From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 2 11:20:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 14:20:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190102192036.GA26001@aishdas.org> On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 04:49:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the article at https://goo.gl/fsMEir : IMO one of the reasons why people talk in shul is because davening : on Shabbos morning often takes a long time. If there are speeches, : Me Shebeirachs, announcements, etc, then people get restless. While I agree it's a factor, I think it's a minor one. Yes, people do chat more once they gets started during Mi sheBeirakh. (Many shuls have instituted short-cuts to announcing the names in the Mi sheBeirakh leCholim to minimize this effect). But it's not like the problem is any less in Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. Or, as RAM noted, even at a weekday Maariv. Also, R Efrem Goldberg refers to repeatedly talking in shul as an "epidemic". I don't know. My experience has been that talking has been in a constant decline since my childhood. Yes, it's still ubiquitous in some places, but more and more shuls do manage to maintain decorum. REG writes: :> Talking during these parts of davening is not only disrespectful to God, :> it is also unkind, insensitive, and cruel to those trying to offer :> heartfelt and focused prayers. It is a gross violation of bein adom :> l'chaveiro. If you wouldn't talk during a show, the opera or a movie, :> no matter how bored or distracted you might be, how could you entertain :> talking when people around you are in the middle of a conversation with :> Hashem, even if you are done? It is hard enough to connect with our :> prayers, to concentrate on the words and to feel we have experienced an :> intimate rendezvous with our Creator in the best of circumstances. To :> do it while people in our vicinity are chatting away is nearly impossible. So the answer I would give falls out from this paragraph... It's that we might know intellectually that we are conversing or holding a meeting with the Creator, but for many of us, that's not an experienced reality. Talking in shul is only a symptom. As is the experience many shuls have where people tend to show on time for Barekhu or Shochein Ad, and are folding their tallis during Adon Olam. I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. (After all, bored people could be silently learning too. There is no shortage of well written parashah sheets, illustrating every point with an engaging story, if need be.) Yelling "Don't! Don't! Don't!" when people have no motive not to will do little but annoy. Shuls that don't have the problem licked have given us decades of evidence of this. We need to motivate people to be talking to G-d, and the problem of talking to friends will evaporate on its own. Here's a litmus test... I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul) ... I would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, only a minority of people get Who I am talking about. There is a dirth of people who remember they are talking to G-d. "If you don't know who I mean, you're not davening right." Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. Teach various techniques to turn muttering syllables into avodah shebeleiv, whether hibonenus or hispa'alus or ... And teach peirush hamilim, Ri Yaqar, Avudraham, R Breuer, R Meir Birnbaum, ... Again, if I ran a shul, here's how I would adapt minyan for today's short attention spans: 1- Between Yishtabach and Barekhu, a 5 minute shiur on either how to approach tefillah in general, or about something the minyzan is about to say. (As above.) By the time you make it from Barekhu to UKhashanim Qadmonios, you could do another cycle. No one will remember a derashah from years ago. As for questions about hefseiq -- it is for tefillah. CYLOR, but I would bet it's fine. 2- If possible without attracting everyone frustrated that their shul banned their Kiddush Club... In the yeshivos in Litta (and in Camp Munk in my childhood), there was a seder between leining and Mussaf. The Torah is returned before Ashrei, IIRC. If davening is too long for the current generation, do the same. Have the rav's derashah be during Qiddush before Mussaf. Maybe even a shiur, and just close with a vertl long enough to repreat at the Shabbos table. Break up the service into two pieces. Since I've started on how I would modify shul norms, other changes I would institute that have nothing to do with the talking and late-in-rush-out problems: 3- Chessed programming -- something that involves some subset of the membership hands-on (not fundraising) in an at least weekly basis. Shuls provide both Torah and Avodah, why not be a full Judaism Center and provide opportunities for Gemilus Chassadim too? At least if the shul sponsors something, there is a different atmosphere about what a shul and Yahadus are. 4- Mussar Ve'adim -- one for each gender, although given the Ahavas Yisrael Project 's presence in Passaic, the men's va'ad would be more critical. The idea isn't just to have a chaburah in a mussar sefer, but to have a group that actually works together on their middos. (AishDas set up a few groups that meet weekly going through the ve'adim and doing the exercises in Alei Shur vol II.) 5- Every Elul, offer a Teshuvah Workshop with a wider audience than those willing to commit to full-year ve'adim. Host speakers giving actual techniques for change. Rather than being all motivated and well intended on Aseres Yemei Teshuvah, but not having a strategy to actually get anywhere. (And that's in a good year! Then we wonder why our list of things to fix is the same year after year...) 6- The membership agreement would include an ethics and dina demalkhusa clauses. In the "Shomerei Shabbos" type shuls of 70 years ago, those who were fighting upstream to retain their Shabbos observance created a supporting atmosphere by creating synagogues in in which only shomerei Shabbos could retain full membership in the shul. We need something similar to shore up what's weak in today's observance. This is largely unenforceable, as we're not going to have accountants check people's books. But the point is to be clear on values and intended culture. It combines with the chessed programming and the ve'adim at adding Gemilus Chassadim to an institution whose format has already grown to include Torah and Avodah. I realize both of those programs would in the real world be limited in population. But they make a statement to the majority of the membership. There is secondary involvement -- helping out once, donating money, just reading about it in the shul email -- that make an impact on everyone. As would knowing there are ethical standards in the by-laws / membership agreement. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For those with faith there are no questions. micha at aishdas.org For those who lack faith there are no answers. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From larry62341 at optonline.net Wed Jan 2 12:11:26 2019 From: larry62341 at optonline.net (Prof. Levine) Date: Wed, 02 Jan 2019 15:11:26 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul References: Message-ID: <4B.7F.29050.96B1D2C5@mta2.srv.hcvlny.cv.net> At 02:20 PM 1/2/2019, Micha Berger wrote: > But it's not like the problem is any less in >Hashkamah Minyanim or my own 9-11am Shabbos morning minyan. When I can, I daven in the Lakewood K'Vosikin minyan during the week. There is literally no talking during this minyan. The attendees are people who take davening very seriously. Also the davening is paced. Brachos start exactly 30 minutes before sunrise, Baruch Sheamar is exactly 10 minutes later. Borachu is exactly 10 minutes later than this, and Shemoneh Esrei is exactly at netz. One is given 7 or 8 minutes to say Shemoneh Esrei. On a weekday without leining davening takes about 50 minutes, With leining about an hour. There is little talking during the Hashkama minyan that I run on Shabbos morning in the YI of Ave J. If people talk, I often suggest that they go to the Main Minyan which starts at 9. I know for a fact that people talk during this minyan. >I have repeatedly said that if I ran a shul, I would teach what davening >is about. It would reduce the boredum. And for those for whom that's not >enough, it would make the idea of "lifnei Mi atah omeid" more of a >reality. Where people wouldn't have the chutzpah to talk. > > >Start with teaching the hashkafos of tefillah, from R' Chaim Volozhiner, the >Besh"t, Moharan and RSRH. The sefer Rav Schwab on Prayer is what I would recommend. It gives marvelous insights into the weekday davening. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ben1456 at zahav.net.il Thu Jan 3 09:38:31 2019 From: ben1456 at zahav.net.il (Ben Waxman) Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2019 19:38:31 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Mitzva surveys Message-ID: <5d9985b9-3a6e-427b-152a-3796bb6e4237@zahav.net.il> Rambam writes, based on a Gemara, that Yochanon Cohen HaGadol did a survey of how people were keeping hilchot trumah and ma-aser. Were there any other examples in the Gemara of chachamim actually going out, checking how people keep mitzvot, and actually changing halacha based on that survey? Did this ever happen in the post-Talmudic period? Ben From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:24:52 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:24:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Bircas Kohanim when when the Shaliach Tzibbur is a kohen In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103232452.GA11226@aishdas.org> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 06:08:38AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : On Areivim, R' Sheldon Liberman asked: :> I heard over Shabbos that in chutz l'aretz, during the chazzan's :> repetition at shacharis, if the chazzan is a kohen, then during :> bircas kohanim, there is an opinion that the tzibbur should :> answer "Amein" rather than "Kein y'hi ratzon". :> Has anyone heard this? : The critical words here are "there is an opinion". Discussing the case where the sha"tz is not a kohein: The Avudraham (really: R' David abu-Dirham) is quoted by the BY (end of OC 127) and Taamei haMinhagim (#117) that some people say "kein yehi Ratzon" instad of "amein" because the berakhos are not being said -- the pesuqim /about/ the berakhos are. The SA (OC 127:2), talking about when there are no kohanim, turns it into a recommendation, not like the Avudraham recording a minhag among many. And the chazan begins "Elokeinu vEilokei Avoseinu, borkheinu..." The MB (s"q 10) paraphrased the same reasoning -- the chazan is requesting that Hashem Bless us the way the kohanim did. Not making a berakhah himself. The Derishah says it's wrong so say amein. The Kaf haChaim (16-17) agrees with it being problematic to say amein, but since shu"t Yachin uVoaz (25) records a minhag to say "amein", says either is okay. The Darkei Moshe (4) says "kein yehi rasons", and he quotes the Mahara (?) who didn't answer at all. RMSternbuch (shu"t Teshuvos veHanhagos 2;101, 3;43) also doesn't recommend any answe. RMS cites R' Chaim Brisker that one is over an asei (and possibly bal tosif -- see Rashi Kesovus 24b) by accepting the birkhas kohanim by a a non-kohein. So, when it comes to the question of what to do when the sha"tsz *is* a kohein, I could see a chiluq depending on which sevara is dominant: 1- If the iqar is that the chazan isn't actually making a berakhah, then a chazan who is a kohein who said "EvE Borkheinu" before the pesuqim is also describing the berakhah, not making a berakhah. So, I could see saying no amein for him either. 2- If R' Chaim Brisker's sevara is the reason for not saying amein, then there is no assei against accepting the berakhah from the sha"tz who is a kohein. And implied is that if saying amein after a non-kohein sha"tz violates an asei of accepting birkhas kohanim, then it would seem that by saying amein, the pesuqim are indeed the berkahos -- regardless of the lines said before them. 3- And if one holds by the minhag the Avudraham assumed was dominant, and the Derishah recommends, then one is saying "amein" even when the sha"tz isn't a kohein. Lo kol shekein when he is! PS: The MB (s"q 11) says you say "kein yehi Ratzon" once, after the last berakhah. The AhS (127:4) records what is the norm (in my experience), once after each berakhah. PPS: My own minhag is "kein yehi Ratzon bizkhus Avraham avinu" after the first berakhah, and invoking the zekhus of Yitzchaq and Yaaqov after each of the other berakhos. But as long-timers know, Berger family minhagim are from a pretty broad chulent (and chamin!) of sources. Anyone else hear of this one? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger We look forward to the time micha at aishdas.org when the power to love http://www.aishdas.org will replace the love of power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - William Ewart Gladstone From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 3 15:41:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 18:41:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Amoraic statements In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190103234123.GC11226@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:49:00PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Anyone know of any writings on how to think about Amoraic statements : that are not sourced but very basic (i.e., why weren't they recorded : earlier)? Two quick examples: 1.) Shmuel -- dina dmalchuta dina (the : law of the land controls), 2.) Rav-Tisha achlu dagan vechad achal : yerek-mitztarphin.(9 who ate grain and 1 who ate greens combine[for a : zimmun of 10]} And waiting until the rishonim to argue about what order the parshios were in the tefillin does make sense to you? I could think of two opposite reasons why this would happen: 1- They are only basic once the machloqes is resolved. (Like in the case I raised, where Tosafos notes that in Bavel they found both of what we would call "Rashi" and "Rabbeinu Tam" tefillin.) Which shifts the question to why the machloqes suddenly needed resolution, if eilu va'eilu was good enough until then. 2- They were so basic they didn't need saying until people started questioning them. Then, a gadol hador needed to get up and tell the doubters they're wrong. As for DDD in particular, Shemu'el was a friend of Shevur Malka. So "malkhusa" may have been a hot topic in his live. And Rava's proof (BQ 113b) is of a puq chazi variety -- of course that's the din, because the government cut down trees to make bridges, and no one avoids using them because of stolen property! So I think it's a "didn't need saying" until people questioned it. Although on second thought I'll add: or maybe simply asked the hypothetical question in Beis Medrash, not actually questioning it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You want to know how to paint a perfect micha at aishdas.org painting? It's easy. http://www.aishdas.org Make yourself perfect and then just paint Fax: (270) 514-1507 naturally. -Robert Pirsig From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 3 18:30:21 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 02:30:21 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul Message-ID: > That's not why they talk. They talk because they saw their parents or > other adults talk. They learned that talking is perfectly acceptable. The > fact that the Shul has not followed the Mishna Berura and appointed > people to end the talking merely reinforces the talkers' understanding > that talking is OK. Perhaps. But I think the reason people talk is because the service, including davening and layning, is boring to many. [Email #2] > I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over > to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who > was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train > and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I > would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they > can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, > only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry (yes, I understand I'm being gender stereotypical but from my discussions with members of our community there's still a great deal of truth in such stereotypes), should be admired that she finds the time to daven on her commute and not criticized by a snide remark. I'd add that while I don't know this for a fact, I'd like to think that God understands her and gets it and, indeed, sides with her rather than the (fictional I trust) snide remarker. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:47:45 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:47:45 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: <20190104144745.GA10273@aishdas.org> Baltimore Jewish Life carried an authorized translation (by R' Elli Fischer) of R' Asher Weiss's teshuvah requiring vaccination. It is longer than the snippets translated on his talmidim's web site: https://en.tvunah.org/2018/08/31/vaccinations https://en.tvunah.org/2018/11/01/new-question-vaccinations-and-halacha See https://www.baltimorejewishlife.com/news/news-detail.php?SECTION_ID=1&ARTICLE_ID=112570 or, just continue reading after my signature. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 In my humble opinion, this is an error. Rather, parents obviously have an obligation to vaccinate their children, and I have ruled that it is even permissible for parents to organize themselves in order to force educational institutions not to accept unvaccinated pupils. I will explain my thinking and my reasoning. I A basic presumption is that there is an obligation to avoid and prevent danger. We find that there are two facets of this mitzvah: passive avoidance and active prevention of danger. In his discussion of the mitzvah of ma'akeh [building a guard rail on a roof] Rambam (Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life 11:4) brings two sources. He writes: Be it a roof or anything else that presents a hazard that people are liable to stumble upon and die--for example, if one had a well or cistern in his yard, whether or not it contains water--he is obligated to make an enclosure that is ten tefachim [handbreadths] tall, or to make a cover for it, so that a person does not fall in and die. Likewise, there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about any obstruction that endangers life, as it says: "Take utmost care and scrupulously guard your lives" (Devarim 4:9). If he did not remove them, but rather left dangerous obstructions, he has negated a positive mitzvah and transgressed "do not bring blood upon your house" (Devarim 22:8). Thus, regarding any danger, "there is a positive mitzvah to remove, to safeguard against, and to be exceedingly cautious about" it. We learn from ma'akeh that one must take concrete action to remove danger, and that we are further commanded to prevent danger, as it says, "Take utmost care". In Minchas Asher on Devarim (Siman 7), I wrote at length on the particulars of this mitzvah and whether it is de-Oraysa or de-Rabanan. Here is not the place to expand upon this. It would therefore seem perfectly obvious that there is a mitzvah to vaccinate children in order to prevent them from contracting terrible diseases. However, some cast aspersions and claim that since vaccination sometimes causes children to become sick, it is improper to endanger the children in the immediate term in the attempt to prevent future disease and danger. However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. The three primary diseases against which the triple vaccination is administered--measles, mumps, and rubella--are terrible diseases. In particular, measles is a horrible disease that entails substantial risk and is more contagious and transmittable from person to person than any other disease known to the medical field. There have already been measles outbreaks in several centers of Yahadus Charedis. It is known that one baby has died, and others have gotten very sick from this disease. I have written at length in several places (Sheilos u-Teshuvos Minchas Asher, simanim 122-123) about the disagreement between poskim as to whether a person may place himself in limited, remote danger in order to save someone else from major, proximate danger. I concluded that if the risk in question is exceedingly remote and very uncommon, there is an obligation [to save the other person]. Moreover, all would agree that doing so is, at the very least, an act of pious virtue (midas chasidus). Certainly one is obligated to undergo a procedure that entails some risk in order to treat a disease that is liable to place him in great danger; the disagreement was only about the parameters of the principle that one places his own life ahead of another's life ("chayecha kodmin le-chayei chavercha"), but it is obvious that all would agree that when it comes to his own life, he is obligated to place himself in remote danger in order to save himself from proximate danger. Likewise, in the present case, a person is obligated to vaccinate his children because vaccination is not dangerous at all, except in extraordinarily rare cases, whereas lack of vaccination endangers those very children. This is all the more certain given that lack of vaccination constitutes public endangerment. In truth, this question was already placed on the tables of kings [i.e., was addressed by leading rabbanim] more than 200 years ago, in 5545 [1784-5]. At that time, the English physician Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine. See Tiferes Yisrael (Avos chapter 3, Bo'az 1), who writes that the "righteous Jenner" ("chasid Yenner") who developed this vaccine is certainly one of the righteous among the nations ("chasidei umos ha-olam") and will be rewarded in the next world for having saved tens of thousands of lives. Indeed, this disease claimed many victims before this doctor developed this vaccine, as we find that the Shelah ha-Kadosh wrote (Sha'ar ha-Osiyos, Derech Eretz 13-14), after expanding on the degree to which a person must keep away from danger: And I am astonished: With regard to the plague of smallpox, called Blattern in German, which spreads among the children--may this never befall us--why aren't people careful to get the children away and take them out of the city!? These fathers will certainly be held accountable for the deaths of nursing babies who committed no sin and children just weaned from milk who committed no transgression, who died from this sickness, and whose fathers did not spirit them away. Magen Avraham cites these words (576:3), as does Mishnah Berurah (ad loc. 14). However, several Acharonim wrote that after the development of this vaccine, it is no longer necessary to take the children away from the city. Rather, they should be vaccinated. So it is written in Zivchei Tzedek (Yoreh De'ah 116:41), who attested that they administer vaccinations on a daily basis, and no one has ever been harmed, and so state Kaf ha-Chayim (ad loc. 60) and Rav Chayim Palache's Tochechos Chayim (on Parshas Vayeitzei). This vaccine, developed by the aforementioned doctor, brought about the elimination of the germ that causes this disease, to the extent that it is gone from the world. This is not the case with respect to the measles and the associated diseases mentioned above, which still exist; if people stop vaccinating, there is a real risk of outbreak of these diseases. In 5745, one of the rabbanim of London, Rav Avraham Hamburg, also known as [Rav Avraham] Nanzig, published a book called Alei Terufah, in which he discusses the question, which was controversial at the time, of whether it is proper to vaccinate, even though in his day there were children who died as a result of the vaccination, or whether it is preferable to do nothing ("shev ve-al ta'aseh adif"). The Tiferes Yisrael also addresses this question in his commentary on Yoma (8:6). He discusses whether it is permissible to administer this vaccine even though it poses danger, and he concludes that since the danger of not vaccinating is much greater than the danger posed by vaccinating, it is certainly permissible and proper to vaccinate. In his introduction to Sefer Alei Terufah, the author describes how his little son and daughter were cut down while still flowering--they died of this disease; and how when he lived in the holy community of the Hague in Holland, there was a major outbreak, and many children died; and how when he was in London, once again, many contracted the disease. In the main part of the text he wrote that even if one in a thousand dies from the vaccination, this is not a reason to refrain from vaccinating, just as bloodletting and laxatives are routine. And even though "we have seen several people who faint during bloodletting, and there are reports that in very rare cases someone has died from bloodletting," one should nevertheless not refrain from these things, which improve wellness and health. The same applies in the present case. [Rav Hamburg] quotes several contemporary rabbanim who permitted this treatment, even though, in their time, it seems that there were indeed those who became sick and even died from this treatment. In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide obligation to vaccinate. II I saw that Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, in his Minchas Shlomo (II:82:12), has a major chiddush about taking experimental drugs: Just as we do not worry about risking lives to wage a milchemes mitzvah [a war that it is a mitzvah to wage], so too, marauding beasts like bears and wolves are akin to a milchemes mitzvah, and we do not worry about risking lives to fight against them. The same applies during plagues and epidemics, which have the same status as milchemes mitzvah. Consequently, he permits taking experimental drugs. But in my opinion, this rationale is very far-fetched. Aside from the fact that it is obvious to me that the laws of waging war apply only to actual wars between nations and armies, not to marauding beasts, and certainly not to sickness and disease, in truth, there is no need or purpose for this rationale, because in the modern world, they neither expect nor allow people to volunteer to take drugs that endanger healthy people. Nor do they administer experimental drugs, except to people who cannot be cured and whose lives cannot be saved by any known means, or unless there is no reason to suspect that these drugs would be harmful to health. In any event, this is a very innovative rationale that there are good reasons to doubt. Therefore, there is no obligation, no mitzvah, and no permission to endanger oneself in order to advance medical research on experimental drugs. However, this is irrelevant to the case at hand, because the effectiveness of these vaccines has been proven beyond all doubt millions of times, and the danger they entail is miniscule. III It is indeed true that since the vast majority of children and adults in modern society have been vaccinated, these diseases have become exceedingly rare. Therefore, it would seem that there are grounds for parents to claim that they should not endanger their children through vaccination, causing them pain and side-effects, when the expected risk of non-vaccination is so miniscule. However, if we allow these parents not to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination is not permitted in any way. In truth, I have ruled, year-in and year-out, that there is an obligation to vaccinate children for this very reason, yet the reality is that more and more parents refrain from vaccinating their children, and we are now witnessing a broad outbreak of the measles. However, it seems that even if we would say that an individual can evade [vaccination] and still claim that he has kept his child safe, it would nevertheless stand to reason that there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and for two reasons: 1. I have explained elsewhere that any idea or action that would cause damage and injustice if done en masse, even if it would cause no harm, injustice, or evil when done by an individual, may nevertheless not be done by an individual. It is not just or right for an individual to do what the masses may not do. Such a person is a villain with license from the Torah ("naval birshus ha-Torah"), for due to the honesty of the masses who walk the straight path in their innocence, this person will conduct himself differently and derive unfair benefit. We learn this from the Bavli, the Yerushalmi, and Midrashei Chazal. Sanhedrin 109b says that the attribute of the people of Sodom was: "When someone was drying out garlic or onions, each person would come and take one, and would say, `I took one.'" And see Rashi ad loc., that each person would say, "I only took something small," but between all of them, they took everything this person had. Yerushalmi Bava Metzi'a 15a says the same of the people of the generation of the Mabul, explaining that this is the meaning of the pasuk, "the land was filled with thievery." This likewise appears in Bereishis Rabbah, parsha 31. From their holy words, we learn a fundamental element of just laws: Anything that would be wicked or unjust if done en masse is forbidden for an individual to do. The same law and the same reasoning apply in the present case. It is only because most people vaccinate their children, thereby causing them pain, that the minority can refrain from vaccination. However, the more people refrain from vaccinating their children, the greater the danger, to the extent that if most people would act in this manner, things would revert to what they were; we would return to the medieval era, and hundreds of thousands would die from terrible diseases. In cases like this, the obligation to vaccinate applies to each and every individual. I know that there is room to engage in mental acrobatics and distinguish between an act of commission ("kum ve-asei"), which would be forbidden, like those who stole less than the value of a perutah, and an act of omission ("shev ve-al ta'aseh"), like refraining from vaccination; moreover, one can claim that maybe this only smacks of a prohibition when many people come at once and steal everything that their fellow has, like the generation of the Mabul and the people of Sodom did. However, in my humble opinion, it makes more sense that there are no grounds to make such a distinction, for in their essence the cases are similar, as is clear to anyone with understanding and intelligence. Indeed, the facts have been proven. Reality--that many people have been refusing vaccination recently, and now many children have caught the measles--is slapping us in the face. 2. It seems that this halakhah can be derived from the obligation of all residents of a city to take part in guarding the city and repairing its walls, as explained in Bava Basra (8a) and in Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 163). Just as all residents of the city must either share in the actual guarding or the expenses of guarding the city, and even though it is clear that if one person shirks his duty to guard or pay the walls will not crumble and the enemy will not prevail, the obligation to guard the city nevertheless applies to each person equally, and no individual may dodge it, so too in the present case. For everyone is a partner when it comes to anything that is for the betterment of society or a public necessity. Each person must contribute his equal share, and there is no difference between a financial obligation and the obligation to vaccinate. The same law applies to both. This all applies in a case where one can refrain from vaccinating his children without risking their health, because enough others do vaccinate. The present situation is far more severe, though, and we need not resort to creative readings of aggados to determine that vaccination of children is obligatory. The disease has broken out already, and every parent who refuses to vaccinate his children is placing them directly in harm's way. Translated by Elli Fischer This translation has been reviewed and approved by Rav Asher Weiss. From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 4 06:57:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 4 Jan 2019 09:57:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Whether You Come to Talk to God, to Your Friends or to Both, Shul is a Place For You: A Measured Call Regarding Talking in Shul In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190104145728.GA16182@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 04, 2019 at 02:30:21AM +0000, Joseph Kaplan via Avodah wrote: :> I have often, in my usual style of eschewing normalcy, have gone over :> to people who interrupted their davening for something (eg a woman who :> was davening while waiting for the train, as she sits down in the train :> and reopens her siddur), or the fellow whose mind wantered in shul... I :> would go over to them and say, "Tell Him I say 'hi!'" Of course, they :> can't hear the capital "h". Sad to say, while it's a significant minority, :> only a minority of people get Who I am talking about." : I would hope that this is an exaggeration to make a point and not what : you actually do. I find it hard to believe that you would not understand : that a woman, who with all the time pressure she has in getting the : kids up, breakfasted, and out to school and getting herself ready to : go to work while thinking about dinner and laundry... No, I really do this. Although, Passaic being what it is, you're picturing the wrong woman. We don't have too many two-income families with kids in the house. Typical woman on the bus is single. And I also do it to the bachur at the table in the shul lobby, who is checking his phone while putting on tefillin. The piece you're missing is tone of voice. "If you don't know Who I mean, you're not doing it right" is said to the rhythm of a punch line. What you picture as a snide remark is intentionally said as an intentionally corny joke, with a self-aware nod to the fact that the person I'm talking to might find my point corny as well. In today's post-modern zeitgeist, going meta by making a joke of one's joke is more common, and expected, than you'd think. But even if not, the punchline rhythm tells them I was attempting humore, not nagging. And I must be carrying it off, because the responses I get tend to involve a smile. To justify putting this reply on Avodah, let me add the following general observation: Tochakhah isn't supposed to be rebuke, and certainly not snide. Has to be said in a way that it will be accepted. Humor is a key tool. