyel, but punctuated in the siddur with incorrect signs: hayvat boro means "the animals of the wild," and that is the way it is in Daniyyel. But people sing "hevat b'ra," which means "the animals of the Son." Chad gaya is sung "di-zabbenn abba," which would meant "that father sold," rather than di-z'van," which means "bought." Why did they bother using Aramaic at all, if they didn't know Aramaic? Probably because it sounded more "authentic." Just like nowadays, Jews studied G'moro. Whether or not they understood Aramaic. Most or all of the children did not, but they learned G'moro like they had learned Chumash: most or all did not know Hebrew, but the rebbe would have them read a couple of words, translate them, and had the kids learn the translation with the Hebrew. When they started reading G'moro, they already knew a lot of Hebrew, and so understood the G'moro based on Rashi. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel Rabbinic Coordinator The Orthodox Union From micha at aishdas.org Thu Apr 11 14:50:21 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 17:50:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190411215021.GA4757@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:02:34PM +0000, Mandel, Seth wrote: : 1) middayya and kokhvayya and dibbrayya are all MASCULINE in : Aramaic. The singular is, like with all Aramaic masculine nouns, has : the definite form midda, kokhva, dibb'ra; the final -a is the definite : article. Similar, "Shabbas haMalka" (ending in an alef) refers to a figurative king, not queen. (Malkesa, OTOH...) ... : Even when the word has an -- ot ending in Hebrew, the Aramiac often has : the -- ayya (maculine) plural. In Hebrew we have a hag called Shavu'ot. In : Aramaic, it is Shavu'ayya, not shavu'ata. Well, "Atzeret", more often. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 11 16:18:28 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 19:18:28 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10/4/19 2:56 pm, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this year on > the Seventh day of Pesach.? To me this is hard to understand.? If > Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach,? then how can > one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? > If it were a real halachic problem then it could not be eaten on the eighth day either. But it is not a real halachic problem, it is only a chumra, because a cheshash of chometz. Al pi din one does not have to worry about this cheshash, and one may eat it even on the first day, which is why nobody has any objection whatsoever to your choice to do so; but since it *is* a real cheshash there are many who choose to be stricter during the first seven days. That doesn't make it forbidden. So when the eighth day is on Shabbos the only question that arises is whether to prepare it on the Friday using the eruv tavshilin, or to do so on Erev Yomtov. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mandels at ou.org Wed Apr 10 10:48:34 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2019 17:48:34 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> , Message-ID: From: Danny Levy Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 1:27 PM > May I take this opportunity to ask another question about Aramaic dikduk? > In Kaddish, ul'olmei olmaya and da'amiran b'olma, do they have kamatz > gadol and therefore shva na, or kamatz katan and therefore shva nach, > or is Aramaic dikduk different from Hebrew and therefore "therefore" > is incorrect? Therefore is not correct. 'olmo in Aramaic have a qomatz in both places, from the time of the book of Daniel at least. At that time the R'DaQ had not been born. Aramaic had qomatz and patach. How you pronounce them is your business, but they were different Aramaic vowels. Neither one was more godol than the other; two different Aramaic vowels. The R'DaQ invented theories about the qamatz gadol, qatan, for Hebrew. The evidence from the Masorah is that he was incorrect in his theories. But assuming he was correct, he spoke about Hebrew grammar, not about Aramaic. So: was the sh'wa in Aramaic 'ol'mo pronounced or not there at all? The answer to the question phrased that way is the same answer to the question posed by the famous poem Antigonish, : Yesterday upon the stair I met a man who wasn't there He wasn't there again today If you claim it is a vowel, then it is there. But is really there? Is it really a vowel? In the Babylonian punctuation, including of Sefer Doniel, there is nothing there. In Tiberinan punctuation, the lack of anything indicates that the consonant is not pronounced, so they wrote a sh'wa. Was it every pronounced? Very doubtful. R. Mazuz, if you are looking for a current day rov who understood the issues, claims that the rules of the R'DaQ for Hebrew sh'wa and qomatz do not apply at all in Aramaic, and so it is not pronounced. This is actually relevant to Pesach, although one level removed! Chometz on Pesach is like the man who wasn't there in Antigonish. In the houses of most Ashk'naz Jews, it is there in the house, but it is not "there in the house." So chometz is the sh'wa of the Jewish yomim tovim, or, more exactly, it is the man in Antigonish. And, so you see, orginally from Nova Scotia, where Antigonish is a town where the man who wasn't there wasn't from. Rabbi Dr. Seth Mandel {Dedicated to R. David Bannett} From t613k at mail.aol.com Wed Apr 10 22:10:39 2019 From: t613k at mail.aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 05:10:39 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1432033141.1702993.1554959439369@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 37, Issue 27 dated 4/10/2019 R' Aryeh Frimer writes: > In Chad Gadya, we say Shelosha Avot and Arba Imahot becauseAvot is > male and Imahot is female. Yet the text reads Asara Dibraya andshlosha > Asar Midaya even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female.Has any > one seen a discussion related to this Dikduk Problem? Are therules in > Aramaic different? << This thread migrated to Mesorah, without changing the subject line. In all the learned back-and-forth I did not see anyone note the simple fact that the Avos, the Imahos, the Dibraya and the Midaya do not appear in Chad Gadya at all! The subject line should have been "Echad Mi Yodeia." Echad Mi Yodeia is written in a mash-up of Hebrew and Aramaic, and there is an excellent reason for that. It rhymes beautifully and is very enjoyable to sing! Beginning with the number five, everything rhymes:5 chumshei Torah6 sidrei Mishna7 yemei Shabata8 yemei milah9 yarchei leidah10 dibraya11 kochvaya12 shivtaya13 midaya All the numbers (chamisha, shisha, etc) are Hebrew. Almost all the words in the poem are Hebrew (including sidrei, yemei, yarchei). The only words in Aramaic are words at the end of a line, where the Hebrew would not make a rhyme.Hebrew: Torah, Mishna, milah, leidahAramaic: Shabata, dibraya, kochvaya, shivtaya, midaya I doubt the poet gave any thought to correct Aramaic dikduk. It's a song, and it rolls sweetly and smoothly off the tongue. BTW it is not surprising that this poem/song was confused with Chad Gadya, which likewise has a multiplicity of smoothly rhyming Aramaic "--ah" words. Gadya, shunra, chalba,chutra, nura, maya, sora. And let us not forget Abba! R' Seth Mandel says Chad Gadya was composed at a time when Aramaic was no longer a spoken tongue. He may be right, or it may be that people were still mixing a lot of Aramaic into their daily language, as many of us continue to use some Yiddish mixed in with our English. Over time people would have simplified their folk-Aramaic and forgotten some of the grammar. To give an analogy, most Yiddish speakers today don't pay attention to which words are masculine and which are feminine, and don't know when you're supposed to say der, dos, dem or di. RMS also says that Chad Gadya is taken from an older popular German song, and he may well be right about that, too. I have a book of Mother Goose rhymes, some centuries old, and one of them is a rhyme that is very similar to Chad Gadya. It has a stick hitting a dog, a fire burning the stick, water putting out the fire, even an ox lapping up the water. But instead of a father it has an old woman, and somewhere in the sequence of events is a pig jumping over a stile. Needless to say, HKBH makes no appearance in the Mother Goose version. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Apr 11 20:15:37 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 23:15:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? I have been bothered by the very end of Magid, when we expound on the 50/200/250 nisim that occurred at the Yam Suf. And this is followed by Dayenu, where we thank Hashem for many things, most of which occurred after the 15th of Nisan. Rambam Chometz Umatzah 7:1 explains the parameters of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim: <<< There is a positive mitzva of the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were done for our ancestors in Mitzrayim on the night of the 15th of Nisan, as it is said, "Remember this day, on which you went out from Mitzrayim" >>> (Shemos 13:3) I note his emphasis on the events of one specific day. The pesukim before and after are perhaps even more explicit: Shemos 12:51 - "It was on that very day - Hashem took the Bnei Yisrael out of Eretz Mitzrayim with their legions." Shemos 13:4 - "Today you are going out, in the month of Aviv." The pesukim seem clear, that we went out on one specific day, namely 15 Nisan, and that by the 16th we were already out of Mitzrayim. Granted, we were still in danger, because Paro could have caught up to us, and did in fact try to do so. But that occurred AFTER we had already left. And I think it very significant that the text of Rambam?s Haggada skips the paragraphs about the Yam Suf, and Dayenu as well, going directly from the Ten Plagues to Rabban Gamliel?s explanations of The Three Things. Apparently, Rambam considered the events of the Yam Suf (and later) to be extraneous, off-topic, and not part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. But *we* do include those sections. It seems that we disagree with the Rambam; we do consider these sections to be part of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim. What is our basis for this? Even if some archeologist (or midrash) would say that the political borders of Mitzrayim extended all the way to the shore of the Yam Suf, we must still deal with the words of the Torah; and I am persuaded by the Rambam's words, that in the context of Sippur Yetzias Mitzrayim, the Torah wants us to tell about what happened on one specific day, 15 Nisan. This would include the prologue, of course. The story would not make any sense if we didn't elaborate on the years leading up to this climactic event. Stories of the slavery and of the makkos are critical; you can't tell about the Exodus if you don't tell what we were Exiting from. But Maggid could have ended there. Why do we include an afterword? Is it really critical that the story of the Exodus has to also tell of the Destination? Wasn't it enough that we got out? Needless to say, yes, indeed, it *would* have been enough! But we say it anyway. And I'm wondering if anyone writes about *why*. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:37:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:37:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: : In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". :-)BBii! -Micha From laser at ieee.org Fri Apr 12 03:14:04 2019 From: laser at ieee.org (Ira L. Jacobson) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:14:04 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Fwd: Chad Gadya In-Reply-To: <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> References: <20190410063248.GA12006@aishdas.org> <5caf1443.1c69fb81.52ed.adec@mx.google.com> <20190412093705.GB25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5cb064f1.1c69fb81.8c8fb.0f8a@mx.google.com> At 05:37 12-04-19 -0400, Micha Berger stated the following: >On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:48:22AM +0300, Ira L. Jacobson via Avodah wrote: >: In Hebrew, the singular of dibrot, as in aseret hadibrot, is dibber. > >Although in biblical Hebrew, it's aseres hadevarim, not "-os". Of course; that makes its gender even more obvious. However, that is not relevant to the original discussion, relating to the word dibber, as in "even though Dibra/Dibrot and Mida/Midot are female." [One is; one is not.] ~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~= IRA L. JACOBSON =~=~=~=~=~=~=~=~ mailto: laser at ieee.org ---------------------- ?There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing.? ? Aristotle -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 02:34:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:34:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> Message-ID: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 07:01:25PM +0000, Shlomo Gertzulin via Avodah wrote: : I believe that in years like this one, they only prepare the gebrocks : food on the seventh day which is Friday but don't actually eat it until : Friday night or Shabbos. I'm not aware of anyone who doesn't eat gebrocks : who actually eats it this year on the 7th Day. With geborchts, the minhag is based on a fear that one might end up with actual chameitz. The odds are small enough that for halakhah the risk is ignorible. But on the level of minhag, and when chameitz is assur deOraisa... So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two possibilities really seperable?) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri Apr 12 02:56:14 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 05:56:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine asked: > Many of those who do not eat Gebrokts make Gebrokts and eat it > on the last day of Pesach. However, this year the last day of > Pesach is on Shabbos, so one cannot make Gebrokts on the last > day this year. > > I know for a fact that there are those who make Gebrokts this > year on the Seventh day of Pesach. To me this is hard to understand. > If Gebrokts is a problem during the first 7 days of Pesach, then how > can one make Gebrokts this year on the Seventh Day? Here's the logic: What's wrong with gebrokts? It might be chometz. What's wrong with chometz? It's an issur karays! Really? Always? No, only if you eat it. No karays for just owning it. So I believe that they are being machmir to avoid eating gebrokts on the first 7 days, but not on the 8th day. And merely owning gebrokts is not a problem even on the first 7 days. (I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of gebroks, and what I have written is merely my guess. If someone would tell me that these people would not even own gebrokts on the first 6 days and make an exception only on the 7th, my guess would be that this is not intrinsically related to chometz, but is merely a protective measure, to avoid the temptation of having edible gebrokts around the house.) If anyone is surprised by my suggestion that someone would be machmir against eating chometz, and meikil on owning it, let me point out that this is exactly how Chazal designed the fifth hour of Erev Pesach morning. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 06:46:12 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 13:46:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? Message-ID: >From yesterday's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the origin of the custom of not eating gebrochts (matzah dipped in water)? A. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 463:3) rules that flour made from roasted wheat kernels may not be mixed with water on Pesach. Even though wheat that is fully roasted cannot become chometz, we are concerned that perhaps some kernels were not properly roasted, and subsequently, the flour might become chometz when mixed with water. The same concern applies to matzah with flour on its surface. It is forbidden to mix such matzah with water because the flour may not be fully baked and would be susceptible to becoming chometz (MB 463:8). Where there is no perceptible flour in or on the matzah, is there a concern that some of the dough may not have been thoroughly mixed, and within the matzah there may be raw flour that was not fully baked? There are two different customs; Mishnah Berurah (458:4) notes that there are anshei ma?aseh, scrupulous individuals, who act stringently and do not allow matzah to come in contact with water, as perhaps it may contain unbaked flour. Many Chassidim have this custom. However, Mishnah Berurah (ibid., citing Shaarei Teshuva 460) maintains that this stringency is not halachicaly mandated, since there is no evidence of raw flour in matzah. In addition, our matzos are thin-like crackers, and it is highly unlikely they will contain flour. This was the opinion of Chazon Ish (OC 121:19) as well. Shaarei Teshuva, (OC 460:10) notes that both groups, are meritorious. Those who do not eat gebrochts are motivated by yiras shomayim (fear of heaven), lest they inadvertently transgress the laws of Pesach. The ones who are lenient are concerned that not eating gebrochts will limit their simchas (joy of) Yom Tov. Shaarei Teshuva concludes: ?Both groups are pursuing paths for the sake of Heaven, and I declare: And Your people are entirely righteous (Yeshaya 60:21).? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:16:21 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:16:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [Mesorah] Chad Gadya Message-ID: <9e4a3e6d-b5bd-de53-2791-cf78b82eaab9@sero.name> On 11/4/19 11:35 am, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > No Hebew speaker would say "ishti yavo hayom." I have seen it often in written Ivrit. Even worse and much more often I've seen "ani yavo". And this is by native speakers. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 07:22:04 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 10:22:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Making Gebrokts This Year In-Reply-To: <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> References: <33f35a8a65ac416abda498cba6273af3@EMail.agudathisrael.local> <20190412093402.GA25558@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <1ce53759-28eb-a3fd-61d6-d446edf8e5ff@sero.name> On 12/4/19 5:34 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So why aren't you worried about bal yeira'eh as much as akhilah? If you > can't eat gebrochts for 7 days, how can you own it? > > Is it akhlah's issur qareis? Or is it that there is damage done al pi > qabbalah when eating that isn't done when owning? (And are those two > possibilities really seperable?) Also consider that even if a speck of chametz does form it will be less than a kezayis, and therefore not chashuv, so there will be no bal yeira'eh, but eating it would still be an issur d'oraisa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Apr 12 07:01:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:01:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I do not eat gebrochts (matzah dipped in water). Should my stringency include refraining from eating matzah with butter as well? A. As previously noted, those who avoid gebrochts are concerned that there may be unbaked flour in the matzah. Nonetheless, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (Teshuvos 6) rules that even those who do not eat gebrochts may be lenient regarding matzah dipped in fruit juice, because Shulchan Aruch (OC 462:1) rules that fruit juices, a category which includes milk and butter, do not cause flour to become chometz. On the other hand, Sama D?chayei (13:6) notes that although fruit juice mixed with flour will not become chometz, fruit juice mixed with water and flour will become chometz in an accelerated manner (see OC 462:2). Since matzah is made with water, some of the water moisture is retained in the matzah even after the baking. As such, the combination of matzah and fruit juice may accelerate the chometz to occur (if there is unbaked flour in the matzah). Therefore, Sama D?chayei argues that one who is stringent regarding gebrochts should not let the matzah come into contact with fruit juice. The Steipler Gaon concurred with this ruling (Orchos Rabbeinu, vol. 2, p. 50). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Apr 12 11:32:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:32:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM - Natural Mortality Message-ID: <20190412183259.GC25280@aishdas.org> Two comments on the article below: I am not sure I agree with RAB's depiction of the Aish Qodesh's position. To me it looks like the Piasecner is saying more that there is a concept of natural morality, but that it is insufficient for a Jew to use it as a motivator. After all, for a non-Jew he believes that natural morality does appropriately provide a calling. AISI, Hillel's "de'alakh sani" as a summary of the entire Torah al regel achas is a strong support for RAYK's position. After all, isn't Hillel's rule in fact a description of natural morality? -micha PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #25: Natural Morality (part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" Is there morality without the Torah? Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have debated whether there exists a natural morality that is binding even in the absence of any legislated ethical rules. Similarly, Jewish philosophers have debated whether there would be objective moral right and wrong if God had not revealed His will and commanded us various moral obligations, from the seven Noahide laws through the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot of the Torah.[1] The Eish Kodesh: No Natural Morality """ """" """"""" "" """"""" """""""" The Piaseczner Rebbe, in his collection of sermons Eish Kodesh,[2] asserts that a gentile who acts ethically does so because he believes in the existence of an independent moral truth. According to this conception, the commandments of God reflect that pre-existing, independent truth. However, we Jews believe that God is the only valid source of moral truth. According to the Piaseczner, it is forbidden to steal only because the true God commanded us not to steal, and it is forbidden to murder only because the true God forbade murder. Those commandments created a moral truth because they issued from the true God. He proves this contention from the fact that Halacha does permit moral wrongs in certain circumstances, which would not be possible if they were objectively forbidden. For example, theft is permissible when authorized by the court (hefker beit din hefker). More radically, God Himself explicitly permitted murder in the commandment to Avraham to sacrifice his son Yitzchak, which constituted a binding obligation, although it was eventually rescinded due to external considerations. According to this approach, there is no objective moral right or wrong in the world. What we call natural moral intuition is merely the influence of secular ways of thought or the clever workings of the evil inclination. The only valid source of truth is Divine revelation. This negation of any valid truth that emerges from human reasoning or intuition strikes us as very devout, and in fact corresponds to a general repudiation of the conclusions of unaided human reasoning, which is pervasive in certain religious communities. But is this perspective consistent with the source texts of our tradition? Two Talmudic Passages that Assume Natural Morality """ """""""" """""""" """" """""" """"""" """""""" We find two Talmudic passages in which the Sages relate explicitly to the theoretical question of what would have been had God not revealed His will in the Torah. The Talmud states: R. Yochanan said: Even if the Torah had not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat [which covers its excrement], and that stealing is objectionable from the ant [which does not take grain from another ant], and forbidden relations from the dove [which is faithful to its partner]. (Eruvin 100b) One may wonder why we would have learned modesty from the cat and loyalty from the dove, and not lethal violence from the lion or evil cunning from the snake. It seems that R. Yochanan did not intend to suggest that we merely emulate what the animals around us do, but rather that we use our natural moral intuition to observe the behaviors of the various animal species and intuitively realize which of those features are worthy of emulation and which should be condemned. In any case, R. Yochanan clearly states that even if God had never revealed His will to us, we would be responsible to learn morality on our own. Likewise, we find in another Talmudic passage: The Sages taught: "You shall do My ordinances [and you shall keep My statutes to follow them, I am the Lord your God"] (Leviticus 18:4) - ["My ordinances" is a reference to] matters that, even had they not been written, it would have been logical that they be written. They are the prohibitions against idol worship, prohibited sexual relations, bloodshed, theft, and blessing God [a euphemism for cursing the Name of God]. "And you shall keep my statutes" - [This is a reference to] matters that Satan challenges because the reason for these mitzvot are not known. They are: The prohibitions against eating pork and wearing sha'atnez (garments of wool and linen); performing the chalitza ceremony with a yevama (a widow who must participate in a levirate marriage); the purification ceremony of the leper; and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts [as they have no reason], therefore the verse states: "I am the Lord," to indicate: I am the Lord - I decreed these statutes and you have no right to doubt them. (Yoma 67b) The Talmud explicitly states that those commandments of the Torah that are labeled mishpatim should have been legislated even if they were not written in the Torah. In other words, we are expected to intuit and follow certain rules of morality even in the absence of revelation.[3] Ramban and Rambam Support Natural Morality """""" """ """""" """"""" """"""" """""""" This is also the position of Ramban, as expressed in his commentary to the story of the deluge.[4] Ramban asks why, according to the midrashic tradition, the fate of the generation of the flood was sealed because of the sin of theft, as opposed to their many sexual perversions. He answers that the prohibition of theft is intuitive and is therefore binding even in the absence of prophetic revelation. The generation of Noach was punished for violating the natural moral law, even in the absence of revelation. Likewise, R. Yosef Albo[5] explains that there exist three types of law, the first of which, called natural law, is binding in all times and places, even without an act of human or divine legislation.[6] Similarly, Rambam writes that the unaided human mind can deduce the existence of various moral precepts. He writes explicitly that the seven Noahide laws can be known by our moral intuition even in the absence of revelation,[7] and he states that a gentile who obeys these seven Noahide commandments merely because of the inclination of human reason is considered wise, even though he is not pious, because he follows the path of wisdom even though he does not heed revelation.[8] R. Saadia Gaon "" """""" """" R. Saadia Gaon is perhaps the most ambitious in his formulation of the significance of natural morality. He explains that God implanted in human psychology a moral intuition that is capable of discerning moral truths that are universally binding.[9] R. Saadia Gaon states clearly that even before the revelation of the Torah, we were obligated to follow the dictates of natural morality. He further assumes that the Torah cannot possibly contradict natural morality, and boldly asserts that if Moshe had descended from Mount Sinai and commanded us a Torah that contradicted the dictates of natural morality, we would have been bound to reject it. He even assumes that even God Himself is bound by natural morality, and it was therefore a moral imperative for God to promulgate the commandments found in the Torah, because natural morality dictates that a wise ruler who is able to encourage moral practice must do so.[10] Summary """"""" The Eish Kodesh claims that from a religious perspective, there is no true morality other than that revealed by Divine command. We have demonstrated, based on two Talmudic passages and the statements of the great medieval Jewish philosophers, that from a Jewish perspective, the human mind is capable of attaining binding moral knowledge. God Himself, who implanted a moral intuition in human beings, expects all people to follow the dictates of natural morality even in the absence of revelation, and He holds us responsible if we fail to do so. Even a Jew, then, can agree that there is an objective moral truth independent of Divine commandments. R. Lichtenstein: Natural Morality is Superseded by Torah "" """"""""""""" """"""" """""""" "" """""""""" "" """"" R. Aharon Lichtenstein, in an article about this topic entitled "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah,"[11] likewise concluded that the mainstream Jewish tradition does recognize the existence of binding morality even in the absence of revealed commandments. R. Lichtenstein then asks a second question. If we assume that there is some system of morality that would be binding upon us had we not received the Torah, but we did in fact receive the Torah, what relevance does natural morality have for us now that we are bound by the Divine morality of the Torah? R. Lichtenstein answers that, at least on an operative level, natural morality has no relevance to the life of a Jew who is obligated by the commandments of the Torah. The Torah, argues R. Lichtenstein, constitutes a complete moral system that includes all the principles of natural morality, in addition to the more advanced moral and spiritual demands that apply particularly to the Jewish People. Natural morality has thus been superseded by the Torah, and we may conclude that the natural moral order has no relevance whatsoever to a Jew, because following the commandments of the Torah will fulfill all the demands of natural morality, plus much more. R. Glasner: Natural Morality Supplements the Torah "" """""""" """"""" """""""" """"""""""" """ """"" Another twentieth-century Jewish thinker and leader of religious Zionism, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, took a radically different approach to this issue.[12] He suggests that while the Torah did command us all the moral precepts necessary for spiritual perfection, which could never have been discovered by natural means, the Torah omitted some moral obligations that are known by unaided human reason and were therefore deemed unnecessary to repeat. Examples of this include the prohibitions of cannibalism, eating disgusting creatures, and public nudity, and the obligation of a father to support his young children. R. Glasner explains that these moral obligations are binding on us even though they were not written in the Torah. Furthermore, one who violates the principles of natural morality commits a worse sin than one who violates a commandment of the Torah, as he betrays not only his commitment to Judaism, but his very humanity. Therefore, when faced with a choice between violating a Torah commandment or a principle of natural morality, one must choose the lesser evil of a Torah violation rather than the greater evil of transgressing natural morality. For example, one who is stranded on a desert island and must eat either non-kosher meat or human flesh in order to survive should eat the non-kosher meat, which constitutes a more serious halachic infraction, rather than the human flesh. which constitutes an infraction of natural morality.[13] R. Kook: Natural Morality is the Foundation of the Torah "" """"" """"""" """""""" "" """ """""""""" "" """ """"" A third answer to this question is found in the writings of R. Kook. In contrast to R. Glasner, R. Kook is convinced that the Torah encompasses the whole of morality and omits nothing. However, experience proves that those who insist on following only that which they learn from the Torah, suppressing their natural moral intuition, do not achieve moral perfection and often act immorally while professing unswerving loyalty to the Torah.[14] R. Kook explains that natural morality is crucially important and indispensable for a Jew who strives to serve God. However, natural morality is not more important than Torah observance, nor is it a necessary supplement to Torah observance. According to R. Kook, there is nothing greater than the fear of Heaven and service of God expressed by following His Torah. However, not everyone who professes to follow the Torah is in fact interpreting the Torah properly, and not everyone who claims to act out of fear of Heaven, or even believes that he does so, is in fact inspired by true fear of Heaven. It is all too easy for the fear of Heaven to be adulterated and for the Torah to be misunderstood and corrupted so that it serves selfish and unethical motives instead of the true service of God. Even the Torah itself cannot guarantee that it will not be misinterpreted and its intention perverted. What, then, can guarantee that a student of Torah achieves a proper understanding of Torah and that one who strives to fear Heaven can attain an authentic fear of Heaven? According to R. Kook, this is the role of natural morality. The litmus test for authentic fear of Heaven is whether it suppresses our natural ethical instinct or raises that instinct to higher levels of power and sophistication.[15] One possessed of a healthy moral intuition who leads an ethical life can then look into the Torah and find the path to spiritual perfection. In Rav Kook's words, "to such a person will be opened gates of enlightenment, which are broader, brighter, and holier than any enlightenment than can be achieved by human reason alone." However, if one does not have the necessary moral infrastructure, and particularly if one approaches Torah with the idea that true commitment to Torah necessitates a suppression of one's moral instincts, then he cannot possibly find enlightenment or holiness in his Torah study.[16] Rav Kook describes the relationship between natural morality and Torah with a beautiful parable, comparing natural morality to a foundation and the Torah to a beautiful palace. The palace is incomparably greater than the foundation, and we want nothing more than to live in the grand and majestic palace. However, the foundation is a prerequisite for the existence of the palace. A palace built on a sturdy foundation will serve its function well, but a palace built without a foundation will quickly come crashing down and destroy its inhabitants.[17] On a practical level, R. Kook concludes that we must embrace the educational vision of the Sages, who taught us that derekh eretz kadma la-Torah, ethics precedes the Torah.[18] In every generation, we must teach natural morality as a prerequisite for understanding the Torah, and in fact there is no part of the Torah that can be appreciated properly without natural morality.[19] We have thus seen four approaches to the relationship between natural morality and Torah. The Eish Kodesh maintained that there is no such thing as natural morality; a Torah Jew must realize that morality is found only in the Torah and not anywhere else. R. Lichtenstein argued that there is a natural morality that is binding in God's eyes, but the Torah has superseded that morality and constitutes a complete and sufficient system of morality. R. Glasner claimed that even after we received the Torah, we need to heed the commands of our moral intuition, because not all of morality is found in the Torah, and those moral precepts which are not found in the Torah are even more binding than those explicated in the Torah. R. Kook held that the Torah subsumes all of morality, and one who properly understands Torah morality lacks nothing. However, the Torah was not meant to supplant natural morality, but rather to raise and advance it to immeasurably greater heights. One who begins with natural morality can reach higher levels of holiness and spirituality by following the Torah, but one who attempts to fulfill the Torah without the prerequisite of natural morality will instead corrupt the Torah and pervert its intention. _______________________ [1] The question of whether morality exists in the absence of Divine revelation is not equivalent to the question of whether morality could exist without God, one side of which was memorably formulated by Dostoevsky: "If God does not exist... then all is permitted." It is certainly possible to claim that morality cannot exist in the absence of God but could exist without Divine revelation. In this shiur, we will not analyze the question of whether there could be morality if God did not exist. Since we believe that the entire world would not exist if God did not exist, it is impossible to inquire as to what would be were the world to exist without God. Instead, we will assume the existence of a world created by God and analyze whether God would hold us accountable to behave ethically if He had not commanded us to do so. [2] R. Kalonymus Kalman Shapira (Poland, 1889-1943), Eish Kodesh, p. 68. This particular sermon was delivered on Rosh Hashanah 1940 in the Warsaw Ghetto. [3] Marvin Fox ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," Dine Yisrael 3 [1972], pp. 5-27), who denies the existence of natural morality, interprets these two Talmudic passages as stating merely that it would have been practically beneficial to deduce and legislate these moral principles, not that they would have been ethically binding. However, this is not the straightforward reading of these passages, and it certainly contradicts the opinion of Ramban and other medieval Jewish philosophers quoted below. [4] Ramban to Bereishit 6:13. [5] R. Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444), Sefer Ha-Ikarim, book 1, chapter 7. [6] His other two categories are conventional law, which is binding as a result of human legislation and aims to improve society in accordance with the specific needs of the time and place, and Divine law, which is ordained by Divine revelation and aims to achieve spirituality and holiness. [7] Hilkhot Melakhim 9:1. [8] Hilkhot Melakhim 8:11. An alternate version of this text of the Rambam states that such a gentile is neither pious nor wise. However, all the manuscript evidence supports the reading that we have adopted. See the critical notes in Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, ed. Shabse Frankel. Rambam's position on the nature of moral knowledge is complex. In both texts from Hilkhot Melakhim, Rambam states that logic inclines towards these moral precepts, but not that it absolutely demonstrates their correctness. Likewise, in the introduction to his commentary on Masekhet Avot, known as Shemonah Perakim, Rambam takes umbrage at R. Saadia Gaon's characterization of those commandments that overlap with natural morality as "logical" commandments (mitzvot sikhliyot), because Rambam holds that moral knowledge does not have the same epistemological status as metaphysical knowledge and is not subject to strict logical proof. See Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6; Moreh Nevukhim I:2, III:27. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not differentiate between the position of Rambam and that of R. Saadia Gaon and other medieval Jewish philosophers. [9] Philosophers have proffered a number of theories regarding what the source of natural morality is. Many philosophers have theorized that natural morality consists of those obligations that can be derived from certain first principles that are assumed to be axiomatic, e.g., utilitarianism or Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, R. Saadia Gaon and other philosophers hold that the source of natural morality is not any philosophical system, but rather a moral intuition that is naturally found in the human mind. According to this conception, it is possible that there is natural morality but not natural law. In other words, we can inherently know the general principles that govern moral behavior, but not necessarily all the specific rules that constitute the application of moral principles to the real world. For the purposes of this shiur, however, we will not distinguish between the question of natural morality and that of natural law. [10] R. Saadia Gaon claims that even those parts of the Torah that deal with our ritual obligations towards God and could have not have been known via natural morality nonetheless fall under the obligations of natural morality. Morality dictates that we repay kindness with thanks and appreciation, and we are therefore morally bound to praise and serve God, because He created us. Natural morality, however, does not specify the particular ways in which we should express our appreciation to God. [11] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakhah?," reprinted in Leaves of Faith: The World of Jewish Living, vol. 2, pp. 33-56. [12] R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (Hungary, 1856-1924), Dor Revi'i, Petichah Kelalit, section 2, pp. 57-58. [13] It is well known that the two founding Roshei Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion, R. Aharon Lichtenstein and R. Yehuda Amital, disagreed regarding this theoretical scenario. R. Amital, quoting R. Glasner, was of the opinion that one must consume the non-kosher meat rather than the human flesh, and R. Lichtenstein ruled that one must consume the human flesh before eating non-kosher meat. This fits R. Lichtenstein's approach as explained above. If, in fact, the Torah does include all necessary moral principles, then if the Torah did not include a severe prohibition of cannibalism, we must conclude that the prohibition of cannibalism is not particularly severe compared to that of consuming non-kosher meat. [14] It we were to envision such a person, R. Glasner would explain his failing as a neglect of those moral principles not found in the Torah. Based on R. Lichtenstein, we would have to assume that a true follower of the Torah could never be an unethical person, and therefore such a character must not have learned Torah properly. The Eish Kodesh would suggest that there is nothing wrong with such a character at all. If he authentically follows a valid interpretation of the Torah then, by definition, he is moral. If our ethical intuition judges otherwise, then we would we be required to ignore it and follow the Torah morality instead. [15] R. Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook, Orot Ha-Kodesh, vol. 3, p. 27. [16] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 5. [17] Ibid., par. 2. [18] Vayikra Rabba 9:3. [19] R. Kook, Mussar Avikha, ch. 12, par. 3. In a later essay (By His Light, appendix to ch. 1, pp. 21-23), R. Lichtenstein echoes R. Kook's position and suggests that although the Torah supersedes natural morality on an operative level, morality serves as the basis for the Torah on an axiological level. He also uses the metaphor of a foundation and a building for the relationship between universal values and Torah. From zev at sero.name Fri Apr 12 13:30:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 16:30:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Gebrockts, matza, and butter In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <11889ec2-0932-74fe-a66a-c3a4e095e5cc@sero.name> The tradition of the Lubavitcher rebbes is that there is no problem brocking with mei peiros, *provided* one can be sure the mei peiros are pure, without a drop of water. E.g. one carefully dried a cup and then squeezed a fruit into it, or dried a bucket and milked a cow into it. The Rebbe Rashab would have what they called "shmura wine" made specially for him, i.e. care was taken that no water be mixed with the wine after fermentation, so that he could brock in it. (Water that gets into the grape juice before fermentation becomes wine, so it's not a problem.) Commercial milk is absolutely certain to contain water, so brocking with them would not be allowed. But commercial butter has all the water squeezed out, so I imagine it would be OK. Home-made butter made from commercial milk would not be OK, because it retains water. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From office at etzion.org.il Sun Apr 14 02:55:45 2019 From: office at etzion.org.il (Yeshivat Har Etzion) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:55:45 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 26: Natural Morality (2) Message-ID: <5CB303A1.8030701@etzion.org.il> PHILOSOPHY > Topics in Hashkafa > Shiur #26: Natural Morality Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-26-natural-morality-2 Shiur #26: Natural Morality (2) """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""" What is one to do in the face of a seeming clash between the demands of natural morality and the prescriptions of the Halakha? Perhaps the most famous example of such a clash is in the case of akeidat Yitzchak, in which God's commandment to Avraham contradicted the prohibition of murder, the most basic of all moral imperatives. While the primary test in this episode was the personal sacrifice of Avraham giving up his beloved son, the Sages were also sensitive to the moral conflict involved in this commandment, noting that an element of this test was Avraham's willingness to subordinate the moral norm to the divine command. The midrash tells us that Satan appeared to Avraham and attempted to dissuade him from fulfilling God's commandment. He first argued that it was unreasonable of Avraham to give up his beloved son whom he had waited for until the age of one hundred. When that tactic failed, he appealed to Avraham's moral conscience, warning him that tomorrow he would be accused of murder for killing his son: "And Yitzchak spoke to Avraham his father, and said: My father" (Bereishit 22:7) - Samael went to our father Avraham and said: "Old man, old man! Have you lost your mind [lit. have you lost your heart]? You are going to slay a son given to you at the age of a hundred!" "Even this I do," replied he... [Samael said:]"`Tomorrow He will say to you, `You are guilty of murder; you murdered your son!'" He replied: "Still I go." (Bereishit Rabba 56:4) Avraham passed the test through his willingness to engage in both personal and moral sacrifice for the sake of God. The Akeida as a Rejection of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" " """"""""" "" """"""" """"""""" Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz """" """""" """ """"""""" """"""""" As we noted in the previous shiur, according to the Eish Kodesh, the message of this story is clear. If God could command Avraham to kill his son, this proves that there is no independent moral prohibition of murder. If so, there cannot be any natural moral order, as the prohibition of murder is the most basic of all moral obligations. Similarly, another twentieth century Jewish philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, understands the lesson of the akeida as the conquest of our natural instincts in order to serve God. He includes in our natural instincts not only our psychological and physical desires, but our moral instincts, which are binding only from a secular perspective and have no significance in the worldview of the Torah. According to Leibowitz, the passage in the siddur introducing the story of the akeida, in which we pray to God to help us subdue our inclination in order to serve Him, includes the subduing not only of our inclination towards evil and selfishness, but the subduing of our moral inclination as well.[1] We argued in the previous shiur, however, that the mainstream tradition of Jewish thought disagrees with the Eish Kodesh and holds that there exists a natural moral order that is binding even in the absence of divine revelation. If so, how are we to understand the commandment of akeidat Yitzchak? We could perhaps argue for a position very close to that of the Eish Kodesh: There exists a natural moral order, but God is not bound by that order, and His commandments do not necessarily conform to natural morality. When faced with a clash between natural morality and divine command, we are bidden to follow the example of our forefather Avraham and transgress the obligations of morality in order to fulfill the divine will. This position was made famous by the Danish protestant philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his book about the akeida.[2] He argues that there is no possible moral evaluation of Avraham's behavior other than as a transgression of morality. The greatness of Avraham, according to this understanding, is that he placed his loyalty to God above his commitment to morality and suspended the ethical obligation in order to follow the more authoritative obligation of serving God. According to the approaches we have mentioned, whether we grant the existence of natural morality or not, the message of the akeida is clear. Divine commandments are not meant to be in consonance with any system of morality; the task of a Jew is to overcome his moral feelings and submit instead to the divine command. The Akeida as an Affirmation of Natural Morality: """ """""" "" "" """"""""""" "" """"""" """"""""" R. Kook and R. Lichtenstein "" """" """ "" """""""""""" A strikingly different approach is taken by R. Kook in his commentary to the story of the akeida. While the Eish Kodesh focused on God's initial commandment as paradigmatic and viewed God's later command not to harm Yitzchak as an expression of divine grace that could just as easily not have occurred, R. Kook focuses instead on God's final command as definitional. He explains that when God commanded Avraham not to harm Yitzchak, His intention was to reveal the uncontested ethical truth that Avraham could never have been permitted to kill his son. R. Kook explains that neither the natural instinct of a father protecting his beloved son from harm, nor the natural moral prohibition against murder, lost any of their binding authority due to the commandment of the akeida. God prohibited Avraham from harming his son not as a divine fiat, but specifically because of the moral reprehensibility of such an act.[3] As we discussed in the previous shiur, R. Kook believes that natural morality and Halakha form one continuum, in which morality serves as the basis for spiritual growth, and Halakha expands, deepens, and sharpens the moral order. R. Kook understands that this is precisely the moral message of the akeida, which is meant to teach us that God's will is always in consonance with morality and that He would never command or desire that we act in an immoral fashion. This raises the question, of course, of how R. Kook understands God's initial commandment to Avraham to slaughter his son. If God's commandments are always in consonance with natural morality, how could He have commanded Avraham to commit murder, even if He later revoked that commandment? Perhaps we can explain this based on the midrash that describes a conversation between God and Avraham in the wake of the akeida: R. Acha said: Avraham began to wonder: "These words are only words of wonder. Yesterday, you told me: `Because in Yitzchak will your seed be called' (Bereishit 21:12). And [then] you went back and said, `Please take your son.' And now You say to me, `Do not send your hand to the youth.' It is a wonder!" The Holy One, blessed be He, said: "Avraham, `I will not profane My covenant and the utterances of My lips, I will not change' (Tehillim 89:35). When I said, `Please take your son,' I did not say, `slaughter him,' but rather, `and bring him up.' For the sake of love did I say [it] to you: I said to you, `Bring him up,' and you have fulfilled My words. And now, bring him down." This is [the meaning of] what is written, "it did not come up on My heart" (Yirmeyahu 19:5) - that is Yitzchak. (Bereishit Rabba 56:8) According to this midrash, God's commandment never contradicted the dictates of natural morality, but only seemed to do so. In accordance with all the information available to Avraham when he set out to the akeida, there was a clash between the divine command and natural morality, but in truth there was never a clash. Perhaps this can serve as a paradigm for all clashes between Halakha and natural morality. A Jew who is faced with such a clash is certainly being tested. According to R. Kook, however, one does not pass the test by discarding morality and committing oneself to worshiping a God who does not care about the moral order. Rather, God desires that in face of an apparent contradiction between morality and the divine will, we remain steadfast in our faith that He is ultimately just, and that there is some information of which we are not aware which can resolve the contradiction. We pass the test by continuing to believe in the morality of Halakha, although we do not yet have an explanation for how that morality is expressed in this particular instance. R. Lichtenstein, in his discussion of the akeida, explains the matter similarly. On the one hand, we must always give precedence to the divine command over our moral conclusions. On the other hand, however, we must remain steadfast in our belief that loyalty to the dictates of natural morality is an expression of, rather than a contradiction to, yirat Shamayim (fear of Heaven). The integration of moral goodness and obedience to Halakha, according to R. Lichtenstein, is a principle that can never be compromised, even if that requires that we admit, as did Avraham on his way to the akeida, that there are apparent contradictions whose resolutions we have not yet succeeded in finding. R. Lichtenstein draws a number of practical conclusions from this understanding. First, R. Lichtenstein concludes that it is not only legitimate, but necessary, that when faced with such a clash between morality and Halakha, we feel the weight of the contradiction and are troubled by our lack of understanding. R. Lichtenstein assumes that during the three-day journey to the akeida, Avraham wrestled and grappled, attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to find an answer to the burning question of "Can the Judge of the whole world do injustice?" This grappling, explains R. Lichtenstein, is not a religious flaw, but rather a religious accomplishment, so long as it is undertaken in the context of ultimate submission to the wisdom of the divine command. Second, R. Lichtenstein suggests that our moral intuition has a role in an interpretive capacity. When the halakhic directive is unclear, we must seek out an interpretation that accords with natural morality. Just as we would interpret one passage in the Shulchan Arukh in such a way that it would not contradict another halakhically authoritative passage, we must likewise interpret the halakhic texts in a way that they do not contradict the authoritative divine will expressed via natural morality. Nonetheless, ultimately, a Jew must be prepared to act like Avraham and submit to the divine will even when he cannot find any resolution to the conflict, neither by re-examining his moral conclusions nor by re-examining his interpretation of the divine command.[4] According to the midrash, the answer to his question was revealed to Avraham shortly after the akeida concluded. Not every Jew merits such revelation, however, and sometimes we may have to live with the conflict for years or decades. R. Lichtenstein admits that from an educational perspective, such an approach is much more difficult to sustain than the competing approach of the Eish Kodesh, who understands yirat Shamayim as a rejection of natural morality. It is always simpler to remain committed to one set of values and reject all others, rather than believing in the integration of values that do not always integrate effortlessly. It may be more challenging for our students to remain committed to Halakha if we challenge them to live with conflict rather than dismiss it. The easy path, though, is not necessarily the correct path. R. Lichtenstein concludes that if we want to imbue our students with loyalty to Halakha in the face of these challenging conflicts, we must teach them to love piety more rather than morality less. The solution is to deepen yirat Shamayim rather than to jettison morality. Summary """"""" We have seen two general approaches to understanding the story of the akeida, and more generally to understand clashes between Halakha and morality. The approach of the Eish Kodesh and Yeshayahu Leibowitz attributes philosophical significance only to God's initial commandment to sacrifice Yitzchak, learning from the akeida that we are bidden to deny the significance of natural morally and heed only the divine command. Even if one were to admit the binding obligation of natural morality, one could conclude from the akeida that although morality is authoritative in the absence of revelation, divine commandments are independent of and more authoritative than natural morality. We must sometimes transgress morality in order to fulfill the divine command. The second approach, exemplified by R. Kook, understands God's initial commandment as merely a test and attributes philosophical significance to God's second commandment forbidding Avraham from harming Yitzchak. According to this approach, we learn from the akeida that natural morality and Halakha are integrated and that ultimately there can be no contradiction between the natural and the prophetic revelations of divine will. Any apparent conflict between Halakha and morality is merely a test, as in the akeida. R. Lichtenstein explained that we pass the test by heeding the divine command, but while our loyalty to Halakha takes precedence over our understanding of reality, we are not meant to reject either our commitment to morality or our belief in the integration of morality and Halakha. We are meant to struggle, to wonder, to ask questions, to seek alternative explanations, and ultimately to have faith that someday we will find a resolution that vindicates our belief that loving piety more does not entail loving morality less. _______________________ FOOTNOTES """"""""" [1] Yeshayahu Liebowitz, "Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah," reprinted in Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish State (Harvard University Press, 1992). Some students of Liebowitz, however, understand that he acknowledges the binding obligation of natural morality but disassociates it from Halakha. In this case, his view would be similar to that of Kierkegaard, as opposed to the Eish Kodesh. [2] Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, chapter 3. [3] Rav Kook, Siddur Olat Re'iyah, pp. 92-93. [4] R. Aharon Lichtenstein, By His Light: Character and Values in the Service of God, chapter 6, part 4, pp. 122-124. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Apr 14 10:27:04 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 13:27:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? Message-ID: . I asked: > Where is the border of Mitzrayim? On exactly which day (hour? > minute?) did we "leave Mitzrayim"? On 16 Nisan, were we already > out of Mitzrayim, or were we still in the process of leaving? At least according to Ramban, the answer is very clearly: Yes, by the 16th we were already out. On Shemos 12:51, "B'etzem hayom hazeh", he writes that on Layl Shimurim, Paro gave us permission to leave, and that made us Bnei Chorin. But it was the next day that we went out "mikol g'vul mitzrayim" - from the entire border of Egypt. Until I saw this Ramban, I had wondered if the shore of the Yam Suf was still within the border of Mitzrayim, which would have made it very simple to understand why the day we crossed the Yam is part of Pesach. But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past the border of Mitzrayim. If there are any other de'os who either agree or disagree with Ramban on this, please let me know. Until then, I will need to understand (and explain at the Seder) why R' Yosi Haglili (and the calculations of the makos at the yam) and Dayenu aren't off-topic. After all, Yetzias Mitzrayim was over and done with, almost a week before Krias Yam Suf. For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved Avi, for example), so too must it include the epilogue. Pesach is not just a Zecher Liytzias Mitzrayim - it is about Zman Cherusenu, and we were not totally free until we reached the other side of the Yam Suf. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Sun Apr 14 09:57:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 12:57:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana Message-ID: A friend of mine, noticed that R Yehuda is sometime called Shinnana, and that got him thinking. I'm very impressed with this idea, and wondering what others think about it, and/or if you've ever heard of this idea before: ============ It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because Yehuda?s arguments were so incisive (think incisors). See Eruvim 54a below but it literally shows up in about a dozen other places. https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.54a?lang=bi This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the ?blunt the teeth? command to the rasha [in the hagada]. Perhaps it is not dental surgery but rather a command to take extra care to counter his thinking - to blunt his incisive points and arguments - lest it infect others at the table. ============ Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:34:49 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:34:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's thought: : It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it : also is translated as wise or keen scholar. Apparently that is because : Yehuda's arguments were so incisive (think incisors). : This got me thinking. If teeth is a metaphor for sharp thinking (or perhaps : persuasive thinking) then this gives a new meaning for the "blunt the : teeth" command to the rasha [in the hagada]... Much better known source your friend could have used, "veshinantam levanekha". I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew being encouraged not to think so much? In WYT, I repeat a thought from R Cary Friedman (I might have used his halachic name)... In rabbinic idiom, shein is a kind of nezeq; it's where A's animal damages B's property in the pursuit of its own desires. Like eating B's grain. So to them, "shein" is about how the side effect eaching can overshadow the desire for food. This son is cynical about the idea of finding holiness in eating a bite of schwarma. (Think about it -- spit roasted lamb, seasoned with spicy lettus atop a hastily made flatbread.) "Mah ha'avodah hazos lakhem -- how is this worship for you?" So he doesn't get why Hashem gave him teeth. That along the way in satisfying your stomach, you can accomplish other things. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 02:45:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 05:45:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] KeBeitzah Message-ID: <20190415094501.GA11908@aishdas.org> H/T RYGB https://rygb.blogspot.com/2019/04/historical-evidence-for-r-chaim-noeh.html RYGB holds this up as proof that RCN's shiurim are iqar hadin. I think they're still a shade too large, actually. And then we have the dessicated olives from Masadah, which say the same thing about the kezayis of chazal's day being the same as today's olives. -micha >From JPost https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/First-Temple-era-eggshells-offer-crack-at-historical-eating-habits-586827 First Temple-era eggshells offer crack at historical eating habits - Israel News - Jerusalem Post An eggy history mystery has been put back together again in the City of David, just in time for the Seder. BY HAGAY HACOHEN APRIL 14, 2019 17:53 Eggshells from the First Temple period were found during archaeological excavations in the City of David in Jerusalem, and were recently put back together again by Prof. Zohar Amar from Bar-Ilan University. ... Using an algorithm developed by the Israel Antiquities Authority's Dr. Avshalom Karasik to rebuild pottery vessels, Amar found that the egg fragments enjoyed by the people of Israel during the First Temple period showed that eggs then were the same size as the eggs we enjoy today on the Seder table, where hard-boiled eggs are a traditional food. ... From zev at sero.name Mon Apr 15 06:28:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 09:28:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <301fb4e2-5ba6-640c-a87e-049a2898fbb6@sero.name> On 14/4/19 1:27 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But at least according to this Ramban, the Yam Suf is almost a week past > the border of Mitzrayim. No. After leaving Mitzrayim and going into the desert beyond, they turned around and came back to Baal Tzefon, which I have the impression marked the border. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 09:33:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:33:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a friend's : thought: :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it ... : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew : being encouraged not to think so much? ... Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now available at https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes (consider these teasers): The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: ... The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. Previously Suggested Explanations The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby ... Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken his teeth with your words."[14] Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... Psalms 35:16... Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - veshinantam. Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." One of the clearest statements of individual accountability is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that there is no intergenerational accountability. It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to the rasha from the Passover Haggada! The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, some of that merit would transfer to him. The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is no transfer of merit. The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from the community. In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to their questions in an appropriate manner. The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is up to him to rescue himself. The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. _______________________ [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba (1:12). [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, R. Reuven Halpern. [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of God's magnificent world. [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children." [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher does not encourage him. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 15 10:21:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 13:21:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations, a teshuvah by Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190415172104.GA20644@aishdas.org> The RCA is asking people to share this teshuvah by R Asher Weiss. R Gil Student posted a translation by R Elli Fischer that was reviewed and approved by RAW. See https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/04/is-it-permissible-to-refrain-from-vaccinating-children/ Many poskim and communal leaders have asked me whether parents are obligated to inoculate their children by means of generally accepted vaccines in order to prevent terrible diseases, because some important rabbanim recently expressed the following opinion: Since there is concern that vaccination damages health, not only is it permissible not to vaccinate children, but it is even recommended not to vaccinate them. In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. ... However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. ... 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163)... This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Apr 16 14:12:40 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 17:12:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:14:29 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:14:29 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Anonymous Donation Message-ID: From R' Aviner Anonymous Donation Q: I want to donate books to my Shul in memory of a loved one. Am I obligated to write in the book the name of the person for whom it is donated? A: No. Hashem knows. Me: Interesting use of the word obligation-how would you understand it?. Perhaps another question would be are you obligated to put your name in the book? As I understand it, it may be that the synagogue has rights to switching if you don't. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 06:16:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:16:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Smoking Drugs Message-ID: From R' Aviner Smoking Drugs Q: I am a teacher. Should I tell my students that before I became a Baal Teshuvah, I smoked drugs and now - Baruch Hashem - I am far from that place? A: No, lest they say: We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah. Me: Another classic type 1/type 2 error case where when asked to make a decision do we do it based on the good of the whole or of the individual? How many people will say "We can smoke drugs now and then do Teshuvah" versus how many people who might have left will realize that there is hope for them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:35:27 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:35:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shinana In-Reply-To: <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> References: <20190415093449.GA21280@aishdas.org> <20190415163307.GD27645@aishdas.org> Message-ID: An alternative thought, based on the same passuk as quoted by RAZZ and that perhaps has some overlap. The root QHH appears to have a broad spectrum of meanings, but one of them, found in the gemara in Arvei Pesachim by the Charoses, is tart or sour (used to explain why we add tapuchim to the charoses). The Jews of Yirmiyah?s time complained that because the fathers ate sour immature grapes, why should the sons wince from the acidic tinge, while Yirmiyahu responded that the sourness comes from what they themselves ate. At the leil seder, we respond to the Ben Chacham, who comes with an expansive appetite for everything in front of him, with a sumptuous feast of Torah, concluding with the final warning that no matter how much he consumes, the ikkar is what he takes away with him ? the ta?am Pesach must remain in his mouth, and this is more important that how much he is actually able to eat. The Ben Rasha, on the other hand, is unimpressed. He waves away everything offered as being a chore, and a chore for someone else. He has no savor for the delicious meal in front of him, so we are instead commanded ?Hak?heh es shinav? ? give him a little bit of a sour taste. Demonstrate to him the imperative of what we?re doing here tonight as descendants of the yotz?ei mitzra?im and how it impacts our avodah during the entire year. The avodah may not be pleasant ? kol has?chalos kashos ? but the masa is placed upon us all. We are confident that if he takes the first bite, even merely to remove the bad taste in his mouth, he will be motivated to eat more. How we are to do this is a question of pedagogy, but the goal is clear. This addresses the question presented by the attitude of some that our goal in blunting the edge of his words is to serve as a warning to or to protect others ? however, Echad Chacham v?Echad Rasha! Each son presents us with the same goal and is equally a son. The Rasha is not merely an obstacle to be neutralized to protect the other three sons but rather his own unique person with experiences that may be different than those of the Chacham and Tam but that has no less potential. This also answers the question of why the ba?al Haggadah uses the third person perspective toward the Rasha. Better to say ?Li v?lo lecha ? ilu hayisa sham, lo hayisa nig?al? ? rather than throwing the passuk at him before moving on to the next son and expecting him to draw the diyyuk himself as stated by an unseen narrator of the unfolding of the seder. As stated before, it is also problematic to say that we?re speaking to the other three sons as a means of blocking the Rasha out ? how is that chinuch? Instead, we?re talking to ourselves. We do say to him ?Baavur zeh asah Hashem li?, because that?s where the whole story starts! But, as we continue talking to the wayward child in front of us, who just doesn?t get it, we should realize, ?Li v?lo lo? ? unfortunately, this son has not yet chosen to be a participant in the work of Klal Yisroel. ?Ilu haya sham, lo haya nig?al? ? If he were there, he would have been completely destroyed. And, therefore, we have the imperative to do whatever we can to guide him back to the road, not by unadulterated sweetness and changing the goalposts but by straight honesty (with tact and love) and a recognition of the compelling obligation placed upon us. The Ben Rasha is not the Chacham, not the Tam, and not even the Eino Yodei?a Lish?ol. However, our responsibility towards him is no less than that towards the others. We *must* teach him and bring him within the fold. We must speak to him in words that he will accept. Success is within the realm of God, but this realization must guide our avodah towards him. On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 12:35 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 05:34:49AM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: > : On Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 12:57:52PM -0400, Sholom Simon forwarded a > friend's > : thought: > :: It is the nick name given to R Yehuda because he had big teeth. But it > ... > : I would think it's definitely sharp thinking. When you go from sharp > : to persuaive, the metaphor of teeth fails. But who ever heard of a Jew > : being encouraged not to think so much? > ... > > Offlist, R A Zivotovsky mentioned his article in Alei Etzion #18, now > available at > > https://www.etzion.org.il/en/personal-accountability-and-blunting-teeth-rasha > > Before his own proposed explanation of haqhei es shinav, RAZZ writes > (consider these teasers): > > The most perplexing part of the Haggada's formulation, and the focus > of this essay, involves the rasha, whose question is deemed to be > outright heresy and who is met with a bafflingly severe response: > ... > The anomalies in the answer are also troubling from a stylistic > viewpoint. Whereas the other three children each receive a > straightforward verbal response, the rasha is treated to two > additional components. The Haggada's response to the rasha includes > the instruction "hakheh et shinav" - do something to his teeth - > and it additionally provides a stinging reprimand for his impudence... > > In the remainder of this essay, we will first survey some of the > standard answers offered to these questions, and we will then propose > a novel explanation of the Haggada's message. > > Previously Suggested Explanations > > The Haggada Sheleima translates "hakheh" as "anger him," and thereby > ... > > Others similarly explain that "hakheh" is not active, but ... > When we inform the rasha that he will have to watch everyone else > eat the succulent, aromatic Passover sacrifice, while he will not be > permitted to partake, his teeth will "stand on edge."[13] The Ramban > (Bereishit 49:10) similarly explains that the meaning is "to weaken > his teeth with your words."[14] > > Most explanations translate "hakheh" as to "blunt" or "dull" his teeth, > and various explanations have been offered to clarify the intent > here. R. Ovadia Yosef in his Haggada offers a creative and beautiful > explanation that views this phrase as an analogy to the rasha.[15] > The rasha is bothered by all of the ritual activities performed at > the seder, which he labels as avoda (work). It seems that he would > rather meditate and think about the Exodus than do... > > Interestingly, there is Biblical precedent for "bashing the teeth" > of the wicked, although the word "hakheh" is not used in these > sources. One example is Psalm 58... Psalm 112 ... Psalm 37 ... > Psalms 35:16... > > Before moving on to his proposal, let me add another, rather creative > one. (Meaning, nice thought, but I doubt it reflects original intent.) > /KHH/ is a shoresh chazal use when speaking of a pregnant woman feeling > weak from cravings. (Eg Y-mi Sheviis, bottom of vilna 12a.) So, this > suggestion, "make him crave his learning" -- going back to shein - > veshinantam. > > Anyway, now on to RAZZ's proposal: > > All of the above explanations ring true, but it is unlikely that > they reflect the original intent of the compiler of the Haggada. > There is much more hidden within the unusual word "hakheh" that is > used to describe blunting the teeth. Indeed, the entire response to > the rasha presents an integrated message about Judaism's system of > reward and punishment. The anonymous compiler of the Haggada cleverly > inserted this message, assuming a knowledgeable readership that would > recognize it via particular words and phrases that would serve as > hints or "hyper-links" to broader concepts.[18] > > The word "hakheh" is extremely rare in Biblical and liturgical > literature. It is not the common word [hakeh], which means "hit," > but is rather [haqheh], from the root H.Q.H. It appears in only three > places in the Bible, Yirmiyahu 31:28-30, Yechezkel 18:2, and Kohelet > 10:10, and all three citations are relevant to the Haggada's usage. > > The verse in Kohelet notes that if one desires to chop wood with an > ax that has a dull blade, he will have to apply additional muscle > in order to accomplish his goal: "Im kaha ([qahah]) ha-barzel." From > this verse, we can deduce an unequivocal definition; in the context > of an ax, "kaha" clearly means "blunt." > > Indeed, Metzudot Tzion uses the meaning of ka'ha in Kohelet to derive > its meaning in the less clear context of Yirmiyahu 31:28, where the > word describes teeth. He explains that this refers to the "weakening > of the teeth's ability to cut food, just like the iron [of the ax] > is weakened in its ability to cut wood," i.e., a blunting of the teeth. > > The contexts of the word's appearance in Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel > both address the culpability of one generation for the sins of > another, an issue that appears to have conflicting sources in the > Torah. Devarim 24:16 states, "Fathers shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] children and the children shall not be put to death for the > [sins of] fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." > This seems to clearly dissociate the actions of one generation from the > responsibility of another, be it previous or subsequent. A seemingly > contradictory statement is found in both versions of the Ten > Commandments (Shemot 20:5; Devarim 5:9) and in the Thirteen Attributes > with which Moshe pleaded with God to forgive the Jews after their sin > with the Golden Calf (Shemot 34:7) and after the sin of the spies > (Devarim 14:17-18). For example, Shemot 20:5 describes God as "visiting > the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the third and > upon the fourth generation of those that hate Me." While the first > source appears to state that Divine punishment does not cross > generational lines, the others imply that it does. Many resolutions to > this apparent contradiction have been suggested.