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Jan 6 11:35:53 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 20:35:53 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way. In particular, the Gemara explains that our Mishna, which posits a disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and teh Sages about the status of the loaves brought with an animal that was found after shechita to have been a ba'al mum (i.e. a blemish that preceded slaughter), obviously was authored by Rabbi Meir. The reaosn the Gemara posits our Mishna was authored by Rabbi Meir is that in the Tosefta, that is Rabbi Me'ir analysis, while Rabbi Yehudah disagrees and posits that Rabbi Eli'eser and Rabbi Yehoshua' (the latter being "the Sages" of our Mishna) do not disagree regarding the status of the loaves accompanying an animal with a blemish, but rather regarding the status of such loaves accompanying an animal that was sacrificed with the disqualifying intention chutz limqomo. The Gemara spends a considerable amount of space working out the logic of the two sides according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Rambam, however, doesn't rule according to Rabbi Yehuda, but rather follows our Mishna, meaning he follows Rabbi Meir (and within Rabbi Meir follows the Sages, i.e. Rabbi Yehoshua' as opposed to Rabbi Eli'ezer). Now that isn't in and of itself surprising. Often the Gemara will spend considerable efforts to understand the rejected shittah, too, and sometimes spend more effort on it than on the shittah we eventually follow. Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying intention. The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such disagreement between them. Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to Rabbi Yehudah. This gives rise to the two following difficulties: Either this proves that the Halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda, so why does Rambam rule like Rabbi Meir, and also: why is the halakha like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Meir? Now perhaps a reader only casually looking at this difficulty of mine may ask whether it is possible that the Rambam ruled according to a particular mehalakh which works out both according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah. Alas, no, that is not the case. The Rambam rules that chutz limqomo the loaves are nonetheless sanctified (and consequently prohibited in consumption as any sacrifice brought with the intention of chutz limqomo), which is only the case acording to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Eli'ezer as understood by Rabbi Yehudah. However, as the Gemara explains, Rabbi Eli'ezer ends up changing his mind and agreeing to Rabbi Yehoshua', so that the Rambam couldn't rule the loaves to be sanctified if he had been following Rabbi Yehudah. Bottom line: I am confused. Why does the sugya present the Amoraim as following Rabbi Yehudah's understanding, when the halakha ought to follow Rabbi Meir? -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:30:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:30:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Sukkah Yeshana In-Reply-To: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <0ba366bf435347f8ac060c596a575ca0@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190107203030.GA4890@aishdas.org> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 07:50:25PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Mishna in Sukkah (9a) discusses Sukkah Yeshana which one would have : thought meant an old sukkah (schach) yet the discussion in the gemara : indicates that it is an issue of lishma (intent). Why didn't the Mishna : use the language of lishma? Because the mishnah is giving you an umdena. If you find a sukkah that is more than 30 days old, assume it's lo lishmah. Lo lishmah being assur is a step before this din. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:47:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:47:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis... According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 , it's R' Meir who breings down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) Chodesh Tov! -Micha From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 7 11:48:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:48:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?The_Mitzva_of_=93To=92ameha=94=96_Tasti?= =?windows-1252?q?ng_Food_on_Erev_Shabbos?= Message-ID: I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL The Mitzva of ?To?ameha?? Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos The Magen Avraham44 writes, ?There is a mitzva on erev Shabbos to taste from all the food that has been prepared for Shabbos.? Elya Rabba45 cites the source for this from the Shabbos davening, ?To?ameha chaim zachu,? those who taste will merit life. There are a number of reasons given for the mitzva of to?ameha. The Mishna Berura46 explains that it is done in order to ensure that the food tastes good for Shabbos. Others47 explain that just as someone who is hosting an distinguished guest makes sure to taste the food before serving it, so too, tasting the food before Shabbos shows that we value the Shechina which enters our home as our guest on Shabbos. Still, one should ensure that he only tastes the different foods so that he can still eat the Shabbos meal with a good appetite. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 12:58:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 15:58:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190107205850.GC4890@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 07:48:59PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : I must admit that I had never heard of this until my wife returned : from a visit to a number of kevarim in Europe with a group of Chassidic : women. If you ask people about this, I think that you will find that : in non-Chassidic circles this Mitzva is commonly unknown. YL It's a "thing" among the Yeshivish too. :> The Mitzva of "To'ameha" -- Tasting Food on Erev Shabbos Who are you quoting? In any case, all it means is that the cook shouldn't serve the food they made for se'udos Shabbos without checking the taste themselve. It is common when cooking to taste the dish anyway. You just ought to remember to check (eg) the soup, even if you make the same recipe every week. Chodesh Tov! -Micha From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 13:27:18 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 22:27:18 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:47 PM Micha Berger wrote: > According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 > , it's R' Meir who breings > down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. > > Not saying I fully understand the sugya, just looks like a source for > the Rambam having a different understanding of the sugya than our girsa > of shas. (Not saying it's necessarily a girsa issue, just saying I can't > insist it's necessarily what the Bavli said.) > That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as reported in the sugya. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 14:22:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 17:22:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 10:27:18PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: :> According to the Tosefta ad loc 8:10 :> , it's R' Meir who breings :> down the machloqes, and R' Yehudah who says lo nechliqu. ... : That doesn't contradict what I reported; it is, in fact, exactly as : reported in the sugya. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : Yehudah's analysis, while according to Rabbi Meir there ain't no such : disagreement between them. You typoed, and I got confused. So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to your question with typoes corrected. On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 08:35:53PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote something like: : Menachot 78b-79a deals with the question of the sanctity of the loaves of a : todah sacrifice that was deficient in some way... : Rambam's psak also accords with the two kelalim of halakha kestam mishna : and also Rabbi Meir veRabbi Yehudah halakha keRabbi Meir. : And yet, I find that here it is difficult, because... Towards the end of : the sugya (on 79a), there is a disagreement between Rabba and Rava : regarding what to do with a Chatat that had been slaughtered with the : disqualifying intention of chutz limqomo and then erroneously brought up : upon the altar. The Gemara explains the disagreement between them as : flowing forth from the disagreement between Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi : Yehoshua' regarding a Todah sacrificed with that same disqualifying : intention. : The problem is that Rabbi Eli'ezer and Rabbi Yehoshua' only disagree : regarding the loaves of a Todah sacrificed chutz limkomo according to Rabbi : [Meir]'s analysis, while according to Rabbi Yehudah there ain't no such : disagreement between them. : Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba : and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to : Rabbi [Meir]. ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I long to accomplish a great and noble task, micha at aishdas.org but it is my chief duty to accomplish small http://www.aishdas.org tasks as if they were great and noble. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Helen Keller From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 7 21:59:52 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Tue, 08 Jan 2019 00:59:52 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: The Rav states: > > However, in my humble opinion, this claim is completely and totally > devoid of substance, because all studies that were done responsibly > establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of > mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe > ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by > vaccination for certain, even though hundreds of millions of children > have been routinely vaccinated. On the other hand, as the number of people > who do not vaccinate increases, danger increases as well; if many people > refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out and > cause mass fatalities, as happened before these vaccines were developed. It would appear that his entire argument hinges on the factual claim that ?all studies that were done responsibly establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that, with the exception of mild side-effects, it is not at all common for vaccines to have severe ramifications, and there are no known cases where death was caused by vaccination for certain?. He repeats this claim later in the article: > In any event, it is clear and obvious that nowadays it is not only > permissible to vaccinate, but there is even an obligation, on order to > prevent danger to the individual and the public. Even if in their time, > hundreds of years ago, they vacillated, it was only because there were > indeed children who died from the vaccine, as is evident from their > words. This is not true of today's vaccines, so there is a bona fide > obligation to vaccinate. > But? this is exactly the point of fact in dispute by the anti-vexers. According to the NIH, there have indeed been cases - roughly 1 in a million - where the death can be attributed to the vaccination. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4599698/ Now, even if you argue that the risk of death from the vaccine is tiny in comparison to the risk of death from the disease, is that true? 1, Try telling that to the parents of those 5 kids who died from vaccination-induced anaphylaxis. I?m not sure they would agree with this cheshbone. It?s like playing Russian roulette - only instead of 6 bullets, there are a million. Someone?s going to get that bullet, hope it?s not my kid. 2, How effective is the MMR? According to the CDC, about 98%. That means that 1 in 50 kids are getting the shots with the small but real risk thereof, and not being protected. Moreover, the immunity appears to wane over time (again, according to the CDC - https://www.nvic.org/vaccines-and-diseases/measles/measles-vaccine-effective ness.aspx ) 3, Now that most kids are vaccinated, how risky is it really not to vaccinate? His argument that ?if many people refuse vaccination, there is a risk that epidemics will break out? doesn?t seem strong enough to compel parents to impose this risk of death on their child which does not even have a 100% effectiveness rate. He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is low but not zero. His main argument: > if we allow these parents not > to vaccinate their children, the results would be entirely predictable: > many would refrain from vaccinating their children, motivated by maternal > compassion and paternal love, and then the great danger of outbreaks of > diseases would emerge once again. Therefore, refraining from vaccination > is not permitted in any way. > The way I understand community-immunity is that there are some people whom vaccines won?t protect (such as the 2 percent mentioned above). Therefore, if everyone in the community is vaccinated, those 2 percent will be less likely to be exposed to someone with the disease. So if my child is one of the 98% who is protected, it?s a chesed toward those 2%. However, if I decide not to vaccinate, I?m exposing my own child to possible risk, and by extension, those 2% who might be exposed to my child. But I?m not putting the 90% at risk ? they have immunity from the disease.Yet he doesn?t seem concerned merely about the 2%, he seems to think that the 98% are also somehow at risk, which I don?t think is true. Therefore, his argument needs to be narrowed to the idea that we could theoretically allow a small number of anti-vaxers, but not too many because then there?s a chance their kids will get sick. The problem with this argument is that the parents know the risk when they decide not to vax, it?s a risk they are willing to take for their own kids, compared to the risk of vaccinating. Based on his reasoning, I would assume that Rav Weiss shlita requires all available vaccinations (flu, chicken pox, cholera, hepatitis, etc)? If not, how does he determine which ones to require? (There are 26 currently available and another 24 in the pipeline - https://www.who.int/immunization/diseases/en/ ) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Mon Jan 7 23:01:28 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 08:01:28 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Menachot Question 79a In-Reply-To: <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> References: <20190107204724.GB4890@aishdas.org> <20190107222208.GA3196@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, 23:22 Micha Berger So, going by what the gemara and Tosefta actually say, let's go back to > your question with typoes corrected. >: Hence, the conlcusion of the sugya, citing the disagreement between Rabba >: and Rava, seems to indicate that the correct interpretation is according to >: Rabbi [Meir]. > > ... which is how the Rambam pasqens. So what's the question? Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah both agree that there is a disagreement; they disagree about what the disagreement is about. My problem is that through the disagreement between Rabba and Rava, we get a sense that the Gemara rules like Rabbi Yehudah; otherwise the Gemara's interpretation of their disagreement makes little sense. Which either means that the Gemara contradicts the later ruling of Rambam, or that the Gemara is difficult, or that I missed some nuance. -- Mit freundlichen Gren, Yours sincerely, Arie Folger Check out my blog: http://rabbifolger.net From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 8 07:48:56 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 10:48:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 8/1/19 12:59 am, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: > He uses the example of a makaa (fence around a place where one could > fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built and used > correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at its job of > preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or misuse such as climbing > over it)? The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, and the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and > obviously apply here. The essence of a ma?aka is that it is a 100% > protection against a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger > without a ma?aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But as I?ve > already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection and the risk is > low but not zero. Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From mcohen at touchlogic.com Tue Jan 8 08:08:03 2019 From: mcohen at touchlogic.com (mcohen at touchlogic.com) Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 11:08:03 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Davar Seser Message-ID: <4b1e01d4a76c$55f43000$01dc9000$@touchlogic.com> There is an in-depth halacha sefer called Davar Seser on the subject of sexual relations (between husband and wife) Has anyone heard any authoritative opinions on the sefer and its (very lenient) halachic conclusions? (email me offline if you w like a copy) Mordechai Cohen From JRich at sibson.com Wed Jan 9 19:12:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 03:12:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Jan 11 02:52:32 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 05:52:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael Message-ID: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Here in the US, we've had a govenrment shutdown, in which non-essential services are not operating until our elected officials can agree on a budget. (And people in essential services are working, but not paid until all this is resolved.) The US FDA is one of the non-essential services that are not operating. And this has been true since December 21. Meaning that for the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA will be checking their milk. At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger When one truly looks at everyone's good side, micha at aishdas.org others come to love him very naturally, and http://www.aishdas.org he does not need even a speck of flattery. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi AY Kook From zev at sero.name Fri Jan 11 10:42:14 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <882488eb-b5be-3336-3efb-e6c12a6153b3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 5:52 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > For the past 20 days, dairy farmers knew that no one from the FDA > will be checking their milk.>> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? First of all, the FDA does not inspect dairy farms or plants. Neither does any other federal agency. So in metzius your question doesn't begin. However, let's suppose this was a state government that shut down, and the state inspectors were not making their rounds, and proceed from there. If you're referring to RMF's heter for commercial milk, it does not depend on government inspection of farms; on the contrary, RMF assumed that there is no effective supervision of farms, since inspectors only come occasionally and the farmers are not afraid of them. His heter originally focused on the regular presence of inspectors at the *processing plants*, and thus the need to bribe them if anything needed covering up, as well as the need to bribe plant workers not to report what they saw; this ensures that it would only be done if a large profit can be anticipated, which is not the case for adulterating cow milk with that of a tamei animal. But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi`a berura which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi`a berura) that this last nochri didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. But once we accept this argument we can dispense with the plant inspectors too. If we buy a sealed tamper-proof container of milk from our local bodega, leshitas RMF we have all we need. We know as if we personally witnessed it that nothing happened to the milk from the time it passed into the bodega owner's hands until he sold it to us. Therefore according to RMF this is cholov yisroel even if the plant that processed and bottled or packaged it has no supervision at all, just as milk from an supervised plant is cholov yisroel even though it comes from an unsupervised farm. So any interruption in the state inspection system, whether at the plants or at the farms, becomes irrelevant. Again, provided that there is no sofek de'oraisa, because if there is one then RMF says we are no longer talking about the gezera of cholov yisroel in the first place. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com Fri Jan 11 11:53:28 2019 From: ygbechhofer at mail.gmail.com (Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer) Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:53:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: > At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam > broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. From micha at aishdas.org Sun Jan 13 17:56:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:56:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 02:53:28PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: : On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: :> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam :> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? : I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. To recap: The Chasam Sofar holds that CY was a taqanah, and therefore would hold even when the rationale doesn't. The Peri Chadash hholds it's a pesaq, and therefore whereever the cheshash is ignoribly small, there is no problem drinking chalav stam. The PC himself drank chalav stam when he was in Amsterdam. For over a generation before the Igeros Moshe, most Americans drank chalav stam. We don't know why. The AhS assumed wthey were just sinning. But this included some notable rabbis. The natural assumption is that they held like the Peri Chadash. But since nothing is in writing, it's all guesswork. Everyone discusses this in terms of RMG's teshuvos in the Igeros Moshe. But that's his post-facto rationale for an existing heter. RMF couldn't believe that the final pesaq wasn't like the Chasam Sofer. Think how often we cite the CS, and how often we even mention the Peri Chadash. And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. But meanwhile, O don't see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" (as it does in other places)? Lo zakhisi lehavin RMF's shitah. And I am not sure we're actually relying on it lemaaseh. Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state agency does those inspections. All in all, I am surprised none of the national hashgachos have chimed in to reassure people yet. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 13 22:42:49 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 01:42:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1b3ccc10-b542-5c34-4072-e85a1054d8c3@sero.name> On 11/1/19 2:53 pm, Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer via Avodah wrote: > On 1/11/2019 5:52 AM, Micha Berger wrote: >> At what point do we say the assumptions behind allowing chalav stam >> broke down, and one needs to buy chalav yisrael? > > I always preferred the Pri Chadash's heter. Which is really the Radvaz. I don't understand why everyone attributes it to the Pri Chadash, when he merely quotes the Radvaz. But that's fine if you're sefardi. At least according to RMF, we Ashkenazim universally reject this shita, and hold like the Chasam Sofer that there was a gezera, which was a davar shebeminyan. The AhS so despised this shita that he wouldn't even name those who hold it, and pretty much calls them machti'ei harabim. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Sun Jan 13 19:23:32 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 22:23:32 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: Zev Sero wrote: >As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective >construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon these are, >that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the MMR vaccine, but let's >suppose 0.02%. (Against that, consider that the risk to the person whom >the remedy fails is much higher for the parapet than the vaccine; the 2% >whom the vaccine fails to protect will, *if exposed*, catch one or more >of the three diseases, with a >99% chance that they will survive with no >lasting injury, whereas the 0.02% -- or whatever the true number is -- >whom the parapet fails stand a >99% chance of injury or death.) > >Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the parapet itself. From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 07:21:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:21:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <86680276-61ce-7de2-247a-a084bab27f20@sero.name> On 13/1/19 10:23 pm, Alexander Seinfeld via Avodah wrote: >> Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking their >> heads against them, which is almost certainly significantly *higher* >> than the corresponding 1/1M risk from the MMR vaccine. > They are not comparable. By the parapet, no one is at risk from the > parapet itself. Sure they are. If the parapet were not there, someone striking his head at the space it occupies would not be injured. It's a minuscule risk, but higher than the risk of being injured by the MMR vaccine. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 07:35:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 10:35:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190114153531.GB13298@aishdas.org> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 03:12:37AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from : a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is : standard practice in this Shul - has anyone seen this done elsewhere? There are a number of shuls in Passaic where this is done. My own shul shul has a ba'al qeri'ah reading from a printed Tanakh codex every week. I prefer it, as I feel so nervous about how my slow meticulous reading is going to annoy mispallelim who would prefer more haste. The whole idea of having a baal qeriah to begin with was to level the playing field so that no one is too embarrassed when he is given an aliyah. In todays world, there are many men who lack the Jewish education to know haftara trop, so that original rationale should extend to cover haftarah from a printed and fully pointed book too. For that matter, my father reads the berakhos out of a siddur (or the sheet on the shulchan, if there is one), for the same reason as having the ba'al qeri'ah. Why should people who dont know the berakhos by heart feel uncomfortable by being the only ones who need to look at the text? (I wonder if Passaic's high percentage of baalei teshuvah, people with less practice reading with trop, is why it's more common in my neck of the woods. That is the population my father is concerned about WRT the berakhos.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From saulguberman at gmail.com Mon Jan 14 10:02:55 2019 From: saulguberman at gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 13:02:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 10:41 PM Rich, Joel via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara from a > Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. Apparently this is > standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone seen this done elsewhere? > KT > Joel Rich > > It has happened a few times when either the person prepared the wrong haftorah or they are not capable of leining but would like the aliyah. Saul > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:04:09 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:04:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > > Meanwhile, Zev mentioned my errors in metzi'us. The USDA not the FDA is > responsible for milk. And the inspection is at bottling, not the farm. > I have gotten conflicting reports about whether the USDA or a state > agency does those inspections. The USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service does not inspect milk for safety. It inspects meat, poultry, and egg products. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_Safety_and_Inspection_Service "Food products that are under the jurisdiction of the FSIS, and thus subject to inspection, are those that contain more than 3% meat or 2% poultry products, with several exceptions, and egg products (liquid, frozen or dried)." As I understand it plants that produce dairy products can voluntarily sign up for a "hechsher" from the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, which inspects its clients and grades them for quality. https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/dairy-program However, unlike a hechsher, there is nothing on a bottle of retail milk to show directly that it comes from an inspected plant. Therefore I doubt any plant producing bottled milk for the retail market would sign up for this inspection, since it would not generate extra sales. It seems to be designed for plants selling to industrial customers, who wish to know that the ingredients in their own products are of good quality. Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but my understanding is that it's the same people.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 14 12:14:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:14:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: ... : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but : my understanding is that it's the same people.) According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must comply to. So, a shutdown of the relevant state government may be an issue, but if the dairy would then have to ship across state lines to reach you, the USDA would have to get involved anyway. The call in which I obtained that info led to me speaking to a few people at OU kosher about the chaos and conflicting claims I've seen on-line, and I was told that they will be putting up a statement about it. Check their Facebook page or web site, I guess. All of which is off-topic for this list, I just wanted to wrap up the halakhah lemaaseh, since I did speak to an institution most of the chalav stam consuming public would follow. In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread . I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm to follow the Peri Chadash. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It is harder to eat the day before Yom Kippur micha at aishdas.org with the proper intent than to fast on Yom http://www.aishdas.org Kippur with that intent. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 12:54:23 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 15:54:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> <8aa5cf60-d9e9-7120-ea4c-7697bb25af55@sero.name> <20190114201429.GA5176@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <48046659-01a1-a155-ef96-bd0a9dd9b512@sero.name> On 14/1/19 3:14 pm, Micha Berger wrote: > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 03:04:09PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > ... > : Dairy safety inspection is a state matter. (I can personally > : testify that the inspectors who come to NY dairy farms are from the > : state. I have no personal knowledge of who comes to the plants, but > : my understanding is that it's the same people.) > > According to the OU as well, the inspection is actually done by state > agencies. The USDA has standard that at minimum the state agency must > comply to. I doubt this claim's validity. From what I can see on the USDA's own site and on other sites about it, its food safety inspection service has no jurisdiction over, or interest in, milk or dairy products, and its marketing service's inspections are voluntary and probably do not cover retail milk producers. > In terms of the theory, see my prior post on this thread > . > I think that if inspections would be temporarily halted (say, in case of > that state shut-down), it would really depend on whether we follow RMF > that all Ashkenazim really follow the Chasam Sofer, or if the rabbanim > who were meiqilim before the Igeros Moshe were really setting up a norm > to follow the Peri Chadash. And as I wrote earlier, I don't see it. According to RMF's shita, the plant inspectors (whoever they are) turn out to be irrelevant. The certainty that the retailer from whom you bought the bottle did not tamper with it is *greater* than the certainty that there is no funny business going on at an inspected bottling plant. So according to RMF it doesn't matter if the plant is never inspected at all. We don't need "re'iyah", however defined, at the plant, but only at the retailer, and by RMF's standards we have it. That is, unless you buy your non-Jewish milk at a Jewish retailer. I suppose that in RMF's day it was common for Jewish-owned corner shop to sell non-Jewish milk. Nowadays it seems to me this is not common; where you have Jewish shops they sell Jewish milk, and where you don't have Jewish milk you also don't have Jewish shops. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 14 16:30:24 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 19:30:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael In-Reply-To: <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> References: <20190111105232.GA6908@aishdas.org> <79718829-f2ea-5e9c-cff0-ec9c5cc9ad29@gmail.com> <20190114015618.GA22305@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 13/1/19 8:56 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > And so R Moshe comes up with a sevara by which we could hold like the > CS and yet stil could be meiqil. It strike me as dachuq, as though RMF > was looking for a way not to overturn a well supported pesaq while still > holding like the CS. Of course, that's just more guesswork. If he thought it was dachuk I doubt he would repeatedly say that it's a solid heter on which anyone may rely, and that one who has been keeping strict CY because he thought it was halachically required doesn't need hataras nedarim to stop. I also doubt he would let his wife and children eat something that he thought could be permitted only through a sevara dechuka. It seems more like he was intellectually convinced that he had hit upon the true halacha, but didn't think people ought to jump on newfangled heterim if they didn't have to, no matter how solid. > But it means that the CS's taqanah requiring re'iyah means requiring > more certainty than usual birur, whereas the PC says it *is* just regular > birur. So, the nafqa mina lema'aseh boils down to measuring probability -- > in a legal system that isn't that rigorous about probabilities? He says we need the same degree of "absolute certainty" that we get from eidus. And his proof is from eidei kidushei biah. This is not birur hametzius, it's anan literally sahadi; it's as if we personally saw it. > Second, as the AhS notes, one only needs to have a Jew attend part of the > milking. This is his ra'ayah for the CS's position. Could you please point out where in the AhS you are seeing this? > But meanwhile, O don't > see how that fits RMF's position -- CY that was only watch for the first > 2 out of a 15 min milking session isn't certainly unadulterated. So how > does RMF take "rei'yah" here for means "or as sure as if it were seen" > (as it does in other places)? Are you referring to the fact that the mashgiach can be sitting outside? If so not even 2 minutes of direct viewing are required. His sitting outside, combined with the fact that either there is no tamei animal available (and he'd see if someone brought one in) or there is one but the nochri will not milk it because he knows the mashgiach is sitting just outside, constitutes re'iyah, giving us the necessary certainty. Basically the difference between the Radvaz and RMF's view of the CS is that the Radvaz assumes that in Chazal's time there was a real cheshash, so they warned us of it. If there is no cheshash then there is no problem. RMF assumes that in Chazal's day there was *no* cheshash, or at least there wasn't always one, because if there was always one then there would be no need for a gezera. Therefore having no cheshash is not enough. Another way to look at it: The OU tells us we need a hechsher on milk, not to assure us that it doesn't contain horse milk but to assure us that it doesn't contain shark cartilage. The Radvaz says the standard for the two is the same; we need the same assurance about horse milk that we do about shark cartilage, no more. The normal OU standards, which fall far short of re'iyah, suffice for both. RMF says no; for shark cartilage it's sufficient to have the company agree it won't put any in and to do bimonthly inspections and audits to make sure they're keeping it. For horse milk we need, *in addition to that*, something that counts as re'iyah, *but only for the last nochri*. For the previous nochrim the regular standard is OK. In any case it follows that when the last nochri is a retailer who received it in a tamper-proof bottle, then according to RMF we have our re'iyah, and now it's like any other product, needing only the same birur that we rely on for everything else. In the case of milk, as the Radvaz points out, we have that birur automatically, so we're good. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 15 05:39:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Using an Automatic Toilet on Shabbos Message-ID: The following is from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Some toilets have an optical sensor and flush automatically when one walks away from the toilet. What should a person do if they find themselves on Shabbos in a place that only has automatic toilets? A. Rav Belsky, zt?l (Shulchan HaLevi 7:7) discusses this question and rules that if there is no other option, it is permitted to use such a toilet. He explains that activating the toilet by movement of one?s body is referred to in halacha as kocho (literally, one?s power.) For example, if one tears a cloth with their hands, that is a direct melacha, but if one shoots an arrow through a cloth, that is kocho. On a Torah level, one is liable in both cases, but regarding Rabbinic prohibitions there is a difference. The Gemara (Shabbos 100b) permits pouring waste water onto the side of a boat and letting it run off into the sea (kocho). The Ritva (Shabbos 100b) explains that pouring waste water directly into the sea is a rabbinic violation (carrying from a private domain to a karmalis). Nonetheless, Chazal permitted this due to the consideration of ?kavod habriyos? (human dignity), so long as it is done indirectly, by means of kocho. Similarly, in the case of one who must use an automatic toilet, it is permitted because of kavod habriyos, since it is activated indirectly by means of kocho. One must be mindful that if lights turn on when one enters the bathroom, then it is forbidden to do so. One cannot violate a Torah prohibition even in a situation of kavod habriyos. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 04:43:51 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 07:43:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Vaccinations - Rav Asher Weiss Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld quoted Rav Asher Weiss, and explained Rav Weiss to be distinguishing between vaccination and ma'akeh: > He uses the example of a maaka (fence around a place where one > could fall). How effective is this fence, assuming it is built > and used correctly? Can we agree that it is 100% effective at > its job of preventing falls? (Excluding building errors or > misuse such as climbing over it)? The vaccination is not like > that ? even when made and used correctly, we still expect about > 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. That?s pretty scary, and > the ma'aka mitzvah does not readily and obviously apply here. > The essence of a ma'aka is that it is a 100% protection against > a possible danger (nobody knows the level of danger without a > ma'aka, I propose 1 in a thousand (.1% percent as a good-faith > estimate). To repeat, a 100% protection against a 0.1% risk. But > as I've already shown, a vaccination is not a 100% protection > and the risk is low but not zero. R' Zev Sero disagrees with the claim that maakeh offers a 100% guarantee: > Nothing has zero risk, or a zero failure rate. > > As you point out parapets have two modes of failure: defective > construction, and people climbing over them; however uncommon > these are, that's a non-zero failure rate; not the 2% of the > MMR vaccine, but let's suppose 0.02%. ... > > Parapets also carry a minuscule risk, e.g. from people striking > their heads against them, ... I would agree with RZS's basic point, but I would go much much farther than he went. The risks of a maakeh are not merely from when the maakeh was built incorrectly (in which case it's not really a maakeh at all), or from when someone deliberately defeats its safety features (like when climbing over it), or from "oness"-type collateral damage (like hitting one's head against it, in which case he'd have been better off if there had been no maakeh at all). Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." The criterion of "leaning" seems rather weak to me. I can easily imagine many situations where a just-barely-kosher maakeh will NOT give 100% protection: When people are running or fighting, their momentum is that much greater, and a maakeh that would have protected someone leaning will be inadequate. Even a person who is walking backwards (for some legitimate reason) may not realize that he is close to the edge and the maakeh MIGHT fail to stop him. This will be especially dangerous if the person is tall and/or a small shiur of "tefach" was used for the construction. No. A maakeh is NOT a 100% protection. It might offer 100% protection to the typical cases, but not to the unusual ones. Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Jan 15 05:13:28 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 08:13:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] haftarah Message-ID: . R' Joel Rich asked: > I recently was in a Shul in Aretz where they said the haftara > from a Chumash yet the baal korei read it for the oleh. > Apparently this is standard practice in this Shul ? has anyone > seen this done elsewhere? The standard practice in my shul is that one person reads the haftara from a Tanach, and most people just listen, though some do read along. Sometimes, someone will have a yahrzeit and therefore wants to lead the haftara, but is unable to actually read it himself. So he says the brachos before and after, while someone else actually reads the navi from the Tanach. (Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish.") Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Maakeh In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190115221640.GA11069@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 07:43:51AM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Rather, I would argue that the maakeh is inherently a less-than-100% : protection, and doesn't even claim to offer 100% protection. : : Mechaber Choshen Mishpat 427:5 writes, "The maakeh must be no less : than 10 tefachim high, so that a faller will not fall from it. And the : wall must be strong so that a person who leans on it will not fall." ... and if maaqeh were about safety, then why is property owned by a tzibbur patur? I therefore suggested here a couple of times that maaqeh is about reinforcing in oneself the importance of safety more than about safety itself. I had the following discussion with an LOR. At the time, his shul's duchan ran the length of the front of the shul, and had steps down to floor level, across only the middle third. The two sides were 3-1/2' high walls. So I asked the rav of this shul why there was no maaqeh. He said it didn't need one, as it was a shul. I pointed to the huge mezuzah on the doorway. That isn't needed either, technically. But, the rabbi noted, it wouldn't feel to the tzibbur like a Jewish place, a maqom qadosh, without one. My point exactly. This is a teaching opportunity about the role of BALC in defining qeduashah. Nothing changed until the entire shul was refurbished from the old facing the center amphitheter shaped structure (think a less grandiose version of the old LSS) to a grid of tables facing mizrach arangement. Then the question became moot. (I should note I knew said LOR in YU. I wasn't stam viciting a shul and being a nudnik. I was prevailing on a decades long acquaitanceship and being a nudnik.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision, micha at aishdas.org yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Yisrael Salanter Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 15 14:38:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:38:25 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages Message-ID: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Here's the case... Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow that is safeiq neveilah. So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. This is another case of a phenomenon I've asked about before. Such as the brisker saying that the tzitzis aren't betelim to the beged for a tallis qatan if it turns out that the Mordechai is right and the tallis qatan doesn't need tzitzis lehalakhah. Lemaaseh, this man is wearing tzitzis on his tallis qatan because he wouldn't wear his tallis qatan otherwise. And that's all yetzi'ah beShabbos cares about. Bitul to the begged. The fact that he only "needs" the tzitzis because of safeiq or minhag shouldn't change that. At least, so it seems to me. Here too... In the end of it, the man can't eat his meat. Midinei mamonus, that's all that matters, no? In fact, the AhS tones this down by saying that someone says (I think he means the Shakh) that this is only when the minhag not to eat the meat isn't fully nispasheit, and some still eat it. Vekhein nir'eh ikar. Okay, I can understand if the person is choosing to be machmir, it shouldn't be on the shocheit's cheshbon. But according to the Rama who says nothing about such a limitation... I don't get it. The shocheit rendered the meat unusable in a manner that he (qua shomer sekhar) has to pay. Why does it matter that mei'iqar hadin it might be that the person is allowed to eat it? He has no access to iqar hadin and we pasten (or minhag hamaqom is) not to eat it. He has no choice! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Every second is a totally new world, micha at aishdas.org and no moment is like any other. http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Chaim Vital Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Tue Jan 15 15:11:47 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 18:11:47 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 15/1/19 5:38 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > Here's the case... > > Someone shechts your cow, and shahah bemi'ut simanim. Now you have a cow > that is safeiq neveilah. > > So the Rama writes (CM 306:5) that even though we are nohagim not to > eat it, midinei mamonus, we can't make someone pay for damages. (E.g. if > caused by neglect.) But also, we can't make the owner pay the shocheit. > The AhS (s' 12) says that in cases, chezqas baalim applies. Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an issur. We who are "yotz'im beyad Ramo", to misquote this week's sedra, don't say we are noheg, we say "the Ramo assers"; but he himself doesn't say "assur", so he didn't treat it as an issur. And if it's not an issur then what right do we have to make the shochet pay for our minhagim (unless that was in his contract)? -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 15 18:48:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 02:48:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim Message-ID: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the actual location? If not, why record these specific places. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Tue Jan 15 22:14:22 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 06:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> In Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 138 dated 12/25/2018 R' Akiva Miller asked: Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests .>> In the Friday night poem "Shalom Aleichem", we ask the mal'achim togive us a bracha. We've often mentioned here that some people avoidthis poem because it is either similar to avoda zara, or perhaps mightactually BE avoda zara. I call your attention to the morning's parsha, Bereshis 48:16, thepasuk "Hamal'ach hagoel osi." Yaakov Avinu refers to a particularmal'ach and asks that this mal'ach should give a bracha to Yosef'ssons. At first glance, this seems to be very similar to ShalomAleichem. How is this justifiable, in the view of those who considerShalom Aleichem to be problematic? << ?>>>>>> ?Sorry I have fallen behind in reading my emails.I don't understand why asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). If you say to your rebbe or to anyone, "Please give me a bracha for parnassa, good health, children, etc" I don't see a problem.? If you say to a human being, alive or deceased, "Please give me parnassa, good health, children, etc" -- THAT'S a problem.? When Rochel said to Yakov, "Give me children" he responded, "Am I in place of Hashem?"? Admittedly Chazal consider his answer unduly harsh; presumably he should have said, "Only Hashem can give you children, but I will daven for you." Getting back to Shalom Aleichem, Chazal say if your house looks nice on Shabbos the malachim will bentsh you.? I just don't understand what the issue is with saying to the malachim, "Welcome to my home, doesn't it look nice and Shabbosdig?? So bentsh me as you are supposed to do." It even seems to me that there is a bit of gaavah involved in saying, "What was good enough for R' Shlomo Alkabetz and the mekubalim of Tzfas is not good enough for me, I have a deeper understanding of halacha than they did."? Unless you are relying not on your own sevara but on some other authority of equal stature to theirs. --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Jan 16 04:53:56 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 07:53:56 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk Message-ID: . In the thread "Government Shutdown and Chalav Yisrael", R' Zev Sero wrote: > But by the end of the long teshuvah that ends the series dealing > with this, RMF had moved away from even that requirement. In > explaining why it doesn't matter that there is no "yedi'a berura > which is like seeing" about what the farmers are doing, he sets > out the real core of his chiddush, which is that the whole gezera > only applies to the last nochri who owned the milk before it > passed into the hands of a Yisroel. Assuming there is no real > worry about treife milk (in which case no gezera would be needed > because it would be a safek de'oraisa), so long as we have "yisrael > ro'eihu" (which he defines as yedi'a berura) that this last nochri > didn't tamper with the milk, it is cholov yisroel and we don't care > about the previous owners. Thus, he says, since we have this > "re'iyah" at the plant we don't need it at the farm. Several others have written similarly, and I haven't noticed anyone dispute it. But the logic surprises me, and I'd like to understand it better. If "we don't care about the previous owners," then what is the whole point? I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there are *several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these things? advTHANKSance Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:00:05 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:00:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Angels and Requests In-Reply-To: <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> References: <936344501.316979.1547619262896.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <936344501.316979.1547619262896@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190116190005.GB23973@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 06:14:22AM +0000, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: : I don't understand why : asking malachim for a bracha is any different from asking your father : to bentsh you, or asking your rebbe for a bracha, or asking a Holocaust : survivor for a bracha (as the Satmar Rebbe advised people to do). Well, since we're speaking about the Gra's position, he also heavenly warns about davening at a qever the wrong way. Can't make requests of deceased people either. But even going less extreme, there is another difference: The gods of the pagans started with mal'akh worship. As per the Rambam, Hil AZ 1:1: In the days of Enosh, the people fell into gross error, and the counsel of the wise men of the generation became foolish. Enosh himself was among those who erred. Their error was as follows: "Since God," they said, "created these stars and spheres to guide the world, set them on high and allotted unto them honor, and since they are ministers who minister before Him, they deserve to be praised and glorified, and honor should be rendered them; and it is the will of God, blessed be He, that men should aggrandise and honor those whom He aggrandised and honored just as a king desires that respect should be shown to the officers who stand before Him, and thus honor is shown to the king." When this idea arose in their minds, they began to erect temples to the stars, offered up sacrifices to them, praised and glorified them in speech, and prostrated themselves before them their purpose, according to their perverse notions, being to obtain the Creators favor. This was the root of idolatry, and this was what the idolators, who knew its fundamentals, said.... To give more weight to this idea... Mercury, the messenger to the gods in Latin mythos was spun off of Hermes (Greek) who had major influence from Apis (who had two temples on opposite ends of the country, with a gold bull in front of each, holiday on the 15th of the 8th month -- sound familiar?), who in turn wouldn't have existed without the precedent of the Sumarian bull-god who delivered prayers up to the other gods, and brought their blessings back down to people -- Kirub. And this keruv-worshipped as a god was even like (but lehavdil) the faces of keruvim on the chayos of the Maaseh haMerkavah (10:15,22), in that in the first telling (1:10) that face is that of a bull. As for a possible reason how the difference between asking a person and asking a mal'akh for a berakhah may be justified: People have bechirah chafshi. They can choose whether or not to daven. When you ask them to do something, you are asking them. And when they ask Hashem for something, it is they who are asking Hashem for something. Mal'akhim do not. Anything they do is Hashem's Idea. Asking them for a berakhah is really asking Hashem for one. But, with the distraction of not relating to HQBH directly. To this school of thought, that not relating directly is the essence of violating the Rambam's 5th iqar: "That He, Yisbarakh, is the one worthy of serving Him,exalting Him, to make His Greatness known, and do do His mitzvos, and not to do this to anythink that is below Him in existence, from the angels and the stars..." Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Strength does not come from winning. Your micha at aishdas.org struggles develop your strength When you go http://www.aishdas.org through hardship and decide not to surrender, Fax: (270) 514-1507 that is strength. - Arnold Schwarzenegger From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 16 11:20:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 14:20:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safek Tereifah and Damages In-Reply-To: References: <20190115223825.GA21029@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190116192048.GC23973@aishdas.org> On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 06:11:47PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : Maybe because it's only nohagim, and the owner *could* break the : minhag, even though he shouldn't. If it were actually forbidden to : break the minhag then it would no longer be nohagim, it would be an : issur... Actually, that's no so clear. Just as there is an issur deOraisa against violating dinim derabbanan (lo sasur), there is a shitah that there is an issur deOraisa against breaking minhag. Rav Sherira Gaon bases the deOraisa on the gemara's use of "lo sasig gevul re'iakha asher gavlu rishonim." (Quoted by the Tur CM 368. See Shabbos 85a, where Chazal use this pasuq about demai, which may be RSG's source that we take "gevul" as something other than a physical border or target market.) This shitah may even be fully accepted by Ashkenazim, which is why we can say "asher qiddishanu bemitzvosav vetzivanu" on Chatzi Hallel. (Long time list people might have noticed that my own attitude toward halakhah has changed significantly in the 20 years this list has been around. Learning this sugya was a big part of it. And now 5 years or so of AhS is cementing it. I have grown much more respectful [in a comparative sense] of minhag in comparison to sevarah than when Avodah started.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Live as if you were living already for the micha at aishdas.org second time and as if you had acted the first http://www.aishdas.org time as wrongly as you are about to act now! Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning From zev at sero.name Wed Jan 16 17:01:39 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 20:01:39 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there > are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. > Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these > things? The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita without it. Start here and keep going: http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=917&pgnum=83 -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sat Jan 19 19:26:48 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 22:26:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Yisro (Interesting gematria) Message-ID: The g?matria of Yisro is 616. The gematria for ?HaTorah? (the Torah) is also 616. Yisro was the father-in-law of the most important prophet who received ?The Torah.? Also, Rashi informs us that Yisro had seven names - Re'uel, Yeser, Yisro, Chovev, Chever, Keini, and Putiel. He was called Yeser (addition) for he advised Moshe in the matter of the judicial system, thereby adding on to "The Torah." When he converted and fulfilled the Mitzvos the letter "Vav? was added to his name, hence the name Yisro. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From emteitz at gmail.com Sun Jan 20 06:21:22 2019 From: emteitz at gmail.com (elazar teitz) Date: Sun, 20 Jan 2019 16:21:22 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftarah Message-ID: RAkiva Miller cited: "Artscroll's "Mourning in Halacha" by Rabbi Chaim Binyamin Goldberg explains that it is not the reading of the haftarah that is important, but the saying of the brachos. In chapter 40 footnote 32 he writes, "Yalkut David (Yoreh De'ah #376) explains that the mourner reads the Haftarah of the Prophets, because the blessings accompanying this reading include prayer for the Redemption of Israel and the sanctification of the name of Hashem, Blessed be He as in Kaddish." I was taught (by my father z"l) that the connection of haftara to the aveil is the first post-haftara b'racha, wherein we say "shekol d'varav emes vatzedek;" i.e, tzidduk hadin. And that saying the b'rachos, rather than the reading of the haftara, is the main connection is obvious from the fact that even where the custom is for the bal korey to read the haftara, priority is still given to the aveil for maftir. EMT -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 22 08:21:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 16:21:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] RSRH on the Giving of the Torah Message-ID: The following verses are from Shemos 19 10 And God said to Moshe: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and have them wash their garments. 11 Let them be ready for the third day, for on the third day God will descend before the eyes of all the people upon Mount Sinai. 12 Set a boundary around the people and say to them: Be careful not to ascend the mountain or even to touch a part of it! Whoever touches the mountain shall be put to death. 13 Let no hand touch it! For he shall be stoned to death, or only thrown down, whether it be beast or man, it shall not live. When the horn of dismissal will sound a long,drawn-out blast, they may ascend the mountain again. On these RSRH comments: 10?13 Precisely this mistaken confidence of Moshe himself, who thought that the people had already attained the required level of spiritual and moral maturity, greatly clarifies the meaning of, and necessity for, the preparations and restrictions that now follow. For if we understand them correctly, their purpose was to make the people realize, and to establish for all time, the vast gulf that separated the spiritual and moral level of the people at that time from the height to which they would ascend and be educated, in the course of hundreds and thousands of years, through the Torah, which they were now about to receive. Closely related to the foregoing is a second purpose: to establish historically for future generations that God, as it were, remained in His place, opposite the people, and that His Word came to the people; God was not inside them or in their midst, and His voice did not emerge from within the people. Jewish Law is the only system of laws that did not emanate from the people whose constitution it was intended to be. Judaism is the only ?religion? that did not spring from the hearts of the people who find in it the spiritual basis for their lives. It is precisely this ?objective? quality of Jewish Law and of the Jewish ?religion? that makes them both unique, setting them apart clearly and distinctly from all else on earth that goes by the name of law or religion. This quality makes Jewish Law the sole factor in human culture that can be considered the catalyst and ultimate goal of every other manifestation of progress, whereas the Law itself, as the given absolute ideal, remains above and beyond any idea of progress. All other ?religions? and codes of law originate in the human minds of a given era; they merely express the conceptions of God, of human destiny, and of man?s relation to God and to his fellow man, that are held by a given society in a particular period of history. Hence, all these man-made religions and codes, like all other aspects of human civilization ? science, art, morals and manners ? are subject to change with the passing of time. For by their very nature and origin they are nothing but the expressions of levels reached by civilization at various stages in human development. Not so the Jewish ?religion? and Jewish Law. They do not stem from beliefs held by human beings at one period or another. They do not contain time-bound human concepts of God and of things human and Divine. They are God-given; through them men are told by God?s Will what their conceptions should be, for all time, about God and things Divine and, above all, about man and human affairs. >From the very outset, God?s Torah stood in opposition to the people in whose midst it was to make its first appearance on earth. It was to prove its power first of all upon this people, who opposed it because they were an ???-??????-????? ????. . This resistance which the Torah encountered among the people in whose midst it obtained its first home on earth is the most convincing proof of the Torah?s Divine origin. The Torah did not arise from within the people, but was given to the people, and only after centuries of struggle did the Torah win the people?s hearts, so that they became its bearers through the ages. (On the uniqueness of Judaism and its relation to religion, see Collected Writings, vol. I, pp. 183?186; Commentary above, 6:7.) The purpose of all these preparations and restrictions is apparently to emphasize and mark this contrast as clearly as possible, at the Torah?s first entrance into the world ? a contrast that so fundamentally characterizes the Torah?s nature and origin. The Torah is about to come to the people. Its arrival is to be anticipated over a period of three days. In order to be worthy of even awaiting the Torah, the people must first sanctify their bodies and their garments; that is, they must become worthy of receiving the Torah by becoming aware, symbolically, of the rebirth ? the renewal of their lives, within and without ? that the Torah is to bring about. In their present state, they are not yet ready to receive the Torah. Only their resolve to ultimately become what they should be will make them worthy of receiving the Torah. The distinction between the people about to receive the Torah, and the Source from which they are to receive it, is underscored also in terms of physical separation. The place from which the people are to receive the Torah is very clearly set apart from them. It is elevated into the realm of the extraterrestrial. No man or animal may set foot upon that place, or even touch it. Any living thing that sets foot upon it must be put to death. Only when the Lawgiving has been completed will the place be restored to the terrestrial sphere, and both man and beast will be free once more to walk upon it. Until that time, the people are to be restricted by a boundary all around, beyond which they must not go. All this is done in order to illustrate the fact of the Torah?s superhuman, extraterrestrial origin. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 22 10:49:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 13:49:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha : of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people (e.g., : sea spitting). Did they still have a tradition in his time as to the : actual location? If not, why record these specific places. The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the landscape. The BH contrasts this to the area around Y-m ih"q where Sancheirev's camp fell. many of the historically significant places in Israel. So, it seems to bedavqa be places where you don't need a tradition. Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make the berakhah? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il Tue Jan 22 12:11:49 2019 From: ari.zivotofsky at biu.ac.il (Ari Zivotofsky) Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 22:11:49 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] sheasa nisim In-Reply-To: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> References: <20190122184957.GG3619@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <5C477905.8010607@biu.ac.il> Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: >On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 02:48:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: The S"A (O"C 2181) lists out a number of places requiring the bracha >: of sheasa nisim where miracles occurred for the Jewish people... >: If not, why record these specific places. >The Magein Avraham says (and repeated by the Ba'er Heitev) these >are specifically places where evidence of the neis was left on the >landscape.... >Which leaves me wondering: Say someone was at (eg) the location where we >crossed the Yam Suf (the first item in the list) as identified by others >who saw the evidence. But they didn't personally see any indication >of the crossing for themselves, would the SA say they should not make >the berakhah? you might find this article of interest: http://www.hakirah.org/Vol19Zivotofsky.pdf [All of the above is discussed, as well as a section subtitled "Is an Artifact Necessary for a Berachah to Be Recited?" which addresses my question. I am not waiting to read it, though, before passing this email through to the list. -micha] From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:38:33 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:38:33 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Jan 22 18:39:43 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 02:39:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions. My simple question-what factor(s) caused the change? (But it does answer where "Havayot d'Abaye V'Rava came from). KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 08:49:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:49:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Science and Halakhah - Tereifos Message-ID: <20190123164944.GA13051@aishdas.org> Today's daf yomi (do not deduce from this I learn DY), Chullin 57b, R Huna says "siman letereifah 12 chodesh". And then the gemara quotes a bereisah with diffeent simanimanim, asking because none of them are R Huna's. - Siman letereifah kol she'einah yoledes. - R' Shimon b Gamliel: if the health improves onward (meshabekhes veholekhes) beyadua it's kosher, if it gets weaker onward, beyadua it's tereifah. - Rebbe: siman letereifah kol 30 yom. The stam beraisa asks about Rebbe's position: of 30 days, "But don't many survive 2 or 3 years?" Norice that no one is giving a defnition. Most of these opinions are about differing simanim. RSbG doesn't give a siman, but really he only discusses two extremes -- the animal that gets progressively healthier and the one that gets progressively sicker. Nothing about the one that is unchanged or has its ups and downs. So, if the gemara is giving indicators, not definitions of tereifah... Even if R Huna were wrong about the lifespan of animals on the known list of tereifos, this wouldn't be a reason to question their inclusion on the list. Nishtaneh hateva or whatnot wouldn't be cause to rethink the list even without reasoning like the Chazon Ish's about the nature of pesaq. It would only be cause to rethink the siman. Does anyone use this argument? (Other than the similar argument made by RGS in 2001, http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n062.shtml#02 ) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From micha at aishdas.org Wed Jan 23 10:55:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:55:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <9b4bca8a06ea4c009631244561d5377b@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190123185514.GC13051@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:39:43AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Maharik (84) posits that we only apply halacha k'batrai (the law : follows the latter decisors) after the time of Abaye and Rava because : before that time everyone only learned their teachers' traditions : whereas in their time they would learn all the traditions... C.f. - Rif BB15a; Shavu'os 29b - Chidushei haRamban Gittin 20a, 50a - Pisqei haRosh Eruvin 2:4; Qiddushin 2:8 There is even a machloqes rishonim about which side of the line Avayei veRava themselves are on. E.g. - Rif BQ 8b - Milchamos H' leRamban Sukkah Rif 2a - Nimuqei Yoseif BQ Rif 8b - Ritva Nedarim 26b (H/T Hebrew Wiki, confirmed only by a quick skim. Don't blame me!) Academics talk about appx 308-appx 351 or 352 CE being the period in which Abayei veRava compiled a proto-Talmud. To explain the dates: The death of Diocletian (308) brought a political mess to EY, and by 308, there were no rashei yeshiva there. This would explain why there was suddenly a desire to formalize and structure more of TSBP. Rav was niftar in 351 or 352. Then this grew into our actual shas: Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. But what the Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Imagine waking up tomorrow micha at aishdas.org with only the things http://www.aishdas.org we thanked Hashem for today! Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Wed Jan 23 19:54:04 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 22:54:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <04dd01d4b398$738a2060$5a9e6120$@gmail.com> R' JR: When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again? ----------------- See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense to say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one used. KT, MYG -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Thu Jan 24 16:04:18 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 00:04:18 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: <35EB3619-5111-4AAD-B9DA-9071D2DF4215@tenzerlunin.com> ?When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person again?? I always thought as someone paying the shiva call (or, rather, as well he caller emailer), that telephone calls were better. But I saw a few discussions on FB about this and the people who had recently sat shiva almost unanimously said emails were better because calls often came at times when it was not convenient to speak. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Jan 24 07:41:19 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:41:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: >From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 One of, if not the most pivotal event in Jewish history, Mattan Torah, is prominently featured in this week?s parasha, Parashas Yisro. The fourth of the Aseres HaDibros, is the exhortation to remember and keep the Shabbos properly. In fact, the Gemara (Pesachim 106a) teaches us that ?Zachor es Yom HaShabbos lekadsho?[1] is not only the basis of our obligation to make Kiddush upon Shabbos?s entrance on Friday night, but also a support for making Kiddush on Shabbos day. Yet, it seems that this is one of the most common halachic realms where we actively see different minhagim manifested. One family stands when making Kiddush, another sits, while a third does some sort of combination.[2] Additionally, another?s ?minhag? preference might just depend on how tired or hungry one is. However, aside for the proper posturical preferences on how to make Kiddush, there are actual variations inherent in the words and actions of the Kiddush itself. Please see the above URL for more. I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From eliturkel at gmail.com Thu Jan 24 11:58:30 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 21:58:30 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] eating Israeli produce in Israel Message-ID: Israel exports many fruits and vegetables abroad and the question is what to do about possible terumot and maaserot Rabbi Zvi Rimon had a recent article on the subject: A BRIEF summary If fruits are grown in EY with the intent to export them then Maharsham (1:72) wrote that they are exempt from terumot/maasrot and this is followed by Rav Kook and Rav Yisraeli, Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Chazon Ish, Achiezer and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach were machmir. CI paskened that in general one can make a copy of the wording of separating T/M and then say that one takes out a little more than 1/100 and it should be redeemed according to the nusach on the page or siddur onto a coin. A coin worth 5 shekel should suffice for 50 times or its equivalent in foreign money. (note Rav Kook disagrees but given the above disagreement one can be lenient like CI) One then places the part separated into a bag and disposes of them in the garbage. He concludes that there is a special merit in eating fruits from Eretz Yisrael. Bach says that since the fruits are influenced by the sanctity of EY so their consumption is above normal. Thus one should make the effort to buy Israeli produce and enjoy the merit of eating the fruits of EY. Ideally one should separate terumot and maaserot without a bracha as simply described above. Even if one doesn't take terumot and maaserot there are lenient opinions that can be relied upon -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Jan 26 20:33:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 23:33:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 08:01:39PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : On 16/1/19 7:53 am, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :>I do see that RZS pointed to "the end of the long teshuvah", but there :>are*several* long teshuvos in the Igros Moshe about chalav yisrael. :>Can someone please show me more precisely where RMF writes these :>things? : The series dealing with this issue, and gradually laying out RMF's : unique shita, is YD2 46-49. But the real meat of the whole thing : the lomdus that demonstrates what he believes is going on here, is : #49. One can't understand or intelligently discuss his shita : without it. I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is owned by a Jew. Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember; micha at aishdas.org I do, then I understand." - Confucius http://www.aishdas.org "Hearing doesn't compare to seeing." - Mechilta Fax: (270) 514-1507 "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites From zev at sero.name Sun Jan 27 06:57:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Sun, 27 Jan 2019 09:57:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> On 26/1/19 11:33 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > I didn't read the IM that way. You're pointing to his discussion of cheese > and butter, and why they don't need to be made of chalav yisrael; wouldn't > the milk had been assur already before it was turned into something else? > So he answers that the issur of chalav aku"m isn't chal until it is > owned by a Jew. > Not that the necessary re'iyah, or as RMF would put it, "re'iyah" > (in quotes), applies at any time after milking. > IOW, RMF's shitah appears to be that milk that was not observed during > milking isn't assur until owned by a Jew. And therefore, if turned into > something else before a Jew acquires it, no issur would be chal. You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the "akum rishon". From this he concludes that we don't need "re'iya" at the farm that produces the milk, since the farmer sells it not to a yisroel but to the nochri-owned company, and we buy it from the company where we have "re'iya" that it didn't do anything. It follows inevitably that if the company sold the milk to an "akum shlishi" then our need for "re'iya" must apply only to him. And since it comes to his hands in tamper-proof containers, our "re'iya" with him is much stronger than our "re'iya" with the company. Therefore leshitas RMF, we no longer need to rely on any kind of inspection or on any need to buy people's silence. We know for certain that the nochri retailer did nothing to the milk, just as we know he did nothing to the packaged kosher meat we may also buy from him. And what happened at the plant can't be more relevant than what happened at the farm. (BTW even in this teshuvah RMF remains under the impression that most of a company's milk comes from its own cows, and it only supplements with purchases from farmers. As far as I know this has never been the metzius, and is not now. Milk is produced by farms and sold to processing companies or co-ops. Also RMF seems to assume that at the plants the inspectors are either there constantly or come very frequently, whereas at farms they come rarely. I don't know whether the first assumption is correct but I can confirm the second. State inspectors come maybe three times a year. On the other hand the farm workers know that they may come at any time, even in the middle of the night, and are definitely mirsesi from that possibility even though it rarely happens, whereas RMF assumes they are not.) -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From eliturkel at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 02:42:25 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:42:25 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai Message-ID: << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Ravina bar Huna (the probable Ravina meant when R' Ashi is named first, as in "Rav Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah") was niftar in 474 or '5. >> why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the days of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 07:12:07 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 10:12:07 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <312b06e8-f937-12f0-81ed-622b8ebb18ce@sero.name> On 28/1/19 5:42 am, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: > << Rav Ashi's Sanhedrin closes in 391 or '2. Rav Ashi passes in 422. Rav Ashi was in Bavel, wasn't he? So how did he have a sanhedrin there? Especially since AIUI the official Sanhedrin in EY didn't close until about 415? Possibly relevant: there's supposedly a grave of R Ashi on the Israel-Lebanon border, which implies (if genuine) that at some point after his Bavli activity he moved to EY. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 10:12:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:12:23 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] halacha kbatrai In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190128181223.GD3975@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Eli Turkel via Avodah wrote: : why would Rav Ashi's sanhedrin close 30 years before his death? This assumes that R' Ashi's Sanhedrin even was a real Sanhedrin (as the Rambam assumes) and that Hillel Nesi'ah's Sanhedrin wasn't the last one (as is often assumed in discussions of our calendar) closing in 385. According to tradition R Ashi was RY in Sura for 60 years. Historically, the numbers seem to add up to 52. But according to this tradition, in the first 30 yarchos kalla they produced the mesechtos of the Bavli, and in the second 30 they chazered and honed them. If the Sanhedrin collapsed (eg lack of eligible members, in-fighting, or whatever), it explains where there aren't 31 mesechtos. But in any case, the idea that the last 30 years were spent on chazarah of the Bavli's 30 mesechtos is the reason for that gap. : Acording to this Ravina was not a contemporary of Rav Ashi : Actually there were at least 3 people with the name of Ravina. One in the : days : of Rava, one in the days of Rav Ashi and one in the days of the Saboraim This would explain why the Rambam breaks with the norm and writes R' Ashi first "R Ashi veRavina sof hora'ah". Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi appears by "name" (Mar?) in shas too often to be the first of the savora'im. No problems -- if we mean the 3rd Ravina. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger It's never too late micha at aishdas.org to become the person http://www.aishdas.org you might have been. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - George Eliot From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Jan 28 08:45:57 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:45:57 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? Message-ID: >From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj A bird so strange that, more than 150 years after Jewish authorities first began discussing it, nobody can decide whether it's kosher today. Domestic ducks are kosher, though duck is not a particularly common protein on the Jewish table (except perhaps in Sephardic, or Mediterranean, families). But the Muscovy was so weird that Rabbi Illowy, upon moving to New Orleans and finding it eaten there, immediately declared it off-limits. New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. The Muscovy duck never became nearly as popular as the mallard in the U.S., but bizarrely enough, it is very popular in, of all places, Israel. A scholarly paper from late 2010 from Zohar Amar and Ari Z. Zivotofsky documents its wide acceptance there. The duck was fairly common in Israel by the late 19th century and was never really considered anything but a kosher duck there. In fact, in early 2010, an Israeli duck farmer shipped, by accident, a huge shipment of Muscovy ducks instead of mallards to kosher communities in the U.S., where the shipment of strange alien-looking ducks was greeted with horror. See the above URL for more. YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 09:27:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 12:27:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe Message-ID: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> In the Chinukh, the Aseres haDiberos include mitzvos no.s 25 - 28, 14 mitzvos. So much for "10 Commandments". Kedarko, with only a couple of exceptions, he follows the Rambam. So, #25 is "Anokhi". R' Chesdai Crescas gave two cogent arguments against counting Anokhi: 1- He didn't understand how we can be commanded in something over whch we have as little volition as what seems true to us. 2- How can you be commanded to believe in the One commanding? The very existence of the mitzvah presupposes that one already got past it. But even without Anokhi, there is no problem without getting to 10, because there isn't a 1-to-1 from diberos to mitzvos anyway. The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal we're discussing.) But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp, micha at aishdas.org And the Torah, its light. http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2 Fax: (270) 514-1507 Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy, micha at aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke From seinfeld at daasbooks.com Mon Jan 28 11:12:55 2019 From: seinfeld at daasbooks.com (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:12:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on his own. What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? From seinfeld at jsli.org Mon Jan 28 11:16:30 2019 From: seinfeld at jsli.org (Alexander Seinfeld) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 14:16:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim Message-ID: > > > >When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as a >general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during the >shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the person >again? > >----------------- > > >See Igros Moshe OC IV:40.11, where he talks about nichum aveilim via the >phone. It seems clear to me that he's saying that someone who is unable to >visit in person still has a mitzvah of nichum; if so, then it makes sense >to >say that whatever of the modalities you suggest would create the most >nechamah (and it may be different from person to person) should be the one >used. It seems to me the thrust of the question is, better to use technology DURING shiva, or do it face-to-face AFTER shiva. Therefore, since there is a special need for and mitzvah to be nichum during shiva, one should pick up the phone and call, if you can get through, and if not, send a message letting them know you tried to call, AND ASLO repeat your words of comfort when you see them face-to-face, since they are presumably still mourning for at least 30 days, if not 12 months. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Jan 28 13:00:20 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:00:20 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> Message-ID: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the : "akum rishon". Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. To elaborate your #1: Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, and the gezeira was only made about milk, then items that the Jew doesn't own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is yours, and I simply see no discussion of the idea -- again, aside from gevinas aku"m -- in the teshuvah. The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Weeds are flowers too micha at aishdas.org once you get to know them. http://www.aishdas.org - Eeyore ("Winnie-the-Pooh" by AA Milne) Fax: (270) 514-1507 From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:24:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:24:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 28/1/19 4:00 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 09:57:46AM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: > : You've forgotten the whole point of the teshuvah, and why he brings up > : cheese & butter at all. The question he's answering is how the "re'iya" > : at the company helps, when the company buys its milk from farms, and he > : explicitly says that there is no "re'iya" at nochri farms and that it's > : forbidden to buy milk there. So how can we buy from the companies? > > : He uses the examples of cheese & butter to prove (1) that the issur > : is chal only when it comes leyad yisroel, and (2) that if there is no > : cheshash about the last nochri, who made the cheese or butter, then > : we don't care that he bought the milk from a nochri about whom there > : is a cheshash. We only care about the "akum sheni", not about the > : "akum rishon". > > Just #1. You don't need #2, if it weren't for gevinas aku"m and straight > kashrus issues. Not Chasam Sofer's gezeira-of-CY issue. That is not correct. You still need #2 to explain why the gezera on the milk doesn't snap into existence as soon as you buy the cheese or milk, since the cheshash for which the gezera was made still applies. > To elaborate your #1: > Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, > and the gezeira was only made about milk, No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away just because it isn't milk any more. The reason cheese and (according to those who permit it) butter are permitted is because the cheshash doesn't exist -- or as RMF would put it, because we have "re'iyah" -- so Chazal were not gozer on them. But when the cheese- or butter-maker bought the milk from another nochri the cheshash *does* exist; so how can we pretend it doesn't? RMF's answer is that Chazal were only gozer when the cheshash exists with the "akum sheni"; if it doesn't, then we don't care that it exists with the "akum rishon'. > then items that the Jew doesn't > own until after the milk ceases to be milk aren't under the gezeira. That's a viable sevara but it's not RMF's. > That says nothing about which aku"m the gezeira was made about, and yet > fully justifies his heter. There is no need for #2, which is consistent > with my belief that it was not intended. The idiom "akum sheini" is > yours No, it is not, it's RMF's words, which is why I put it in quotes. If it were my own term I would have used "nochri", not "akum". > The gezeira, as everyone including the teshuvah in question (YD 2:49, > 1:49 in Bar Ilan) describes it, is about "chalav sheCHALVO aku"m". Yes, if chalvo yisrael then we have no issue. But RMF says when chalvo aku"m they were only gozer if there is a cheshash, since when there is not then it's called "re'iyah", *and* that the presence or absence of th cheshash is determined only at the moment that it comes leyad yisroel, and only in relation to the nochri from whom it comes, the "akum sheni" as RMF calls him. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:30:11 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:30:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0a18ab82-4326-4c99-fd02-83c68e76a53b@sero.name> On 28/1/19 12:27 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. Not that this answers your question, but surely #29 is the *third* dibber. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Mon Jan 28 17:54:17 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:54:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Wait, Is This Weird Duck Kosher Or Not? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 28/1/19 11:45 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > From https://goo.gl/VyQGmj Note that this is not a Jewish site, and the author gets quite a number of things wrong and/or inconsistent with halacha. In particular note that in this paragraph which RYL quoted: > New Orleans Jews were familiar with the Muscovy, and told the new > rabbi that there was indeed a history of eating this bird, therefore > making it kosher, but Illowy arbitrarily declared, according to > Kashrut.com, that he doubted the expertise of the rabbis who had > allowed the eating of the Muscovy in the past. the claim that R Illowy's declaration was arbitrary is neither true nor supported by the linked article at kashrut.com (by our own RAZZ). -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Mon Jan 28 17:04:17 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:04:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Common Kiddish Questions Message-ID: . R' Yitzchok Levine cited: > From https://ohr.edu/this_week/insights_into_halacha/5477 and he asked: > I may have missed it, but I do not see any mention of making > kiddush on Shabbos day using a shot glass of whiskey. That is correct. My guess is that he did not shy away from that topic, given how often he explains widely different practices. More likely, since he did not get into the idea of alternative beverages at all, it was simply out of place to get into the details of specific drinks and shiurim. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Jan 29 06:12:06 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:12:06 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?What_is_ne=92itza=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is ne?itza? A. Ne?itza is a procedure for cleaning a knife. The word ne?itza means thrusting. If a knife was used even once to cut a hard non-kosher food, such as non-kosher hard cheese, or if a knife was used repeatedly to cut any non-kosher food, there is a concern that non-kosher residue will remain on the surface of the knife. To remove this residue, it is not sufficient to rinse the knife with water. Rather, Chazal instituted a method of cleaning called ne?itza, whereby one thrusts the knife into the ground ten times. The ground must be hard earth that had not been plowed (Chochmas Adam 3:4). In practice, ne?itza is seldomly performed nowadays. Instead, one can clean the knife by immersing it in boiling water (hagalah) or by pouring hot soapy water over the knife, thereby melting away the residue. Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt?l (Emes L?Yaakov YD 89, footnote 38) maintains that one may also rub the blade up and down (ten times) with steel wool. He posits that this might be even better than ne?itza. Because steel wool scrapes the blade, it is similar to rubbing the blade against a sharpening stone, which is an extremely effective method to remove the non-kosher fat from the blade. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Jan 29 11:11:18 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Last Nochri Who Owned The Milk In-Reply-To: References: <4e8716ed-a3bb-198c-bfbe-dc40365381be@sero.name> <20190127043331.GA24397@aishdas.org> <84aa5c71-f676-24a5-003f-ca07e694b508@sero.name> <20190128210020.GA17931@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190129191118.GA21672@aishdas.org> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 08:24:55PM -0500, Zev Sero via Avodah wrote: :> To elaborate your #1: :> Once you say the issur is only chal when it becomes a Jew's property, :> and the gezeira was only made about milk, : No! Here may be your error. RMF does not believe any such thing. : The cheese or butter is made from milk; the gezera can't go away : just because it isn't milk any more... And yet that's what he says. It isn't that the gezeira "goas away", it is that the gezeira isn't chal. The gezeira was made about on milk acquired by a Jew, and not on items made of milk that are acquired by a Jew. RMF tells you at the start that the gezeira was "ne'esar mishum chalav sheCHALVO aku"m" (emphasis added). Worries about later adulteration is a regular kashrus question, not the gezeira. Here is the only accurance of "sheini" in the teshuvah (other than within "keshenidon"), as found on Bar Ilan's copy: ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ???"? ?? ???? ???"? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ????"? ??? ????? ?? ???? ???"? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ??"? ???? ???"? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?????. But from the gezeira's side of things, they weren't gozerim to prohibit when it's in the aku"m's posession, even if it is a different aku"m. Therefore, since it was butter that reached the posession of the Jew, even though it is from the second aku"m, we only judge on the second aku"m -- that he wasn't crazy enough to mix [anything in]. And we do not judge at all the first aku"m as all, even according to Rabbeinu Tam, even though there is a cheshash that he would mix it. Notice that for the aku"m who made the butter, we aren't chosheish that maybe he was nuts. Even though in the case that we had bought directly from the first aku"m milk that he produced in order to have drinking milk, we would have been. This is because mitzad hagezeira, they didn't prohibit buying butter, only milk. (Or with cheese, mitzad this particular gezeira doesn't cover cheese either.) So now we're just judging the kashrus risk of the 2nd aku"m, not the gezeira. However, for the gezeira's purposes, we have to rely on gov't inspection. This was the whole she'eilah -- companies buy a mi'ut of their milk meiha-farmers she'aleihem ein hashgachas hamemshalah kol kakh ki ein shoterim ba'im betemidus. For that matter, if the aku"m milked the cows intending to make cheese, and a Jew buys that pre-cheese milk to make his own cheese, that too is mutar (quoting the Shakh a"q 18). Because the gezeira isn't chal on that milk either. There is no need for the milk to change hands before a Jew buys it for RMF's reasoning to hold. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness micha at aishdas.org which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost http://www.aishdas.org again. Fulfillment lies not in a final goal, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH From jmeisner at gmail.com Tue Jan 29 17:37:10 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 20:37:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 613 mitzvos is from Torah Tzivah Lanu Moshe In-Reply-To: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> References: <20190128172757.GB3975@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 1:13 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > The bigger problem is that this whole thing of counting mitzvos is based > on R' Simlai, so the first two diberos, the ones heard directly miPi > haGevurah, have to be two mitzvos (plus the 611 tzivah lanu Moshe). > Judging from the parashah breaks, that means 20:2-6 and 20:7 includes > only two mitvos. (Interestingly, the break after the second diberah is > pesuchah. It is the only pesuach within the diberos. Fits the chazal > we're discussing.) > > But... The first dibera includes Chinukh no.s 25-28 (Anokhi, Lo YihYeh, > Lo Sa'aseh, Lo Sishtachaveh), and the 2nd -- #29, lo lishava shav. > The Semag has a similar list for these pesuqim, except in his numbering, > it's Asei #1, followed by Lavin no.s 1, 20, 18, and 238. > > So, if the Jews couldn't handle the first two diberos, that comes to 5 > mitzvos heard miPi haGevurah + the 611 we received via Moshe! > > (You would have to not count Anokhi AND count the three about AZ as one > mitzvah to get 2 + 611.) > > How do rishonim who are trying to give peshat in R' Simlaei's 613 > doing so in a way that contradicts his ra'ayah for the idea? > -Micha > The Ramban on the Sefer HaMitzvos asks the same question on the Rambam - how can the Rambam count 4 lavin of avodah zarah in the second dibra if R' Simlai only leaves room for 1? The Meshech Chochma (20:3) suggests that the Rambam is l'shitaso in Moreh Nevuchim that Klal Yisroel did not hear any individual words from Hashem; rather, all they heard was a Kol Elokim. In this light, R Simlai does not mean that they heard the words "Anochi..." and "Lo Yihyeh?" from Hashem in the same manner that they heard the other mitzvos word-for-word from Moshe. Rather, they heard a Kol Elokim. And once they heard this Kol Elokim, they knew, beyond any shadow of the doubt, that 1) there exists a Borei and that 2) there was nothing else in the world that can compare to this Borei. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Jan 31 12:51:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 15:51:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? Message-ID: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> And I'm not talking about watching the half-time show or the cheerleaders. In fact, my question would apply even more to HS football. Should O Jews be capable of enjoying watching people play a support that involves pounding each other until Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) is commonplace. CTE used to be called dementia pugilistia ("punch drunk"), but now pugilists aren't the most common sufferers. The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? (Assuming I personally enjoyed spectator sports to begin with.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life is a stage and we are the actors, micha at aishdas.org but only some of us have the script. http://www.aishdas.org - Rav Menachem Nissel Fax: (270) 514-1507 From mgluck at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 19:52:51 2019 From: mgluck at gmail.com (mgluck at gmail.com) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 22:52:51 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0b1201d4b9e1$9b4a3960$d1deac20$@gmail.com> R' MB: But aside from halakhah, from a straight mussar point of view; shouldn't knowing the amount of danger people are subjecting themselves to for my entertainment shterr my ability to enjoy it? ------------------------- I'm having a little trouble processing the question. From a straight mussar point of view, there are so many other reasons not to watch the Superbowl, even if CTE were not an issue. KT, MYG From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Jan 31 20:17:31 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 23:17:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: . R' Alexander Seinfeld asked: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) > is different when chanted in the congregation than when an > individual is chanting on his own. > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public > trop supposed to resonate with the listener differently? I wish I could remember where I heard this, but here is what I heard: Let's take "lo tirtzach", for example. When an individual reads it, the trop is "mercha tipcha", one single solid straightforward command: "Don't murder!" (or kill or however you prefer to translate it) But when the community reads it, the trop is different, and the tipcha is now on the first word, causing a slight pause: "Lo - tirtzach!" This resonates (to use RAS's word) in an entirely different manner. In this particular case, it was suggested to me, that the tzibur (more specifically the court) is is sometimes obligated to do that which is normally assur. "Lo! [No! Wait! wait, pause, think, decide... okay, on this particular occasion:] Tirtzach!" Consider the eleven words that comprise Shemos 20:13. When the individual reads it, there's only one "sof pasuk". But for the public, there are four. One pasuk vs four pesukim has got to resonate differently (though I don't recall the messages right now). Akiva Miller From jmeisner at gmail.com Fri Feb 1 09:09:09 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 12:09:09 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 4:36 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > The stam beraisa (AZ 18b) prohibited going to itztadinin (stadia) mipenei > moshav leivim. R' Nasan permits, because he may be able to scream and > save someone, or at least prevent his widow from becoming an agunah. > How are we defining moshav leitzim? We often use the word "scoffer", but that doesn't seem to fit here. Rashi uses the phrase "s'chok v'leitzanus" to explain what happens at a karkom (Rashi says siege), as well as explaining bukyon, mukyon, lulyon, and salgaryon as being "minei leitzanim" - but would this definition of leitzanus apply more to a football game than to a baseball game? Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back toward your particular concern over violent sports. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 4 15:07:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 18:07:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi Message-ID: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> We spoke about it in the past, RGS has an interesting new post on the subject. https://www.torahmusings.com/2019/02/revoking-ordination-2/ Tir'u baTov! -Micha Torah Musings Revoking Ordination by R. Gil Student Feb 4, [20]19 What do you do when a rabbi is shown to be deficient in his behavior or incompetent in Torah matters, perhaps even adopting heretical views? We can understand if an ordaining authority revokes his ordination, but what if that person is deceased? Can someone revoke ordination given by someone else? I. One Rabbi Giveth, Another Taketh Away Rav Meir (Maharam) Lublin, in the late 16th century, found a ruling of Rav Yosef Ashkenazi so ill-informed and presumptuous that the former sent a letter to the rabbis of Worms insisting they declare publicly that this man was unworthy of the title rabbi and unfit to rule. He would have done so himself but worried that having a famous rabbi in another city do it would have given the man greater prestige. (Responsa Maharam Lublin, no. 88) [1] A century earlier, Rav Eliezer of Passau--a student of Rav Ya'akov (Mahari) Weil who also had ordination from Rav Yisrael (Mahari) Bruna--attempted to establish himself in Prague without permission of the rabbi, Rav Eliyahu of Prague, or rather grossly overstepped their formal agreement about his activities. Additionally, he ruled on difficult matters against the advice of older rabbis, reaching conclusions that his elders thought were mistaken. Therefore, Rav Peretz (who apparently was a leading German rabbi) declared that Rav Eliezer could no longer be called rabbi nor issue halakhic rulings until he proved to Mahari Bruna or another leading scholar that he had mastered the law sufficiently to issue rulings. (Responsa Mahari Bruna, no. 278. See also no. 282.) [2] Something similar occurred in the Alexandersohn affair of 1834. II. Revoking Ordination Jonathan Alexandersohn, the rabbi of Csaba in Hungary, was accused by some of his townspeople of improper personal conduct, incorrect halakhic rulings, heretical views, and having arranged an improper get. This last issue is as follows. A get must include the name (in Hebrew letters) of the town in which it is written. Many European town names are very difficult to spell in Hebrew. However, if the town's name is misspelled, the get is invalid. Therefore, rabbis arrange a get in a town in which a get has never been written only after consultation with, and consensus among, colleagues. Alexandersohn arranged a get in Csaba, where none had previously been performed, after asking a senior neighboring rabbi who told him not to. This deviation from established practice and setting of a precedent for future potentially problematic gittin was considered severe and intentional halakhic misconduct. After a rabbinical court investigated and concluded that the accusations against Alexandersohn were correct (although he refused to participate in the proceedings), leading regional rabbis denounced him. Additionally, Rav Moshe Sofer, commonly known as the Chasam Sofer, declared--based primarily on the get issue but also on reports of his improper behavior--that Alexandersohn may no longer use the title "rabbi" or issue halachic rulings. The Chasam Sofer explicitly revoked Alexanderson's rabbinic ordination. [3] The difficulty is that the Chasam Sofer had not ordained Alexandersohn. How could he revoke ordination that he had not given? How could Maharam Lublin and Rav Peretz? I suggest the following possible explanation. III. Worthy of Respect I see two issues here, related but distinct. The first is removal of the title "rabbi." That title is a form of respect for a Torah scholar. The Gemara (Kiddushin 32b) says that one need not show respect for a zaken ashmai, an ignorant elder (as per Tosafos, ad loc., sv. zaken). Showing respect to such a person is optional. However, you are forbidden to show respect to a Torah scholar who lacks care for the commandments (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 243:3; cf. Arukh Ha-Shulchan, ad loc.). If a rabbi shows that he lacks care for the commandments, people are prohibited from calling him by the respectful title "rabbi." I am not aware of a specific definition for this category. It seems to be left to the best judgment of the halakhic decisor. However, when invoked, it effectively revokes the title "rabbi" from anyone who listens to the halachic decisor. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was using this halakhah in stating that Alexandersohn should not be called rabbi. Maybe he considered Alexandersohn's disregard for the rules of gittin to be lack of care for the commandments. IV. Unqualified Rabbi Additionally, someone who is unqualified to rule on halakhic issues is forbidden to do so (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 242:13). When invoked, this rule declares someone unfit to issue a halakhic ruling. It is possible, today even likely, that someone can acquire rabbinic ordination but still be unqualified to rule. Perhaps he was not tested thoroughly or his capacity diminished over time. Either way, by declaring someone currently unqualified to rule, a halakhic decisor effectively removes this person's permission to rule. He revokes the man's ordination. Perhaps the Chasam Sofer was also invoking this rule when revoking Alexandersohn's ordination. The Chasam Sofer indicated that Alexandersohn was serving as a stumbling block, presumably by arranging questionable gittin and setting a problematic precedent that could lead to many improper gittin in the future. By ignoring a basic rule of rabbinic conduct--consultation on such an important communal matter--Alexandersohn demonstrated that he was unfit to serve as a rabbi. The Chasam Sofer removed this stumbling block by revoking his ordination, declaring him unfit to rule. V. Who Cares? These episodes provide examples of revoking ordination. Even a halakhic decisor who did not give the ordination may revoke it. However, it is not immediately clear what effect this revocation will have. The rabbi whose ordination was revoked will likely ignore it and claim that it was all based on a misunderstanding or politics. Alexandersohn even published a book in German and Hebrew defending himself against the accusations. The communal value of the revocation of ordination is twofold. Primarily, the Chasam Sofer gave the townspeople of Csaba license to remove Alexandersohn from his position as rabbi and instructed them to look elsewhere for halakhic guidance. It is no small matter to undermine a rabbi's authority and damage his career, but sometimes extreme measures are necessary. The Chasam Sofer, in a letter Alexandersohn published in his book (part 58), says that he had asked Alexandersohn in person to remove himself from the rabbinate for a year or two to return to yeshiva to study until the controversy died down. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer recognized the huge personal impact on Alexandersohn of this action. When a figure of the Chasam Sofer's towering prominence declares a man unfit to be a rabbi, people listen. Similarly, Rav Peretz offered Rav Eliezer of Passau a way to return to the rabbinate after furthering his learning. Additionally, the Chasam Sofer's revocation of ordination over the get impropriety sent a loud message about the importance of care in proper rabbinic conduct in halakhic matters. He took a stand on an issue he felt was critical, even though it meant destroying a man's career over it. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer felt his stance was warranted. But his message--that this issue was very serious--could not be missed. Revoking ordination--of course only when warranted--sends an important message about halakhic standards of consultation and ruling. __________________________________________________________________ 1. I assume that this is not the same Rav Yosef Ashkenazi who immigrated to Israel around 1570, caused a ruckus and was put in cherem, which I discussed last year. 2. The above sources are quoted in Prof. Simcha Assaf, Be-Ohalei Ya'akov, p. 57. 3. Alexandersohn published a book in his defense titled [58]Tomekh Kavod (Frankfurt a.M., 1847). The Chasam Sofer`s letters appear in the Hebrew section, parts 21, 31, 48, 58. Two of these letters are also published in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat 162 and 207. Note that [59]R. Moshe Teitelbaum, the Yismach Moshe, also explicitly revoked Alexandersohn's ordination, in a letter appearing in Tomekh Kavod, part 27. From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Feb 5 07:20:55 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:20:55 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD Message-ID: >From today's Hakhel email bulletin PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF MEZONOS BREAD: The following exceptional excerpt is from the outstanding work The Laws of Brachos (Artscroll) by Rabbi Binyomin Forst, Shlita: Practical problems of ?mezonos? bread?: A. Franks, falafel and sandwiches: One who eats a filling meal of ?frank-on-roll,? falafel or salami sandwich, regardless of the fact that the breads are kneaded with apple juice, is required by Torah law to recite Birkas Hamazon. Consequently, one who treats ?mezonos bread? as cake often neglects a positive commandment of the Torah. The responsibility for this transgression is shared with the proprietors of the restaurants, since they serve these foods to a public often unaware of these halachic problems?. B. ?Mezonos challos?: Some caterers even serve ?mezonos challos? at wedding banquets to save their guests the ?inconvenience? of al netilas yadayim and Birkas Hamazon. This practice is regrettable since the guests are encouraged to neglect their requirement of Birkas Hamazon. These challos are eaten before or during the meal in the place of normal challos, and are thus considered as pas ha?ba b?kisnin eaten together with other foods, which effects a k?vias seudah. However, one who eats cake or cookies for dessert need not be concerned with this problem. The cake is not eaten as part of the meal and does not combine with the other foods to effect a k?vias seudah (unless one eats a considerable amount of cake, in which case the cake alone may constitute a k?vias seudah). C. Airline meals: Airlines usually serve packaged kosher meals. These meals are commonly accompanied with a roll or bun marked ?mezonos.? This practice is misleading and improper. Although the bun by itself may require only a mezonos (which is by no means certain), the fact that the bun is eaten with the other foods as a meal gives it a status of k?vias seudah. One must certainly wash, recite al netilas yadayim and hamotzi. One may eat the meal without the bun, recite a bracha achrona and eat the bun as a snack later during the course of the flight. In this case, one may perhaps rely on opinions which hold that one may recite mezonos on a roll of this type even if the taste of the fruit juice is not noticeable. Hakhel Note: Every person is faced with the challenge of Mezonos bread in various contexts--and must realize that there is no one to fool. Rather, he should consult with his Rav or Posek as to the appropriate conduct in the various circumstances with which he is presented. ------------------------------------------------ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 5 11:50:46 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 14:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Defrocking a Rabbi In-Reply-To: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> References: <20190204230741.GA6030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: See also the case of the author of Shut Binyamin Z'ev. https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%96%D7%90%D7%91_%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A8%D7%98%D7%94 [or http://bit.ly/2MQImNp -micha] -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 5 12:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 15:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Announcement: New Book -- Widen Your Tent Message-ID: <20190205205037.GA20519@aishdas.org> We so often study a book and simply skip its introduction. And yet, introductions are often where authors lay out their view of the world, the grand big picture they see the work fitting into. In the introduction of his magnum opus, Shaarei Yosher, Rav Shimon Shkop outlines his view of the purpose of Judaism, our lives, the nature of holiness, and what it means to be a good person and in the image of G-d. His vision is one that speaks to us today: "Blessed shall be the Creator, and exalted shall be the Maker, Who created us in His 'Image' and in the likeness of His 'Structure', and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others, to individuals and to the masses, now and in the future in imitation of the Creator (so to speak)." In this new book, I use Rav Shimon Shkop's teachings as a guide to provide direction and give meaning to our own lives. Available from Feldheim Books or Amazon.com. http://www.aishdas.org/asp/widen-your-tent We now return you to our regular Avodah programming. Chodesh Tov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 08:28:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 11:28:30 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Privacy in Halakhah Message-ID: <20190206162830.GA28651@aishdas.org> Aviad haKohein and Gavi Siboni wrote an article in last December's issue of Cyber, Intelligence, and Security titled "Ubiquitous Presence: Protecting Privacy and Forbidding Intrusion into a Persons Records in Jewish Law". Mosaic Magazine's snippet The ban on infringing upon a person's privacy is specifically mentioned in Jewish law in many contexts.... For example, the Mishnah states, "A person must not create an opening [in his own house] opposite an opening [in his neighbor's], or a window opposite a window. If his opening or window is small, he must not make it larger. If there is one opening, he must not turn it into two openings."... In his commentary on the Talmud, Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir explains that the ban on creating a new opening opposite the opening to his neighbor's yard (or even a yard shared by both of them) is designed to prevent damage caused by looking into another person's property; that is, infringement on another person's privacy. [The contemporary scholar] Eliyahu Lifshitz explains that the Mishnah shows that damage to privacy caused by opening a window opposite a shared yard is relative and not absolute damage. For this reason, there is no requirement to conceal an existing window, even a large one; it is merely forbidden to create a new window or enlarge an existing one. If the window existed even before the neighbors moved in, they cannot force the window-owner to change his situation; rather, they must take their own measures to prevent the infringement of their privacy.... Jewish law took a more significant step in protecting a person's privacy regarding personal documents--such as medical records, letters, and, nowadays, material stored on a personal computer--based on a ruling by Rabbi Gershom ben Judah, the greatest Jewish sage in Germany in the 10th century. Among other things, he enacted a ban against any person who reads someone else's letters without permission, since doing so invades the letter-writer's privacy.... The general prohibition against infringing upon privacy as well as the specific prohibition against accessing another's records without that person's explicit consent are therefore deeply rooted in Jewish law. Accelerated technological development, the weaknesses of cyberspace, and difficulties in security pose new and exciting challenges to Jewish law concerning the application of ancient principles to our times--pouring the fine old wine of Jewish law into the new container of the legal system in Israel, whose values are both Jewish and democratic. RGS posted a link to the Mosaic piece on Torah Musings' Daily Reyd with the comment: "Deeply rooted"? I'm not convinced -- Finding a Right to Privacy in Halakhah This topic was recently discussed by R Yonatan Ziring in his shiur series for Gush's VBM Halakha in the Age of Social Media: #13: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media Part 1 What does privacy mean in the modern online world? Is revealing secrets a biblical violation, a rabbinic ban or simply bad manners? https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-13-confidentiality-age-social-media-part-1 #14 Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 2: Public Information https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-14-confidentiality-age-social-media-2-public-information #15: Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media 3: Public Information -- Applications https://etzion.org.il/en/shiur-15-confidentiality-age-social-media-3-public-information-%E2%80%94-applications I can think of two meqoros for the concept of privacy: 1- Hezeq re'iyah -- I'm allowed to protect existing privacy in my yard or who can see in my windows. 2- Lishna Bisha -- according to the Rambam, the Aramaic translation of lashon hara means the same as the idiom LH. But most describe it as a right for private information to remain private. (See RJZ's shiurim.