[19] > > This same apparent contradiction is found in Nakh as well. > Yirmiyahu 32:18 presents an example of intergenerational merit and > culpability along with the associated reward and punishment: "And who > recompenses the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their > children after them."[20] Additionally, Yirmiyahu 36:31 states: > "And I will visit their iniquity upon him and his seed and his > servants." However, the contrary notion of personal responsibility, as > expressed in Deuteronomy 24:16, is also found in the prophets. > Yechezkel expresses it in a number of places, most prominently in > chapter 18, where he states: "(v.17)... he shall not die for the > iniquity of his father... (v.20) the son shall not bear the iniquity of > the father... neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son ... > (v.26) for his iniquity that he has done shall he die." > > One of the clearest statements of individual accountability > is a proverb found in almost identical form in Yirmiyahu 31:28-29 > and Yechezkel 18:2-4, and it is in that context that the uncommon > word "hakheh" appears. Yirmiyahu states: "In those days, they shall > say no more: `The fathers have eaten unripe (sour) grapes,[21] > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena).' But everyone > shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eats the sour grapes, > his teeth shall be set on edge (tik'hena)." In Yechezkel, the proverb > is formulated as a question: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, > and the children's teeth are set on edge (tik'hena)?" Thus, in the > Bible, this unusual word appears as part of a parable to teach that > there is no intergenerational accountability. > > It seems that the word "hakheh" in the response to the rasha is > designed to recall for the reader the verses and parables from > Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel. Seeing that unusual word is supposed to be > like a hyperlink that reflexively brings to mind the rare Biblical > occurrences of its use and its meaning in that context. Certainly for > Rashi, this association is self-evident. In Ta'anit 7b (s.v. kaha > ha-barzel), Rashi explains the word "kaha" in the verse in Kohelet > by citing the verse from Yirmiyahu 31 and by quoting the response to > the rasha from the Passover Haggada! > > The message of the parables is clear - there is no cross-generational > reward or punishment. Merit and culpability are individually accrued > and do not get passed down from previous generations, nor is the next > generation burdened or rewarded with them: "Every man that eats the > sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge." That is the message > transmitted to the rasha in the Haggada. > > As noted above, the passage about the four sons in the Haggada is > taken from the Mekhilta. This is the only occurrence of the root > Q.H.H. in the Mekhilta and, indeed, it is rare in all of Rabbinic > literature. The root sometimes refers to its plain meaning of "blunted" > or "bitter." However, it seems that it is more often summoned from > obscurity by the rabbis to link the reader to the Biblical parables > and hint at an intergenerational context, or, more precisely, an > unsuccessful transfer from one generation to another. > > In Avot 4:2, R. Yossi bar Yehuda compares the disadvantages of > learning from a young person to eating unripe grapes ("anavim keihot") > and drinking freshly squeezed wine from the winepress. There are > many other ways to say unripe grapes that are used throughout the > Mishna, but the word of choice here is "keha," in the context of an > unsuccessful intergenerational transfer. > > In Sota 48b-49a, the Gemara analyzes Zekharia 4:10 and suggests that > the verse refers to the young children of the wicked who died for the > sins of their fathers. The bereavement over their deaths would spare > the wicked fathers additional punishment in the World to Come. The > children petition God that if His intent was to exact punishment from > the wicked in the future, why did He "blunt their teeth" ("hek'heita > shineihem")? Here, children being killed for the sins of their fathers, > i.e., intergenerational transfer of guilt, is termed "blunting teeth." > > Later on the same page, the Gemara relates that R. Huna found a > special type of date, which he proudly gave to his son Rabba after > he had established the latter's spiritual purity. Rabba's son Abba > soon arrived, and Rabba gave the date to him without ascertaining > his spiritual level. To this show of generosity, R. Huna responded > that Rabba had blunted his teeth ("hikeita et shinai"), indicating an > attempt at intergenerational transfer of merit. Generally, however, > there is no intergenerational transfer of guilt or merit. > > The Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b engages in exegetical analysis of Korach's > name, as the Torah refers to him as Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehat. As > he was a descendent of Kehat,[22] the Gemara explains that his > name characterizes him as a son who set the teeth of his ancestors on > edge by embarrassing them through his actions. Again, the word is not > merely used as an expression of upset or disappointment, but rather > in the context of a perceived intergenerational relationship.[23] > > The Ramban suggests that this same root is actually found in several > other Biblical verses. Commenting on Bereishit 49:10, "ve-lo yik'hat > amim," the Ramban understands the word "yik'hat" differently than > Rashi, connecting it to Yirmiyahu 31:29,where it means weakness or > breaking. The Ramban explains the verse to mean that the scepter > of kingship will not leave Yehuda until his son (i.e., the messiah) > comes and defeats the nations. This understanding of "yik'hat" adds > a multi-generational component that is not explicit in the verse. > The Ramban does not explicitly explain the appearance of the root > ?.?.?. in Mishlei 30:17, "tavus lik'hat eim," but he alludes to the > same explanation as Menachem ben Saruk (s.v. kuf heh), writing that > the phrase means something like "He scorns the mother when she is > weakened," i.e., in her old age. In this case, the verse itself uses > the word "keheh" to describe an intergenerational process. > > What is the significance of this association between the word "keheh" > and intergenerational relationships in the Haggada? Possibly this: > The rasha excludes himself from all of the Passover rituals, yet he > is seemingly not concerned about his fate. Surely, he thinks, if all > of the ritual that he rejects is truly required, he has no cause for > worry. After all, the people around him are his family, and they are > all engaged in performing God's commandments. In his way of thinking, > some of that merit would transfer to him. > > The compiler of the Haggada therefore instructs, "Blunt his teeth!" In > other words, remind him of the "sour grape" verses. Remind him of the > message of those parables. Neither guilt nor merit crosses generational > lines. The code-word "hakheh" reminds him (and us) of the Biblical > parables that teach that there is no intergenerational transfer. > > Based on this, the logical conclusion is exactly what the compiler > of the Haggada writes next. If the rasha were in Egypt and had not > behaved properly, he would not have been redeemed. The merit of his > family would not have helped. The universal message is that there is > no transfer of merit. > > The prophets in the books of Yirmiyahu and Yechezkel stressed personal > accountability. Each person is responsible for his own deeds and is > capable of teshuva. The burden of one's sins and the suffering that > one might endure as a result of them cannot be attributed to previous > generations. Neither can one sin in the anticipation that the burden > of guilt will be borne by subsequent generations or that he will get a > free ride on the backs of meritorious previous generations. Jews cannot > rest on the laurels of righteous ancestors; rather, each generation > must establish its own merits and legacy. This is the meaning of the > keyword "hakheh" and the Biblical parallels associated with it. > > It might be suggested that there is one exception to the rule > of individual accountability - the concept of community zekhut, > merit. That is why, for example, tefilla be-tzibbur is so important. > Someone who falters can continue to be supported by the community > that surrounds him. This is why we stress to the rasha that this > merit will be of no avail to him, because he has removed himself from > the community. > > In 1985, I was fortunate to spend the Passover seders in > Odessa, Ukraine at the home of some real Jewish heroes, the > Nepomnaschys. Yehudit, a courageous young woman whose father and > fiance were both rotting in Soviet prisons, explained to me and > Baruch Sterman, my traveling partner, what was an important concept > for these returning Jews of the Soviet Union. Although they were > now practicing Jews, many of their close friends and relatives > were not. She emphatically stated that in Judaism, almost no one is > beyond the pale of hope. At the seder, one of the sons is labeled a > rasha, an evil son, which is not a trivial designation. And yet he > is given a seat at the table and even dignified with an answer to > his insolence! We invite all "children" to the table and respond to > their questions in an appropriate manner. > > The new understanding of the blunting of the rasha's teeth makes > Yehudit's insight even more meaningful. We answer the rasha in a > seemingly harsh manner. However, in reality, it is a subtle yet > powerful reminder of his personal responsibility. This individual > accountability has the potential to doom him, as he is explicitly > told, but it can just as readily rescue him, because he is judged on > his actions alone. We tell him that he is not beyond hope, but it is > up to him to rescue himself. > > The message to the rasha is a powerful message to us as well - each > person is given free choice and sinks or swims on his own merit. > > > _______________________ > > > [13] For support for this theory, see the Be'er Miriam commentary in > the Haggada of R. Reuven Margoliot. This also may be what the 18^th > century Moroccan paytan R. David ben Chasin (1727-1792) had in mind > when he wrote, "It is the Pesach, and the teeth of the resha'im will > be blunted when they do not have a portion in it." > > [14] The Ramban cites a similar explanation from Shir Ha-Shirim Rabba > (1:12). > > [15] I originally heard this idea many years ago from my good friend, > R. Reuven Halpern. > > [16] See Sefer Ha-Chinukh, mitzva 16 (the prohibition to break bones of > the korban Pesach), where he first presents his important principle of > "adam nifal kefi pe'ulatav" - people behave based on their actions. In > other words, a person develops a certain personality and attitude based > on the activities that he engages in. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh reiterates > this fundamental tenet again in mitzva 40 (not to cut the stones for > the altar with metal), mitzva 95 (to build the Beit Hamikdash, albeit > with a slight change in the phrase), mitzva 99 (the special garments > for the priests), mitzva 263 (the obligation for a Kohen to become > tamei for relatives), mitzva 266 (a korban must be unblemished), > mitzva 270 (korban musaf on Pesach), and mitzva 285 (lulav). In > mitzva 264, he suggests that observing the rules of mourning leads > to the emotion of tza'ar, pain, once again invoking the principle > of adam nifal kefi pe'ulotav. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh emphasizes the > idea that humans require physical activities via other principles as > well. For example, in mitzva 265 (the Kohen Gadol must marry a betula, > virgin), he writes, "acharei ha-machshavot yimshakh ma'aseh ha-gufot," > and in mitzva 275 (prohibition of a Kohen with a blemish performing > the avoda), he explains that a person is influenced by external > actions, "lefi she-rov pe'ulot bnei adam retzuyot el lev ro'eihem > lefi chashivut oseihen." This idea, which is beyond the scope of > our present discussion, is central to the Torah view of mitzvot. > Rather than actions that express existing emotions, mitzvot are > intended to instill within us proper ideas. Thus, for example, Chazal > instituted the recitation of Asher Yatzar not because every time one > says it, he feels inspired to acknowledge the wonders of the creation, > but rather because that is an opportune moment in which to remind the > person who has just relieved himself that he should now be aware of > God's magnificent world. > > [17] Note that the root used here, ?.?.?., is relatively rare, > appearing in only 5 places in Tanakh: 3 times in the psalms cited here, > in Iyov 16:9, and in Eikha 2:16. > > [18] It is unclear whether the Haggada's author expected a similar > familiarity with Rabbinic literature. For example, is a phrase such as > "kol dikhfin" meant to trigger an association with a similar phrase > found in the last line on Ta'anit 20b? There, one of the praises of R. > Huna is that when he would sit down to eat, he would open his door > and declare, "whoever is in need, let him come and eat." Regardless, > it is fairly certain that the Haggada assumes familiarity with Tanakh. > > [19] For a survey, see Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky, "Inter-Generational > Accountability in the Torah Judicial System," Young Israel of Cleveland > Torah Journal, vol. 2 (May 1995). > > [20] This verse is a paraphrase (with some important variations) of > Exodus 20:6: "Who shows mercy to the thousands and pays the iniquity > of the fathers into the bosom of their children." > > [21] See Rashi, Sanhedrin 39a. > > [22] The Torah Temima (Bemidbar 16:1, note 2) similarly notes that > the verse that states that Korach was ben Kehat, the son of Kehat, > means that with his actions he blunted the teeth of his parents. > > Note that in later generations, the word may have lost its Biblical > and Talmudic meaning. Hence, the Shela posits that the names of Levi's > three sons are intended to show the empathy that the Levites felt > for their oppressed brethren. Gershon indicated that they felt like > strangers, Merari that their lives were embittered, and Kehat that > their teeth were blunted (kehot) by the misery of the exile. (Cited > in Torah Lodaas, vol. 4, p. 156, commenting on Shemos 6:14-16.) > > [23] The Gemara (Ta'anit 7b) analyzes Kohelet 10:10, where the > word "keheh" appears, but none of the suggested exegeses relate to > intergenerational issues. Rather, it explains that the verse is either > ascribing lack of rain to a degenerate generation, as describing > a student who struggles because he has not organized his studies, > or as referring to a student having difficulty because his teacher > does not encourage him. > > Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes > micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - > http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a > Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at mail.gmail.com Wed Apr 17 09:32:16 2019 From: jmeisner at mail.gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 12:32:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 1:07 AM Rich, Joel wrote: > Siman 231 in S"A O"C is one sif long ("buried" between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I'll just mention two points 1.) His "psak" (and I assume > it's psak since it's included in S"A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I'm not sure all agree on this conclusion In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism. Which, of course, only changes the goal posts of the original question. [This discussion can be found on the 2nd page (pg #46) of the PDF at http://www.aishdas.org/asp/ShaareiYosher.pdf#page=2 That PDF is the haqdamah with translation in the form of ch 1 of "Widen Your Tent" . My own discussion of this section of the haqdamah, and what it means about qedushah and perishus, is the first half of ch. 3, some 25 pages or so. [And now back from overstepping my bounds. -micha] > (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range where each of us > must figure out for ourselves?) Both. The gemara provides a set of values in the aggadeta, but unlike in the halacha where we can state that everyone (with a few global exceptions) must eat a kezayis of matzah, the avodah of the other 7 days, 23 hours, and 57 minutes of Pesach is much more open-ended. Some people may eat a kortov of these values and others may eat a kor, but the sugya cannot simply be waved away without personal introspection. > 2.) The general rule of evaluating each action based on a goal of service > to HKB"H seems right on to me but I also perceive that people who actually > do this or articulate it as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, > at least in the MO community. Thoughts? Everything looks odd when you attempt to break it down into pieces, zoom in on them, and try to give them names. L'havdil, you can open up a grammar book if you want to learn how to speak perfect English, but trying to apply the rules on the fly will probably make you look odd unless you have a sufficient (native?) fluency in the language that enables you to apply them naturally. The way that a speech therapist helps correct a speech impediment or how a physical therapist teaches someone to walk again is also bizarre compared to the way that a regular person engages in these daily activities. The children of a number of gedolim, whom we would generally use as a rough model for applying these values, have commented that the greatest characteristic of their father's house was its normalcy. Getting there, though, may require a phase of oddness. Chag kasher v'samei'ach, Josh From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:08:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:08:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant arm? https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah Tir'u baTov! -Micha Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita For the Zechut of R' Zion Hilu Pesach- hesebah Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: The Jewish Calendar, [Kelali] Question: Likvod Harav Shlit"a, Seeing as we know that the understanding of some Rishonim that eating while leaning on the right is dangerous was based on a mistaken understanding of the location of the windpipe and foodpipe (kaneh and veshet), and we are therefore forced to explain that the sakanah was only said in regard to one lying on his back (as per Rashi Pesachim 108, and contra Rashbam) should a "lefty" lean to his right (the more natural position)? Answer: No, even a lefty should lean on his left side. The Mishna Brura brings an opinion [472 Shaar Hatziyon 13] that even a lefty who leans on his right may not fulfill his obligation, even bdieved. When Chazal rendered a halachic ruling they were intended to do so with their understanding of nature, biology and the physical world. Their rulings then become part of Torah Shbal Peh. This was the intent of Hashem when giving over the ability to make halachic rulings to Chazal. This was never intended to line up with scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge by its very nature is dynamic, constantly changing with new discoveries and advances. Torah is the ultimate unchanging mesorah, so once Chazal established the halcha it doesn't change based on scientific knowledge which is a totally different wisdom and set of rules. This principal idea is the key to understanding the general question of Torah and Science. A an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory, well based and logical as it is. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 17 14:14:43 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:14:43 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190417211443.GA10016@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 05:12:40PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are : there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started : at night")? Balebatishe answer: It works better that way. A meal, song, telling stories, trying to relive an experience. The seder is at night for the same reason why people make bonfires at night, or a kumzitz, a tish, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha From JRich at sibson.com Wed Apr 17 15:11:20 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 22:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> References: <20190417210854.GA8014@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? Can't you > cut us lefties some slack and free up our dominant It certainly is an interesting approach. I love the line of attack maybe that heseiba Itself is vestigial in nature Since it reflects a practice of a society long gone. This argument has been bad for doing away with it all together but has never been accepted I know that the Shulchan Aruch in oc 192 uses the language of msubin when speaking of a group that has to do zimun. I'm pretty sure we don't require actual leaning today for that purpose. Kt Joel rich From zev at sero.name Thu Apr 18 11:42:30 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:42:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Showering during shloshim (was: Showering during shiva) In-Reply-To: <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> References: <724c4e99-7c57-2b29-8c42-8e5c5c06c065@sero.name <8EA9CE2D-0340-459D-86F6-3ED813D0EA03@biu.ac.il> Message-ID: On 7/4/19 3:35 am, Ari Kahn via Avodah cited his own articlehttps://arikahn.blogspot.com/2012/07/is-it-permissible-to-shower-during-nine.html as follows: >> But in present times our custom is to prohibit bathing for the entire >> 30-day period [known as shloshim]? > > Rav Moshe Soloveitchik argued that [...] this (presently unknown) > custom regarding personal mourning.[...] the now-defunct custom, > cited by the Rama as the Ashkenazi practice current in his time, of > refraining from bathing for the entire shloshim period. Once this > custom fell out of practice, Rav Moshe argued [...] Looking around in the seforim and online it seems that the custom is far from unknown. On the contrary, every reference I have so far found takes it for granted that this is very much still binding minhag ashkenaz. R Kahn's article is the only reference I have seen that claims it is no longer done. What is the source for this, and does the fact that so many references know nothing of this not mean that the metzius contradicts it? Or is this a case where the books say one thing and universal practice is the opposite? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Fri Apr 19 06:00:49 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 09:00:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] at shul this morning Message-ID: 1. The guy who davened from the amud was wondering if this is the shortest shacharis of the year: (a) no tachnun; (b) Friday is shortest shir ha'yom; (c) skipping mizmor l'soda. Thoughts? 2. The young rav making a siyyum on Chullin mentioned 139b where the gemara asks "Moshe, min hatorah minayin" and answers "inasmuch as he is [mere] flesh". He thought that that was a perfect (and timely) answer to "Moshe, why don't we find him in the haggadah" -- i.e., inasmuch as he is a mere person, we don't want to give credit to him so much for the geula from Mitzrayim as the haggadah would rather focus on H's beneficence. Nice "food" for thought this morning, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 05:29:58 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:29:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger cited Rav Asher Weiss at https://en.tvunah.org/2019/04/17/pesach-hesebah > ... This principal idea is the key to understanding the > general question of Torah and Science. > > ... As an aside, even from the scientific side of things, we > only accept proof after experimenting and proving, ie. the > scientific process. To the best of my knowledge no study or > survey was ever done to prove that leaning on the right is just > as safe as leaning on the left. While we don't see a reason for > there to be a difference, this would be our unproven theory ... This has always been my understanding of these things. Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. I am also unaware of any research into the many situations which Chazal say are harmful to one's memory. R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? We people nowadays do not see any connection between these causes and their supposed effects. So what did Chazal see, and how did they come to these conclusions? How often did a woman miscarry, and the circumstances led them to believe that the miscarriage was because she stepped on some fingernails? That boggles my mind. To my way of thinking, the time delay is so slow that any rational person would have to admit that the fingernails were only one of several possible causes. This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Apr 22 05:41:13 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 08:41:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... Another teshuvah by R' Asher Weiss. I'm sharing it for the metahalakhah > implications. Must heseibah be on the left even now that we know there > is no greater risk of choking by reclining on the right? > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 19:01:10 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 22:01:10 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: In Avodah V37n31, RSS asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha and/or "the geula started at night")? < On Mesorah recently, I mentioned: [[ note what RNW quoted *b'sheim haGRA* here (stanza "THE ANOMALY OF THE FEMALE FORCE") ]] By and large, "layla" portends problems. "[H]alayla hazeh" of *g'ulas Mitzrayim* (as well as the "layla hahu" that began the turn towards *qiymu v'qiblu*) was, by contrast, beneficial like *or*. We begin the mini-process of killer-Bs (*b'diqah*, *biyur*, and *bittul*) at night, but it is "or l'14", a night that qualitatively is day. *Yachol mib'od yom*? Nope, has to be at the time of "zeh", the *layla hazeh* that is like *or*. Quoting from "Parsha Potpourri" V14n29 by R'Ozer Alport: --- ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? (????) Near the beginning of the Maggid portion of the Haggadah, the youngest child present asks the Mah Nishtanah, a series of four questions that highlight atypical actions we do at the Seder that differ from our conduct on all other nights of the year. However, the Vilna Gaon points out that the expression ?? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? seems to be grammatically incorrect, for the word ???? is feminine ? as evidenced by its plural form ????? ? in which case the question should be worded .?? ????? ????? ???? The Vilna Gaon explains that the concept of night symbolizes difficulty and suffering. Accordingly, the word ???? should be feminine. However, in situations where the darkness is actually beneficial, it is transformed and becomes masculine. In this case, the Zohar HaKadosh (Vol. 2 38a) teaches that on the night of the Exodus from Egypt, a tremendous light shone that was as bright as day, and Dovid describes it as (Tehillim 139:12) ???? ???? ???? ? a night that shines like the day, with the verb ???? in the masculine. On this night, it only appeared to be dark, but in reality, it was a remarkably joyous time that was analogous to day. We allude to this by referring to the Seder night as ????? ??? , a ???? that is compared to ??? (day), a word which is masculine. However, the Torah Temimah vehemently disagrees with the Vilna Gaon?s explanation, for he maintains that the original question does not present any difficulty. He writes that although the word ???? appears to be feminine, it is an exception to the rules of grammar and is in fact masculine, as we find in the Megillah that when Achashverosh?s sleep was disturbed, it is described (Esther 6:1) as ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? , not ????? ???? , which would be the feminine construct. If so, why is ????? the plural of ???? , which seems to indicate that it is feminine? The Torah Temimah notes that there are other clearly masculine words that follow this pattern and are similarly exceptions in this regard, such as ???? (firstborn), which becomes ?????? in the plural, making it appear to be feminine even though it is in fact masculine, and so too is the case with ???? and .????? To resolve the dispute between these two great Rabbinical authorities, Rav Yisroel Reisman suggests that the Vilna Gaon?s logic regarding the night of the Exodus also applies to the night of Achashverosh?s interrupted sleep, which was also a positive seminal moment in the Megillah worthy of being likened to the masculine ??? . He adds that since Chazal teach us (Berachos 60b) that everything that Hashem does is ultimately for the good, every difficult episode in our lives that presents itself as dark ???? is actually a ??? full of light waiting to be discovered and revealed. --- Gut Moeid/Mo'adim l'Simcha! and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Apr 22 20:06:21 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 23:06:21 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > Most mitzvos are done by day. Most Pesach mitzvos are done at > night. Are there any deeper reasons for this (beyond halacha > and/or "the geula started at night")? We need to start by being more specific about which mitzvos we're discussing. I presume that you are talking about the Seder. IOW, the eating of the Korban Pesach when there *was* a Korban Pesach, and also the related mitzvos, such as matzah, haggada, and others. I hope we can agree that the zmanim of these "related mitzvos" are all tied to the eating of the Korban Pesach (as it is written, "Baavur Zeh"). Okay, now to answer your question. If these mitzvos would be assigned to the daytime, which day would you suggest that they be done on? Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days. In Mitzrayim we had not yet switched to the current system. Thus: The original Korban Pesach was shechted on the afternoon of the 14th and eaten on the night of the 14th; Makas Bechoros was even later on the night of the 14th, and we finally left in the daytime on the 15th. So, if the Seder would be in the daytime, which day? We can't have the Seder on the day of the 14th, because the re-enactment of eating the Korban Pesach would end up being done PRIOR to the anniversary of shechting it. We can't have the Seder in the daytime of the 15th either, because then we'd be doing it at a time when the original was already nosar. But the way Hashem told us to do it is a perfect re-enactment: We have our Seder during the nighttime that is between the day of the 14th and the day of the 15th, *exactly* as it originally occurred. Only in this manner can one "see himself as if he had left Mitzrayim personally." (According to my presentation above, it turns out that Makas Bechoros occurred at midnight on the 14th, and we re-enact it on the night of the 15th. I do concede this to be a weakness in my answer. However, we don't really re-enact Makas Bechoros at the Seder at all. We do *mention* Makas Bechoros at the Seder, but in the very same sentence we mention the other nine makos too, and those dates are even farther away. One could argue that if we commemorate Makas Bechoros at all, it is done not at the Seder itself, but by Taanis Bechorim on the 14th, the exactly correct day.) Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Apr 23 06:52:49 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 09:52:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] kesubah d'irkasa Message-ID: <012201d4f9db$d7270640$857512c0$@touchlogic.com> Does anyone have a printable kesubah d'irkasa that you can email me (or can be downloaded) Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 19:13:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 22:13:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425021323.GB4977@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:06:21PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* the days... Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". But in any case, I would point to another calendar in which the night follows the day -- avodas habayis. And so the zeman including the next night isn't really surprising. To my mind the question would be more why the zeman akhilah doesn't start until night, why is it /only/ the night after and not from after haqaravah including the following night. For that matter, since the Pesach has most of the dinim of shelamim, not eating it the next day is equally unique to the pesach. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Apr 24 20:49:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 23:49:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Pesach mitzvos at night Message-ID: . I wrote: > Keep in mind that prior to Matan Torah, nights came *after* > the days... R' Micha Berger countered: > Is that so? Rashbam aside, the prooftext for our days is from > Maaseh Bereishis and "vayhi erev vayhi voqer". I anyone wants more info about that pasuk and how Rashbam understood it, check out the archives, on the thread titled "night before day or after day". But that thread doesn't include any mention of Rav Moshe Sternbuch, who wrote at length on this in Moadim Uzmanim 5:315 > The truth is that prior to Matan Torah, the night was after > the day, and it was only after Matan Torah that the day begins > in the evening. (in the paragraph Amnam L'achar) For more information, you can check out the Moadim Uzmanim, or click on http://old.torah.org/advanced/haaros/behar97.htm Here's one piece of what you'll find there: > Rav Moshe Sternbuch (Moadim Uzmanim, part 5, #315) and Rav Yaakov > Kamenetsky (Emes L'yaakov Parshas Bo 12:2) show how this concept > fits perfectly into the verse: "Eat matzos on the fourteenth at > night." (Shmos [Exodus] 12:18). Pesach is the fifteenth of the > month -- why does the Torah here state the "fourteenth at night?" > Since they still had the laws of Bnei Noach (the Torah hadn't yet > been given), the night belonged to the previous day. The night of > Pesach actually occurred on the night of the fourteenth (that is, > the night following the fourteenth day). In later years it would > be seen as the night of the fifteenth, because the night would > precede the day. DISCLAIMER: I make no claims that this is absolute Truth for everyone. I apologize for giving that impression in my previous post. Rather, I recognize that not everyone holds this way. But for me, it is very reasonable, especially in light of the current question about the timing of the Seder. [And on a personal note, even from before I really learned Torah, this seemed to be the simplest meaning of the pasuk in Bereshis: "God made the light, and then it was evening, and then it was morning, and that defines one day." If the pasuk was intended to define a day as being a nighttime and the following daytime, then it would have used the words Layla and Yom; by choosing the words Erev and Boker, the Boker seems to demarcate the end of the day. In my opinion.] Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:58:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:58:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] lifestyle choices In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425015835.GA4977@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:32:16PM -0400, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : In the Hakdama to the Shaarei Yosher, R' Shimon Shkop notes the absurdity : of thinking that the command kedoshim tihyu/perushim tihyu ki kadosh Ani : means asceticism as a goal within itself. Would it even be coherent to : suggest that Hashem does not eat too much, does not sleep too much, etc.? : Instead, he redefines/redirects ascetism to altruism... I formulated it differently. RSS defines qedushah as commitment to a given goal. Li nir'eh this explains "harei at mequdeshes li" -- it's a statement of her exclusive commitment. Qedushah in the sense of holiness is leshitaso commitment to our purpose. In addition, RSS says that purpose is "vehalakhta bidrakhav", and thus, being meitiv others. This will mean that anything that distracts us from this purpose is to be avoided. The medrash's "qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu" is necessary for humans, since we have multiple desires and motives that can come into conflict. However, as the medrash continues "Qedushasi lemaalah miqedushaskhem" -- Hashem has One Plan, and He is fully committed to it without the possibility of distraction. But also, anything we enjoy in order to enable helping others, including *necessary* downtime, is also holy. :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From micha at aishdas.org Wed Apr 24 18:49:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:49:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190425014925.GA3571@aishdas.org> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 09:59:42PM -0400, Michael Poppers via Avodah wrote: : In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: :> remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < : What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? It's more like people don't notice what goes on that high. You can't count on someone seeing a menorah > 20 amos above the ground, or when you sit in your sukkah, pay attention to similarly high sekhakh. But here it's kind of different. Someone is executed; people are told to go look. The height is to maximize how many people see the execution's results first hand. Not for them to notice the body and thereby learn about the execution. Efshar? :-)||ii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 4th day micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others? From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Sun Apr 28 05:29:15 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2019 12:29:15 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: RAM gives two thoughtful possible analyses of how Chazal came to the conclusion that stepping on fingernails led to miscarriages. Let me add a third (perhaps not as thoughtful). That conclusion was a common thought of the people of Chazal?s time. Like, in generations past, when people would say if a pregnant woman was carrying high it was a boy and if low it was a girl (or vice versa; o forget). No one that i know of ever scientifically tested the ?theory? and now, of course, there are scientific ways to determine sex which have been tested and work. ISTM that not everything that Chazal said has to be, or should be, given the same weight. Joseph Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Mon Apr 29 14:00:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 17:00:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190429210026.GA1456@aishdas.org> On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:40:59PM +1100, Rabbi Meir G. Rabi via Avodah wrote: : at the start of Mishnah Yuma : why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes : Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof : : but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Nothing made the replacement KG officially the replacement. It was just smeone who prepared in case the understudy was needed. See Hilkhos Avodas Yom haKippurim 1:3, who pasqens accordingly (following R' Pappa on Yumo 12a-b). Very unlike what a marriage that might prove pointless would do to a person's life. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 9th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Gevurah: When is strict justice Fax: (270) 514-1507 most appropriate? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 10:26:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 13:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 11:15:37pm EDT, R Akiva Miller wrote: : (In this post, I presume that "Eretz Mitzrayim" and "Mitzrayim" are : synonymous. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.) Eretz Goshen is both in and not in Mitzrayim. I am not sure whether the issue is the word "eretz", but I think some ambiguity as to what the term refers to exists somewhere. I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. I would faster guess that Yetzias Mitzrayim refers to leaving Egyptian controlled territory, to the point where we escaped their control. Which would actually be a moving target -- before the army was dispatched and after Par'oh exerted his authority up to the Red Sea. And on Sun, Apr 14, 2019 at 01:27:04pm EDT, RAM's follow-up included: : For now, I plan to say that Maggid is *not* only about Yetzias Mitzrayim. : Just as proper understanding of a story includes its prologue (Arami Oved : Avi, for example)... Bitechilah ovedei AZ starts at Terach, even! Not even background to how and why we were in Mitzrayim to begin with. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From micha at aishdas.org Tue Apr 30 11:44:58 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 14:44:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190430184458.GC16694@aishdas.org> [Replies to RSSimon and RAMiller's emails included, discussing very different aspects of the topic.] On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:41:13AM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : His teshuva seems to fit a meta-halachic theory I've heard from a teacher : that many times Chazal knew the mesorah/law/torah she'bal'peh, but didn't : necessarily know the reason and they (to put it bluntly) guessed at the : reason. I've heard the kashrus status of bee honey described in that way : -- i.e., nobody disputed that bee honey was kosher, but they were incorrect : when they ascribed a scientific reason for it. The kashrus of bee honey is also derived from "*MI*kol sheretz ha'of" and "eretz zavas chalav udevash" (Bekhoros 7b). "Devash" in that 2nd pasuq probably means date nectar, as it does in the similar berakhah about EY's 7 minim. But if any kind of devash weren't kosher, the word wouldn't be used in a berakhah without a disambiguating qualifier. (Or, as the gemara says, unless the non-kosher devash was always named with a modifier, like wasp honey.) : How might that apply to other situations? (Killing lice on shabbos?). It : is a general meta-halachic rule? If not, when is it applied and when not? : Or is this a post-hoc justification? I have no idea... We discussed this a few times. The Gra and R Kook both hold that for every reason given for a halakhah there are usually many others not spelled out for us. So, if the reason for a heter is found to be scientifically wrong, we would need to be machmir (killing lice). But, if a reason for a chumerah were disproven, we have to assume there are other reasons still around sufficient to justify sticking with the chumera. So, they only change the halakhah to add chumeros. I heard RDLifshitz give shiur on maggots found in meat. Leshitaso, the maggots would be kosher. We have maggots in the meat because (1) there were microscopic maggot eggs laid in the meat, and (2) once the maggot hatched, it ate meat until it grew to visible size. But #1 doesn't count, not being microscopic. It's the meat that made the problem halachic -- allowing the maggot to grow from micro- to visible size. And thus, it still is born from the meat" in a halachic sense". And I would think parallel reason would permit killing lice on Shabbos. Assuming a bree of lice with invisibly small eggs. I got the impression that RDL would assume that this kind of reasoning could be found in every example. >From which I generalized way out there to the principle that halakhah doesn't deal with scientific reality, but reality as experienced. And there are a lot fewer exceptions to Greek science that way. On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:29:58AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Similarly, I am not aware of any rigorous double-blind study on whether : pregnant women miscarry after stepping on discarded fingernails. ... : R' Josh Backon did post some research here (for example, at : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n035.shtml#11 and : http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol16/v16n151.shtml#09) to show that it is : dangerous to eat fish with meat. But even there, I am not aware that there : were any actual tests done to *prove* his conclusions. : : My personal interest has been on the other side of this coin: Why don't : these "dangers" count a forbidden superstitions? First find the line between supersition and dicarded scientific theory. To the Ibn Ezra, astrology was part of natural philosphy. Basically, science. To the Rambam -- superstition. In Aristo's physics and metaphysics, the IE's position is quite reasonable. ... : This leads me to two possible conclusions: (1) Perhaps Chazal never saw a : case where a woman did step on fingernails, and successfully delivered her : baby. If every single test case resulted in miscarriage, then their : conclusions are reasonable. But how can they have been so carefully : observant of every single case? (2) The other possibility is that the : belief in this danger is not the result of anything they observed, but was : Received Revelation. This seems much more likely to me, because it is a : simple entryway into halacha. Without a Revelation from Shamayim, wouldn't : a belief in these dangers be a forbidden superstition? Maybe R/Dr JB is right and mixing fish and meat does pose a danger. The effect would have to be minimal, since we don't find anyone else noticing it and turning it into a medical recommendation. Not much different than there being no medical effect at all. Why would G-d be telling us such things and not about much riskier foods? And the Rambam omitted any ban on meat-and-milk from his book. It seemed to R' Avraham ben haRambam that this was because he considered Chazal's ban to be based on discredited science. Why did the amoraim of Bavel spend so much time talking about sheidim, while the Y-mi does not? Was it that they fought into Babylonian superstition ch"v? Or was it that in the Bavli worldview, demonology was accepted science. OR was it just coincidence that only the amoraim living in a culture that paid much much attention to demons are the ones concerned about sheidim? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 10th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Gevurah: When does strict Fax: (270) 514-1507 judgment bring balance and harmony? From zev at sero.name Tue Apr 30 15:24:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 18:24:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Exactly when did we leave Mitzrayim? In-Reply-To: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> References: <20190430172629.GD25284@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 30/4/19 1:26 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I think looking for a firm border is anachronistic anyway. Control kind > of faded away as you reach the no man's land of the desert. Think the > European city-state -- there was more or less sovereignty over areas > further from the city, depending on roads, distance, etc... > > And before any real cartography? I don't think the notion of "drawing > lines", hard demarcations, would have crossed anyone's mind. And yet the Torah demarcates the borders of Eretz Yisrael, and the Tanach gives the intertribal borders. It also says that Edom had borders which we could not cross, and that the Arnon was the border between Emor and Moav, etc. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Apr 30 16:54:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 23:54:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth Message-ID: ________________________________ From R B?Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. Me-How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems to look at halachic truth as Boolean? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed May 1 04:34:39 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 07:34:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science Message-ID: . I asked: > Why don't these "dangers" count as forbidden superstitions? R' Micha Berger pointed out: > First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. I'm wondering about the line between *discarded* scientific theory and *current* scientific theory. I don't think the line exists; the only difference between the two is which era WE happen to be living in. If so, then the real question is "merely" to find the line between superstition and science. No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions, and I wonder whether the other questions are truly different, or they are just different expressions of the same idea. These other questions include: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Where's the line between miracles that one is allowed to perform (if he has the ability) and those that he is not? I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and culture of whoever is asking. There is no fixed standard, but whatever the consensus holds to be science, superstition, magic, or miracle, so does halacha. Perhaps we can draw a precedent from dangerous situations: Which are the dangers that halacha requires us to avoid? The ones that people generally consider to be dangerous. So too in these other areas. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 1 12:14:03 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 19:14:03 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Where's the line between magic (according to those poskim who accept that it exists) and technology? Clarke's Third Law: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:23:54 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Heseibah, Halachah and Science In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501202354.GA16967@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 07:34:39AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> First find the line between superstition and discarded scientific theory. ... : No, that's not "the" real question. It's just one of several questions... To me it is "the real question". Because if, as you write: : I suspect that the answer to all of these is flexible with the time and : culture of whoever is asking... Then the question is not whether a given danger is supersition or not, but what kind of reasoning is used to declare heseibah on the left or meat and fish or sheidim or stepping on nail clippings or... to be dangerous. It isn't belief in supersitious dangers that is assur, as that's not a definable set. Rather, it's superstitious thinking leading one to conclude something is dangerous or propitious that would be the topic of issur. It's like assments of chi and reiki. Ch'i / Qi could be viewed as a mataphysical kishuf thing. Or it could be viewed as a scientific theory (accurate or not aside), not different in kind than fields in contemporary western science. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 1 13:31:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 16:31:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190501203124.GB16967@aishdas.org> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 11:54:27PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : From R B'Bednarsh on halachic pluralism: :> Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic :> ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper :> knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic :> matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper :> applications of that multifaceted truth... : How do you reconcile this with the classic brisker chakira which seems : to look at halachic truth as Boolean? I think R Bednarsh is confusing two of Aristo's laws of logic. Multivalent logic rejects the classical Law of Excluded Middle -- there is true, false, and nothing in between. Multivalent logic says their are other valencies. The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim. Although it does find a rational basis for both sides of machloqes, so I'm not sure it's true. In either case, the Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally true. To the Rambam, machloqes is due to attempt to reconstruct the forgotten; and one side is indeed in error. We just do our best to minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 11th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 4 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Gevurah: What is imposing about Fax: (270) 514-1507 strict justice? From meirabi at gmail.com Wed May 1 21:17:18 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:17:18 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 50 Amos too high Message-ID: 50 Amos high gallows But Halachah suggests we don't notice things higher than 20 Amos - Menorah, Sukkah and the beam of a MaVuy must all be below 20 Amos. However a beam that is decorated, may be placed higher than 20 Amos because people will be attentive to its design and will therefore not confuse that MaVuy with a true public domain. The dangling corpse of the second highest official of the kingdom, the known Jew hating thug, executed at the behest of the Jewish Queen and the king's rabbi advisor, would have been a spectacle we would have gladly gaped at all day long. Somehow though, the flickering flame in the second floor window, is not quite as spellbinding. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 2 10:51:24 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 17:51:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? Message-ID: Please listen to the shiur at https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586/rabbi-aaron-selevan/sclissel-chalah-/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 2 11:26:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 2 May 2019 14:26:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sclissel Chalah? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190502182641.GD23115@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 05:51:24PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please listen to the shiur at : https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/923586 Rabbi Aaron Selevan's point is what I've said in countless iterations. The problem with segulos like shlissel challah is not inherent in the practice, but with the person's understanding of segulah. Otherwise, we could argue that Rosh haShanah's simanei milsa were problematic. Although he had a far richer list of possible origins for the custom than we've accumulated over the years. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 12th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 1 week and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Gevurah: What aspect of judgment Fax: (270) 514-1507 forces the "judge" into submission? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 06:22:40 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 06 May 2019 09:22:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Sun, 05 May 2019 19:55:19 -0400, wrote: On Wed, 1 May 2019 Micha Berger wrote: > The Law of Contradiction -- something and its inverse cannot > both be true at the same time -- is more relevant to eilu va'eilu divrei > E-lokim Chaim. ... Rambam bought into Aristotilian logic, and > (therefore?) doesn't believe both sides of a machloqes are equally > true. To the Rambam, ... one side is indeed in error. We just do our > best to > minimize the chance that we're following that side. And since Briskers so > heavily lean on the Rambam, maybe R Chaim accepts the Rambam's position > on this too. And so if there is a conflict between the ideas multiple > truths and Brisker derekh, it wouldn't be a problem. Brisker derekh > might not accept a literal eilu va'eilu anyway. Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." This adage is a primary source for Recanti and ibn Gabbai, but Rashi dislodges it from its apparent, literal sense. Rashi writes, "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides the Torah of our G d. "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. The legitimacy that both opinions of a machlokess have, according to Rashi, is not that they are both correct. The legitimacy is in the sense that they both are the results of sincere, loyal to Hashem and Moshe, attempts to correctly gauge what Hashem and Moshe meant to teach: "Make you ear act as a funnel": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will prove kosher, establish that as the halacha. Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 08:00:47 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 11:00:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... : : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god : besides the Torah of our G d. : : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah could indeed mean both. And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". And the Ran, derashah #7: We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever they decide is what God has commanded. The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. See my blog post at which includes links to articles each had published in early 2005. All this goes back to our debate about whether the Rambam has a daas yachid about many of the kelalei pesaq because of an a different belief about what machloqes is and what pesaq accomplished. I think that much is provable, regardless of my fear that the Rambam's divergance is most easily explained by his Aristotilianism. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 11:09:19 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 14:09:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 11:00 AM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:22:40AM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : Most rishonim (Recanti may be an exception, and R. Meir ben Ezekiel > : ibn Gabbai [1480-1540, in Avodas HaKodesh] probably is) do not > : accept that eilu va'eilu means that something and its inverse can > : both be true in the same situation, at the same time and place. Look > : at Rashi on "All [the variant opinions] were given from one > : Shepherd, one Almighty gave them, one leader said them from the Adon > : of all maasim (Chaggigah 3b)." ... > : > : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the > : bnei hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god > : besides the Torah of our G d. > : > : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a > : prophet who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. > > Not sure how that denies plurality of truths. He just says that eilu > va'eilu must both stand on Toras Moshe. > You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Rashi is telling you the way to understand the adage whose naive meaning would teach a concept of contradictory truths. The way is not the naive way. He doesn't have to spell it out for you that he denies the naive way. The last Rashi I quoted, which is omitted in your response, was "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. ''In the morning, sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or this, or if both of them are equally good.'' In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's ''yichshar'' to mean ''yatzliach''--succeed. In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but about determining pesak, and that (since the possibilities under consideration are all sincere attempts to know G d's Will, and not anyone else's) through sincere analysis one can decide which side if a machlokess is correct. According to Rashi this adage is not at all talking about some suggested truth outside of halacha l'ma'aseh. So according to Rashi, this adage, used to promote the contradictory truths concept, is not at all meant to teach that concept, which leaves us without that adage as a source for that concept. But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit > which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > could indeed mean both. > Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. But if he held it, here is where he would say so. The fact he's going out of his way to take a statement that would apparently support the concept, yet explains it to mean something else, indicates he does not support the apparent concept. Otherwise, he should give that as an explanation ("in G d's mind, opposites can be true, so both sides of a machlokess are truths") or say nothing, and let the reader read it naively. Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same time and place and situations. > And then we have the Ran's haqdamah to haMafteiach leMenulei haTalmud > (tr. R/Dr Moshe Halbertal): > It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, > was transm itted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, > R. Hiyya bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and > on them was written according to all the words.." teaches that the > Holy One blessed be He showed Moses the details prescribed by the > Torah and by the Sages, including the innovations they would later > enact. And what are those? the reading of Meggila. The 'details' > provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and conflicting views > held by the sa ges of Israel. Moses learned them all by divine > word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet [God] > also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the > majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for > the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written: > 'And you shall come to the priest the Levites, and to the judge that > shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....". > The sentence translated "Yet [God] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority opinion'..." is crucial and mistranslated. The sentence actually reads, "Umassar bo klal asher bo yodea ha-emmess, v'hu: acharei rabim l-hatos. The correct translation, as I've pointed out before, is "G d gave him a rule through which one knows the truth." Because between the opinions, one is the truth and the other is not. Why did the author create a distorted translation? And what in the world does "a rule whose truth is manifest" supposed to mean, anyway?? > And the Ran, derashah #7: > We have been commanded to obey their decision whether it represents the > truth or its opposite ...for the power of decision-making has been > entrusted to the halakhic authorities for each generation. Whatever > they decide is what God has commanded. > Exactly. There is a a truth and its opposite. Not two contradictory truths. And the Ran goes on to explain that in very rare instances the Sages may err and reach the opposite of the truth, but the negative effects of our following a false halacha are mitigated by the overriding positive effects of our being loyal to the Torah's rule of following the majority. > > The Ritva on eilu va'eilu https://www.sefaria.org/Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2 > endorses an understanding of Rabanei Tzarfat (who I think are Baalei > Tosafos) that HQBH gave Moshe both, saying that it was up to chakhmei > Yisrael bekhol dor vador... uvderekh ha'emes yeish ta'am sod bedavar > > In short, your position is contrary to both R' Michel Rosenseig and > RMH's takes, and I've posted source like these in the past. > The Avodas HaKodesh (Cheilek HaTachlis and chap.23), a rishon, contra these contemporaries, dismisses the Rabanie Tzarfat in favor of what is as close to a multi-truths concept you can find (and even he may be speaking only hyperbolically). He doesn't understand them to be saying there are multiple truths. Rabanei Tzarfat are saying HKBH revelaled to Moshe all the legitimate pros and cons (the various panim, not the various shittos) involved in situations which are to be weighed by the Sages in each situation to arrive at the correct pesak. Zvi Lampel [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/06/19, 1:58:46 PM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon May 6 16:24:59 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 19:24:59 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. More later. Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, but : about determining pesak... Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another repeat from previous years: : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : The phrase, "Aysehua yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : this, or if both of them are equally good." : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean : "yatzliach"--succeed. This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. Now, on to the third Rashi: :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A limit :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah : > could indeed mean both. : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not saying : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. See https://www.sefaria.org/Rashi_on_Ketubot.57a.9.1 again, because I don't see any way of saying it's less than muchrach. : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same : time and place and situations. Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many arguments I can retread at once. Chodesh Tov! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 16th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 2 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Gevurah sheb'Tifferes: What type of discipline Fax: (270) 514-1507 does harmony promote? From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 18:51:48 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 6 May 2019 21:51:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: > : You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is > : dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a > reason. > > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, > We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. because in Kesuvos 57a, he embraces the idea. He does not. > More later. > > Skipping ahead to another comment you make on this first Rashi: > : In explaining the adage that others use to promote the concept of > : contradictory truths, he explains it not at all as talking about that, > but > : about determining pesak... > > Actually, Rashi says that while there are complementary truths, > We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and place. that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the > contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. > I cannot decipher this statement. > Now, the Rashi I didn't bother with last time, because it's another > repeat from previous years: > > : "Make you ear act as a funnel/hopper": Since all of them [the baalei > : machlokess], their hearts are to heaven (leeban la-shamayim), make your > : ear one that listens, and learn, and know the words of all of them. And > : when you will know to discriminate (le-havchin) which one of them will > : succeed (yichshar), establish that as the halacha. > > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." > > > : The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, > : sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing > so > : again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or > : this, or if both of them are equally good." > So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. > > : In Yevamos 55b Rashi explains this posuk's "yichshar" to mean > : "yatzliach"--succeed. > > This *reinforces* how I read the Rashi on the gemara in prior iterations. > Rashi's measure is not truth-vs-falsehood but success-vs-failure. He is > talking about what is usable for halakhah lemaaseh. > And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same situation at the same time and pace. > > Now, on to the third Rashi: > :> But in Kesuvos 57a, "ha QML", Rashi says that one side being wrong in > :> a machloqes is something specific to two amoraim arguing about what a > :> tanna or earlier amora says, "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". A > limit > :> which would seem to be intentionally excludes the gemara's other case > :> "terei amora'ei aliba dechad amora". > > : > The earlier amora could only have meant one of the two. But the Torah > : > could indeed mean both. > > : Again, you're not showing that Rashi holds this, just that he's not > saying > : he doesn't, and that you wish to impose it upon him. > > He makes a chiluq between aliba dechad amora and ata'amei denafshei. The > first part of the Rashi says that terei amora'ei alibe dechad amora alone > one is right and the other erred. And then he closes by saying that > when they argue ata'amei denafshei "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim". > > Kind of more than just "not saying he doesn't" -- Rashi pretty explicitly > denies plurality ONLY in a minority of machloqesin, those where the debate > is over what an earlier amora (or a tanna) said. > First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where the concept of eilu va-eilu applies. Why? Not because eilu va-eilu means that one thing and its inverse can both be true in the same situation and the same time and place. But because on the contrary, Rashi explains that eilu va-eilu means that each of the sevaros are shayyach (applicable, appropriate, fitting) in DIFFERENT circumstances. > > > : Further, he explicitly says that eilu va-eilu means that each side of a > : machlokess will hold true in DIFFERENT circumstances, but not at the same > : time and place and situations. > > > Each is true and therefore each can be used halakhah lemaaseh in different > situations. Or to use Rashi's words, each is "shayakh" in different > circumstances. Shayakh, relevant. Not limiting when it "holds true". > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that particluar situation.) > > In this email I'm sticking just to Rashi, because I don't know how many > arguments I can retread at once. > I know the feeling.... ...But I did introduce new data--the Avodas HaKodesh (and Recanti). > > Chodesh Tov! > Tir'u baTov! > > Amen! Zvi Lampel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon May 6 21:23:55 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 00:23:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 9:51 PM Zvi Lampel wrote: > > > > > He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one >> sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the >> other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that >> particluar situation.) >> > >> Meaning, that the disputants are disagreeing over whether it is sevara "A' that applies to and determines the halacha a certain way in scenario"X," or that it is sevarah "B" that applies and determines the halacha otherwise, *in that same scenario*. If the disputants are each talking about a different scenario, they are talking past each other. They would not be demonstrating much wisdom in arguing and bringing evidence for their opinions. If you say it's daytime and I say it's nighttime, but you are talking about one side of the earth and I'm talking about the other side of the earth, we would be foolish to argue. Zvi Lampel > [image: Mailtrack] Sender notified by Mailtrack 05/07/19, 12:23:49 AM -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 7 18:14:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 01:14:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Brisker psak redux Message-ID: <38E1F13B-0865-4E20-9780-BE3BF40A8C09@sibson.com> I spoke to a young (to me) Talmid Chacham about what seems to me to be a disconnect between Brisker lomdus and reticence for psak. He articulated two theories: 1.) R?Chaim, as an individual, was a yarei horaah (in awe of psak?) and for whatever reason this tradition continued. 2.) Per R?Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik?R?Chaim felt that since his methodology was new, psak should continue in the ?traditional manner? that amcha was used to/had accepted My thought?if we accept #2, should it follow the ?traditional? phase in over time and be part of psak (think about cantorial music). Your thoughts? Kt Joel richTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:30:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:30:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Multivalent truth In-Reply-To: References: <20190506150047.GA27133@aishdas.org> <20190506232459.GB20708@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190509193041.GA18603@aishdas.org> On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 09:51:48PM -0400, Zvi Lampel via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 7:25 PM Micha Berger wrote: : > On Mon, May 06, 2019 at 02:09:19PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote: : >: You have to understand what's bothering Rashi. As I described it, he is : >: dislodging the adage from its naive reading, He's doing that for a reason. : : > Yes, but it can't be because he has a problem with a multifacted truth, : : We're not discussing multifaceted truths. We're discussing the concept of : something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, tiime and : place. Which is what I means by "multifacted truth" -- a truth that has facets that contradict, or at least, appear to contradict to intellects with human limitations. We can't know if we're really supporting a logic in which paradox isn't a problem, or if we're like the famous story of the 5 blind men who were asked to describe the elephant. But in any case, saying "we're not discussing multifacted truths" indicates a communication gap. : We are are not discussing complementary truths. We're discussing the : concept of something and its inverse both being true in the same situation, : time and place. Something that seems weird until you realize that the truth of both sides of a conflicting dialectic is typical of the human condition, so why not of halakhah? :> that doesn't mean that we need to consider all claims, nor that the :> contradiction means that one wasn't in Moshe's Torah. : I cannot decipher this statement. Another communication gap. To explain by example. When you mention eilu va'eilu on Jewish fora that aren't specifically Orthodox, some C Jew is bound to claim that if we're ready to accept positions other than our own, we should be ready to accept C as a valid position, if not our own. People need it pointed out that embracing a range of answers doesn't imply that one is ready to embrace all answers. And that's exactly what Rashi is talking about. Here, reread your translation, within the context I am suggesting: : "All of them--One Almighty said them": You have no one of the bnei : hamachlokess bringing evidence from the torah of any other god besides : the Torah of our G-d. : "One leader said them": You have none bringing evidence from a prophet : who comes to argue against Moshe Rabbeynu. He doesn't dislodge the proof, he explains why the description of multiple truths places emphasis on meiro'eh echad. : > Yes, yikhshar as usable halakhah. Which is exactly what Rashi says in : > the last clause. Not on the level of "eiluv va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim", : > multifacted truth, but on the level of "vehalakhah ke..." : : >: The phrase, "Ayzehu yichshar," is from Kohelless 11:6. "In the morning, : >: sow your seed; and in the evening, do not let your hand rest [from doing so : >: again], because you do not know which [attempt] yichshar, whether this or : >: this, or if both of them are equally good." : : So you are agreeing with my point that Rashi is dislodging the adage of : "kulan me-Adon echad" from meaning eilu va-eilu as you take it. No. I am saying Rashi discusses multiple truths, and therefore a poseiq's job is to figure out which is a successful strategy -- "yichshar" and "yatziliach" (as per Yevamos 55b), not "nachon" or "emes". : And not talking about a notion that despite what the halacha l.maaseh is, : there is really truth to both one thing and its inverse in the same : situation at the same time and pace. Both are Torah in all times and places. One emes, with facets that contradit, or appear so to humans. What may change with the times is which one is a better choice for halakhah lemaaseh. : First of all, I don't know where you get the idea that the debates over : what an ealier Amora or Tanna said are in the minority. It seems to me to : be otherwise. All the more so since Rashi and Tosefos' stand, that when : there is such a debate, one of the sides is sayimg sheker, logically : applies not only to what the previous authority said, but what he meant and : held. ("V'ee michlalah, lama li?") How many machloqesin in shas are "Amar Y amar X" vs "Amar Z amar X"? Of course they are far outnumbered by machloqesin where no one name aappears in both sides. Machloqesin between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, Rabbi Aqiva & Rabbi Yishmael, Rav & Shemuy, Abyaei & Rava... All those machloqesin that aren't debates about the identity of the shitah of some earlier member of Chazal. : Secondly, I reiterate that Rashi explains himself that in those cases where : the debaters are not deliberating over what former authorities held/said, : but promoting their own sevaros, each one atamei d'nafshei, this is where : the concept of eilu va-eilu applies... And in contrast to aliba de- where he describes one as being sheqer. When the contrast is one is being sheqer, eilu va'eilu means both are emes! ... : He doesn't says both sevaros are shayyach to both situations. He says one : sevara is shayyach in one situation and the other sevara is shayyach in the : other situation. (So "Shayach doesn't mean relevant. It means it fits that : particluar situation.) Both are emes, one is applicable. I feel like when you explain a source, you repeatedly jump between modalities -- emes vs halakhah lema'aseh -- in ways that the source doesn't. In this particular email: Yatzliach doesn't mean true, but successful. It's a halakhah lema'aseh term. Whereas his discussion of eilu va'eilu is where there is no sheqer, ie Rashi is saying it's about emes. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 9 12:48:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 9 May 2019 15:48:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] umdena(presumptions) and halakhic theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190509194812.GB18603@aishdas.org> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 01:16:54PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While I can certainly construct a logic, it's hard to see why an umdena : as to people's awareness would not follow the actual facts on the ground ... It would depend on whether we're talking pesaq or din derabbanan. If a pesaq is based on an umdena, when the umdena changes, we should be saying it's a new situation and requires a new pesaq. But if we're talking about chazal making a taqana or gezeira because of an umdena that is no longer true, wouldn't it require a Sanhedrin, and maybe one gadol mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan, to change the law? Then you have matters like RYBS's position WRT tav lemeisav, where he holds (according to one interpretation) that since the Torah says "ve'al isheikh teshukaseikh" we are only fooling ourselves if we think the umdena changed. And really, deep down, feelings haven't. : I'm also not convinced that at some level following two different : "unrelated" psakim of two poskim does not run the risk of inconsistent : application (or tartei dsatrei). Especially if you take the position : that Hakachic intuition is based on their total knowledge of Torah. Makes sense. But then... even a single person isn't that consistent. For example: How I respond to questions about scientific theories of origins depends on the day, my mood, and how the question was phrased. And I am betting I'm not alone on that. Our positions aren't all perfectly integrated. So if we really demanded perfect consistency across all inyanim and including even very subtle implications, even relying on one poseiq would only reduce the problem, not eliminate it. I think tarta desasrei is more limited than that. Like the way one pelag-to-sheqi'ah can be either day or night, but the next one needn't be consistent. Not sure where that thought is taking me, though... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 19th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 2 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Tifferes: When does harmony promote Fax: (270) 514-1507 withdrawal and submission? From ygbechhofer at gmail.com Tue May 14 06:25:27 2019 From: ygbechhofer at gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 09:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at long last, trying to do shva na's. I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. Thanks! KT, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 14 09:29:56 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 12:29:56 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190514162956.GA9138@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 09:25:27AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of the : large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could say at : long last, trying to do shva na's. : : I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. ... : I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will : help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. My tallis bag usually has a pocket-size Siddur Tefillah Simanim, from the people who gave you the tiqun with a parallel name and format. I noticed from discussions on Mesorah that R Seth Mandel (PhD Semitic Languages) disagrees with Simanim less often than ArtScroll. (But I CCed RSM to let him speak for himself, if he so chooses.) Additionally, Simanim has nice notes in the margin, kind of rashei peraqim to keep kavanah on track. (As expected, I don't always agree with their decisions, but more often than most.) It *can* be a bit of an information overload. For someone our generation or older, I would also recommend the full size edition, as even with reading glasses, seeing all the simanim in the pocket-size is a challenge. So, if that's too busy, Koren. Moving beyond your actual request: If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. The footnotes contrast older nusachos to their and the Gra's emendations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 24th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Tifferes sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in balance and harmony? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 15 06:22:24 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 13:22:24 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] passing a cemetery Message-ID: If one passes a cemetery every day on their commute to work but their brain doesn't process it (that's how our vision actually works), do they then make a bracha when going to a cemetery for a funeral? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu May 16 05:09:47 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 08:09:47 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . > As sha"tz during my aveilus for my mother a"h I daven out of > the large AS siddur. It has started me trying to do, one could > say at long last, trying to do shva na's. ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the word is shtayim." If find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. > Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Every word lacking the meteg ought to be me'l'ra. If you want a siddur that has an explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know what their rule is. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 16 12:57:03 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 15:57:03 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari siddurim, among others. I have had a mental picture of the Razah as something of a non-conformist, ever since I saw he has "Rubbi Yishmael omer", with a qubutz instead of the usual patach or (in some eidos) chiriq. And it is possible that the Baal haTanya only coincidentally happened upon sheva rules which give results consistent with the Razah's. The other common choice, eg Artstroll, is the Gra's understanding of Rav Eilyahu Bachur's (Rav Eliyahu ben Asher haLeiv Ashkenazi, or to academics: Eliya Levita, 1469-1549) rules. It is the latter which Ben Yehudah runs with. I assume that there could be Yekkishe siddurim that use R/Dr Mordechai Breuer's interpretation of R' Eliyahu Bachur's rules. His interpretation reduces the gap between it and the Razah's position. But the thought just hit me, I didn't look around siddurim to see if anyone does use RMB's version. (I compiled the three versions of the lists of rules, see below.) On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:09:47AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's... ... : Well, they do put a meteg on every word that is me'l'eil. Both of these decisions actually break mesorah. In Tiberian niqud* a line over a letter is a rafe mark, meaning the same thing as an undotted bege"d kefe"t, but more noticable -- or more usable when there is no room in the manuscript for dotting the plosives. And a meseg is a Tiberian trope mark, and by using it as an accent you have two uses for the same symbol in any pesuqim written with trope. (As AS does for Shema.) (Tiberian niqud is the system we pretty much exclusively use, except Teimanim who still have occasional use of Bavli niqud.) : If you want a siddur that has an : explicit mark for me'l'ra, I suggest the Rinat Yisrael, which puts a : sideways "8" over such syllables. But not all the time, and I don't know : what their rule is. I think Rinat Yisrael is a "he", not a "they", R/Dr Shelomo Tal. Funded by the Misrad haChinukh, but a one-man job. RST's notation is to put an inifinity over the milra accent in words that Israelis would guess were milra, and "<" to denote mil'eil, also only where he judged that most Israelis would assume incorrectly. I don't think there is a hard rule for you to know. If the word has neither symbol, imagine saying it in an Israeli accent, and figure that's the right emphasis. Not a perfect system. And now, my understanding of the rules for sheva: All: aleph: a sheva in the *first* letter (e.g. shema) "Shtei" is a common exception. beis: the *second* of two sheva's are next to each other in the middle of the word (e.g. Mordechai) But not at the end of the word (eg neft). -- The Gra's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peeynechas) Except for the melupum at the begining of a word (e.g. uvrachah) dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) -- R' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: gimel: sheva following a trope that is "nasog achor" e.g. "yoch'lu lachem" (Raza"h's rule zayin) dalet: sheva following the 1st of 2 different tropes on the same word, e.g. "hama'achil'cha", "yatz'u" (Raza"h's rule tes) (exception: kadma-zakeif on one word or on a hyphenated word is not considered two different tropes, e.g. "v'halviim", "ulchalosam") hei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) (Raza"h's rule vuv) (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", "vaynahageihu"), 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") -- Raza"h's rules gimel - tes: gimel: after a tenu'ah *g*edolah [long vowel] (e.g. Peen'chas) that doesn't have the word's only trop. Or perhaps: Not if the tenu'ah gedolah denotes an accent mil'eil. dalet: under an os *d*egushah (e.g. dab'ru) hei: under the first of two osios *h*adomos [identical letters] (e.g. ran'nu) vuv: a sheva following a meseg (mnemonic: which looks like a vuv) Given RAP's "mem" for nach (below), this must mean only where the meseg is alongside a tenu'ah that isn't qalah. zayin: after a nasag achor, where the neginah moved (zaz) ches: chatufos [the shortened patach, kamatz or segol] tes: a sheva that follows the first neginah, in a word that has two t'amim (see rule gimel) yud: any yud that has a sheva after a vav hahipuch; eg: vayedaber Off another source I found the following: Razah: A sheva immediately before an undotted b,g,d,k,p,t (yaat'fu) Raza"h's four rules for nach (others define nach by default); mnemonic: "miqnos": mem: meteg under a tenu'ah qalah the sheva after it is nach. Identifying tenu'os qalos was a chiddush of the Razah's, not to be confused with tenu'os qetanos -- an idea borrowed from Arabic grammar by R' Yosef Qimchi, the Radaq's father.) eg: vihyitem, shimu, tichyu. See rule vuv, above. quf: following a tenu'ah ketanah that doesn't have a meseg (the flip-side of gimel + vuv, above) nun: after a neginas ta'am, even if also after a tenu'ah gedolah (see gimel) samech: at the end of a word, regardless of dageish or previous sheva. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 26th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Hod sheb'Netzach: When is domination or taking Fax: (270) 514-1507 control just a way of abandoning one's self? From llevine at stevens.edu Thu May 16 14:36:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 21:36:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a minyan, who walks into a random shul in many places around the world, might be in for a surprise. After the Shemoneh Esrei prayer on Sunday there will be no Tachanun. On Monday there will be Selichos; and on Thursday there again won?t be Tachanun! Why would this be? No Tachanun generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] yet, no other observances are readily noticeable. As for the reciting of Selichos on Monday, they are usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is going on? For more please see https://to.ly/1z5wP YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 17:47:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 20:47:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 16/5/19 3:57 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > followed the Razah (Rav Shelomo Zalman Katz / Rav Zalman Hanau [his > birthplace], 1687-1746), and so that's what you will find in Nusach Ari > siddurim, among others. I know of no evidence for this. The Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his system only because the siddur from which it was originally copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu May 16 21:37:13 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 00:37:13 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > This coming week, an unsuspecting person wishing to catch a /minyan/, > who walks into a random /shul /in many places around the world, might be > in for a surprise. After the /Shemoneh/ /Esrei/ prayer on Sunday there > will be no /Tachanun/. On Monday there will be /Selichos/; and on > Thursday there again won?t be /Tachanun/! Why would this be? No > /Tachanun/ generally signifies that it is a festive day;[1] > yet, no other observances are readily > noticeable. As for the reciting of /Selichos/ on Monday, they are > usually reserved for a fast day; yet no one seems to be fasting! What is > going on? I repeat my objections to this article from last year, when you also linked to it. Come on. Neither Pesach Sheni nor Lag Be'omer can possibly be described as "unknown days". It's just not true. Anyone who has never heard of these days has never heard of tachanun either, and wouldn't notice whether it's being said or not. The author himself later notes that even in chu"l there is the tradition of an outing on Lag Ba'omer, though he strangely refers to it dismissively, saying there are no observances "unless one counts" this one. That's a bit like saying Chanukah has no observances unless one counts the menorah, etc. If the author wants to write about these days, let him write about them; there's no need to pretend they're "unknown" as an excuse. I also take issue with the author's characterisation of Behab as "Days of Tefilah" on which, by the way, some people also fast. On the contrary, they are voluntary fast days, which nowadays have mostly fallen into desuetude. As fast days, those observing them say selichos and read Vayechal. Those who are not observing them don't. I suppose that if one who is not observing them davens in a minyan that is, it would make sense to selichos with them. If there are minyanim where there are not ten fasting, so they don't read Vayhechal, but they still say selichos, I assume the idea is that it's "officially" a fasters' minyan, but it just so happens that lately there have not been enough fasters so they had to cancel the Vayechal, but they still continue the previous practice of saying selichos, like a shul that's officially Nusach Ashkenaz even if everyone who currently attends davens Sfard. I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing. But even if such communities exist, it is seriously backwards to characterise the days as the author does. The selichos is always secondary to and a consequence of the fast, not vice versa. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 07:18:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:18:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently : >followed the Razah... : : I know of no evidence for this... I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said "apparently". And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his : system only because the siddur from which it was originally : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 08:09:44 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:09:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> On 17/5/19 10:18 am, Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 08:47:58PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote: > : >More significant than notation... There are two different sets of rules > : >for sheva floating around various siddurim. The Baal haTanya apparently > : >followed the Razah... > : > : I know of no evidence for this... > > I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said > "apparently". But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its production. The late LR, who was involved in the production, said publicly that it was done in haste and therefore not everything was exactly as it should have been. He didn't specifically mention the stars, but on a rush job that would have been a very low priority. > And, FWIW, Seder haAvodah: > : Tehilas Hashem siddur uses his > : system only because the siddur from which it was originally > : copy/pasted in the 1940s did so. The newer edition printed in EY > : was completely reset and uses the system taught by R Mottel > : Shusterman AH, who was the baal korei at 770 and at the LR's > : instruction taught dikduk at Oholei Torah. > > And still has the Razah's shevas. (According to R Alex Heppenheimer, > who was one of 3 proofreaders of the new edition.) No, it does not. It has very few stars, I think even fewer than Artscroll. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Fri May 17 07:49:14 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:49:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n39, RYGB noted: > I also was caught once saying l'eyla in kaddish me'l'ra. Embarrasing. The AS does not indicate me'l'ra's. > The siddur I use personally, the German Roedelheim siddur, does not identify either. < (By "either", I'm assuming that RYGB meant to say that the "German Roedelheim siddur" also does not "indicate me'l'ra's"; his words could be interpreted as meaning that said *siddur* does not indicate either *mil'eil* or *mil'ra*.) The default accent for *t'fila* is *mil'ra*, and printers tend to only indicate exceptions from the default. (Whether Aramaic follows the same rules as Hebrew is a separate discussion, but for purposes of *siddur* publishing, let us assume it does.) R'Micha replied: >> I am soliciting recommendations for an Ashkenaz siddur that will help me out with these (and perhaps other) enhancements of tefillah. << > If you want to see what the 19th cent O-Haskalishe gramarians (including R Shlomo-Zalman Hanau [Raza"h] and R Wolf Heidenheim [Ravva"h]) did to Nusach Ashkenaz, you need an Eizor Eliyahu. < If you don't mind using a full-size *siddur*, you might want to [per]use R'Hofmeister's T'filas Y'shurun ( https://www.moreshesashkenaz.org/en/associated-publications/76-tefilas-yeshurun-2). As just one example of corrections it made to the Roedelheim (influenced by the noted grammarians), see this week's Mesorah "Nusach Ashkenaz - Long Tachanun" thread re *m'qaveh* vs. *m'qavah*. A gut'n Shabbes and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 08:29:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 11:09:44AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> I don't think it's compelling evidence either. Which is why I said :> "apparently". : But what is the non-compelling evidence? The Alter Rebbe never saw : the US Tehilas Hashem siddur, and was not involved in its : production... Because there are other places where Nusach Ari follows the Razah's tenu'ah qalah concept. The one case I recall is the Razah's Shaarei Tefillah was the first to have Adon Olam say "beterem kol yetzur nivra". Which the Siddur haRav haZaqein has as well, complete with a melupum malei, so we see the vav in "yetzur". And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. Which is why the new edition was loathe to change things. The odds that the Razah's niqud was an intentional choice was too high. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 17 09:59:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 12:59:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190517165946.GA27777@aishdas.org> On a very differen note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva nach under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva na means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter. It instead marks the syllable as closed by putting a line above the letter that opens it. Whether it's also over the vowel (and all their vowels are above the letter) or between the vowel and the letter depended on whether the syllable was closed by doubling the next letter (a Tiverian degushah) or by just simply using the letter. And: Rules should be seen as a means of explaining the patterns seen in the Mesoretic niqud, trop, and margin notes balancing keeping the rules sane in complexity and keeping the number of exceptions down to a minimum. It is the individual examples, not the rules, which are to be treated as miSinai. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 27th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 3 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Yesod sheb'Netzach: When does domination or Fax: (270) 514-1507 taking control result in relationship? From emteitz at gmail.com Fri May 17 14:43:02 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 17:43:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] The "Unknown Days" of the Jewish Calendar Message-ID: RZSero writes, " I will not be so foolish as to claim there are no communities where it has lately become the "established custom" not to fast but still to say Selichos; there are so many different customs that it's foolish to insist that *anything* doesn't exist. So I will merely say that I have never heard of such a thing." It is surprising that RZS has never heard of such a thing, given that it is -- and has been for decades -- the practice in virtually all Litvishe yehivos, in the US and Israel, to do just that: say the slichos of BH"B, but not fast. I am virtually certain that such was the custom in Lita itself. It is also the practice in the shuls of the Prushim in Yerushalayim. While doubtless the custom originated as a fast with slichos, the fast was long ago abandoned, while slichos lo zazu mim'komon. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Fri May 17 12:42:29 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 15:42:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> On 17/5/19 11:29 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And while the original Tehillas Hashem copied Seder haAvodah (1911, > Vilna), the above could be why they chose a Razah-based pointing rather > than copying another siddur. The project wasn't run by amei haarez, > and they did give RYYS (L's Friardiker Rebbe) a voice in the result. It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get everything perfect. Given that L does not put any great emphasis on correct pronunciation of tefillah, making sure the stars were correct would have been quite a low priority. They almost certainly chose that siddur to copy simply because it was available in a good clear print, so it would reproduce well. (This was photo offset, so every generation of reproduction degraded the quality.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Fri May 17 13:08:33 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 16:08:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger's post had some typos. With his permission, I'm putting the original in parentheses and the corrections in brackets: > I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into > rules about syllables. > > A sheva (nach) [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. > > A sheva (na) [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; > i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable This is exactly my understanding of these two shevas. A sheva na is like a regular vowel. It is a major defining characteristic of a "syllable". But a sheva nach is a null value, empty of sound, signifying nothing. But these thoughts led me to a strange calculation. If the sheva na is a regular vowel and can create a syllable, then isn't chataf patach even more certainly so? Tonight, in Tehillim 92, we will say the word "poalei" twice. How many syllables are in this word? I would say three: "po" (peh cholam), "a" (ayin chataf-patach), and "lei" (lamed tzere yod). And the accent is on the first of these. That means that the accent is neither on the final syllable, nor the next-to-last. What is this word? Is it mi'l'eil or mi'l'ra? How do we categorize it? I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... Or, just as likely, that I don't know how to pronounce a chataf-patach correctly. In which case I *certainly* don't know how to pronounce a sheva na properly... Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 17 15:06:24 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 18:06:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: No, I am not looking for indications of mil'ra. I am quite aware that that is the default. Only me'l'eils. I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is the minhag I would like to approximate. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Sun May 19 04:48:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 07:48:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> References: <20190516195703.GA9512@aishdas.org> <20190517141840.GD13250@aishdas.org> <20a13bfa-f2f3-5d3e-a7e1-f77176ada8e6@sero.name> <20190517152905.GA24358@aishdas.org> <50c11813-a42a-d3d6-7df2-51fcd7b33d2d@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190519114852.GE6868@aishdas.org> First, my apologies to everyone on the crossed wires when I said it was better to explain the sheva rules as syllable rules. The words "sheva nach" and "sheva na" were flipped in my head as I typed the first part of it. That email ought to have read: On a very different note, I found it easier to remember sheva rules by recasting them into rules about syllables. A sheva [na] under a letter is the vowel of a syllable. A sheva [nach] means the consonant is closing the syllable; i.e. we just finished a "consonant-vowel-consonant" syllable. So: Hebrew doesn't have a syllable that is only a consonant. So, the first letter's sheva has to be na, because the first letter can't be a syllable all by itself. (It also doesn't have very many two-consonant dipthongs like /sht/ in the one syllable "shtei".) Similarly, by definition, the vowel of an open syllable is a long vowel. So a sheva under the next letter can't be nach, as that would have meant that letter closes a syllable with a long vowel in it. And if a letter is degushah, the second half of the letter starts a syllable, and the sheva must be that syllable's vowel, so it must be na. If the same letter both closed one syllable and opened the next, it would only be written once, and the Baalei Mesorah would give it a dagish. So, if you see the same letter twice, you know they must be in the same syllable, and any sheva must be the short vowel inside that closed syllable. (And an os geronois is too faint to close a syllable, so it could never take a dageish. Except the reish, which the Seifer haYetzirah says takes a dageish and the two times in Tanakh it gets a dageish are not exceptional cases.) This is something Bavli niqud does better than having a sheva nach symbol (never mind sharing its symbol) and a dageish for a doubled letter.... (This tangent and the one about not taking rules too seriously, deleted.) On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 03:42:29PM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : It was certainly not run by amei-haaretz -- it was run by the : then-LR's son-in-law, later to become the LR. But he himself said : that it was prepared in haste and they didn't have time to get : everything perfect... Which is quite different than finding one of the minority of siddurim that mark shevas, and marks them following the rules of a minority opinion, and using that as your base text. Between it being the future LR who chose a text with the Razah's shevas and the other, non-sheva evidence that the Baal haTanya followed the Razah, I can see why many concluded that he probably held like the Razah when it came to shevas as well. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 29th day, which is micha at aishdas.org 4 weeks and 1 day in/toward the omer. http://www.aishdas.org Chesed sheb'Hod: When is submitting to another Fax: (270) 514-1507 an act of kindness? From zev at sero.name Sun May 19 06:40:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:40:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2a0e3b59-aaa5-6169-7311-e48443e47e5f@sero.name> On 17/5/19 4:08 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > > I once asked someone more knowledgeable than me, and his answer was that > for this purpose, "The chataf-patach counts as a sheva. This word has > only two syllables. It is mi'l'eil." > > He seemed to mean that the first syllable is "poa". I was stunned, and > walked away, disabused of the idea that I knew what a syllable is... > As grammarians count them, rather than as ordinary people do, sh'va na is not a real vowel and does *not* make a syllable. A sh'va at the beginning of a vowel becones na, and a chataf is just a fancy kind of sh'va na. Therefore the official syllables in "poalei" are "po" and "alei". -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From info at daasbooks.com Sun May 19 13:24:19 2019 From: info at daasbooks.com (Daas Books) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 16:24:19 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. This is not even printed in most Chumashim. What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? Alexander Seinfeld From micha at aishdas.org Sat May 18 22:39:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 01:39:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: [I have no idea why, but it took dozens of tries to get this email past the spam filter. -micha] RYGB responded to me: > I'm prejudiced against Tefillas Yeshurun because he changed Nochri to Goy > unilaterally. He also is very much Nusach Frankfurt oriented. WADR, I question "unilaterally". Yes, Minhag FFdM is "shelo asani goy", but neither R'Hofmeister nor R'Hamburger at Machon Moreshes Ashk'naz hew to that nusach (details upon request). As per the publication available at http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21467&st=&pgnum=10, "shelo asani goy" would also appear to be Minhag Wien. Last and not least, RSS z'l' is quoted as advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or "she'asani Yisrael". > My educated guess is that in K"K Bechhofen they said Nochri, and that > they did not follow Nusach Frankfurt on other matters. Minhag Bechhofen is > the minhag I would like to approximate. I can understand why you would be seeking such a siddur. Have you ever sought out former residents of that town or the area? Did you ever speak with your family (including longtime KAJer Jerry Bechhofer a'h') about what siddur they used? [Email #2 -micha] (After speaking privately with RAM and then with REMT, I think it worthwhile to briefly respond publicly....) In Avodah V37n40, RAM wrote: > ArtScroll does have a horizontal line above shva na's, but NOT when it is > the first letter of the word. Apparently they expect you to be aware of the > rule that "If the first letter is a shva then it is always na unless the > word is shtayim." > I find this very easy to forget, especially with letter pairs that glide > together in English but not in Hebrew. (What's the word for such pairs? I > think "dipthong" is only for vowels.) In Yishtabach, for example, I'd love > a reminder to say "b*rachos" instead of "brachos". RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq. The only difference between a shva na' and a shva nach is that the former begins a syllable while the latter ends a syllable (and the only emphasis I would want RAM to remind himself of is the accent, e.g. braCHOS). Gut Voch/Shavu'a Tov and all the best from Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ, USA From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 21 14:27:11 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 21:27:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? Message-ID: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver. I suspect that this will be subject to regulation and/or industry standards since divining what the other party will do is a big part of the challenge in the technology. In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? You might also want to think about whether the "driver" (versus the software provider) should be liable for damage if the programmer is programming based on the driver's perceived priorities. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Wed May 22 12:55:29 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 15:55:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? Message-ID: I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or apply to) microbes. Such as: they?re everywhere, there are far more of them than us, they are invisible for good reason (you wouldn?t want to see them), some are harmful while others are helpful. And that there are other kinds of forces in the world, also called sheidim, that cause dementia etc. I?m looking any further sources. Thanks. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Wed May 22 09:22:54 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 16:22:54 +0000 (WET DST) Subject: [Avodah] A unit for poetic purposes In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at May 22, 2019 12:31:17 pm Message-ID: <15585601740.F347fC8.23606@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself > (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the > 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), > This is true, but misleading, because it implies, incorrectly, that the poet considers a schwa to be interchangeable with a non-schwa vowel, for the purposes of his rhythm scheme. This may be true in Y'did Nefesh but it is not, in general, true. Typically a poet uses a schwa intentionally, when his rhythm scheme demands one, and not otherwise, as in Adon `Olam, and as in D'ror Yiqra, where each phrase begins with exactly one schwa, followed by exactly three non-schwa vowels (following similar forms in Arabic poetry). Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "The umbrella of the gardener's aunt is in the house" From sholom at aishdas.org Wed May 22 19:47:52 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 22:47:52 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> References: <20190523004104.GA27143@dekalb.dreamhost.com> Message-ID: <3c8eafb7a1e960fccfb67866e700032a@aishdas.org> R Akiva Miller was asking about how to count syllables with a shva na, and also about the chataf vowels. My (very limited) understanding, or perception, is that: (a) it's sort of "half" (or some smaller fraction) of a syllable; and (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that it's a partial syllable) (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in particular places: I *think* RSM responded that in some cases it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really know why he chose one over the other.) (And, another tangent, someone earlier was asking about the difference between a shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in various places. RSM (again, to the best of my recollection) said something like: he preferred a shuruk when possible, but we don't really know exactly why. RSM, if you're reading this, please correct me -- these are recollections from 10 years ago!) Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol han*shama" . . . is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno . . . ) -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From haravydk at yahoo.com Thu May 23 04:53:35 2019 From: haravydk at yahoo.com (Y. Dovid Kaye) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:53:35 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Selichos on BaHaB References: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1186470919.3958404.1558612415680@mail.yahoo.com> HaRav Elazar Meir Teitz Shlita is of course correct in his post. Indeed many Poskim note that the minhag is to recite slichos even if one does not fast see for example. Shut. Levushei Mordechai Tinyana 41, Shut. Rav Eliyahu Gutmacher 50 as well as the Pri Megadim 566:1 in MZ.?? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 08:28:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 11:28:11 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah Message-ID: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> >From https://www.jpost.com//Israel-News/International-humanitarian-law-in-Halacha-590408 Anyone know an argument why international law that is imposed on a country might be halachically binding? If the country voluntarily signed on, then it became dina demalkhusa, and DDD. But I don't see RSYisraeli's argument (see below) WRT the case where the UN votes in a law that one's home country not only voted against, but chooses not to recognize. And while I see R Aviner's point, that we want reciprocity, and I see how it can have enough weight to justify bending din in the ways mishum eivah can. But that's for the country to decide. I don't see it as grounds for saying -- nor does RDA say -- that it could make the law halachically binding on me even if my host country rejected that law. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? The Jerusalem Post - Israel News May 23 2019 | Iyar, 18, 5779 International humanitarian law in Halacha By Shlomo Brody May 23, 2019 08:29 One of the biggest questions in contemporary jurisprudence relates to the relationship of national jurisdiction and international law. Given the growth of international treaties and bodies to enforce those agreements, jurists are increasingly challenged how local laws may be impacted by international standards. This question has also been asked by Jewish legal decisors regarding how Halacha might be impacted by such norms. We'll try to sketch some of the broader approaches taken in this ongoing conversation, particularly as they relate to the laws of war. International law generally comprises two types of norms: those agreed to by multinational treaties and those established by customary practice. The former include, most famously, the various Hague and Geneva conventions regarding warfare, while the latter include many norms regulating maritime practices, for example. When a country has formally signed a given agreement, it is readily understandable that its own laws should encompass those norms. When it does not formally consent, however, it is more difficult to understand why it should relent on its own sovereignty and accept standards imposed by others. This broader issue engages many scholars and remains a critical point of contention amongst jurists. Within Jewish legal circles, one of the first scholars to address this question was Rabbi Hayim Hirshenzon (1857-1935). While a figure of minimal influence in his time, Hirshenzon remains a fascinating figure because he addressed many of the challenges posed by the political and moral developments of the modern era. Following the bloodshed of World War I, he supported the founding of the League of Nations as a method of peacefully resolving international disputes. This included the adoption of ethical standards, including the Hague Conventions, that were intended to tame wartime behavior. Hirshenzon believed that Jews were obligated to follow such standards, even in cases when they were not signers of such covenants. This was, in part, because it would be a desecration of God's name (hillul Hashem) for Jews not to support progressing toward a better civilization. When Jews signed covenants, they were further bound to uphold them even when its provisions were not endorsed by Jewish law. As precedent, he cited a remarkable case in the Talmud which describes how the Jewish people suffered because King Saul had violated a covenant with the Gibeonites. The Gibeonites demanded that, to make amends for this breach, seven of Saul's children be handed over to be killed. King David remarkably agreed to these demands, which the Talmudic sages condoned because it was a sanctification of God's name to show that the Jewish people upheld their promises! International agreements, Hirshenzon concluded, are therefore binding, even when they demand acts that would otherwise be prohibited. A more moderate model was suggested by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli. While arguing that Jewish law imposed few restrictions on wartime behavior, he asserted that Israel would be bound by the regulations agreed upon by the nations of the world. This was because Jewish law accepted the notion that "the land of the kingdom is the law." While this principle normally demands observing laws within a given country, Yisraeli broadly applied it to intergovernmental institutions. Accordingly, if the nations of the world would ban warfare - and hold to that agreement - then Jewish law would prohibit such wars. Yet in the absence of such agreements (or actual observance of the agreed-upon restrictions), Jewish law would not impose such restrictions. MANY RECENT scholars, including Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have argued that the international community's failure to uniformly enforce its rules - and worse, its inordinate targeting of Israel for censure while hypocritically remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses by Israel's enemies and others around the world - entirely undermines any possible halachic recognition of international law. This is for two reasons: firstly, because the premise of treaties is reciprocity. If one side is not committed to fighting by the agreed-upon rules, then the other side is no longer bound to those restrictions. Moreover, the unfair application of the rules is legally analogous to a state discriminately imposing taxes on one sector of the population. Ultimately, this is a form of extortion or theft, and the discriminated-against population would not be obligated to follow such rules. So, too, when the world gives disproportionate scrutiny to Israel's behavior, it reflects a bias that undermines the legitimacy of the entire system. Perhaps for that reason, a better model might be to see international law as an external challenge that can be compared to Jewish law. In this model, international standards deemed worthy of emulation still do not become obligatory; instead, a challenge is posed for decisors to search Jewish law and find internal precedents for observing these values. As Amos Israel-Vleeschhouwer has argued, this model may explain, for example, the attempt of figures like Israel's first Ashkenazi chief rabbi, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, to assert that minority groups should receive equal status under Israeli law. Similarly, one could suggest that the attempts of figures like Rabbi Shlomo Goren to argue that Jewish law prohibits targeting noncombatants, in spite of the biblical passages that seem to indicate otherwise, were attempts to bring Jewish norms into line with contemporary moral beliefs. The disadvantage of such an approach is that it may create situations in which decisors appear to force-read a given text. The distinct advantage, however, is that it gives Jews the impetus to derive new ideas from our own authoritative texts. Especially given the shaky status of international law, this may be the best path for Judaism to continue to develop a rich moral discourse. -- The writer is the director of the Tikvah Overseas Students Institute, a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School, and the author of A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary Halakhic Debates. Facebook.com/RabbiShlomoBrody Copyright ? 2018 Jpost Inc. All rights reserved From micha at aishdas.org Thu May 23 10:17:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 13:17:02 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> On Sun, May 19, at 1:39am EDT, R Michael Poppers wrote: : .. Last and not least, RSS z'l' : is quoted as : advocating the "generally-accepted" l'shon CHaZAL of "shelo asani goy" : as opposed to the "shelo asani nachri" emendation of a few grammarians : (naming Heidenheim and Baer and leaving the 3rd name to the imagination) or : "she'asani Yisrael". It is unclear what nusach Chazal was, before censorship. Shu"t Zekher Yehosef 1:13 prefers "shelo asani nakhri" on the grounds that that was the gemara's original girsa. "Shelo asani nakhri" is also the nusach some of the Gra's students record as his nusach. Because "umi ke'amkha Yisrael goy echad ba'aretz" -- we are a goy. I think the change, for those who see "nakhri" as a change rather than a restoration, is part of the same O Maskilim "correcting" Nusach Ashkenaz in general to leshon Tanakh. "Goy" as "[member of another] nation", rather than simply "nation" starts with Chazal. ... : RAM indicated a preference for "b*rachos" over "brachos", but I : think he should reconsider (and I believe he did after our conversation). : A sh'va (or, perhaps better, shva :)) is not a syllable unto itself : (that said, poets can consider it a unit for poetic purposes, e.g. the : 8 units in each phrase of "Y'did Nefesh"), but emphasizing a shva na', : e.g. "b'rachos", could turn it into a chiriq... True, so don't emphasize it. I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong. On Wed, May 22, at 10:47pm EDT, R Sholom Simon wrote: : (b) the sound is equivalent to a chataf vowel (as well as the fact that : it's a partial syllable) Grammatically, chataf vowel is a kind of sheva nach. That's how he can be either Mordechai or Mordochai (with a chataf-qamatz under the dalet). But a chataf under a dalet is a grammatical oddity. Maybe it's because the name "Mordochai" is borrowed from Persian? As for sound: : (As for "b", I once asked RSM: if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is : the same, why did ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice : versa in particular places: I think RSM responded that in some cases : it was to remind us to vocalize it, but in other cases, we don't really : know why he chose one over the other.) I dont' think that's true. A schwa can get a range of "colorings" based on what vowel is nearby. I thought that was why a geronit that can't take a sheva nach will be written with a chataf version of the adjacent nequdah. Wiki gives an example which matches my perception: he'emid, where the "'e" is an ayin with a chataf segol -- because your mouth can most readily repeat the segol that was under the hei. : Keitzad half of a syllable? Think of the last pasuk in Tehillim: "kol : han shama"... is han'shama 3 syllables? Or 4? Or 3-1/3? (I dunno : ...) This was new to me. When looking up the wiki example, I think the author says something similar. They have "he'emid" syllabified as "he-emid", only two syllables. I would have said he-`e-mid, a short but distinct middle syllable. There are two things making the syllable short, or leshitas Wikipedia (and as you wrote above), part of the next syllable: the letter will (almost) always be a geronit, AND the vowel itself is. So even if this new-to-me idea is correct, I wouldn't apply it to b'rakhos. BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 33rd day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 5 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Hod sheb'Hod: LAG B'OMER - What is total - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF submission to truth, and what results? From zev at sero.name Fri May 24 07:55:31 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:55:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] International Humanitarian Law in Halachah In-Reply-To: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> References: <20190523152811.GA3018@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <784525c6-60ae-22d6-9351-5eaf06fc930a@sero.name> The whole question doesn't begin, because there is no such thing as binding international law in the sense that national laws are considered binding. The UN *cannot* "vote in a law". The UN is not a world government or a legislature; it is simply a club for sovereign countries to talk to each other and negotiate voluntary agreements among themselves. Even under its own rules, the only body that can make "binding" resolutions is the Security Council, and only those resolutions adopted under Chapter 7; but even those are only binding because UN members agree to be bound by them. Treaties are binding only to the extent that countries agree to be bound by them; a country can repudiate it at will. The main reason not to is that it will then not get the benefits that were the reason it agreed to the treaty in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From rygb at aishdas.org Fri May 24 06:36:00 2019 From: rygb at aishdas.org (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 09:36:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of print. One that I think is in print is the Siddur Vilna. What about the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on YhA. KT, GS, YGB From micha at aishdas.org Fri May 24 09:35:39 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 12:35:39 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> References: <5ce6d7b5.1c69fb81.3fd73.81a7@mx.google.com> <7be80931-abeb-388a-7fb3-17fe171e6c38@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190524163539.GB14634@aishdas.org> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:36:00AM -0400, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote: : What, if any, significance does the meseg in the AS have? They are : really tiny. I hadn't even noticed them until a couple of days ago. They mark emphasized syllables. They, like everyone else, seem to only denote those that would avoid mistakes they think are common. And, diqduq is not ArtScroll's highest priority. So I wouldn't assume one /should/ be relying on the opinion they chose. A confusion is that sometimes a meseg is a real meseg, there since the Baalei Mesorah marked up the text with trop symbols. Which gets confusing in their text for Qeri'as Shema. >From my list of rules: > ' Mordechai Breuer's version of R' Elyahu Bachur's rules gimel - hei: > ei: sheva following a meseg (but not every meseg is still printed in > the text, nor is every meseg in the text from the originals) > (Raza"h's rule vuv) > (exceptions: 1. meseg between patach and yud-sheva (e.g. "vayhi", > "vaynahageihu"), > 2. meseg on chirik or segol of binyan hispa'el (e.g. > "mishtachavim", "esnahalah") : The siddurim that have been recommended to me are mostly out of : print... Both of the siddurim I suggested, Simanim and Ezor Eliyahu, are in print. Simanim, with the helpful floating text in the margine, is even comparatively inexpensive. : the new (Hebrew only) Koren siddur? I am not happy with it either, : since in the Heb-Eng Sacks siddur is says to say Hallel with a : bracha on YhA, but I am not sure what is a graver sin - changing Goy : to Nochri or directing the davener to say Hallel with a bracha on : YhA. If you are bothered by changing goy to nakhri then you really need an Ezor Eliyahu, which will tell you every change in girsa from the norms since the invention of the printing press. But they don't have all of them. Get used to "vesein chelqeinu beSorasakh, sabe'einu mituvakh, samach kafsheinu biyshu'asakh", numerous "shaAtah"s turning back into "sheAtah", etc.. Evolution in the siddur is the norm. You can't go crazy about any one change. (As long as it's not as big as a berakhah levatalah.) :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 34th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 4 weeks and 6 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Yesod sheb'Hod: How does submission result in - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF and maintain a stable relationship? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue May 28 03:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 06:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: . R' Sholom Simon asked: > if the sound of a shva na and a chataf is the same, why did > ben Asher use a chataf instead of a shva na, or vice versa in > particular places To me, this is an entirely reasonable question. And then the same question about a different pair. > ... someone earlier was asking about the difference between a > shuruk and a kubbutz and stated something to the effect that > there must be a difference, otherwise why would there be two > ways to write the vowel. RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in > various places. I understand why Ben Asher was named in the first question: Until that point, all our texts were consonant-only, and the correct pronunciation was pure tradition. Ben Asher and the other Baalei Mesorah took it upon themselves to devise systems to capture the traditional sounds with written symbols. If I am correct so far, then it is entirely reasonable to ask why someone would use two different symbols for the same sound. But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the unvowelled text (which, in many cases, is Hashem Himself). "Why was a vav used over here, but not over there?" I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text being more malleable than I had been led to believe. I can accept the idea that errors crept into the texts despite our best efforts, but I hope not to hear that chaser/malei were a free-for-all until Ban Asher standardized them. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue May 28 14:36:27 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 21:36:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther Message-ID: Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai or Chazal? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue May 28 14:47:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 17:47:31 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] An Aleph with a Nekuda Message-ID: <20190528214731.GA31471@aishdas.org> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:24:19PM -0400, Daas Books via Avodah wrote: : In last week's parsha (Emor; Lev. 23:17), there is an aleph with a nekuda. Also, Bereishis 43:24, "Vayavo Yoseif bahaysah, vayavi''u" -- where vayavi''u has the dotted alef Same shoresh, too. Ezra 8:18, "Veyavi''u lanu..." Iyov 33:21 has the only example with another shoresh "veshupu atzmosav lo ru''u" (ru''u with a dotted alef). Assuming that's real. The Rambam on Seifer haYetzirah only lists the other examples. Also, in the ta-/yavi''u cases, it's after a tenu'ah gedolah, a chiriq malei. So, it's not just the alef that makes it odd. And it means you can't just double it -- the previous syllable would have a chiriq chaseir if it were closed! This alef is entirely at the start of the /''u/ syllable. And the chiriq has the emphasis, too. It is about as far from a tenu'ah qetanah as exists. There is a mapiq hei, and Teimanim also have a mapiq alef -- maybe it's one of those. But it's not at the end of the word. So that is also a stretch. I would guess it's a mapiq alef. Of course someone else would say that it's not at the end of the word, so they would guess it's a dageish chazaq. This is not only oddly in an alef : This is not even printed in most Chumashim. Well, that's likely just because of the difficulty of implementing special cases with computer publishing. What are the odds the dageish misses any of the black of the alef? No one is going to bother coding for it. : What is its significance? How does it affect the leining, and why here? R Josh Waxman suggested to R Stephen Belsky that MAYBE it's to tell you to read the chiriq as chaseir, despite the yud. Of course, the only time you hear people make a point of pronouncing a chiriq malei differently is in Mezotrah with the metaher vs the meetaher. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 38th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 3 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Tifferes sheb'Yesod: How does reliability - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF promote harmony in life and relationships? From zev at sero.name Tue May 28 22:59:37 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 01:59:37 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > or Chazal? Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically applying to the Chachamim for canonization? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 04:04:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:04:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: , <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: >> Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to >> be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai >> or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > > -- > I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:14:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:14:32 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Sheidim = microbes? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529221432.GC4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:55:29PM -0400, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: : I have heard it said in the name of Rav Ahron Soloveichik (Logic of the : Heart) that some of what Chazal tell us about sheidim might refer to (or : apply to) microbes... His shitah is more general than that. At times sheidim and maziqin refer to mental illness or hallucinations too. Which explains their connection to night, to being alone, that those who are more fixated on them are more likely to be victimized. RAS's shitah is that Chazal (at least the Bavel branch) lived in a sociaty where the theory explaining these phenomenon used a different model of invisible cause than science found. It's not supersticious, but it's not "a sheid is a bacterium", either. See Logic of the Mind, Logic of the Heart pp 50-52. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:05:12 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:05:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers : prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it. You set a list of hundred of parameters to random values. (These parameters are the weights given to each input of an idealized "neuron"; each neuron produces a result which is then passed on either to other neurons as their inputs, or as output.) Give it sample input. If it gets the right answer, tweak those parameters one way; if it gets the wrong answer, tweak them another. Over time, the number of wrong answers diminishes. (Only your model is broken, and then you rethink what your inputs should be, or maybe which choice of mathemtical idealization of a "neuron" you chose, or how you layered their interconnections, or...) Notice you don't give a NN rules. Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what it did. So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral standards at all. Now what? : In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular : law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an : agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. So, if there were any way to know what values were encoded into your car's neural net, halakhah may tell you to get the one that prioritizes the driver. Also find a manufacturer that doesn't rank animals when the alternative is human life. And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 14:50:27 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 17:50:27 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190529215027.GA4687@aishdas.org> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:04:23AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: :> Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically :> applying to the Chachamim for canonization? : I was thinking the former but will accept either :-) Megillah 7a, version 1: Shalkhah lahem Esther laChakhamim: qav'uni ledoros.. They balk, saying it would cause antisemitism. She replies that Paras uMadai already have it recorded, so that problem would exist either way. Version 2: ... Kisvuni ledoros And their objection was from Mishlei "halo ketavi lakh shelishim" -- the inyan of Amaleiq needn't / shouldn't show up in Tanakh a 4th time. One difference -- version 1 is about Purim, version 2, about the megillah. In any case "shalkhah lahem" sounds like it's the person. Wouldn't a metaphoric request from Purim or the Megillah just say "sha'al/ah"? But "qav'uni" or "kisvuni"? It's not the queen who would be established or written down. Could be shorthand. Boils down to which you find a bigger stretch: that the metaphor would include sending messages, or that Esther the person would use the "-i" suffix not to mean "me" but "about me". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From micha at aishdas.org Wed May 29 15:25:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 18:25:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190529222524.GD4687@aishdas.org> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 06:38:46AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Sholom Simon asked: : > RSM asserted (orally, to me) that, : > aderaba, the sound is exactly the same. And then I asked the : > same question: why did ben Asher choose one over the other in : > various places. First, just about RSS's post. RSM says that in general. That the yud in a chiriq malei or the vav in a colam malei also don't impact pronunciation. RSM isn't just a chaver on Avodah, he is a rav nearly every O Jew who eats meat relies on, and has a PhD in Semitic Languages. So, his opinion would be treated seriously. However, we do need to note it's likely a daas yachid. ... : But that's not the case regarding shuruk (a vav with a dot in the middle) : and kubbutz (three diagonal dots below a letter). This question, it seems : to me, should be asked not of Ben Asher, but of the original author of the : unvowelled text... : I fear that the answer will have something to do with the written text : being more malleable than I had been led to believe... Well, even by R Meir's day we couldn't rely on our chaseiros and yeseiros. But these things would be decided by sampling reliable sifrei Torah and finding rov, not grammar rules. So there is some drift (and I do not take the Rambam's iqar as insisting otherwise). But the Baalei Mesorah would not be imposing the drift by fiat. Like the famously odd "mishnah" in Soferim (6:4) in which we learn that Ezra followed rov of the three sefarim found on Har haBayis and after 3 of the differences between them he ended up with a text that wasn't in any. And that's the kosher text from which we ended up basing ours! (Also, let's not forget that Ben Asher was only one family of Mesoretes. Not everything we have is their work alone!) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 39th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 5 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Yesod: What is imposing about a - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF reliable person? From JRich at sibson.com Wed May 29 16:31:07 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:31:07 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] driverless cars in Halacha? In-Reply-To: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> References: <20190529220512.GB4687@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Micha:] > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I've heard Ravi Asher Weiss make the point concerning the programmers >: prioritizing driverless cars' decisions from the point of the driver... > Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the idiom is currently used, generally > refers to Neural Nets (NN). One doesn't program a NN, one trains it... > Notice you don't give a NN rules. True, I used program in a colloquial sense but still the triner (perhaps subconsciously ) gives over his priorities so one could still "train" from the drivers point of view when saying if a result is "right" > Worse, there is no way to pick out of NN to figure out after the fact what > it did. Amen-there's a lot of work being done on how to get these systems to explain their results because no one will trust them otherwise > So, what you're saying is that whomever is training the neural net will > treat risk to the driver as more wrong than other people's death or injury. Yup > If it requires a LOT of data, it's going to be based on movies of people > with good driving records actually driving, and not articulated moral > standards at all. That's really a question the designers will have to thinkabout (e.g. what is a good driver? >: In addition I'm not sure whether Halacha or secular >: law will view the programmer as an agent of society rather than as an >: agent of the eventual buyer. Thoughts? > As R Aqiva said about not sharing your canteen in the desert -- chayekha > qodmin. Nothing about shelichus. And unless the programmer is one of > the people crossing the street in front of the car, I don't see applicability. Think about the 3rd party with water and no need for it > Rather, I would frame it in terms of purchasing decision: It is appropriate > for a buyer to choose a car that places more value on his own life. And then you and not the programmer are liable? > And since halakhah is more about following the rules and leaving the > conseqences to Hashem, not one that chooses swerving out of a lane with > 2 people in it in order to hit only one. Halakhah would seem to tell > you not to go near the switch in a Trolley Car Problem situation. And > therefore that's what you should choose to buy. Not sure- maybe you go with the CI saying it could be considered an act of hatzalah KT Joel From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu May 30 11:19:03 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Thu, 30 May 2019 21:19:03 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Megilat Esther In-Reply-To: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> References: <2b0cde7c-cd18-9252-8ffc-107299ae8a7f@sero.name> Message-ID: On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 9:37 AM Zev Sero via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On 28/5/19 5:36 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > > Any thoughts on why the Talmud places the request for Megilat Esther to > > be part of Tanach in the mouth of Esther rather than that of Mordechai > > or Chazal? > > Does "Esther" here refer to the queen, or to the sefer, metaphorically > applying to the Chachamim for canonization? > If the sefer, then the question becomes -- why is the sefer called Megillat Esther rather than Megillat Mordechai? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From martinlbrody at gmail.com Fri May 31 10:45:31 2019 From: martinlbrody at gmail.com (Martin Brody) Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 10:45:31 -0700 Subject: [Avodah] It's called Megillat Esther..... Message-ID: ...because she wrote it. -- Martin Brody 310-474-1856 From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Jun 2 13:51:58 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 16:51:58 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Shva Na's etc. Message-ID: In Avodah V37n42, R'Micha wrote "the Gra's" and then -- forgive me, R'Micha, but that's the way I perceived your comments -- harped on the tree and ignored the forest by noting, 'I don't think Hebrew is supposed to have any consonant blends, including the /br/ you would end up with. Maybe I should write it "b'rakhos", rather than "berakhos", but I wouldn't write "brakhos", that just seems wrong.' and 'BTW, RMP, what would you do with "v'hoda'os"? /vh/ doesn't blend; you can't say vav and hei without a vowel in between. (I guess you can fully combine them into a single aspirated /wh/, given a waw instead of a vav.)' The main point is that a sh'va na' begins a syllable; the ancillary point is that it can never be a syllable unto itself and therefore should never be pronounced in a manner which would cause confusion with a vowel that can be a syllable unto itself. Precisely how one should then pronounce a sh'va na' may depend on the consonant it's gracing, on whether that consonant has a dageish, and perhaps on the following consonant; but just because the "vav" consonant with a sh'va na' does not smoothly continue into the following consonant does not, at least to me, mean that a beis w/ a sh'va na' cannot smoothly continue into a reish (likewise, and this is why I quoted the GRA acronym, a gimel followed by a reish); and (in case this was not clear before!) while I really was addressing pronunciation and not orthography, I'm happy that R'Micha and I can agree that transliterating a sh'va na' with an "e" can lead to mistakes (see the ancillary point above). Gut Voch and all the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 08:42:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 15:42:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I know it is customary to wait to daven Maariv until after nightfall on the first evening of Shavuos. Is it permissible to make early Yom Tov on the second day of Shavuos? A. The Taz (beginning of OC:494) writes that one should not daven Maariv on the first night of Shavuos before nightfall. The counting of the 49 days of Sefira concludes with Shavuos. If we daven Maariv before nightfall, we declare it to be Shavuos, and the last day of Sefira will have ended prematurely. What about the second day of Shavuos? The reasoning of the Taz would seemingly not apply since the Sefira was concluded a day earlier. However, some poskim point out that it is inappropriate to start Yom Tov early on the second day of Shavuos as well, based on an additional comment of the Taz. The Taz (OC 489:10) writes that one should count Sefira on the eighth day of Pesach before Kiddush. By delaying the recitation of Kiddush, we preserve the Kedusha (sanctity) of the seventh day of Pesach, which is a Biblical Yom Tov, for a few extra moments, before initiating the Kedusha of the eighth day of Pesach, which is of Rabbinic nature. The same argument can be applied to Shavuos: It is inappropriate to daven Maariv on the second day of Shavuos before nightfall and diminish the sanctity of the first day of Shavuos, which is a Biblical Yom Tov. The Minchas Yitzchak (10:41), based on the Kaf Hachaim, adds an additional concern. If we begin Yom Tov early on the second day, it may lead to confusion, and people might start Yom Tov early on the first day as well. The Minchas Yitzchak concludes that regarding both concerns, there are dissenting views, and if there is a strong need, such as for those who are ill, there is room to be lenient. It should be noted that even if one starts the second day Yom Tov early, it is forbidden to begin preparations (such as lighting candles and warming food) for the second day until after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 3 09:49:27 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:49:27 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul Message-ID: >From https://is.gd/znrz8P Brooklyn, NY - A well known and respected voice in the world of at risk behavior is calling for a drastic change to the religious education system, observing that the one-size-fits-all approach taken by many yeshivos is failing a substantial number of students. In an 18 minute video, Avi Fishoff of TWiSTED PARENTiNG noted that in the post-war years, the educational system focused on producing students who could reinvigorate the Torah world by building yeshivos and other communal institutions. Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. ?Otherwise we will have a majority of our children leaving the yeshiva world feeling like they are not a success, the hatzlacha that they were meant to be, which is false, and the result of that can be disastrous,? said Fishoff. Please see the above URL for more. In particular, there is a video at the end of this article that is well-worth seeing. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 3 20:44:24 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 06:44:24 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides nishtane hateva? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 14:10:31 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, there would not be a kiyum krait hatorah bshlaimuta (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik - Page 101). This would preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. All other things being equal, should you seek out a minyan with a Cohain to get the complete mitzvah? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 4 15:56:35 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 22:56:35 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Some thoughts on Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Message-ID: Blessings and Thanksgiving- Reflections on the Siddur and Synagogue Rabbi Joseph B Soloveitchik The editors have drawn from a number of The Rav's presentations to provide us with insights regarding prayer and the synagogue. These are two areas where we could all probably use a little chizuk(strengthening.) The use of the word reflections in the title is indicative of what seems to me to be the best use of the book. It?s not meant to be a prayer or synagogue companion but rather a text to provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the deeper meaning of our prayer and synagogue participation which will hopefully inform on our experiences in those venues. The summary below is but a pale reflection of The Rav?s brilliant intellect and communication skills. Chapter 1 The Morning Blessings In this chapter, The Rav demonstrates in practice that a true scholar must never lose his childlike curiosity. He begins with some simple questions concerning the morning blessings which lead to an analysis of Chazal's phrasing and an understanding of their main elements. We see that the essence of prayer is our relationship with God who is beyond our ability to praise appropriately. Our prayers also establish ethical norms for us. The morning blessings deal with both our aesthetic and ethical experiences and remind us of our total dependence, on God from both a practical and legal standpoint. Because of this dependence, we are insecure and the antidote is our relationship with HKB"H. The Rav then analyzes the individual blessings and shows how the opening and closing morning blessings reflect our physical and spiritual creation by HKB"H which is the basis of all Jewish philosophy. Chapter 2 - Psukei Dzimra and Kaddish In this chapter, the Rav compares our praise of HKB"H through Psukei Dzimra to that through Hallel. While not explicitly mentioned here, The Rav?s opinion that prayer requires a matir (permission) leads him to an analysis of these two forms of praise. He concludes that the praise of Psukei Dzimra is grounded in our inability to praise God appropriately and thus we can only use the specific Tanach texts already established by those much greater than us. Hallel however is praise directly commanded by HKB"H (indicated by the mitzvah blessing it starts with) and thus God's commandment itself is the matir. Psukei Dzimra concludes with yishtabach which is a reflexive term indicating that only God himself would be able to praise himself appropriately. We thus use yishtabach to reflect on the fact that all the praises we?ve said up until that point are still insufficient. The Rav then compares the kaddish we say prior to barchu with barchu and kedusha. He concludes that kaddish is grounded in our inability to appropriately praise God whereas barchu and kedusha are grounded in the command obligation to praise him. The Rav sees the role of kaddish before barchu as taking a disparate group of individuals and forming them into a cohesive kahal (congregation). In our age of radical focus on the individual, this message of community focus becomes all the more important. Chapter 3- Keriat Shma and the Blessings of Torah In this chapter The Rav develops the role of Keriat Shma as the acceptance of the heavenly yoke, mitzvot and remembering leaving Egypt. He notes a parallel between each of the blessings recited around Keriat Shma and the themes of the three paragraphs of Keriat Shma. The learning of Torah includes both intellectual and emotional components but the blessings refer to the emotional one which require a total commitment to Torah as our highest priority. The Rav describes his own mesora experience in the most poignant manner. The purpose of the blessings includes a quest for truth and chesed as a person moves from object to subject and seeks to relieve his existential loneliness. Chapter 4 - Birkat Hamazon , The Grace After Meals Grace after meals demonstrates both the need to do chesed (loving kindness) every day [e.g. inviting those who are hungry] and to be kadosh (holy) [e.g. the ability to withdraw from the from forbidden] Birkat Hamazon is not primarily a blessing on thanksgiving but rather of recognizing and remembering God?s mastery over the world and our ability to benefit from it. From the requirement for a zimmun(group of 3 or more) we see the importance of group recognition of God's mastery. The themes of the specific blessings are God as caretaker for all of creation, the great gift of the land of Israel and thanks to God whether we are are in times of good or adversity. Chapter 5 - Grant us Understanding to Know Your Ways The amora Shmuel wrote the prayer of havineunu which summarizes the middle blessings of the shmoneh esrai in order to be used if time were short. Although we do not say this blessing today, the text reveals a number of insights into the meaning of the blessings of the shmoneh esrai. They include: human intelligence is the source of our bliss and suffering, recognition of our mortality and acceptance of our burden, prayer is a result of distress, our purpose is to know God?s ways (which will also form our personality), we need to expose our heart to the word of God, we choose the ethical over the social norm, there is a requirement not just to seek God but to find him , there are three forms of mesora - lomdus(intellectual), practical and haleiv (experiential) and the last is the most difficult to transmit, individual redemption can come through Torah and prayer which transport us to another reality, we pray for the community redemption, the righteous will be for fulfilled with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, prayer is needed for redemption but we must ask for that redemption, prayer is both intellectual and emotional, zeaka (anguished cry) is not regular prayer but a wordless prayer/cry. Chapter 6 Praying for the defeat of evil The first two chapters of Psalms reflect the destruction of evil and the triumph of good, one on a communal level and one on individual level. Psalm 104 is the first hallelujah which reflects the destruction of sin rather than of sinners. The lesson is that God dwells in each of us and each of us is capable of repentance. Chapter 7 Berakhot in Judaism Blessings are not primarily about praise but about self-actualization and increasing goodness, renewal and expansion in the world. Kabbalists see the role of blessings as discovering God in this world. The formulation of the brachot is about asking God to reveal the glory of his dominion. Using Adona-i is about lordship meaning that everything (including our material and mental elements) belong to him. Use of Malchut allows us not to commit sacrilege when using his belongings. So what does God asks of us? We must contract (mtazmtzeim) and defer to his rules (halacha as a hedge of lilies), we must act with humility and anonymity and we must be silent and accept suffering with love. Chapter 8 - Communal Prayer and the Structure of the Synagogue The prayer leader stands in the middle of the synagogue in front of the Torah because the minyan is a miniature assembly representing the entire congregation of Israel. Voluntary prayer is compared to both personal pleading and the communal sacrificial service. Individual prayer is important but communal prayer bonds us all together in a communal sacrifice. The Torah amalgamates all our prayers into a single prayer and that?s why the prayer leader stands in front of the Torah as we bond together into a single community of sacrifice. Chapter 9 - The Synagogue as an Institution and an Idea The Rav reflects on the laity?s view of the synagogue in his day, it?s certainly worth thinking about whether times have changed or not. The main issues a with the synagogue across all branches of Judaism in his day was that there was a general anti-establishment mood, the commitment to Israel outweighed the commitment to the synagogue and Rabbis did not always meet the peoples? needs, especially the younger folks who wanted more religion. Because of these and other issues, people tended to wander from synagogue to synagogue and tfila btzibbur was not considered a priority. The Rav explains that man is in exile and must pray in order to redeem himself. The exile is both historic and existential. The beit knesset is not a house of prayer but a home of prayer. It is really not God?s home but the home where God comes for his appointment to meet man. The shaliach tzibbur is an existential agent for the tzibbur (community) and the tzibbur in turn represents all of knesset yisrael- now and throughout history, thus the beit knesset becomes the home for all of knesset israel Chapter 10- Old Prayer and New Jews Jewish prayer is not ceremonial in that it is not superstitious, illusory or requiring of an officiant. True prayer has both an act (maaseh) and a completion (kiyum). The completion of prayer is the heartfelt emotion, the actions are the words of prayer. We really don?t understand how prayer works and why God should care what we say, but we know he does because we know our great forefathers prayed. Because of the need to follow in the footsteps of our forefathers, The Rav was very against any changes in that prayer text or adding additional prayers. What we have managed to do is infuse fixed prayer with feeling(me-halevai) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ajfried22 at gmail.com Tue Jun 4 18:36:35 2019 From: ajfried22 at gmail.com (Abraham J. Friedman) Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2019 21:36:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? [image: Google Plus] *Sincerely, * Abraham J. Friedman ajfried22 at gmail.com Connect with me on Linkedin On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:22 PM Marty Bluke via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 bones and that > women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. The modern consensus is that > an adult has 206 bones the same number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies besides > nishtane hateva? > _______________________________________________ > Avodah mailing list > Avodah at lists.aishdas.org > http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 03:13:54 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 06:13:54 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The Gemara in bechoros 45 says that the human body has 248 > bones and that women have 4 additional bones, 252 in total. > The modern consensus is that an adult has 206 bones the same > number for men and women. > > What explanations are given to resolve these discrepancies > besides nishtane hateva? To me, the simplest answer lies in the definition of "a bone". For example, there might be something that the modern consensus counts as mere cartilage or something else, while the Gemara counts it as a bone. And there might be things that the modern consensus counts as one single bone, while the Gemara counts it as two or more. By the way, a careful reading of R' Bluke's first sentence will suggest that according to the Gemara, women are not human. For more on this topic, I highly recommend Sarah Rudolph's recent article, "Words Matter", at https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/words-matter/ Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Wed Jun 5 01:25:48 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:25:48 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Abraham J. Friedman wrote: > I would imagine that just like by a strawberry whereby it is classified as > a fruit scientifically but nevertheless halacha requires us to make a > hadaamah on it, similarly with the skeletal structural composition of a > human. There must be a difference for the basis of classification as to > what makes something count as a bone. Did they actually count it out or > simply come to the conclusion based on a drasha? The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that they actually counted the number of bones. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:19:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:19:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 04:49:27PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : From https://is.gd/znrz8P :> Having successfully created that infrastructure, Fishoff said that :> the time has come to prioritize maximizing the potential of each child :> instead of encouraging every student to become a long term learner, :> a goal that leaves many feeling like failures. This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild the infrastucture. And yes, dyslexic and AD[H]D labeled children might well make up the majority of the OTD boys' population. If not, it's a very disproportionate minority. But I think there is something else going on that may be more primary than the urge to produce gedolim. R Ari Fishoff talks about "child", but focusing on the goals of producing a "long term learner" means he's talking about boys' education. On the girls' side too, though, we had a system that used to teach a Yahadus of "Chessed and the other 612". (Exagerating for slogan purposes. Chessed is an umbrella that includes a number of the 613, not just 1.) But now there is progressively more focus on tzeni'us. What the two have in common is a turning inward. A transplant of Torah through the "Me Generation" period. Insert my usual rant about frumkeit having replaced ehrlachkeit here. One of my OTD sons picked up my sefer long enough to form an opinion of its thesis. He is pretty sure that had Yahadus actually maintained the Bein Adam laChaveiro focus R Shimon Shkop (or R' Chaim Volozhiner or R Chaim Brisker, or...) had taken for granted, he doesn't know if he wouldn't have opted out. In short, the O he doesn't believe in, I don't believe in either. And it's quite likely my boys picked that much of the message up from me. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jun 5 10:16:34 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 13:16:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Avi Fishoff: Yeshiva Systems Needs Major Overhaul In-Reply-To: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> References: <20190605161915.GP12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: At 12:19 PM 6/5/2019, Micha Berger wrote: >This is akin to discussion we had in the early days of this list -- >did REED et al mean "1000 go in so that 1 gadol comes out" as a hora'as >sha'ah? At the time this model was promoted, we did need to rebuild >the infrastucture. IMO everyone should read Rabbi Dr. Joseph Breur's essay Vocation and Calling. I can send it to anyone who is interested. Here are some selections from this essay. The choice of a vocation for our mature youth (we are initially concerned with our male youth) is unquestionably one of the serious challenges that confronts parents. Aware of their responsibility, parents realize that the success and happiness of their children are vitally dependent on the right choice of a profession, which, obviously, should be compatible with their children's inclinations and talents. Fortunate the parents who succeed early enough in analyzing their children's talents and traits, and are thus able to offer helpful guidance in their choice of vocation. Alas, the wrongly chosen profession often results in acute dissatisfaction or, worse,utter emptiness. This, incidentally, brings to mind the oft-repeated question whether it should not be welcomed if bachurim express the desire to "remain in learning." "Remain"? Should not everyone "remain in learning"? Evidently what is meant is the exclusive occupation with Torah study. If this involves the student's full-time occupation with "learning" for a period of several years before embarking upon a professional career, such a decision should only be welcomed. We would have serious misgivings, however, if the decision of exclusive "learning" would exclude any thought of a practical preparation for the demands of life. Every profession requires training. This may not be possible at a more advanced age. (The chance of entering the firm of one's future father-in-law where further training is possible is not normally given to the average student.) On the other hand, few possess the ability to become a Rosh Yeshiva. To be able to "learn" does not at all mean that one is able to teach. In this connotation, the following word of wisdom comes to mind, albeit in a loftier, more far-reaching interpretation: "Thou- sands occupy themselves with the Written Teaching, but mere hundreds emerge who actually possess it; tens occupy themselves with the Talmud, but only one actually masters it - and thus muses Koheles: 'One man I found among thousands'" (Midrash Rabbah Koheles 7). In every case, the responsible officials of our Torah institutions should carefully determine, after a given period of time, whether the individual student possesses the qualifications to justify the choice of Torah study as an occupation, or whether it would not be necessary to suggest to him to concern himself with his professional training (while, of course, continuing to be koveah itim l'Torah). ln many of the latter cases the school officials would do well not to rely on the self-judgment of the individual student. Is it conceivable that the high praise that Tehillim (128) reserves for the head of the family who labors and cares for his wife and children would be directed only to the "less gifted" among our people? We need the greats of Torah. But we also need men, solid bnei Torah, who prove themselves as conscientious Yehudim in every type of profession, thus striving towards the lofty goal envisioned by the faithful of our people: to serve with their lives, before all the world, the sanctification of the Divine Will - Kiddush Hashem. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 04:38:46 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is > a requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not > observed, there would not be a kiyum kriat hatorah bshlaimuta > (complete completion of the mitzvah of kriat hatorah (see Halakkic > Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik ? Page 101). This would > preclude what seems to be the somewhat common approach of asking > the Cohain to leave so that his aliyah can be given to a Yisrael. Even in a situation where the kriat hatorah is essentially d'Oraisa, the structure and organization of the aliyot is d'rabanan at most. In other words, I cannot imagine that R?YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a *Torah* requirement in the kriat hatorah. But honoring the Cohain *IS* a Torah requirement. If there is a situation where we are justified in asking the Cohain to step outside, I can't imagine worrying about the "bshlaimuta" as described here. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 09:49:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:49:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik pg 101). We have seen the inyan of calling a kohein up first when discussing how "darkei Shalom" can't refer to a survival strategy. If we call a kohein first "mishum darkei Shalom", then why are we assuming any of the invocations of the idea WRT nakhriim is any different? (Never mind the Rambam proving "darkei Shalom" with "derkheha darkhei no'am vekhol nesivoseha shalom".) But back to our point, Gittin 5:8 says the reason for calling a kohein first is "darkei Shalom". Isn't that about not offending the person who would think they deserve the first aliyah if the criterion was more objective? (And when only the first and last person made berakhos, this didn't just shift the competition among Yisraelim to shelishi.) It is true that the gemara's proof-text (59b) is Devarim 31:9, MRAH giving the kohanim their manuscript of the Torah first. Or other such pesuqim which list teaching the kohanim first. One exception, R Chiyya b Abba holds it is from Vayiqra 21:8, "veqidashto" -- making it a din in qedushas kohanim, unrelated to lating. But then Abayei continues by asking whether all this means that darkei Shalom is deOraisa? And R Yosef says it is true that a kohein reads first deOraisa, and yet it's because of DS. None of which would make it a din in qeri'ah. What's RYBS's maqor? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 5 12:09:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 19:09:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> References: , <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <4F7C0F14-BD65-4F59-8070-EEC126A445F8@sibson.com> > On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 09:10:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > : R'YBS held that the order of kohein, Levi, Yisrael for aliyot is a > : requirement in the kriat hatorah (not in kavod) and thus, if not observed, > : there would not be a kiyum [kriat] hatorah bshlaimuta... > > Lo zakhisi lehavin (and I don't own a Halakkic Positions of Rabbi Joseph > B. Soloveitchik pg 101). ',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ?The Gemara Megillah 23b asks ?to what do the three aliyos correspond? Rav Assi answers: To Torah,Nviim, and Ksuvim. This means that the Torah incorporates within itself all three kedushos: Kedushas Torah,Kedushas Neviim , and Kedushas Ksuvim. Rovo answers that the 3 aliyos correspond to Kohen, Levi and Yisrael. We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. Therefore according to Rav Soloveitchik if there is no kohen for the first aliyah for any reason, the completeness of kiyum krias hatorah bshlaimus is lacking.? Kt Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jun 5 12:12:38 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 15:12:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Kriat Hatorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190605164933.GQ12270@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190605191238.GA8951@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:08:31PM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: : We see from the above that the reason for calling a kohen first to the : Torah is not only because of vkidashto, as the Gemara gittin suggests, : but also because it is an integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah. ... Then R Yosef couldn't respond to Abayei that the pesuqim prove that darkhei Shalom is deOraisa. They could well speak of this "integral part of the mitzvah of Krias hatorah." I mean, the majority of pesuqim in Gittin even would seem to be about qeri'as haTorah, until R Yosef says that they're about DS, just in QhT and talmud Torah situations. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Today is the 46th day, which is http://www.aishdas.org/asp 6 weeks and 4 days in/toward the omer. Author: Widen Your Tent Netzach sheb'Malchus: How can some forms of - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF "unity" be over domineering? From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Jun 5 13:35:54 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 20:35:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Why Do So Many Boys and Girls Go to Learn in Eretz Yisroel Message-ID: Ever wonder why it has become so popular for boys and girls to go to Eretz Yisroel to study Torah. Rabbi Brudny discusses this in the talk below starting at about half way through his remarks. YL LINK TO RABBI BRUDNY BEAUTIFUL SHAVUOS VAAD: https://www.dropbox.com/s/a8gj253fs4gww05/026%20Rav%20Brudny%20Vaad%20Shavuos%205779.MP3?dl=0 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Wed Jun 5 16:10:29 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:10:29 +1000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 can mean many Message-ID: Can anyone assist with sources which use the figure 2 to actually mean 2 out more? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 6 02:41:17 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:41:17 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] How many bones in the human body? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wednesday, June 5, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > The Gemara there has a story that they counted the bones of an executed > person and ended up with 152. They asked R' Yishmael about the extra bones > and he asked was it a woman and they said yes. We see from this story that > they actually counted the number of bones. In fact the Gemara a little later quotes R Akiva that women have 253 bones so we have a dispute whether they have 252 or 253 bones. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 6 11:10:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:10:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Halachic Challenges of the Cheesecake Message-ID: Interestingly, the upcoming holiday of Shavuos nowadays might be best known for the minhag that even many non-practicing Jews are stringent for: eating cheesecake. Yet, did you know that by abiding by this time honored and delicious custom, you are actually commemorating a korban? And what does it have to do with the prohibition of Dairy Bread? Please see https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5154 YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jun 11 11:02:38 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:02:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender Message-ID: This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346/rabbi-efrem-goldberg/man-and-woman-he-created-them-torah-view-of-transgender/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jun 11 18:26:33 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 21:26:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Man and Woman He Created Them: Torah View of Transgender In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190612012633.GC5637@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 06:02:38PM +0000, Lawrence Levine via Avodah wrote: : This topic was discussed by Rabbi Efrem Goldberg in 2015. You may listen to his talk at : https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/837346 Related is the beraisa on the top of Yevamos 83a in which R' Yosi says an andogynous is a berya bifnei atzmo, and the discussion as to whether the beraisa has authority in the face of a mishnah. However, the notion of a middle sex is at least taken seriously, and not "merely" as a safeiq sex. However, I haven't seen any ground in the Torah for the sex vs gender distinction being used to model these things in modern Western discourse. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow http://www.aishdas.org/asp with only the things Author: Widen Your Tent we thanked Hashem for today! - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:13:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:13:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife Message-ID: Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in the majority of cases, there's no other way. 1.) How did HKB"H expect this to work prior to the Rabbinic injunction? (this applies to other examples as well where the halachic gold standard of two witnesses is relaxed) 2.) Is it related to R'Moshe's (self-knowledge) and "neemanut" (trust).[see Iggrot Moshe Y"D 1:54] KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 12 02:15:16 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:15:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum Message-ID: Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries who seem unsure. Perhaps Chametz/Pesach is different but it seems an undetermined state is a challenge halachically (me - are bein hashmasot and koy chiddushim or paradigms?) KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Wed Jun 12 20:31:50 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 06:31:50 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is the kinyan? Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn?t work. Additionally, credit cards would seem to not be kesef as the buyer is not actually paying anything, the merchant when he swipes the card receives a promise from the credit card company that it will pay him. The buyer is not paying the seller anything. The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice to close a deal is considered a kinyan. However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made system? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jun 13 08:58:08 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Lawrence Levine) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:58:08 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Rav_Nosson_Kamenetsky=2C_zt=94l?= Message-ID: Please see the article at https://cross-currents.com/2019/06/09/rav-nosson-kamenetsky-ztl/ I found the following from the article most interesting. My most vivid memory of him was of an exchange just a few months ago. The last time I visited him in his apartment, my son asked him a difficult question about how to explain some apparent shortcomings in the community to his own children. At one point, my son pushed him to better define one of his answers. ?But what does Daas Torah say about that?? my son asked. Rav Nosson looked him straight in the eye and responded, ?Daas Torah is that you should use your own brain!? He could hardly be called a free-thinker (like the European maskilim were called), but he put individual sechel on a pedestal. I can?t think of a quality that is so often in short supply, and that will be so sorely missed. I sincerely wish that more people would subscribe to this approach to Daas Torah!!!!! YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Thu Jun 13 05:51:33 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:51:33 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:22 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik > framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is > the kinyan? The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, music and the like. From marty.bluke at gmail.com Thu Jun 13 06:09:46 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:09:46 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Thursday, June 13, 2019, Saul Guberman wrote: > The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into > your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, > music and the like. > That would mean that internet purchases don?t really happen until you get the actual goods. Not the way it is generally looked at -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From galsaba at aol.com Fri Jun 14 05:59:20 2019 From: galsaba at aol.com (Aharon Gal) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 08:59:20 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Trop Metigah ("Kadma - Zakef Katon") Message-ID: <397E3A23-5049-494D-B225-96B62DC986E8@aol.com> I am curious to know how Ba?alei Keriah leins a word that has a Metigah. I used the term Metigah, but there are other names to it. The Yemenites call it Dorban. Some call it Kadma-Zakef Katon. I don?t use this term, as the siman above the letter is not Kadma, it is only the same siman that Kadma uses. Some call it Pashta Katon. I dont like this term either, for the same reason that I dont like the terem Kadma-Zakef Katon. In a word like ??????????????? (Levinyamin), some emphasize both the the Zakef Katon and the ?Kadma? (the ?not kadma??), which i dont know if this is correct or not, because this ?Kadma? is not a ta?am, but Metiga. Some treats it as a Meteg. But also those who treat it as a Meteg, or secondary accent, I am not sure if they need to accent the letter under the metiga, or may be the metiga is always (almost) at the same place, but not necessarily the accent is (compare Telishot). Most uses special nigun (?melody?) for a word that has Metiga-Zakef Katon, but I am curious to know if in addition to it they pronounce the Metiga as well. Aharon -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:02:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:02:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150246.GB6588@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 06:31:50AM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: : I am struggling as to how to fit in credit card purchases into a halachik : framework. The question is when I buy something with a credit card what is : the kinyan? : : Everyone agrees that kesef, money, does not work to acquire metaltlim so : even if a credit card is kesef it shouldn't work... On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 08:51:33AM -0400, Saul Guberman wrote: : The kinyan can be when you take the goods with you or are delivered into : your possession. Not sure how that would work for intangibles like apps, : music and the like. Not "can be", that is when the qinyan is made. Mese'oraisa, moving the money was the qinyan. However, Chazal saw that if the money changed hands first, and the seller still had physical control of the cheftza, he could damage something that was the buyers. So, they changed the rules. I don't know their mechanics for doing so: hefqer beis din hefqer or the CM version of minhag mevatel halakhah -- that when it comes to money, what both parties agree to or even implicitly agree to matters more than default halakhah. Which is the general ruberic under which one of RMBluke's other points fall: : However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does the Torah : have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah is devoted to them : when they are basically irrelevant and have been superseded by a man made : system? You can ask that about situmta and minhag mevatel halakhah in general. Why are there dinei mamonos (excluding kenas and ribbis, which are in YD rather than CM) if the expectations of both parties can trump them anyway? Good question even without bring up credit cards. Then at 04:09:46PM +0300, R Marty Bluke replied: : That would mean that internet purchases don't really happen until you get : the actual goods. ... Credit cards do add another complication. The money transfer isn't final. You have so many days to call your company and question the charges. So if the qinyan were at the transfer of money, would it be assur to challenge the bill until after you return the lemon you bought? : ... Not the way it is generally looked at But that brings us back to situmta, and minhag mevatel halakhah. No? I think you have to consider it, but you said you didn't want to. Maybe we need to start with "Why CM if it's only a default that is almost always overridden?" and then consider the situmta argument viable here. I think there are two things I picked up from AhS CM: 1- The meta-issues. In other words, by seeing how one set of rules are adjudicated, you get some feel for how our set of expectations should be interepreted. 2- Dinei mamonos tells us something about the ideal society's relationship to money. That's not our context, so as halakhah it doesn't often apply. Perhaps only where these is no expectation, or international business where each party has different norms (and there is no international trade norm). But it says what ideal BD should err on the side of, and on an aggadic level, what we individuals should be thinking about our (?) money vs communal money vs honesty in business, vs... :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger Here is the test to find whether your mission http://www.aishdas.org/asp on Earth is finished: Author: Widen Your Tent if you're alive, it isn't. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Richard Bach From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:13:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:13:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Call the midwife In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614151329.GD6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:13:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Kiddushin 73b states we believe the midwife to tell us which twin came out : first. The Ran on the Rif on Kiddushin 31a states a midwife's credibility : is not "mdin" (from the law) but the Rabbis believed her because in : the majority of cases, there's no other way... And further, d"h Aval heikha, the only reason why an eid achad can trump her ne'emanus is that it's not midina. I think the Ran is saying the midwife's ne'emanus is as evidence, not eidus. (Midina -- midin eidus in particular.) Halakhah has a very weak view of evidence, usually considering it circumstantial, or grounds for not giving up on the derishah vechaqira until it's explained. If they were trumping all the deOraisa and not limiting it to dinei eidus... I mean, this isn't dinei mamunus. In the gemara's case talking about allowing a person eat terumah despite being only one of 4 potential kohanim. And presumably this neemanus would be enough to permit marriages between these for velodos and the other families' daughters! :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger The thought of happiness that comes from outside http://www.aishdas.org/asp the person, brings him sadness. But realizing Author: Widen Your Tent the value of one's will and the freedom brought - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF by uplifting its, brings great joy. - R' Kook From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jun 14 08:04:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:04:08 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] time/space continuum In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190614150408.GC6588@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 09:15:16AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Take a look at S"A O"C 441 (1 & 2) where there's a loan/surety situation : over Pesach between a ben brit and non ben brit where the whole space/time : continuum thing is in play (the agreement is the surety belongs to the : lender as of the date of the loan [prior to Pesach] if, and only if, the : repayment is not made on the due date [during or after Pesach]). While : the S"A seems straightforward (me - compare to the quantum physics/double : slit once there is an observer) the M"B quotes a number of commentaries : who seem unsure. ... Since this is before measurement, I think this is less like quantum uncertainty and more a simple case of yeish bereiera vs ein bereira. :-)BBii! -Micha From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Jun 16 10:19:26 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 13:19:26 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Can You Tell What Kind of Adult A Child Will Become? Message-ID: <0A9F0F26-954E-4BC3-BF85-916AEA173B14@cox.net> The four sons of the Pesach Seder leads to an interesting question: Can you tell what a child will be like judging from his/her behavior as a child? The Talmud relates the following story about two of our greatest sages when they were but boys: A child younger than 13 years old who knows to whom the benediction is addressed (i.e., God) may be counted for zimmun (the invitation to say grace after meals). When Abaye and Rava were boys, once they were sitting before Rabbah. Said Rabbah to them: To Whom do we address the benedictions? They both replied: To the All Merciful. And where does the All Merciful abide? Rabba asked. Rava pointed to the roof; Abaye wentbecome Rabbis. What?s interesting is the pointing to the ceiling and to the sky of the two children. This is a very childlike conception of God. It would have been amazing if one or both, encircled their hands around the room, signifying God is everywhere, or better still pointed to each other's hearts, signifying God is with in us, or pointing to all of the people present signifying we are all made in His image. But they may have heard many an utterance, begin or end with, 'for the sake of Heaven.' This accords with the popular saying, "Every pumpkin can be told from its stalk.? (B. It appears that 'back then', one's that he ate or drank too much, he may as well be killed, while still a child, as there was no hope for him. The Talmudic rabbis did not believe this. On the other hand, we have the story of the redemption and change of Yaakov the usurper, into Israel the God wrestler. The truth of the matter is: If we as parents or teachers, deem a child to be a future scholar, and treat him like such, chances are he will be. Conversely, if a child is not doing so well, and we deem him to a life of a tanner (one of the Talmud's not so likeable professions), he will most likely grow to be one as well. [Self-fulfilling prophecies]. So for every child who we can say, ah, he was a brilliant kid and now he is a brilliant scholar, there is one who we could also say, he was not such a bright kid, but look at him now. Better we don't 'judge' children but give all positive re-enforcement and chances to succeed. As Abaye later went on to teach :"What is heard from a child's mouth is merely a repetition of what he has heard from his parents" (Sukkah 56b) I must say that in my life experience sometimes the worst behaved children and teenagers turn out to be the best behaved adults. One of the joys of being a religious leader is to see misbehaved children and teens take their place as community leaders. So how did these two kids turn out? Abaye, the one who pointed to the sky, was a great Sage in Babylon, and spent his adult life debating Rava, told in the "Havayot d'Abaye ve'Rava." But aside from his wisdom, and great scholarship, most notably in Tractate Sanhedrin, he was most known for his piety and loving of peace, urging his Talmidim to "Be mild in speech; suppress your wrath; and maintain good-will in relationships with your relatives as well as with friends ? and even with strangers in the market-place."(Berachot 17a) So just as Laurel needed his Hardy, as Dean Martin needed his Jerry Lewis, as Regis needed his Cathy, so Rava needed his Abaye. In the 100?s of debates recorded in the Talmud, Rava's opinion came out on top, except for six. But when the Rosh Yeshiva of Pumbedita retired, Abaye became the new head of the academy, and Rava moved to start his own. Rava also firmly believed in ethics, and his quote of "When one is brought for his Heavenly Judgment, the first question he is asked is: 'Did you deal honestly with your fellow human beings?...(and not did you keep kashrut or Shabbat?)" (Shabbat 31a) is one of my favorite verses in the Talmud. Discussion Questions: 1. Can "every pumpkin be told from its stalk"? Or can children turn out to be quite different as adults? 2. What do you make of how the two boys indicated God's location? Does it have any significance? From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 17 03:12:57 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Credit cards and kinyonim Message-ID: . R' Marty Bluke asked: > The other option is situmta which is whatever is common practice > to close a deal is considered a kinyan. > However, if we go with situmta then basically we can ask why does > the Torah have this elaborate set of kinyonim and so much Torah > is devoted to them when they are basically irrelevant and have > been superseded by a man made system? 1) We still need to know what the default values are, in situations where there isn't any established common practice. 2) If one believes that every situation does have a common practice, and therefore these halachos have zero practical value, there is still a mitzvah of Talmud Torah to learn them. It could be that we were given these halachos specifically for that purpose. Personally, I am a very practice-oriented person, and the lack of practicality in these situations drives me crazy. And then I remind myself that the failing is not in the subject matter, but in myself, and perhaps the whole reason for these halachos is the improve my neshama. Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:05:07 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:05:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] great list of online Torah resources Message-ID: <00a601d52515$ac5e74b0$051b5e10$@touchlogic.com> https://rabbimanning.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/On-Line-Web-Resources-20 17-Version-3-March-2017.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mcohen at touchlogic.com Mon Jun 17 07:13:38 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:13:38 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] hashgasha pratis and r tzadok Message-ID: <00ba01d52516$dc9b2140$95d163c0$@touchlogic.com> There is a well known machlockes rishonim about HP - does it apply to the average person or not A while ago someone here quoted r tzadok to the effect that klal Yisroel has chosen for themselves the (minority) opinion that HP does apply to the average person Does anyone know I can find that quote inside? Thanks, Mordechai Cohen mcohen at touchlogic.com -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jun 18 14:37:46 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 21:37:46 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education Message-ID: https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By David Stein A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration IMHO. "Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that there exist multiple - and competing - values in our world, all while upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies." Can we quantify "All too often" KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jmeisner at gmail.com Wed Jun 19 09:46:40 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:46:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Modern Orthodox Jewish Education In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 10:21 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > https://www.thelehrhaus.com/commentary/compartmentalization-and-synthesis-in-modern-orthodox-jewish-education/#em > Compartmentalization and Synthesis in Modern Orthodox Jewish Education By > David Stein > > A long piece focusing on proposed approach to education. The entire piece > is interesting reading but this statement alone is worth our consideration > IMHO. > > ?Modern Orthodoxy is a worldview that encompasses intellectual, social, > spiritual, cultural, and professional dimensions, and which recognizes that > there exist multiple ? and competing ? values in our world, all while > upholding the primacy of Torah learning and observance. All too often, > however, it gets reduced (at worst) to an ideology of compromise, or (at > best) a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies.? > > Can we quantify ?All too often? > > Quantify? Are we looking for a precise number such as 50% (or 5% or 95%) of the time MO is reduced from a worldview that upholds the primacy of Torah to an ideology of compromise or a superficial pairing of general and Judaic studies? (Granted, having such numbers would help us go a long way towards developing the sorely needed actuarial tables that could once and for all resolve the great debates of the history of Klal Yisroel). I think that R' Stein would be best able to answer the question of what he meant - the Shalhevet website does not provide his e-mail but rather only has a link to contact, although I'm sure that some list member must know how to cc him - but in an attempt to unpack his words, he seems to be saying that MO is a worldview that upholds the primacy of the Torah while recognizing that there exist other - and competing - values that, by default, must be relegated to a secondary place. All too often, though (continuing to unpack), this primary-secondary hierarchy is instead reduced to an ideology a) where the primary value of Torah is placed secondary to the secondary other - and competing - values or b) instead of the secondary values being acknowledged as being secondary values, they are instead superficially paired with Torah values (which could either mean providing them with equivalency that breaks the primary-secondary hierarchy or keeping them as secondary but expending time on the intellectual endeavor of trying to pair them off - although the second explanation does not seem to fit the context). I believe that RJR's question here is relevant to the discussion that he began a few months ago (April 4) Siman 231 in S?A O?C is one sif long (?buried? between hilchot brachot and > tfilat mincha) which covers all human endeavor. Worth some very detailed > discussion but I?ll just mention two points 1.) His ?psak? (and I assume > it?s psak since it?s included in S?A) seems to demand an ascetic lifestyle > (ex. His comments on attitude towards onnah). I?m not sure all agree on > this conclusion (and is this truly an area for psak or is there a range > where each of us must figure out for ourselves?) 