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The meaning of life is to find your gift. micha at aishdas.org The purpose of life http://www.aishdas.org is to give it away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Pablo Picasso From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 6 15:50:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:50:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> On Fri, Feb 01, 2019 at 12:09:09PM -0500, Joshua Meisner via Avodah wrote: : How are we defining moshav leitzim? ... : Interestingly, the Bach changes the phrase "she-hein moshav leitzim" by the : stadium to "she-hein shofchei damim", which may tilt the discussion back : toward your particular concern over violent sports. To answer your question: I think the Bach /is/ defining moshav leitzim. That leitzanus is simply being crass, not just scoffing, being snide, sarcastic, ridiculing, and the other usualy translations. This would explain why eating together without a devar Torah is a moshav leitzim. They're only worried about gashmius without any spirituality. A leitz is someone at the ground level of spiritual development. To quote R Shimon, who does not associate the following withn leitzanus even remotely: The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person -- "ha'ish hagas vehashafeil" -- is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his I, and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In R' Shimon Shkop's worldview, the person totally lacking sheleimus is one who, when he uses the word "I" thinks only of his body. Like the people who eat without divrei Torah. Or the person who can enjoy the atheletics of the Roman stadium without being distracted by the human cost. In Nesivos Olam, Nesiv Haleitzanus ch 1, the Maharal defines leitzanus as the simchah that comes from something more base than mitzad hasheleimus. have joy despite being a shaleim? In the begining of ch 2 he says it's the opposite of hakhna'ah and koveid rosh... a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A wise man is careful during the Purim banquet micha at aishdas.org about things most people don't watch even on http://www.aishdas.org Yom Kippur. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From arie.folger at gmail.com Thu Feb 7 00:38:48 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:38:48 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot Message-ID: R' Alexander Seinfeld wrote: > The trop (cantillation) for the 10 Statements (Commandments) is different > when chanted in the congregation than when an individual is chanting on > his own. > > What is the meaning or reason for this? How is the public trop supposed to > resonate with the listener differently? Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 6 20:41:08 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 23:41:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Is the Superbowl Kosher? In-Reply-To: <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> References: <20190131205122.GA26818@aishdas.org> <20190206235036.GB25912@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On 6/2/19 6:50 pm, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > . a ma'aseh sechoq vehatul. (What's > hatul with a tav? -- "worn out" doesn't fit.) It's "hitul", as in "va'avichen heiseil bi", or "rak al yosef Par'oh hoseil". To make sport, to play around. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From zev at sero.name Thu Feb 7 06:42:55 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 09:42:55 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <50a916ca-4623-2980-008e-320a2a62993e@sero.name> On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > > Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who > want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a > machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi haGevurah. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Feb 10 11:38:27 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 14:38:27 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread Message-ID: For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are marked as "mezonos". And for the last several decades, I haven't seen their hechsherim on such products either. But I *have* seen such products in the stores, and invariably they have a chassidishe hechsher. Not only on the bread and rolls themselves, but even on prepared ready-to-eat sandwiches. I prefer not to believe that the poskim of those hechsherim are blind to the problem. Rather, I would like to believe that they are following a different shita. Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who says that in writing. It's not difficult to open the Orach Chaim 168 and find that the Shiur Kevias Seudah is 3-4 beitzim. The tricky part is applying that rule to this makom and this zman, where the definition of seudah is not necessarily the same as it used to be. The misnagdishe poskim have come down on the side of saying that the definition of seudah has indeed changed, and the opportunities to say mezonos on a roll are very limited. But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to chassidishe poskim at all. Can anyone offer any insights? Thanks Akiva Miller From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 03:52:12 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:52:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <7694369f-ab41-b20e-efa6-902dd66707c5@sero.name> On 10/2/19 2:38 pm, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: > But what do the chassidishe poskim say? I haven't seen > anything, but I'm sure that's because I don't have much access to > chassidishe poskim at all. You can look at chapter 2 of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos Hanehenin, but I'm afraid you won't find what you're looking for there. http://chabadlibrary.org/books/adhaz/piskey/52/2.htm -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From sholom at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 10:22:12 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 13:22:12 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 7/2/19 3:38 am, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: >> >> Very simple, so that each dibbera is one passuk. Which is why those who >> want to accentuate that Anokhi is a separate dibbera (actually a >> machloket) do not use ta'am elyon for the first passuk. RSZ writes: >Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >haGevurah. My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an after-the-fact justification for the fact that they _should_ be two psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets of ta'amim. (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", etc.). When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. One piece of circumstantial evidence: there is a rule that a segol has to be the first melech-type trop of a pasuk, and that it must appear before the esnachta -- but the versions that present the dibros as nine psukim violate both of those rules. (Granted, one could argue that this is a special circumstance and thus an exception) Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: "it's nine psukim because ..." Thoughts? -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:07:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Practical Problems of Mezonos Bread In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190211200714.GC23838@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 02:38:27PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : For as long as I can remember, Misnagid poskim and rabbanim have been : warning people about the halachic problems of bread and rolls that are : marked as "mezonos"... : But I have seen such products in the stores, and invariably they : have a chassidishe hechsher... : Specifically, I have heard over the years, that they hold that Pas : Habaa B'Kisnin retains its mezonos status as long as one eats less : than the shiur of 3-4 kebeitzim, EVEN if one eats it with other food : as a normal meal.Unfortunately, I've been unable to find any posek who : says that in writing. The AhS (OC 168:16) explicitly says kevi'as se'udah is not subjective, "ela kol she'acheirim qov'im se'udah al shiur zeh." Citing Berakhos 42a. And as the SA itself says, "she'acheirim regilim liqvoa". The MB (168:24) gives 3-4 kebeitzim as the shiur for qevi'as se'udah WRT eiruv techumin and draws from that conclusions for HaMotzi and bentshin. "Aval kamah acharonim behaGra mikhlalam cholqim" but because this is the shiur for lunch, and a se'udah qavu'ah would be dinner or breakfast. So it seems that even in Litta, the norm isn't to look at whether one is indeed eating a meal, or even whether this is the amount of pas the individual in question would eat for a meal, but rather, on a public shiur. The open question one would get from the MB is whether that is 3-4 kebeitzim, or like the Gra says, more. As far as I can tell, the MB mentions this Gra, as does the Chayei Adam 54:4, but it's not in the Bar Ilan DB. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Nearly all men can stand adversity, micha at aishdas.org but if you want to test a man's character, http://www.aishdas.org give him power. Fax: (270) 514-1507 -Abraham Lincoln From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:14:59 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:14:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 1:22pm EST, Sholom Simon wrote: > RSZ writes: >> Taam Elyon combines the first two dibros because they were heard mipi >> haGevurah. > My limited understanding is that some view that reason as an > after-the-fact justification for the fact that they should be two > psukim. IIRC, Rav Breuer has them as two psukim. ... > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion that: > "it's nine psukim because..." We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. There is no point in trying t o justify an error. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 11 12:44:02 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:44:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> Message-ID: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 11, 2019 at 08:14:59PM +0000, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: : We have other evidence thst they were always 10 pesuk until the error. : Someone wrote an article tracing when the error was made. : There is no point in trying to justify an error. Generalizing away from leining the 10 haDiberos... At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. >From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From mandels at ou.org Mon Feb 11 12:54:53 2019 From: mandels at ou.org (Mandel, Seth) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 20:54:53 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org>, <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> On February 11, 2019 at 3:44:16 PM EST, Micha Berger wrote: > At the end of the day, the RBSO arranged things so that for centuries now > Jews have been leining His 10 haDevarim (as Hashem calls them) as 9 pesuqim. > From a causal perspective, I agree with RSM. From a teleological one, > it's hard for me to dismiss that quickly a widely accepted minhag, > discussed by generations of gedolei Torah. What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. And the Teimanim have for 1,000 years been always reading it as 10, both on Parshat Yitro and Parshat wa'ethchannan and on Shavu'ot. They had the advantage of not being corrupted by the printed versions that changed it. There are many other issues where you can properly use your teleology. But a mistake remains a mistake according to halokho. It is still a meqqah ta'ut. From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 11 13:25:58 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:25:58 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <15c8ff3c-e1c5-933e-3e1f-314540102cbd@sero.name> On 11/2/19 1:22 pm, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: > The problem arose because these psukim used to be printed with both sets > of ta'amim.? (A lot of them were above the letter -- thus ta'am "elyon", > etc.).? When they were disentangled into ta'am elyon and ta'am tachton, > R Breuer contends, a mistake was made. Not unless this disentanglement happened centuries ago, which I don't think it did. > Might there be another piece of circumstantial evidence?? I always > wondered: in what year/decade/century do we see the first suggestion > that: "it's nine psukim because ..." No later than the Mas'es Binyomin (1530-1620). And it seems from his explanation that the "disentangled" versions did not yet exist, since his questioner can't make head or tail of the printed te'amim and he explains them one by one. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 12 18:24:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 21:24:34 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Braisa Pesachim 116a: If he is a chacham, then his "ben" asks him. If he's not a chacham, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. Rambam Chometz UMatza 7:3: If he has no "ben", his wife asks him. If he has no wife, they ask each other... If he is alone, he asks himself. Mechaber 473:7: If there's no chochma in the "ben", his father teaches him. If he has no son, then his wife asks him. If not, then he asks himself. I would like to know the best way to translate "ben" in the above halachos. Does it refer to a generic "child", or specifically to a "son"? The word "ben" can go either way. Many are accustomed to translating it as "son" in this context (and in other contexts, like "arba banim", and "v'higadta l'vincha") but I don't know whether this is out of habit, or whether the sources actually intend to imply "ben zachar". I would like to suggest a test which might determine the answer to this question. Suppose there are three people at the Seder: husband, wife, and daughter. No sons. Who asks the Mah Nishtana? If "ben" means "son", then there is no son present, and the wife should ask. But if "ben" means "child", then the daughter *is* present, and it is her job (if she has chochma). Right now this is a merely hypothetical question, but in some homes it will surely become practical two months from now: According to the Braisa, and the Rambam, and the Mechaber, who should ask? Has anyone heard this discussed or paskened? I'd love to hear your thoughts. Akiva Miller Note: Aruch Hashulchan 473:21 says: If the "ben" does not have chochma to ask, then his father teaches him to ask. If he doesn't have a "ben", then the "bas" asks. If he doesn't have a "bas', then his wife asks or someone else who is sitting at the table asks... Undeniably, in this case, the contrast shows that "ben" and "bas" must be translated as "son" and "daughter"; there is no generic "child" in the Aruch Hashulchan. But this doesn't really answer my question of according to the Braisa, Rambam, and Mechaber, because on the one hand, the daughter gets priority over the mother, but on the other hand, the daughter is unequal to the son. I suppose it is possible that the Braisa Rambam and Mechaber would all agree with the Aruch Hashulchan (that the daughter ranks midway between son and wife), but I'd like to know if anyone has actually written on this subject. I would also point out that none of these four authorities mention the modern practice of giving the Mah Nishtana davka to the *youngest*. I wonder who the Aruch Hashulchan would give this kavod to: an eight year old son or a seven year old daughter. From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 12 22:41:01 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 01:41:01 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 10 Dibrot In-Reply-To: <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> References: <6E2B554A-E300-4598-9BD9-B5D5353778FC@ou.org> <20190211204402.GC8278@aishdas.org> <054CCEEE-6550-4390-BB52-85B4EEAECE19@ou.org> Message-ID: On 11/2/19 3:54 pm, Mandel, Seth via Avodah wrote: > What you say is not correct. Most Ashkenzim just follow what is in print, > no matter how you prove that it was a mistake on the printer's part. > > You can be m'lammed zechus, but that is not the same as justifying it. But the poskim who give the reason are not being melamed zechus, they are seriously explaining the reason for the minhag. They don't think it's a mistake, they assume that the minhag is correct. And this is not some modern phenomenon. How do we know it was a mistake and not a deliberate decision? How do we know it wasn't he Temanim who made a mistake by reasoning that there ought to be 10, not 9? Isn't there a rule in girsa'os that it's the less obvious version that's more likely to be correct? When were the two taamim first printed separately anyway? If it was after Mas'eis Binyamin then we know that couldn't be the source for the minhag. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:35:50 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:35:50 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Safah Achas uDevarim Achadim? Message-ID: <20190214213550.GA12609@aishdas.org> The time scale is all wrong, but this is notably similar to what we would expect of pre-migdal culture. https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/cave-art-symbolic-language Big Think Did ancient cave artists share a global language? The same 32 symbols show up in prehistoric European cave art. Frank Jacobs 13 February, 2019 * Many of these symbols are found in caves in Africa, Asia, Australia and America as well. * At least 40,000 years old, the set of symbols may have been a universal communications tool. * Among these symbols is the iconic hashtag. Is seems all over the world, the symbols alongside the pictures of cave art is surprisingly consistent. At the URL, there is a map of the world, showing which symbols were found in cave art where. Along with theories as to why. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Problems are not stop signs, micha at aishdas.org they are guidelines. http://www.aishdas.org - Robert H. Schuller Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 14 13:16:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:16:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: <20190214211640.GA3152@aishdas.org> SA CM 360:5 talks about acquiring an item after gezeilah through a shinui that is not chozer libriaso -- no yi'ush needed. Of coure I had starts at AhS, where it's se'if 7. Examples: Stealing wood and nailing it together to make a boat is chozer lebriaso (AhS: ssuming the wood was stolen in ship plank form) because one can pull the nails out and restore them. If one steal sand and make bricks, one are not qoneh -- because a hammer can return them to sand. (AhS has a yeish omerim that limits this to bricks dried in the sun; kiln baked bricks can't be broken back down to sand.re not qoneh because one can melt the coin back down. SA s' 6: But the following shinuyim are qonim: - One steals wood and planes it smooth, cuts it or hollows it out to make keilim, - Steals wood and dyes or bleaches it - Steals a brick and turns it into saned - Destroys coins Because even if you turn the metal back into a coin it's panim chadashos. First, a tangent.... Notice how entropy-related the halakhah ends up being. A shinui that matters increases entropy. If you actuall make an item out of something of lower entropy -- a brick from dirt -- it's reversible because entropy naturally increases. The AhS (again, se'if 7) spends time defining panim chadashos. 1- Shitah Mequbetzes: because you can't make it with exactly the same look as the original. 2- Rashi: ... exactly the same width or length And even if you used the same stamp, the appearance would be a little different (AhS: even according to Rashi, kakh nir'eh li). Going back to my entropy detour: because you aren't restoring it to the same low-entropy state. But here's the question I am really interested in: I had gotten into this thinking that panim chadashos had to do with identity. Even if it the sand were reformed into a brick, it would be a new brick made of the same stand. But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. Seems to me. And if so, would the halakhah change? (Not that a gazlan getting ahold of the same mass production equipment to remake the same item as the owner originally did is all that likely...) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From zvilampel at gmail.com Mon Feb 18 17:05:10 2019 From: zvilampel at gmail.com (Zvi Lampel) Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 20:05:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The DICTA project Message-ID: Ami magazine (issue 405) interviewed Dr. Moshe Koppel, who is developing a valuable free website program ??(dicta.org.il), 5 tools of which are available now. I tried out its Nakdan program, which inserts ?nikud into non-nikud texts, and I am very, very impressed. Here is how the website describes its tools:? The DICTA Bible search engine allows users to easily search for words and phrases in the Bible, ?with no need to worry about spelling and word forms. Search results of one or more words will ?include verses in which the searched words appear, with appropriate variations of spelling and ?word form. ? ? Results appear in order of relevance, alternatively you can choose to have them presented in the customary order of biblical books.? NAKDAN Automatically add nikud (vocalization) to any modern, poetic or classical Hebrew text.? https://nakdan.dicta.org.il TIBERIAS STYLISTIC CLASSIFIER FOR THE HEBREW BIBLE Define two or more categories of texts that interest you (e.g., "early Biblical Hebrew" and "late ?Biblical Hebrew") and specify some examples of each category (e.g., Joshua and Judges as ??"early" and Esther and Ezra as "late"). Dicta's classifier will assign any new text that you select ??(for instance, Ruth or Joel) to its most likely category, based on the key stylistic markers of each type. ? SYNOPSIS BUILDER Synopsis Builder aligns two or more versions of the same (arbitrarily long) text, highlighting differences between versions and matching up parallel words, including variant spellings and synonyms.? COMING SOON Flag corrupted words Identify text origin? ? Expand abbreviations Source criticism? ? Find parallel texts Forgery detection Zvi Lampel -- Using Opera's mail client: http://www.opera.com/mail/ From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 20:09:56 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 04:09:56 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines which "these" is used when? --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From t613k at aol.com Mon Feb 18 21:33:55 2019 From: t613k at aol.com (Toby Katz) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:33:55 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? References: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242.ref@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <379906793.1451013.1550554435242@mail.yahoo.com> In?Avodah Digest, Vol 36, Issue 63 dated 5/24/2018 "Rich, Joel" wrote: Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated ? >> From "Scalia Speaks" : "The religious person, the truly religious person, cannot divide all his policy preferences into those that are theologically motivated and those that proceed from purely naturalistic inclinations. Can any of us say whether he would be the sort of moral creature he is without a belief in a supreme Lawgiver, and hence in a Supreme Law?" Me: how would you answer this question? How would an atheist? What would be an acceptable answer for a religious person to give if asked at a judicial confirmation hearing in the US? In Israel? << KT Joel Rich ?>>>>> [Just found this old post from May in my "send later" folder, long neglected!? Here is what I meant to write then, always timely] There is no constitutional requirement, no legal requirement, no ethical requirement and no logical requirement for each individual to erect a wall of separation between church and state in his heart and mind. As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated minds.? They hold two mutually exclusive sets of beliefs and values, one set for chol and the other set for kodesh.? You see a lot of that in Teaneck and in Hollywood, FL.? But the bifurcated mind is, as I say, not at all required to be a good citizen of the United States or to be a good judge or a good legislator and certainly not to be a mensh. To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a Designer or anything other than random chance.? They are opposed even though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in a Creator.? But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in the university or any public space, oh no! --Toby Katzt613k at aol.com ============= ______________________________ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 02:27:29 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 05:27:29 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause Message-ID: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, but says PvR that does not create an obligation. Also, the sho'el mentions that RSZA thought that it was wrong to do IVF in order to choose a gender, to which RAW notably does not make a comment that made it to this authorized presentation, even though the aside from the sho'el did. I would take that to mean ascent. But in the sh'el's case, IVF is required either way, the question is only about shoosing a boy. Here is R Akiva Dershowitz's translation? summary? of the teshuvah, from https://en.tvunah.org/2019/02/19/ivf-and-gender-selection/ Tvunah in English Beit Midrash for Birurei Halachah Binyan Zion Under the Leadership of Maran HaRav Asher Weiss Shlita Ivf and gender selection Posted by: Rabbi Akiva Dershowitz In: Medical Law and Ethics, Tags: IVF Question: Would there be any halachic/ethical issues with one who is performing IVF due to infertility to request a specific gender? I've heard that R SZ Auerbach thought it to be unethical for a couple to undergo IVF specifically to have a specific gender, however what would be with one who is anyway undergoing IVF? (We currently have 2 girls BH and would like to be mekayem Pru Urvu.) Answer: While it would not be an obligation in order to fulfill the mitzvah of Pru Urvu, it would be permissible to choose the gender of the baby for one who is anyway undergoing IVF treatment. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When a king dies, his power ends, micha at aishdas.org but when a prophet dies, his influence is just http://www.aishdas.org beginning. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Soren Kierkegaard From JRich at sibson.com Tue Feb 19 06:48:02 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 14:48:02 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] IVF and Gender Selection -- for a good cause In-Reply-To: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> References: <20190219102726.GA6354@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0129C59C-7F71-4699-B198-46FE03C06941@sibson.com> R Asher Weiss recently fielded a question about selecting the gender of a baby being produced via IVF. The parents' motive is that as they already have two girls, they (perumably: the husband) could fulfil pirya verivya if they could insure the next one was a boy. He permits, :/:::::::::::::::::: Listen here https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/918137/rabbi-mordechai-torczyner/does-the-artificial-uterus-change-the-halachic-definition-of-maternity/ Rabbi Mordechai Torczyner-Does the Artificial Uterus Change the Halachic Definition of Maternity? Iirc R Torchyner says the general consensus is no sex selection till 4 kids Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Tue Feb 19 05:54:48 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 08:54:48 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 18/2/19 11:09 pm, Toby Katz via Avodah wrote: > What is the difference between "eileh" (aleph-lamed-hei) and "eilu" > (aleph-lamed-vov)?? Both mean "these."? My husband wants to know.? I > don't believe there is any difference in meaning, but he thinks there > must be.? I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the > difference between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except > "lamo" is poetic).? Or perhaps there is some grammatical or dikduk > difference, like the beged kefes letters that get a dagesh or don't get > a dagesh, depending on what is else is around them.? There is also > another word that means "these" -- the word "halalu."? What determines > which "these" is used when? Eileh is Biblical, Eilu and Halalu are Mishnaic. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 13:05:08 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:05:08 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Eilah and Elu In-Reply-To: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> References: <1674417180.1407078.1550549396819@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <20190219210508.GA5856@aishdas.org> Tangent... On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 04:09:56AM +0000, Toby Katz wrote: : I think the difference might just be stylistic (like the difference : between "lahem" and "lamo" which both mean "to them" except "lamo" is : poetic).... I don't know if it's that "lamo" is more poetic as much as it is used when better fits the meter. When the suffix is "-hem" it gets the emphasis. However, with "-mo", it's the previous syllable that is emphasized. E.g., in Shemos 14:29 "vehaMMAyim laHEM choMAH", and a few pesuqim later "youkhLEImo kaQQAsh" (where the capitalized syllable has the trop). -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com Tue Feb 19 13:57:23 2019 From: jkaplan at tenzerlunin.com (Joseph Kaplan) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:57:23 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? Message-ID: RnTK: > As a sociological matter I note that there are certain Modern > Orthodox Jews or YU types who suffer from what I have called bifurcated > minds.... .. > To give specific examples of what I mean, the bifurcated people are > "personally opposed" to abortion and gay marriage but take it as a point > of pride to be in favor of legalized abortion throughout nine months of > pregnancy and in favor of legalized gay marriage.? The bifurcated people > are opposed to teaching anything in the public schools about the origin > of life or the origin of the universe that even remotely smacks of a > Designer or anything other than random chance. They are opposed even > though in one half of their minds (the Shabbos half) they do believe in > a Creator. But this must not be even hinted at in public school or in > the university or any public space, oh no! As someone from Teaneck (I can't speak for Hollywood FL), my mind may be bifurcated, but on the issues raised it's not between kodesh and chol; it's between kodesh and constitution. IOW, I believe that God created the world. But I recognize that this is a religious belief that is not shared by many other American citizens. And my understanding of the first amendment is that religious beliefs should not be taught in public schools. (I don't wish to discuss that understanding of the constitution here. If you disagree that's fine, but if you understand constitutional law you also know that my understanding is a valid (perhaps not the valid but a valid) understanding of the constitution.) Thus, as a matter of Jewish belief, I believe in a creator and want my yeshivot to teach my children and grandkids this religious belief, which, indeed, was/is the case. But as a matter of constitutional law, I do not think that religious belief should be taught in public schools. Or, similarly, that public prayer should be allowed in public schools. (Similar analyses can be also be made for abortion and gay marriage.) BTW, I believe in a creator and prayer even during the week and not only on Shabbat. Joseph Sent from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 19 14:30:28 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 17:30:28 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] theologically motivated? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190219223028.GB18314@aishdas.org> To me the question RJK raises starts one step before -- is compartmentalizing Torah and constitution even appropriate? Is the Nachide mitzvah of Dinim an obligation to implement a court system that enforces other Noachde laws, or to create a system to prevent "ish es rei'eihu chayim belo'o" (to borrow a quote from what may or may not be an entirely different discussion). If the latter, then it is our duty as citizens to foster the existing system based on rights, and incorporating values from halakhah at their expense may not be the right choice. IOW, I would agree with RJK. But if the purpose of their courts is to prevent violations of the Sheva Mitzvos, or includes that prevention as one of multiple purposes, we have to weigh the battle vs the war -- we should be waging a battle about teaching Design, but will we lose more in the long run? (To me, abortion is an entirely different issue, as piquach nefesh to Jewish mothers is involved. But y'all should know that by now.) RMJB gives a lot to work with at . See the relevant section below (with fn). -micha Jewish Law - Commentary/Opinion The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review Rabbi Michael J. Broyde The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide[1] Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde[*] III. The Obligation of "Laws" or "Justice"[43] The final commandment in the Noachide code is dinim, commonly translated as "laws" or "justice". Two vastly different interpretations of this commandment are found among the early authorities. Maimonides rules that the obligations of dinim require only that the enumerated Noachide laws be enforced in practice. Maimonides states: How are [Noachides] obligated by dinim?. They must create courts and appoint judges in every provence to enforce these six commandments . . for this reason the inhabitants of Shechem [the city] were liable to be killed[44] since Shechem [the person] stole[45] [Dina], and the inhabitants saw and knew this and did nothing.[46] According to Maimonides it is logical to assume that other types of regulations that society might make are subsumed under the rubric of either "laws of the land" or "laws of the king." Their binding authority is quite different.[47] Nachmanides argues with this formulation and understands the obligations of dinim to be much broader. It encompasses not only the obligations of society to enforce rules, but it also obligates society to create general rules of law governing such cases as fraud, overcharging, repayment of debts and the like.[48] Within the opinion of Nachmanides there is a secondary dispute as to what substantive laws Noachides are supposed to adopt. Rama, writing in his responsa,[49] states that according to Nachmanides in those areas of dinim where Gentiles are supposed to create laws, they are obligated to incorporate Jewish law into Noachide law unless it is clear contextually that it is inappropriate. Most authorities reject this interpretation and accept either Maimonides ruling or that according to Nachmanides those rules created under the rubric of dinim need only be generally fair, and need not be identical to Jewish law.[50] This author cannot find even a single rishon who accepts the ruling of Rama, and one can find many who explicitly disagree.[51] The dispute concerning the nature of the commandment called dinim is extremely relevant to explaining the obligation of Jews to provide guidance and seek enforcement of the Noachide laws. It would appear to this author that Maimonides accepts that the biblical commandment of dinim (or some Noachide cognate of it) compels enforcement by all -- Jews as well as Gentiles -- of these seven laws, perhaps because Jews too are bound by them.[52] Maimonides in his explanation of the laws of dinim does not appear to limit them to Noachides only. Indeed, writing much more recently, Rabbi Yoseph Engel,[53] Rabbi Meir Simcha MeDivinsk, Rabbi Yecheil Yakov Weinberg, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach,[54] and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[55] all seem to indicate that there is some residual jurisdictional impact upon Jews from their Noachide obligation. For example, Rabbi Meir Simcha recounts that if a Jewish child who is not yet bar or bat mitzva, and thus not an adult according to Jewish law, comprehends the nature of right and wrong,[56] he or she[57] is obligated according to torah law in the Noachide commandments, since according to Noachide law he is an adult.[58] In a similar vein, Rabbi Weinberg states that a marriage entered into between two Jews which is technically invalid according to Jewish law still creates a Noachide marriage between the couple.[59] The opposite claim could be made according to Nachmanides (as interpreted by those who disagree with Rama). Since the obligation to create dinim according to Nachmanides includes in it other obligations clearly not applicable to Jews (such as the creation of a general civil or secular law system governing all other than Jewish) it would appear that Nachmanides could not accept a Jewish obligation to participate in dinim.[60] That is not to say that Jews need not obey dinim or other aspects of the Noachide code according to Nachmanides. Indeed, it is clear that a number of authorities find some connection between the obligation of dinim and the halachic mandate of dina demalchuta dina, the obligation of Jews to obey the secular law.[61] If Noachides are obligated in the creation of general secular law and not only the enforcement of these six specified commandments, it would seem logical that Jews must too obey these dinim, at least in interactions with Noachides.[62] However, a crucial observation must be made. Merely because Jewish law rules that one is obligated to obey Noachide law does not mean that one is necessarily obligated to assist in its enforcement.[63] The two are not necessarily interrelated.[64] Indeed, as noted by Chazon Ish, Jewish law requires respect of the Noachide legal pronouncements even in a situation where the Noachide judges themselves do not fully observe Noachide law.[65] Chazon Ish was asked concerning the obligation to accept legal pronouncements from a Noachide court that does not generally observe (or enforce) all of the seven commandments, but "observes the law concerning sanctity of life and theft of property." Chazon Ish replies that if they are enforcing even a section of the Noachide laws properly, it is halachically necessary to respect those pronouncements.[66] However, respect does not necessarily mean that full participation is mandatory. In sum, there certainly is an obligation upon Noachides -- at the minimum -- to create a legal system designed to enforce Noachide law. Jews have an obligation to recognize and respect this system, even if it is incomplete in its observance of Noachide law. According to many, there would appear to be a residual impact of Noachide law in Jewish law.[67] ... 43. For an excellent review of the Noachide commandment of dinim, see Rakover, supra note * (both articles). 44. See Genesis Chapter 34. 45. As to why Maimonides uses the word "stole" see Sanhedren 55a and Chatam Sofer YD 19. 46. Malachim 10:14. 47. See generally Teshuvot Chachmai Provance 48 which clearly distinguishes between regulations based on the Noachide laws and regulations based on the law of the land or the law of the king. For more on this distinction, see Arnold Enker, "Aspects of Interaction Between the Torah Law, the King's Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law", Cardozo L. Rev. 12:1137-xxxx (1991). 48. Commentary of Nachmanides, Geneses 34:14. 49. Responsa of Rama 10. His ruling is also accepted by Chatam Sofer CM 91 and R. Yakov Linderbaum (melisa), Responsa Nachalat Yakov 2:3. 50. See Rabbi Y. Elchanan Spector, Nachal Yitzchak CM 91; R. Abraham Issaih Karelitz, Chazon Eish on Hilchot Malachim 10:10 and Bava Kama 10:3; R. Isser Zalman Meltzar, Even HaAzel, Chovel Umazek 8:5; R. Yecheil Michael Epstein, Aruch HaShulchan He'Atid, Law of Kings 79:15; R. Naphtali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Haamek Shealah 2:3; R. Abraham Kook, Etz Hadar 38, 184; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi, OC II, Kuntres Mili de Berachot 2:1; R. Ovadia Yosef, Yechaveh Daat 4:65; R. Yitzchak Yakov Weiss, Minchat Yitzchak 4:52:3. For a more complete analysis of this issue see N. Rakover, Jewish Law ..., supra note * at 1098-1118, and App. I & II. 51. Most authorities do not accept Nachmanides' opinion; see e.g. Maimonides, Hilchot Malachim 10:10; R. Yom Tov Ashvealli (Ritva), Responsa 14 (quoted in Beit Yosef CM 66:18); Tosafot, Eruvin 62a ("Ben Noach"). The comments of Albo are also worth citing: One finds although torah law and Noachide law differ in the details, the principles used are the same, since they derive from the same source. Moreover, the two systems exist concurrently: while Jews have torah law, the other peoples abide by the Noachide code. Sefer Haikarim 1:25. 52. Maimonides asserts in his commentary on the Mishnah (Chulin 7:6) that the reason why these seven commandments are obligatory is because God commanded these seven laws as part of the divine revelation at Sinai. Based on this, the Bal HaTurim notes that 620 commandments were revealed at Sinai which he remarks is hinted at by the 620 letters in the Ten Commandments. Interestingly, Machzor Vitri notes that only 606 commandments were given to the Jews at Sinai, since the Jews were already commanded in the Noachide laws prior to that; this is also noted by Gra as derived from the word "Ruth", whose value is 606, which Gra asserts is the additional commandments she became obligated in. See also Maimonides's Sefer Hamitzvot Aseh 176-177. For a general discussion of the Noachide laws and the counting of commandments, see Noami Cohen, "Taryag and the Noahide Commandments", Journal of Jewish Studies, 43:46-57 (Spring 1992). 53. See Rabbi Yosef Engel, Beit Otzar Marechet 1-1: '7, 9. "The seven Noachide commandments are still obligatory to Jews, and their authority derives from their pre-Sinai obligation. The Torah . . . merely added to Noachide laws . . ." 54. Rabbi Pinhas Hayyim Sheinman "Teshuva be-inyan yeladimn mefagrim legabe hinukh u-mitsvot" Moria 11:(9-10) pp 51-65 (1982). (This article contains an appendix written by Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach). 55. Iggrot Moshe YD 1:6. Rabbi Feinstein there discusses whether one who is legally excused from observance of commandments generally because of blindness (according to one opinion) is nonetheless obligated in the Noachide laws. 56. Is a bar deah (understands right and wrong). 57. Although this goes almost without saying, there is no general difference in level of obligation in Noachide law between men and women; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, supra note *, at page 348. 58. Or Samach, Issurai Beah 3:2. This presupposes the correctness of the Minchat Chinuch famous assertion (Minchat Chinuch 190; also found in Chatam Sofer YD 317) that Noachides become adults -- and thus obligated in obedience of the law -- not when they reach any particular age, but then they reach intellectual maturity. It is likely that the correctness of this assertion is itself in dispute between Rosh and Rashi; compare Teshuvot HaRosh 16:1 and Rashi commenting on Perkai Avot 5:21. See also Yabia Omer YD 2:17. See also Sefer Hamikaneh 1:8(5) which states "for violations of the seven commandments Jews certainly are to be punished . . ." Perhaps similar sentiments are expressed by Rav Kook when he states "in our time, when Torah is not upheld . . . still it seems that the principles of fairness applied by force of torah law of dinim to Noachides applies, since we are no worse than they" Etz Hadar page 42. 59. Seredai Eish 3:22; Rabbi Menashe Klein, Mishnah Halachot 9:278 also agrees with this. 60. This author has found no authority who explicitly notes this in the name of Nachmanides. However, it would appear logical to this author that there is no obligation to participate in the creation of a legal system that is not binding on one who creates it. Other factors, such as lifnei ever or its analogs, would be in place according to Nachmanides to prevent Jews from enticing Noachides to violate; indeed, even dina demalchulta might be such rule. 61. See Rashi, Gitten 9b and Rabbi Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's . . . , supra note *, at 856. 62. See for example, Rashi commenting Gitten 9b. Rabbi Issar Zalman Meltzar Even HaAzel, Nizkai Mamon 8:5 freely mixes as near synonyms the terms dina demalchuta, din melech, benai noach metzuve al hadinim in a discussion about why a Jew must return property lost by another when such is required by secular law and not halacha. See also Rabbi Meir Dan Polachi, Chemdat Yisrael, Ner Mitzvah 72 Mitzvah 288. See also the discussion in section IV:3 of the position of Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson on this issue. 63. This article does not address one very significant issue -- the scope of a Gentile's obligation (both as an individual and as a society) to enforce Noachide law. As is clear from Maimonides' formulation (cited in text accompanying note 46), Gentiles are obligated not only in formulating a legal system, but also in actually enforcing it; after all the inhabitant od Shechem were punished because they declined to enforce the law. On the other hand, as noted by many authorities (see sources cited in notes 90 and 158 and more generally the sources cited in notes 90 to 99) it is clear that Noachides need not punish all violations with death. Indeed, a claim can be made that a Noachide system of law fulfills it's mandate as a system of justice (dinim) even if it were to occasionally decline to criminally punish a clear violation of Noachide law (such as theft of a nickel). So too, it is reasonable to suppose that Maimonides's formulation of the difference between the obligations of an individual to enforce law and the obligation of society to enforce law (see Rotzeach 1:5) has some place in the Noachide system also. This is even more so apparent according to the approach of Nachmanides that incorporates vast amounts of general law into Noachide law. Clearly not every violation of this general law requires death or even criminal punishment. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assert that the Noachide obligation is not fulfill merely by legislative action without any enforcement activity. What is missing from this discussion is the halachic parameters of the discretion, and that task shall be left to another time. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Feb 19 18:25:02 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2019 21:25:02 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > But if it's about appearnace (tzurah, mar'eh according to the > SM or dimensions according to Rashi), then is this still true? > Aren't today's mass produced items so consistent that a human > can't tell them apart? And therefore if the same metal was made > using the same die to make a coin, there would be no change. > Seems to me. At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of artwork, each unto themselves: This one is a little off-center in this direction, and that one has a little too much metal over there, and so on. But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people give up on them, and they are hefker." Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we might think. Akiva Miller From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 08:00:31 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 11:00:31 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Panim Chadashos in an era of mass production In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220160031.GC13359@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 09:25:02PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : At first I wanted to agree. To the modern eye, modern coins are all : clones of each other, but the ancient ones are unique pieces of : artwork, each unto themselves... : But I think Perek Eilu Metzios would disagree. See Rashi, right there : at the beginning of the perek (Bava Metzia, chap 2): "Maos mefuzaros - : Scattered coins, since they don't have a recognizable siman, people : give up on them, and they are hefker." : Mass-produced is mass-produced. Things haven't changed as much as we : might think. However, I already quoted AhS (CM 360:7) listing the shitah the same rishon (BQ 96b, Rashi "panim chadashos bo'u lekan") as the restored coin or brick "d'i efshar letzamtzeim o gedolah or qetanah". Or, as the AhS paraphrased, "sheyehi shaveh be'orekh o berochav kebarishonah". And then the AhS continues "ve'af im ya'asenu bidfus..." I think it's that in BM they're talking about simanim. Not whether the coin is visibly different as is the chiluq in our case, but whether people would pay enough attention to the differences for them to serve as a siman. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The trick is learning to be passionate in one's micha at aishdas.org ideals, but compassionate to one's peers. http://www.aishdas.org Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 09:25:11 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 12:25:11 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] nichum aveilim In-Reply-To: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <082de4d68e444984b78e84cfc5701350@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190220172511.GA11565@aishdas.org> On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 02:38:33AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : When one is physically distant from a friend who is sitting shiva, as : a general rule, is it better to (pick one) call, text, or email during : the shiva period? Or, is it better to wait until you actually see the : person again? How would that phone call (human touch /has/ to be best) make that seeing them again less likely or later? I don't see where the either-or begins. As for the question of whether one can be yotzei with the phone call, see IM OC 4:40:11 and Yabia Omer YD 10:48. RMF holds that nichum aveilim includes 2 things: (1) to help the aveilim talk things out and give them nechama, (2) letovas hmeis. (The latter is why a minyan comes to sit in the home of someone who r"l passed away without aveilim.) Still, even though it's only an impefect fulfillment of #1 to call, if that's the best you can do, YEISH ALAV CHIYUV to do what he can, and yeish lo to be menacheim by telephone. (I kept "yeish alav chiyuv" and "yeish lo" to minimize distorting his nuance.) As far as I can tell, and learning YO really takes practice I don't have, ROY holds that there is no nichum aveilim by phone, but it is lehachayos ruach shefalim, and a mitzvah to do. But not as strong as RMF obligating the phone call. I could see ROY saying you're closer to qiyum with the visit. Whereas I could still see RMF saying the visit is too late to help the meis, though, and therefore not qualitatively different than the phone call. So don't wait! Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Like a bird, man can reach undreamed-of micha at aishdas.org heights as long as he works his wings. http://www.aishdas.org But if he relaxes them for but one minute, Fax: (270) 514-1507 he plummets downward. - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 10:18:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:18:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190220181824.GB11565@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 09:24:34PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : Who asks Mah Nishtana at the Seder? Chinukh #21 says that sippur yetzi'as Mitzrayim is obligatory on men and women equally. The Minchas Chinukh questions this, since it's a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama and not on the list of MAshZ"G the Rambam has (Hil' AZ 12:3) that women are mechuyavos in. The MC concludes the chiyuv on women is derabbanan. The Rama (OC 473:6) says the the Ri meiLondri would do Maggid in laaz so that women and children understand. And pasqens accordingly. (And you thought that it was more frum to read the haggadah in Hebrew..) The MB (s"q 64) says that the women must understand because they are mechuyavos in the mitzvos of the night and the telling of the haggadah. Which seems to imply deOraisa, since the CC lumps the chiyuv of sippur with the other mitzvos of the night, like akhilas matzah. The MB's source is a nir'eh li from 472:14, where the SA says "nashim chayavos in 4 kosos and all the mitzvos of the night" (naming a derabbanan) and the MB ad loc (s"q 44) says "she'af hein hayu be'oso haneis" an explanation originally given for the deOraisos of the evening. My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future chiyuv is equal to his. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From micha at aishdas.org Wed Feb 20 12:50:19 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 15:50:19 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: <20190220205019.GA1592@aishdas.org> We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized picture of an olive. I was never so sure. And I posted a whole bunch of math computing the ammah from Y-m's water tunnel or marks found on Har haBayis, and still concluded with doubts that it matters. This morning, when the subject came up on Facebook, I was less certain which way to go and spelled out three possibilities. I want to share it here, where people might actually spend time looking up details to fill in or refute... My non-answer: 3- maybe our system of shiurim is not broken because law is law, or 1- maybe it should be fixed using archeology, or 2- maybe it should be fixed using today's olive, arm, and coinage. 1- "Law is law": It depends whether the shift in shiurim is binding halakhah even though we are aware that it happened and how. (Or maybe more stringent shiurim could be binding minhag, if not binding on the pesaq level.) Halakhah is legislation, not fact-finding. And if your community converged on a finite range of values, staying within that range may well be halachically binding. 2- Historical measures: Well, while some of that legislation was based on formalizing what was done mimetically (eg R Chaim Naeh's shiurim) yishuv hayashan), much/most was based on beliefs that they were preserving / recreating the old shiurim -- whether we look at the Rambam or the Nodeh biYhudah. So maybe we follow Chazal because the shitos that drift from their measures in error are non-binding because they are just that, in error. 3- Using today's measures: It could be that we shouldn't say "law is law" for the reverse reason -- when dealing with one's one carrying on Shabbos, the measure (at least according to the Arukh haShulchan) is 4 of one's own amos. Not a standard measure, but take out your arm (presumably you have mainstream structure) and measure it. The AhS says the role of the standard ammah is for communal things -- like an eiruv can't be kosher for a tall guy but pasul for his 5' high wife because the gaps are more than 16 of her amos. And that's due to population statistics! And there is strong reason to believe a perutah just means the smallest coinage where you are. Less than one coin isn't really money. (Wow, did that open a pandora's box in my head. Maybe a kezayis is just a small food staple, and we shouldn't even be looking at olives in today's world! A kechumus!) So maybe in order to degine "4 amos" for today's communities, we need to take statistics on today's Jews' arms. Before getting to eiruvin in AhS Yomi, I was firmly in the law-is-law camp. But I think the AhS holds that shiurim are personal, and any fixing would be against today's people. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Fortunate indeed, is the man who takes micha at aishdas.org exactly the right measure of himself, and http://www.aishdas.org holds a just balance between what he can Fax: (270) 514-1507 acquire and what he can use." - Peter Latham From director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org Wed Feb 20 13:12:20 2019 From: director at biblicalnaturalhistory.org (Rabbi Dr. Natan Slifkin) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:12:20 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> References: <20190220205450.GB1592@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, 22:54 Micha Berger We've discussed this in the past. R Natan Slifkin always chimed in > with a firm "yes" -- such as in his "kezayis chart" which is a life-sized > picture of an olive. It's absolutely not true that my answer is a firm "yes"! My answer is actually usually "no!" I think that revising halachic practice in light of scientific knowledge is usually wrong. The difference in the case of kezayis is that there was never a canonized halacha that a kezayis is the size of seven olives. Plenty of Rishonim held that it was the size of a regular olive, and there was always such a view throughout the generations. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Wed Feb 20 20:11:05 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 23:11:05 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > My point being.... If the mitzvah is not male-specific, why > would we think that "vekan haben sho'eil" means son and not > daughter. In fact, if you have two little ones, and the younger > is a daughter, it seems to me that: The MC would have the son > ask Mah Nishtanah, since the girl's chinukh is for a derabbanan. > Whereas the MB would have the daughter ask since her future > chiyuv is equal to his. Your example, which included the word "younger", highlights another question that's been on my mind: It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon the *youngest*? I think this is a great example of something that is so ingrained in us that we accept it without question. But the minhag could just as easily have gone in a different direction. All the children might have asked together, or it might have gone davka to the *oldest* for any of several reasons. The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do when there is more than one? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Feb 21 05:59:59 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:59:59 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: Q. This year there are two months of Adar. When is a yahrtzeit (the anniversary of a parent?s death) observed? In the first Adar or the second? Also, thirteen years ago there was only one Adar. When does a boy born at that time celebrate his Bar Mitzvah, during the first Adar or the second? A. With respect to a yahrtzeit, there is a dispute between the Mechaber and Rama (568:7). According to the Mechaber, if a person passed away in a year where there is only one Adar, the yahrtzeit is observed in the second Adar (in those years that have two months of Adar). Rama cites two opinions: 1) it should be observed in the first Adar, or 2) one should be stringent and observe it in both Adars. Mishna Berura (568:42) states that the custom is to observe yahrtzeit in the first Adar, however he cites the position of the Vilna Gaon that it should be observed in both Adars. Regarding a Bar Mitzvah, Rama (55:10) rules that it is observed in the second Adar. Mishna Berura (55:45) explains that the first Adar is an add-on month, while the second Adar is primary. Appropriately, the Bar Mitzvah occurs in the authentic month of Adar, which is Adar Sheini (the second). There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 08:03:06 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 17:03:06 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data Message-ID: RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even though the arm and the dirham actually clash). So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small. To my surprise, that is exactly what I heard from noted talmid chakham Rav Zalman Koren when I visited him three weeks ago. He claims that there is no reason and no archaeological support to claim that when Herod enlarged the Har haBayit he added to the breadth of the plaza, and only added to the length. Rav Koren argues that there are no tolopogical features forcing the large narrow side (the Har haBayit is a trapezoid, not a rectangle), and after bringing proof from teh Gemara's discussion of the mizbeach that when Chazal state sizes, they mean the size of the circumscribed (this is actually the wrong verb, but will make it understandable) rectangle, he then argues that the size of the northern wall are the 500 amot of Massekhet Middot. He argues that tefachim have not changed and are a tefach, confirming the large amah, and that we therefore must reject the dirham as a reference size. At the same time, he argues that the olive is not connected to the size of eggs, and therefore a large etzba does not imply a large olive, thus solving some of the problems raised by large shiurim (for example that according to the Gemarah the beit habeli'ah can contain three olive sizes, which cannot be the "Chazon Ish olives." To top it all off, he claims that that was precisely the shitta of the Chazon Ish and the Steipler, and has the quotes to support that interpretation. The only or greatest problem with the above, he admits, is that no less than the Rambam used the dirham as a reference size, and he shows that the Chazon Ish and the Steipler acknowledged this, and yet they rejected the dirham reference shiur. I haven't yet fully digested this, but thought Ovedim may be interested in this. Kol tuv, -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:57:10 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:57:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave three : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. : : So I thought that fellow Ovedim may be interested to hear of another : shittah, namely that we reject the dirham, that based on archaeology the : ammah is longer than Rav Chaim Noe, while the kazayit is small.... Tangengially, I am not sure about the clause about the ammah. R Chaim Naeh's ammah is 48cm. According to the plaque at Chizqiyahu's Water Tunnel (BTW, in kesav Ivri), they dug a canal of 1,200 amos. As the tunnel is 533 m long, that's somewhere between 42.6 and 46.3 cm. (As 1,200 is a round number, I figure the actual number of amos is somewhere between 1,150 and 1,250 amos. Thus the range.) So that's one piece of archeological data that says that RCN's shitah for the ammah is too BIG. Of course, if shiurim are supposed to drift, either because of the "law is law" theory or because an ammah is based on contemporary peoples' arms, then this may simply mean that the ammah during bayis sheini was lohnger than it was in Chizqiyahu's day. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 09:21:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 12:21:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221172100.GF21715@aishdas.org> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:11:05PM -0500, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : The bottom line is that the classic seforim all write it just as RMB : quoted: "vekan haben sho'eil" - THE ben, as if there is only one ben : at the table. Does anyone know of any authorities who say what to do : when there is more than one? All but one. To use an idiom of the AhS, "velahaRambam z"l yeish lo dei'ah achares".... (Although it isn't really an idiom, because he uses several different paraphrases: "yeish lehaRambam", "lehaRambam sham", "delehaRambam hayah lo bazeh", "da'as acheres", "shitah acheresh"... My personal favorite YT 183:39, "Vezehu lefi kol rabozeinu, aval lehaRambam tzarikh lomar kavanah acheres". The AhS clearly noticed how often the Rambam is a da'as yachid. Which to my mind reflects the Rambam's unique approach to what machloqes and pesaq are, so I'll ping R Zvi Lampel....) Anyway, in our case, the unique shitah of the Rambam (Chameitz uMatzah 8:2), "... ve'omar haqorei, 'Mah nistanah....'" And is only required when someone in the audience doesn't spontaneously ask real questions (7:3), with dinim derabbanan at the seder just to get those real questions going. The mishnah 10:4 has "vekhan haben sho'el aviv, and if the ben lacks da'as, his father teaches him, 'mah nishtanah...'" (With different girsa'os in the Bavli and the Y-mi.) According to the Bartenura, the correct girsa as found "bekhol hasefarim" is "vekhein haben sho'el" (minus an alef), and the "vekhein" is like "kein benos Tzelofchad dovros". So that's the source of "vekan haben sho'el". Rov rishonim say that the child asks "Mah Nishtanah" and if he has no da'as, the father teaches him to say "Mah Nishtanah". Whereas the Rambam understands the mishnah as saying that the child should ask questions, and if there is a da'as shortage, then the father teaches the child starting with the words "Mah nishatanah" -- I guess instead of starting by addressing the child's questions. Anyway, on to the main question.... Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. However, if makes sense from the sevara I assumed (above) motivates rov rishonim. It is the father's job to teach Mah Nishtanah to the kid who can't come up with his own questions. It is a natural implication to assume that the child who has been at the fewest sedarim who would need this coaching. The minhag seems pretty directly supported by the Yerushalmi (vilna edition 70a). R Yosah identifies the "im ein da'as beven aviv melemdo" in the mishnah with the "at petach lo" of the she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. So it would be logical for minhag to concludes that Mah Nishtana goes to the child closest to she'eino yodei'a lish'ol. (In my house it goes youngest to oldest, every descendent who is willing to. Sometimes we have choirs, sometimes strange languages or Dr Seuss, but it is a long production. But that has more to do with not wanting to grow up than anything halachic or minhag.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 10:42:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 13:42:14 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Two Adars In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190221184214.GG21715@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 01:59:59PM +0000, Prof Levine quoted from today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis: : There is a striking and obvious question. Why does Rama hold that a : yahrtzeit is observed in the first Adar, while a Bar Mitzvah is observed : in the second? Whichever Adar is primary for yahrtzreit should be primary : for Bar Mitzvahs as well. Particularly surprising is that the source of : both rulings is the same posek, the renowned Mahari Mintz. The answer to : this question is beyond the scope of this article. See Teshuvos Mahari : Mintz 9 and Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah III 160 for possible resolutions. The Mahari Mintz dismisses reasoning based on the name "Adar". The only reason why the extra month makes an Adar Rishon and Adar Sheini is because Adar is the last month. And had we chosen a different way to raname months for a shanah me'uberes, creating a new name or goubling the name of another month, no one would be asking whether the bar mitzvah of someone born in Adar should be in Shevat or in Adar. Just as in the real world, no one asks whether a Bar Mitzvah boy born in Adar II should have his bar mitzvah in Adar or Nissan. So the kid doesn't turn a bar oneshin a month early just because of a naming convention. However, a niftar's oneshim is measured in months. So the first yahrzeit makes sense being on the 12th month, and that's when the son should fast. "Vekhein bekhol shanah", no explanation other than the implied one of consistency. (Mahari Mintz also toys with the idea of chodshei hachamah, and the constellations, as yahrzeit could be about the mazal of the day the parent died being a bad one for the child. But doesn't take it beyond being a hava amina.) Jumping ahead 550 years... RMF (answer A, the sho'el asks three questions) cites sources, not reasons. What I did find interesting was that RMF holds "for we who have the minhag of keeping both yahr-zeits" (hyphen in the IM; keeping both is a chumera mentioned in the Rama and endorsed by the Gra) keeping the first years' yahr-tzeits the aniversary of the yom haqevurah in Adar I and the aniversary of the yom haqmisah in Adar II. The reason why we (in general, not an Adar issue) wait for yom haqevurah for the first yahr-tzeit is out of fear that people would end aveilus at less than 12 months year because it would be natural to end it at yahr-zeit. But the year doesn't include aninus, so we want to mark 1 year from qevurah, when aveilus began. And since Adar II is after 12 month, there is no such fear. That said, I heard or saw (maybe here) another conceptual reason: (My engineering background wants to talk about ordinal vs cardinal numbers. But I'll resist.) Bar mitzvah marks a boy becoming 13 years old. It's about a span of time. Yahrzeit makes an anniversary, it being the same day in the year. The year is 13 months long, so the bar mitzvah boy's 13th year ends in Adar II. But the date in Adar I is the same date as the yom hamisah, so for yahrzeit, that's the appropriate month. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From afolger at aishdas.org Thu Feb 21 12:35:10 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 21:35:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: > On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 05:03:06PM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: > : RMB asked whether we should revise the size of our shiurim, and gave > three > : possible answers. Implicit in his trichotomy is that all shiurim are > : connected (he mentions olive and arm and dirham in one fell swoop, even > : though the arm and the dirham actually clash). > > If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to > remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related > in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. Well, since I am not reporting my own views or research, but rather the view of one notable TC I visited, let me correctly state his views. For Rav Zalman Koren, the olive is an olive, perhaps even a contemporary olive and subject to change, but an amah is a fixed measure. Furthermore, Rav Koren remarked that even though people have grown taller as our public health has improved, fists have not grown broader. If anything, our fists are smaller than those of our forebears, since we do not do as much hard menial work. Hence, his argument goes, an etzba cannot be less than a contemporary actual finger breadth. Same for tefach. This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, the eggs become unrealistically large. The Chazon Ish's kebeitzah is almost twice as large s a large egg; it's even larger than a so called jumbo egg (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_egg_sizes). Also, a zeres, defined as half an amah, is really problematic, as I know of no one with a thumb to pinky spread of thirty centimeters. I assume some giant basket ball players may have such hands, but they are so unsually tall that they cannot possibly be the standard setting example. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Feb 22 10:58:17 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 13:58:17 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 09:35:10PM +0100, Arie Folger wrote: : On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 7:57 PM Micha Berger wrote: ... :> If shiurim do depend on today's arms and olives, they wouldn't need to :> remain in the ratios they were in when Chazal stated how they related :> in their forearms, finger-widths and olives. ... : This insistence that the shiurim are meant to match realia leaves me with : some questions. First of all, if we take the fingers and fists literally, : the eggs become unrealistically large... Why? If they have to match realia, then eggs become egg sized. And a zeres would be the span of your fingers, whether or not that's half the length of your forearm. And if it's a communal project -- measuring se'ah for a miqvah or the AhS's case of eiruvin -- then the normal finger span in your place-and-time, normal forearm, etc... As I said in the post you're replying to, the ratios between shiurim wouldn't necessary remain as they were for chazal.) I feel we are talking across each other. If one takes a hybrid approach, different than that you described besheim RKZ, that only the ammah etc... which are based on anatomy are personal (and therefore communal measures be based on normal range in the population). And perhaps kezayis, kebeitza, etc... were intended to be objective. After all, the AhS doesn't actually say that middos change with the times. He says that middos are based on the individual, that 4 amos doesn't mean 4 of some standard measure, but 4 of your own ammah. And then that because the eiruv is for many people, they need a consensus ammah. And that *implies* that with new population demographics, the consensus will change. Meanwhile, he also says a number of times that 4 amos are 3 arshin, which is 6 regel which is one sachen. And in CM 218:1 he also says that a tefach is 2 vieshok. (Translating using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obsolete_Russian_units_of_measurement that comes to a 21" ammah.) Ammah as a fixed measure. So, does he mean that 21" was a normal length for an East European Jewish forearm? Or do I entirely not understand AhS OC 363:32-35? Explanation from when it was fresh in my mind at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol33/v33n006.shtml#01 I had open questions then too. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger People were created to be loved. micha at aishdas.org Things were created to be used. http://www.aishdas.org The reason why the world is in chaos is that Fax: (270) 514-1507 things are being loved, people are being used. From afolger at aishdas.org Sun Feb 24 11:39:47 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:39:47 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: There are essentially three positions possible, one of which can branch out in at least two but really many more: 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small dirham shiur) 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the AhS RMB is citing. 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one of the basic realia-based shiurim. So you tell me that AhS has a different approach that CI. I think that we can accept that. But it isn't a stira of any shitta. Arie Folger -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Feb 24 17:47:49 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 20:47:49 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The youngest child (was: Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"?) Message-ID: In Avodah V37n14, R'Micha responded to R'AMiller: > Having the youngest ask does seem to be a minhag that arose in comparatively recent times, given that I also failed to find a maqor. < Perhaps it's part&parcel of evoking questions from the might-soon-fall-asleep'ers that (after a series of questionable/strange/unusual pre-"Maggid" actions) they themselves are bidden to formally "ask"/state/exclaim/sing "Mah nishtanah" (in a typical Yuntef meal, they are not given a leading role), much less do so about future actions (e.g. the 2nd dipping). All the best from *Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Mon Feb 25 00:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 08:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. 2. Also rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -do We have any idea who ended the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work then. As always any insights appreciated > > Kt > Joel THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. From cantorwolberg at cox.net Sun Feb 24 19:36:10 2019 From: cantorwolberg at cox.net (Cantor Wolberg) Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 22:36:10 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. Message-ID: Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. When the garments were used for holiness, they were "bigdei hakodesh." This term "bigdei hakodesh? occasionally appears in the Torah (Ex.39:1). Where do we ever hear of holy garments? Could you imagine going to Macy's and requesting a holy pair of jeans [they'd probably refer you to the Salvation Army]. The word "kadosh" can also have the opposite meaning of holy. If the bigdei kehuna were properly utilized, then there was Kedusha in the positive sense. But if not, it was a betrayal to HaShem and the kedusha was reversed. Chazak! Chazak! Venischazeik! -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Feb 25 06:57:43 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah Message-ID: The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. GENERATIONS II! In last week?s Bulletin, we provided a chart showing how few the generations really are since our receipt of the Torah at Sinai--and the transmission from generation to generation. A master mechaneich has provided us with two additional, more professionally prepared, charts, which we present by the following links: http://tinyurl.com/zpkbwhq http://tinyurl.com/hw6bxe5 After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions below. Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Mon Feb 25 08:35:43 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:35:43 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42d7c5ad-d2dc-6854-ac33-6741213b5426@sero.name> On 25/2/19 9:57 am, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list?? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > The answer is obvious. The first list presents the chain of mesorah to a specific individual, and the second to the students at a particular high school. In neither case was the Chofetz Chaim or any chassidic rebbe part of that specific chain. This is a little ironic in the second case, since the school in question is part of the Chofetz Chaim network, but the fact is that while Reb Dovid did learn from his great-uncle, his rebbe muvhak was the Slabodker Alter. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From jmeisner at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:10:00 2019 From: jmeisner at gmail.com (Joshua Meisner) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:10:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > > After looking at the list I sent an email to Hakhel with the questions > below. > > > Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there a > reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? > As shown at the bottom of the second list, this chart is the specific linear mesorah chain for the talmidim of Valley Torah High School (VTHS). R' Avrohom Stulberger, the rosh hayeshiva, appears to be a musmach of Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, which is why the chain goes up through R' Henach Leibowitz and R' Dovid Leibowitz and thereby up through the Alter of Slabodka, his rebbe the Alter of Kelm, and his rebbe R' Yisroel Salanter and thereby through Volozhin and beyond, all the way up to the 40-step list that one can find in the hakdama to the Rambam. A branched mesorah tree, of course, would also include the Alter of Novardhok, the Chofetz Chaim and many chassidishe rebbes, but that is not the purpose of this list. Interestingly, R' Dovid Leibowitz was a great-nephew of the Chofetz Chaim and learned in Radin until the age of 19 (where he also learned under R' Naftali Trop), but in the interest of keeping the list linear, the compiler chose only his rebbe muvhak, the Alter of Slabodka, for this list. Josh -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From saulguberman at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:53:44 2019 From: saulguberman at mail.gmail.com (Saul Guberman) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:53:44 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:46 AM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I would say that the people who did the lists were trying to trace their own mesorah. They are not Chassidishe, so no Chassidishe Rabbonim. The bigger question is where is the RIF, RAN and RAMBAM. Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. Saul From simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com Mon Feb 25 08:36:56 2019 From: simon.montagu at mail.gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 18:36:56 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 5:46 PM Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: > The following is fro today's Hakhel email bulletin. ... I assume the objective is to produce a specific chain of massora, rav to talmid, to students at a specific institution -- "VTHS/BMNA" (where is this?). Otherwise, I have no idea why you only note the Chofetz Chaim and Chassidishe rebbes as missing -- almost everybody is missing! Where are the Rambam, the Rif, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef? Where are the Ramban, the Rashba, the RItba and the Ran? From micha at aishdas.org Mon Feb 25 08:21:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 11:21:41 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:57:43PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Is there a reason why the Chofetz Chaim is not on this list? Is there : a reason why there are no Chassidishe rebbes on this list? Everything up to and including Rav Ashi is from the haqdamah to the Yad par 21. But at some point it turns into a rebbe-talmid chain for R' Shach. It's not like it can list every member of Chazal, every gaon, rishon and acharon. And Rav Shach wasn't a muvhak of the CC or any talmidim of Chassidishe rabbeim. Notice (ironically, given the start of the list) the Rambam isn't there either -- the chain is distinctly Ashkenazi. I did one for myself back in 2009: http://www.aishdas.org/asp/my-mesorah Now, how it's flawed: It's two different things spliced together - The Rambam lists the key baalei mesorah. It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get more rationalist than that. But from a rebbe-talmid perspective: Osniel ben Kenaz probably taught more talmidim than Yehoshua did. The entire time Yehoshua led, ObK had no other job. And he's the one who was able to restore the Torah forgotten during aveilus for Mosh. Derashos and TSBP first run through him. - Through the geonim it lists every gaon of Pumpedisa. Listing every gaon fits the key baalei mesorah pattern, but choosing Pumpedisa over Sura (which is only where Rav Ashi compiled shas) was because of the next pattern -- the chain of rabbe-talmid runs through R Hai Gaon to Rabbeinu Gershom. Sort of. Rabbeinu Gershom's primary rebbe was Rabbeinu Yehudah Liontin HaKohein. But we don't know the chain to Rivam Ka"tz, so we use Rabbeinu Gershom's 2nd-hand exposire to Pumbesisa instead. And that's where the "lead baal mesorah" list gets spliced into the rebbe-talmid list. - Because of the previous item, it has too many generations. There are geonim that served only a few years. I bet if we knew who learned from who, we could skip numerous entries in period from Chazal to Rabbeinu Gershom. Enough to make up for any nevi'im elided over because of Pinechas. (And has a few late rishonim in the wrong place.) Still, with all the flaws, it's nice to know that I can demonstrate that in principle, the TSBP Rav Dovid taught me in NY in the 1980s is indeed the same one Moshe Rabbeinu was given. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger When you come to a place of darkness, micha at aishdas.org you don't chase out the darkness with a broom. http://www.aishdas.org You light a candle. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l From simon.montagu at gmail.com Mon Feb 25 13:23:58 2019 From: simon.montagu at gmail.com (Simon Montagu) Date: Mon, 25 Feb 2019 23:23:58 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger via Avodah < avodah at lists.aishdas.org> wrote: > It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long > lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get > more rationalist than that. > > I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 11:37:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:37:22 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] The Meshekh Chokhmah on Abortion Message-ID: <20190226193722.GA25578@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Korbin, I just read your reply to R Herzfeld's op-ed in the Fev 13th post on Jewish Journal, "Open Debate Continued: Is N.Y.s Abortion Law Halachic?" What caught my eye is your citation of the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah (Shemos 35:2) which I happen to be in the middle of preparing to teach. You imply that R' Meir Simchah haKohein miDvinsk holds that abortion is murder, by citing the first Meshekh Chokhmah on this week's parashah. What he says, though, is that it's assur, even if the punishment is left to beis din shel maalah. RYMhK does not actually say that said issur is retzichah. He calls it "makeih adam", a quote of the pasuq. But never says anything about murder. Rabbi Herzfeld's statement that it takes a somewhat unique reading of the Rambam to conclude that he believes that abortion of retzichah appears a solid argument to me. the Bach doesn't reach that conclusion. After all, Hil' Rotzeich 1:9 gives different pesaqwim for an ubar a moment before hotzi rosho, and the same baby a moment after. The Rambam's "kerodeif achareha lehorgah" appears to only be sufficient for an ubar, and for an actual tinoq, "ein dochin nefesh mipenei nefesh". Because, leshitaso, an ubar isn't a "nefesh" yet. Similarly, you cite Nishmas Avraham CM IV 425.1 (vol II, pg 220). But he explicitly says that "mevu'ar midivrei haRambam, haSmag, haR' Bechayei vehaSA" that there is a prohibition of killing an ubar, "im lo midin rodeif". Similarly his citation of the CI says that "mai chatzis dama didakh" doesn't apply. Why not, if the ubar is a human whose abortion is actual retzichah? And the NA even discusses whether the issur is deOraisa or deRabbanan! Even though he does conclude rov poqim hold it's deOraisa, at least if done directly and not gerama (eg fasting). Citing him as a source that says abortion is retzichah is far from what one can actually prove from Rav Avraham. Because he doesn't actually say in that citation what that issur is. And all that back and forth implies it's nothing as cut-and-dry as just throwing his name into the list. Similarly, Achiezer III 65.14 (daf 65 amudah 4) concludes that aborting an ubar before 40 days may not be assur min haTorah. And after 40 days (first paragraph on the amudah) he explicitly states, "gam be'ubar af al pi delo igrei nefesh legabei din retzichah" we are still machelel Shabbos to save him. In the paragraph in between, R CO Grozhinsky discusses whether the issur is even deOraisa! Tosafos in Chullin holds its assur derabbanan, but in Sanhedrin that it's deOraisa. The Achitezer cites the Chiddushei haRan on the case of a pregnant woman hayotzeis leihareig, that we don't wait until the baby is born, "kivan shelo yatza la'avir ha'olam, lo chaishinan". And RCOG concludes from the Ran that the issur is not min haTorah. In Yachel Yisrael II #65, end of pg 150 Rabbi Lau explicitly writes that an ubar is not a human for retzichah to apply, "ein ledamos es hamatzav shel chayei ha'ubar lechayim shel adam." So, of the meqoros you site, I only see where Rav Moshe calls abortion retzichah. From what I've seen of the shu"t in the past, the only ones who says that abortion is murder are 20th cent American yeshivish posqim. Which admittedly is itself an impressive group one can't summarily dismisss, as we're including not only Rav Moshe, but also R' Aharon Kotler and R Yaaqov Kamenecki. And I say "yeshivish" because R YB Soloveitchik allowed the abortion of a fetus with Tay Sachs in the 6th month. ("Mentor of Generations: Reflections on Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik edited by R Zev Eleff, "The Rav: His Impact on My Life, [R] Haskel Looksteing, pg 106.) It is true that in "The Emergence of Ethical Man", pg 28, the Rav writes "The murder of an unborn child is classified as a crime", it is still unclear the crime is retzichah. To quote the previous sentence "Turning to the beginning of life, even the embryo in the womb is considered under many aspects a person endowed with juridic prerogatives." And on the next page RYBS contrasts abortion or euthenasia, which are outright assur, with the machloqes whether ha-mezakeh le-ubar kanah. It is very hard to argue he holds that an ubar is a full human in all ways. I can't say we have a raayah the Rav held it wasn't murder, but we really have little indication that he did. Especially in light of the above pesaq. Tay Sachs isn't piquach nefesh for the mother, that we have the Rambam's usual matir of the ubar being in effect kerodeif. And Rav Aharon Lichtenstein said, according to an unreviewed presentation of a sichah at : Even if we were to accept that indeed it is the womans own body, we totally reject the conception that she then can do with it as she pleases. This is a completely anti-halakhic perception. It rests on a secular assumption that, as it were, "My Nile is my own; I made it for myself" (Yechezkel 29:3), as if we are the source of our own existence and therefore the masters of our own being. This is assuredly not the case. He could be arguing leshitasam, but more straightforwardly it would seem that Rav Aharon holds that an ubar is indeed part of the mother (as implied by the dinim of hezeq of a shifchah), but still aborting it is assur. Lemaaseh: If abortion is indeed assur for reasons other than retzichah, that would change what legislation we should support. Because even just one women in a piquach nefesh situation, would be a greater consideration than all those assur abortions a law may permit. And even that piquach nefesh is not literal death, or the probability of death isn't high enough for the law to allow, but is sufficient for her poseiq to permit. And so, since it is impossible to get consensus about what that would mean, never mind getting a voting block strong enough for halachic limits to reach a court, how would we be allowed to back any Pro-Life legislation? Whereas if we were talking about abortion as actual retzichah, then a rape victim who couldn't step forward for 40 days couldn't get an abortion. Even if she is a naive chassidishe teenage girl whose therapist believes she couldn't handle carrying her attacker's baby to term without real risk of ending up a shotah to the point of not being mechuyeves bemitzvos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha Cc: Avodah Torah Discussion Group -- Micha Berger Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten micha at aishdas.org your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip, http://www.aishdas.org and it flies away. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 07:56:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:56:00 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 08:39:47PM +0100, R Arie Folger wrote: : 1a) All the shiurim are connected and they are small (Rav Chaim Noe, small : dirham shiur) : 1b) All the shiurim are connected and they are large (Noda biYhuda a.k.a. : Chazon Ish, even though CI himself held like a variant of view #3) I would have said (1a) All shiurim are connected and we are sure enough of what they are to continue making them small. (1b) All shiurim are connected, we can't make sense of their stated connections, so we have to end up much more machmir than (1a). : 2) All shiurim that can be connected to realia are connected to realia even : if their ration then conflicts with Chazal. I understand that this is the : AhS RMB is citing. Well, again, that's my conclusion, and who said I'm right? When I first wrote about this AhS , I wrote, "But then in se'if 34 he says something I do not follow, but key to our discussion." And am still not sure enough I figured out for the surety you're crediting me. What the AhS actually says OC 363:34 is that carrying 4 amos in a reshus harabbim on Shabbos is 4 of one's own forearms. However, for a mavui, one cannot use just one person's ammah, so Chazal gave a machmir measure that would include everyone. And then he spells out a machloqes about whether that means machmir for each instance, or for each mitzvah. The former leads to inconsistency WRT mavui -- big amos to the 4 ammos width, but 20 small amos for the height. Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking yourself!!! : 3) Some shiurim are connected to realia and some are standardized. This : view can then split up based on two factors, first of all which are the : shiurim that are connected to realia and which not (Rav Zalman Koren claims : that CI held that the kazayit is an exception and is connected to olives, : but almost all other shiurim are standardized), and secondly whether those : shiurim that are standardized are small, large or connected by ratio to one : of the basic realia-based shiurim. Since the AhS only talks about length where the measure are indeed anatomical terms, I can't rule this out leshitaso for kezayis, sheqel, se'ah, beis se'ah, etc... Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow micha at aishdas.org man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries http://www.aishdas.org about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Tue Feb 26 03:08:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 06:08:24 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:23:58PM +0200, Simon Montagu via Avodah wrote: : On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:32 PM Micha Berger wrote: :> It requires believing that the medrash about Pinechas's centuries long :> lifespan is historical. Then again, the Rambam did, and you don't get :> more rationalist than that. : I don't think it requires a longer lifetime for Pinehas than is explicit in : Navi -- he is still active at the end of Shoftim (20:28). Unless one takes the dating of the Seder Olam (Leiner ed. #12) that the stories of chaos at the end of Shofetim (from Pesel Mikhah ch. 17 onward) were during the rule of Kushan Rish'asayim, king of Aram. Then the stories happen before the shofetim, as Osnial was sent to free us from Kushan Risha'asayim's oppression. By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. That's very different than living long enough to teach Eili. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From jay at m5.chicago.il.us Tue Feb 26 06:47:57 2019 From: jay at m5.chicago.il.us (Jay F. Shachter) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:47:57 +0000 (WET) Subject: [Avodah] 60-Year Gaps In-Reply-To: from "avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org" at Feb 26, 2019 12:00:44 pm Message-ID: <15512140770.a4559d5d.54628@lsd.chicago.il.us.chicago.il.us> > > ... Also any gap greater than 60 years would seem to be a problem. > How many people have major talmidim after that time frame. > When I was the last graduate student who worked with Ernest R