2.) The general rule of > evaluating each action based on a goal of service to HKB?H seems right on > to me but I also perceive that people who actually do this or articulate it > as an aspiration, are thought of as somewhat odd, at least in the MO > community. Thoughts? Is v'chol ma'asecha yihyu l'shem Shamayim davka or lav davka, or is there room for secondary - and competing - values? I suggested in a response that the Shulchan Aruch in this siman (and a handful of others) was dipping a toe across the line between halacha and aggadah, the former being a set of hard lines that either tell us what we can never do ("Electric fence Judaism") or tell us what we need to do during finite periods of time in our lives ("Time-share Judaism") while the latter is a fuzzy (although equally real) entity covering an infinite portion of space (hyperspace?) that takes on the illusion of lines when viewed piecemeal. R' Micha, in a response to my invocation of R' Shkop, made the correct observation that sometimes downtime can also be holy. R' Gil Student put up two posts on Torah Musings in the past week (one a reposting) titled "Is Leisure Kosher?" and "Everyone Needs a Yisro" that touch on the real tension between the two poles in Jewish thought and practice. And the Nazir of last week's parsha, far from being a Maimonidean caveman, intentionally separates himself from a community of yere'im ushleimim who spent the previous parsha and a half organizing themselves in a circle around the Aron - and he, too, must contend with the tension between being a kadosh and being a chotei. (Upon rereading this post, I realize that I used RDS's article as an excuse to take another shot at grappling with RJR's previously cited post, but I suppose that it's all Torah.) - Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 06:47:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:47:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name Message-ID: https://thehalacha.com/wp-content/uploads/Vol5Issue11.pdf Calling a Woman by Her First Name In bungalow colonies men tend to be in the presence of women more frequently than during the rest of the year. One should not call other peoples' wives by their first name. One can be lenient in regard to relatives such as his aunts or cousins. Unfortunately, many people are not careful with this and it leads to an excess of familiarity. Tznius is something that is learned, and the best way to promote an elevated level of tznius is to be extra stringent in a summer related setting such as bungalow colonies etc. One should use chuchmah and seichel to avoid putting himself into potentially harmful situations. Tiny breaches, if not controlled, can be openings for dangerous situations. Therefore, one should talk in a manner that reflects tznius and self control. 83 83. ? Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Bach E.H. 21, Taz 21:1, Ben Yehuyoda Sotah 2a:page 109 (new), Divrei Chachumim page 256, Rivevos Ephraim 6:402:page 440, Sharei Halacha U???minhag E.H. page 147, Teharas Hamisphacha page 240. The custom is to be lenient in regard to calling a non-Jewish woman by her first name (Horav Yisroel Belsky Shlita). Refer to Yisroel Kedoshim pages 165-169. Refer to Sdei Chemed chof:120:page 203, Darchei Chaim V???sholom page 372:1063, Minchas Elazar 3:13, Bais Avi 2:121, Betzel Hachuchma 4:70 Yismach Lev 1:pages 255-256, if a man can call his wife by her name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Jun 21 07:32:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:32:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Shab?= =?windows-1252?q?bos=94=3F?= Message-ID: >From Today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: A. There are three main opinions among poskim for the earliest time to light candles and recite kiddush on Shabbos (See Mishnah Berurah 233:4 and Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem) : 1. Vilna Gaon and Levush: after plag ha?mincha, which in their opinion, is one and a quarter halachic hours before sunset. In this view, a halachic hour is calculated as one twelfth of the time-span between sunrise and sunset. 2. Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom: after plag ha?mincha, which they maintain is one and a quarter halachic hours before tzeis ha?kochavim (nightfall). In their opinion, a halachic hour is one twelfth of the time-span between alos ha?chama (dawn) and tzeis ha?kochavim (night fall). 3. Rav Eliezer Mi?metz: two hours before tzeis ha?kochavim. (See Mishnah Berurah, Beiur Halacha 263, s.v. Kodem). He reasons that just as we find that certain laws of Shemita begin a month (a twelfth of a year) before Rosh Hashanah, so too Shabbos can begin two hours (a twelfth of a day) early (see Darkei Moshe OC 261:1). The difference between these three opinions can be very significant. For a day that is 12 hours long from sunrise to sunset, the Vilna Gaon, Levush and Rav Eliezer Mi?metz would allow lighting candles more than an hour before sunset, while the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom would not permit lighting until approximately 18 minutes before sunset. It should be noted that all three positions agree that Maariv cannot be recited before plag ha?mincha. As noted in 1 and 2, the time of plag ha?mincha is a matter of dispute. In practice, many people light candles, daven Maariv, and recite kiddush significantly before sunset. They are following the position of the Vilna Gaon and Levush in item 1. Other segments of the Jewish community follow the more stringent position of the Shulchan Aruch and Magen Avrohom in item 2 and begin Shabbos considerably later. Both customs are firmly rooted in mainstream Halachic viewpoints. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From larry62341 at optonline.net Fri Jun 21 07:38:49 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:38:49 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: At 10:20 AM 6/21/2019, Zalman Alpert wrote: >Most of your sources are Hungarian seforim These are not my sources, but come from the article that I referred to. Are you implying something about Hungarian seforim? If so, then what? >Your statement here was never the practice among Lithuanian Jews >Chabad ,Modern Orthodox etc Again, not my statement, but from the article referred to. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mandels at ou.org Fri Jun 21 07:48:38 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 14:48:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?How_early_can_one_make_an_=93early_Sha?= =?windows-1252?q?bbos=94=3F?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: multipart/alternative Size: 1215 bytes Desc: not available URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Sun Jun 23 20:47:11 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 06:47:11 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash, the worker can agree to take other payment or defer payment and then you are not over the lav, however then you are not yotze the mitzva either. The question is what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? For example, I go to the barber and pay by credit card or I go to the cleaners and pay by credit card. What about if I pay the plumber with a bank transfer (for example using Zelle)? Are these considered cash payments? Credit cards It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: 1. You aren?t actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren?t mekayem the mitzva. 2. The vendor doesn?t get his money that day. Typically, a *payment* can take anywhere from 24 hours up to three *days* to process the *payment*. What comes out is that when you deal with Jews it would seem that you should try to pay in cash and not a credit card to be mekayem the mitzva doraysa of byomo teeten scharo. Electronic bank transfer Here there are a number of issues: 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your agent to transfer your money to the other person? 2. Is getting money in my bank account like receiving a cash payment? Money in my bank account is actually a loan to the bank so when someone transfers money to my account it would seem that they are lending the bank money and designating me as the person to pay back to. Therefore maybe that is not considered the equivalent of a cash payment. On the other hand, since I can go to an ATM and take out the amount in cash maybe it is. As the world moves away from cash the Halacha needs to adapt with it. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Jun 24 04:37:23 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:37:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> > The Torah is very makpid that we pay our workers on time and there is both a lav and an aseh. The din is that payment must be in cash ????- While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jun 24 06:21:11 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Prof. L. Levine) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:21:11 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How does early Shabbos work? How can I make kiddush if it is still Friday afternoon?H Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis A. There are three explanations why kiddush can be recited Friday afternoon, after accepting an early Shabbos: * Shulchan Aruch (OC 261:2) writes that one is required to add from Friday onto Shabbos (mosifin michol al hakodesh). The Magen Avrohom (OC 261:9) maintains that this is a positive Torah commandment. The basis for this is as follows: The Torah (Vayikra 23:32) writes that one must begin Yom Kippur while it is still the ninth day of Tishrei. Since the pasuk refers to Yom Kippur as Shabbos (Shabbos Shabbaton), we infer that the requirement to begin early applies to every Shabbos as well. Because tosefos Shabbos (the added portion of Shabbos) has a Biblical status, it follows that one who accepts Shabbos early can recite kiddush during this time as well. * The Mordechai disagrees with the above and holds that tosefos Shabbos is valid only on a Rabbinic level. If so, how can one recite kiddush, which is a Biblical requirement, during a period when Shabbos is only Rabbinic? The Magen Avrohom (267:1) addresses this question. We will not present the Magen Avrohom?s response because it requires explanation and commentary. We encourage you to explore the Magen Avrohom on your own. * The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 29:11) writes that one may recite kiddush even if it is not yet Shabbos, because the mitzvah to remember Shabbos can be accomplished even a short time before Shabbos begins. The above discussion relates to reciting kiddush Friday afternoon. With respect to the Shabbos meal, the Magen Avrohom (267:1) quotes the Shelah and the Maharal who maintain that, although one may begin the Shabbos seuda on Friday afternoon, one should make sure to eat a kezayis (of bread) after nightfall. The requirement to eat three seudos on Shabbos is derived from the repetition of the word ?ha?yom? (today) three times in the Torah. Accordingly, a kezayis of bread must be eaten on the actual day of Shabbos and not during the tosefos (the addition). The Magen Avrohom and Mishna Berura (267:5) write that it is preferable to follow the Shelah and Maharal, by eating a kezayis of challah after nightfall. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jun 24 07:58:06 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 10:58:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: On 24/6/19 7:37 am, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > While we?re on the topic is it clear that fiat money which certainly > did not exist at matan Torah is considered cash? Coins probably didn't exist at matan Torah either. A shekel was a weight, and you would pay by putting bits of metal on a scale until you had enough. And by Chazal's day coins had become a form of "fiat money", since they were often underweight but were expected to be accepted at their official weight. At any rate I've seen a teshuva of the Chasam Sofer saying that "kesef" means whatever the local government has designated as currency, and circulates as such. (If the government's currency doesn't circulate, this invalidates the government.) So that a paper bill is not a shtar but kesef. (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 08:51:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 11:51:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> This likely should have remained on the "Credit cards and kinyonim" subject line since although it's not the same topic, it's clearly a continuation of the same discussion. Easier to find in the archive if a discussion sticks to one subject line. On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 06:47:11AM +0300, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: : ... : what if I pay the worker electronically am I yotze the mitzva? ... : Credit cards : It seems clear to me that credit cards are not considered cash payments and : you are not yotze the mitzva for 2 reasons: : 1. You aren't actually paying. The way credit cards work is that you are : telling the credit card company to pay the vendor and then they will : collect from you. Since you are not paying you aren't mekayem the mitzva. This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive the money on time and agree to the arrangement. : 2. The vendor doesn't get his money that day. Typically, a payment can : take anywhere from 24 hours up to three days to process the payment. Worse, because you can cancel payment during that time (and usually even later tha money can be clawed back). The problem I have is that the end of the siman talks about bal talin only. I do not know if the following applies to the asei too. I would guess yes, because that's a lot of ink to spend on saying the issur is "only" the violation of an asei without explicitly pointing it out. But as I said, that's a guess. Here's the relevant bit, in s' 9. If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not bal talin to pay later. So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is no problem paying by card. : Electronic bank transfer : Here there are a number of issues: : 1. How does it work? Is it like a credit card where you tell the bank to : send money and then the bank collects from you or is the bank simply your : agent to transfer your money to the other person? The problem is, as RJR implied, the same as fiat money, but more extreme. When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be any different than fiat currency? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is capable of changing the world for the http://www.aishdas.org/asp better if possible, and of changing himself for Author: Widen Your Tent the better if necessary. - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 10:17:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 13:17:29 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <247955D9-DB12-437D-A0A6-C955A30FFA59@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190624171729.GA8357@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 10:58:06AM -0400, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : (We've discussed the history of coins before. Secular archaeology says they : were invented in the late Bayit Rishon era. But this seems to conflict with : Chazal's understanding of "Vetzarta Hakesef".) I looked through the archives, I didn't find any reference to that pasuq. Mostly our discussions were of Avraham's coin -- which if we look was really a coin of Avraham, with no claim as to age, and whether Avraham paying for Me'aras haMachpeilah with 400 sheqel "oveir lasocheir" was indication there was coinage, or proof there wasn't. (Was a sheqel oveer lasocheir a coin, or because there were no coins, some 1 sheqel pieces of silver looked more reliable than others.) And a little of the fiery machatzis hasheqel described by the Tanchuma to explain the "zeh" of "zeh yitenu" in Shemos 30:13, quoted by Rashi. What would they need to be shown if not coinage? A hologram of a random lump of silver? I assume you are talking about Berakhos 47b, which contrasts pidyon maaser sheini on kesef "sheyeish aleha tzurah", in contrast to an asimon. A similar contrast between coinage an an asimon appears in BM 47b, but there is no implication that the deOraisa referred to minted coins. Personally, I like your Mar 2018 suggestion: > Even more balebatish: Coins hadn't yet been invented. Therefore Moshe > had never seen one. *If* there is a requirement that the ten gerah of > silver be minted into a coin before being given to the mishkan, Moshe > would have to understand what such a thing looked like, and make an > example to explain it to the people. (Ditto for pidyon maaser sheni, > but by then they'd already seen what a "coin" was.) Perhaps this was > the invention of the coin, and it merely took another six centuries or > so for the idea to catch on among the nations that this Jewish ritual > object might have secular applications. So, pidyon and machatzis hasheqel requires this ritual thing of a coin, and coins as currency did indeed become commoplace later. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. http://www.aishdas.org/asp Life is about creating yourself. Author: Widen Your Tent - George Bernard Shaw - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 10:44:51 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 20:44:51 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > This is not a problem. You are allowed to send your employees to the > chenvani or shulchani to get paid. CM 229:10. As long as they receive > the money on time and agree to the arrangement. Yes but then you are not mekayem the mitzva of paying in time. > If the sakhir knows that the baal habayis usually doesn't have money on > hand until market day, it's not bal talin if he doesn't get paid until > market day. The Rama adds that if the norm is to pay later, it's not > bal talin to pay later. > So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > no problem paying by card. I thought I made that clear. You definitely don't violate the lav. The question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 11:03:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 14:03:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is :> no problem paying by card. : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out on fulfilling the asei. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig From marty.bluke at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 11:16:32 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 21:16:32 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Monday, June 24, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 08:44:51PM +0300, Marty Bluke wrote: > :> So I would think that if your vender has a card reader, there is > :> no problem paying by card. > > : I thought I made that clear. You definitely don?t violate the lav. The > : question im asking is how can you be mekayem the aseh. > > This asei is a chiyuv, not a mitzvah qiyumis. You can't just skip out > on fulfilling the asei. > > You aren?t skipping out. You are creating a situation where there is no chiyuv aseh either. Which is why it's hard to believe that all that discussion is of which > cases are oveir "only" the asei. Even if the mention only mentions bal > talin. How could it write "if you do X, or Y, or Z, or... you aren't > over bal talin" without not mentioning in in any of those se'ifim that > you're still not allowed to do any of these things anyway? > > My understanding is that the aseh and lav go together. Whenever there would be an issur of bal talin there is also an aseh of byomo teeten scharo. However, if you create a situation where the lav does not apply by for example sending the workers to the chenvani then the aseh likewise doesn?t apply. My point was that by paying with a credit card you are creating a situation where you will not be mekayem the mitzva. There is no aveira/issur to do that, it?s just that we should want to be mekayem as many mitzva as we can especially mitzvos doraysa which there aren?t so many of. Tir'u baTov! > -Micha > > -- > Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect > http://www.aishdas.org/asp painting? It's easy. > Author: Widen Your Tent Make yourself perfect and then just paint > - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF naturally. -Robert Pirsig > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jun 24 14:42:16 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 17:42:16 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> I took part of the conversation off list because I feared we were just dealing with miscommunication. But in that exchange, I found a real difference in understanding between RMBluke and me. Curious to know whether the rest of the chevrah can help clear this up. The other RMB understands the asei as being paying your worker the same day. "Beyomo titein sekharo". I am not sure "yomo" hear means day. First, it means up to a half-day. If the worker stops before sheqi'ah, you have until sheqi'ah. If he stops at sheqi'ah or during the night, you have the whole night. But the night isn't a "yom" in neither the 12 nor 24 hour sense. It is, in the general "in its time" sense of the word. Second, Both the SA and the AhS start CM 339 talking about the asei and lavin of paying bizmano. First I thought-- this isn't the Rambam, where diyuq in lashon is necessarily valid. BUT, after I sent the last private email, I bothered to open Hil' Seckhirus 11:1, which does begin "mitzvas asei litein sekhar hasakhir bizmano, shene'emar 'beyomo...'" (I mention the AhS's language because my attitude toward the subject is strongly shaped by having learned it in AhS Yomi a few months ago. So, his wording is my first impression.) The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the trading industry.) I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, http://www.aishdas.org/asp it is still possible to accomplish and to Author: Widen Your Tent mend." - https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jun 24 19:00:44 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:00:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > When you wire money, money goes from one account to another. > The fact that said money is only represented by bits, rather > than slips of paper, may not change anything. Even if the bill > was backed by gold or silver, you could ask whether it counts > as money; fiat currency more so. But data... why would it be > any different than fiat currency? I would suggest that there is one small difference between bytes of data and fiat currency: Granted that fiat currency doesn't have any inherent value, but it at least a tangible object. Being a tangible object, even if it is a worthless one, it is still possible to pick it up physically and perform some sort of kinyan on. I'm not at all familiar with the halachos of performing kinyanim on worthless objects, but I'd presume that it's at least a mashehu better than the kinyanim one might perform on intangible bytes. Next topic... In several contexts, and with various phrasings, R' Micha Berger has pointed out: > credit card transfers include the power to claw back the money. I would like to distinguish between two different kinds of credit card transactions. One is the ordinary purchase of an object in a store. I choose my object, somebody presses buttons and/or swipes a card, and the sale is complete, with a debit from my account and a credit on theirs. My ability to challenge the transaction later, and "claw my money back" is totally irrelevant, because even if I am successful, it would be a separate transaction. Every economic system provides for this situation, because we must have a way to correct errors (whether accidental or deliberate). For example, suppose I pay my employees promptly and with cash, with all the hidurim. And then I realize that I overpaid one of them. The fact that I can get the overpayment back does not invalidate case as a payment method! And similarly, I can't see why "the power to claw back the money" would be a problem with other payment methods. But there is another, entirely different sort of credit card payment, and it is fairly common at hotels, restaurants, and many other situations: Instead of everything becoming a fait accompli at the point of sale, the transaction is merely put on "hold", giving the merchant a few days to adjust the amount up or down. And then, a few days later, that's when the transaction is finalized. In this model, errors can be corrected before the money actually enters the receiver's account, and it seems to me that this is a serious problem for all sorts of Bal Talin situations, because the recipient might not receive the money until days later than expected. Next topic... It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.) In contrast, it is very easy to use a bank card to purchase groceries, and in fact some stores are trying to refuse cash. When I compare this fact to what I wrote at the beginning about fiat money, I come to an interesting conclusion: If the issue is making a kinyan, then physical fiat money is possibly better than the intangible bytes that were credited to my card. But if the issue is spendability, then a bank card is much better than a check. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Mon Jun 24 22:07:31 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 08:07:31 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: <20190624155106.GC21189@aishdas.org> <20190624180341.GA16477@aishdas.org> <20190624214216.GF1274@aishdas.org> Message-ID: [Email #1, sent on Tue, 25 Jun 2019 at 7:19am IDT. -micha] On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, Micha Berger wrote: > The difference between RMB and my positions would be whether it's possible > to avoid the lavin and yet not fulfill the asei. > RMBluke is saying yes -- if you pay him when expected, but the expectation > isn't same-day. And thus he asks about a credit card payment that doesn't > clear immediately. ("T+0" -- time + 0 days -- is how we say it in the > trading industry.) > I worked with the idea that beyomo is just an idiom for bizmano, and so > the asei and the lav are both about paying him when you agreed. So, if > he offers a credit card option and you use it, you would fulfil the asei. R' Nissim Karelitz writes in Chut Shani that if the worker agrees to defer payment or collect from a chenvani you are not over bal talin but you are not mekayem the mitzva either as I suggested. I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' Micha. [Email #2, sent at 8:07am. -micha] On Tue, Jun 25, 2019 at 7:19 AM Marty Bluke wrote: > I saw that there is a machlokes of modern day poskim about post dated > checks whether you are mekayem the mitzva. The machlokes revolves around > whether does the agreement of the worker Relate to the mitzva as well. See > http://www.ladaat.info/Gilionot/20190504/[2347]????_????_??????.pdf the > section about post dated checks. R' Elyashiv seems to be holding like R' > Micha. After thinking about it and seeing R' Shternbuch (3:470 Teshuvos VHanagos) I think they are saying something else. They also understand the mitzva of Byomo literally that it has to be that day. However, they claim that the special din by workers that you have to pay cash can be waived by the worker. And therefore, if you pay with shaveh kesef ON THAT DAY you are also yotze the mitzva. Based on that, they say that a post dated check is considered shaveh kesef and you are yotze. However, I don't think anyone is saying that you can be mekayem the mitzva of byomo on a different day even if the worker agreed. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:06:30 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:30 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim Message-ID: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Shimon (or Nachshon) Haamsoni is quoted in the famous darshening and undarshening of etim (e.g., Psachim 22b) saga. [For a somewhat different version of the story, see Yerushalim Sotah Chapter 5, which is worthy of its own analysis and reconciliation as is the fact that this is the only context he?s mentioned in the Talmud]. The language of the story has his students questioning what will happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will other drashot be found to replace these? Kt Joel RichTHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jun 26 15:05:12 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:05:12 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin Message-ID: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:03:50 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:03:50 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Darshening etim In-Reply-To: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> References: <87D110C3-B617-41F7-BB78-0D522CAF264D@sibson.com> Message-ID: <0cfac237-0ef3-bf73-f057-23a19f7fabd7@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:06 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > The language of the story has his students questioning what will > happen to all his previous drashot and his answering he?ll get reward > anyway. The answer doesn?t seem to directly address the question. > Perhaps they were asking whether the halacha will change or will > other drashot be found to replace these? I have always understood that they were asking whether his life's work was wasted, and he answered that it was not, because it was an honest attempt at determining the Torah's meaning, so it counts as talmud Torah, whereas had he spent his life trying to prove a mathematical theorem that turned out to be wrong it would indeed have been wasted. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From simon.montagu at gmail.com Thu Jun 27 16:30:05 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 02:30:05 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Thu Jun 27 17:08:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 20:08:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5f4c7660-620c-d9b6-a4bb-1192ef51419b@sero.name> On 26/6/19 6:05 pm, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before > mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? You have that backwards. As I understand it, for those who daven Nusach Ashkenaz there is no reason to remove tefillin at all on Rosh Chodesh. People only do so because the Shulchan Aruch says to, but as the Taz points out this only applies to Nusach Sefarad/"Sfard", which says Keter/Kesser. If you say Nekadesh (or are davening without a minyan) the tefillin can stay on. (Which leads me to wonder how Italians, who say Keter in every tefillah, hold about the propriety of doing so in tefillin, and whether they too remove them on Rosh Chodesh, and if so why.) On Chol Hamoed I assume that once you've started on the "yomtov" portion of the davening tefillin become a contradiction, so they come off. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Fri Jun 28 05:24:28 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:24:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah > wrote: Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with their tefillin on? ================================= Oops-I reversed them KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:57:53 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:57:53 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Calling a Woman by Her First Name In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Adding the subject On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 4:55 PM Marty Bluke wrote: > I just heard a recording from R' Asher Weiss where he discussed whether > first names should be used in the workplace between men and women. He said > that in the modern business culture using first names is not considered > intimate or personal but is simply the way people talk. Therefore, he said > that to expect frum people to not use first names is silly and > counterproductive. > > This is a statement by a Rav who understands what is going in the world > and applies the halacha to that reality. > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 06:50:35 2019 From: marty.bluke at gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:50:35 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments Message-ID: R' Akiva Miller wrote: "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions regarding payment by check. For example, one of my seforim points to a difference between the common practice in Israel and in the US: In Israel, many merchants will accept a third-party check as payment, and therefore a paycheck can be considered as cash (in terms of the employer's mitzva to pay with cash). But in the US such checks are accepted far more rarely, and so it is not considered cash. (Personally, I'm not sure if I *ever* "spent" a paycheck in this manner, except for some supermarkets that allowed it *IF* I would pre-register and fill out a few forms and such beforehand.)" I think credit cards payments are different for 1 simple reason. When you get a check you have a physical object on your hand that you can take to the store and uses in lieu of cash. This is why the poskim consider it cash. When you get a credit card payment you have nothing tangible to take to the store. You may have money in the bank but you have no tangible way of spending it. Now, if you have a debit card that can be used to spend that money it might be different, but at least in Israel, people don't have debit cards because credit cards are sort of debit cards (not for now). So even though the money is in the bank you can't directly spend that money. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From simon.montagu at gmail.com Fri Jun 28 07:29:54 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 17:29:54 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Hallel and Tfillin In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 5:02 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 1:38 AM Rich, Joel via Avodah < > avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > Why do we take off tfillin before Hallel on Rosh Chodesh but before mussaf > (for those who wear tfillin) on Chol Hamoed? > > > > I'm not sure who "we" are. I don't wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d, but I > have always seen tefillin taken off before mussaf on Rosh Hodesh. Are you > saying that those who wear tefillin on Hol Hamoe`d shake the lulav with > their tefillin on? > > ================================= > > > > Oops-I reversed them > Ha, well in that case I think I stumbled on the answer in my previous reply -- one naturally removes the tefillin before netilat lulav because it would be immensely incongruous to hold a lulav with tefillin on. Then on other regalim one takes them off before Hallel for consistency. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From mgluck at gmail.com Sun Jun 30 10:14:09 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (Moshe Y. Gluck) Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 13:14:09 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Concerning ourselves with the world at large In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: > > > >>>I only have one Makor for this idea, that we, as Jews, should concern > ourselves with the well-being of the world at large.>>> > Continuing this thread from 2007, I have another mekor for this concept: See Rabbeinu Yonah on Pirkei Avos 3:2 (in the Babli numbering): "This means that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and to be pained about other people's suffering. And this is the way of the righteous... ...that a person shouldn't pray for his own needs alone, rather to daven for all people, that they should have peace. And when there is peace in the government, there's peace in the world." EDIT: I went back to R' MB's compilation of the sources mentioned in the thread (here: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/universalism) and I found that R' Doron Beckerman had already included this exact quote. I'm sending it anyway, because it's a great passage, and because it was in yesterday's Pirkei Avos. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com Sat Jun 29 12:41:29 2019 From: marty.bluke at mail.gmail.com (Marty Bluke) Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2019 22:41:29 +0300 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Friday, June 28, 2019, Marty Bluke wrote: > R' Akiva Miller wrote: > "It seems to me that many of the questions being raised about credit cards > are not really new at all, and are easily compared to older questions > regarding payment by check... One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of cash right now which he can take to the store. From zev at sero.name Sun Jun 30 23:16:25 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 02:16:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Paying your workers on time using electronic payments In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 29/6/19 3:41 pm, Marty Bluke via Avodah wrote: > One more point regarding credit card payments. When you pay by credit card > you are not paying the worker. You are telling them to collect from the > credit card company who will pay them in a day or 2 at best. On the other > hand when you pay a worker by check you are giving him the equivalent of > cash right now which he can take to the store. He has to deposit it first and then withdraw the cash. Unless he happens to know a store that takes third-party checks. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper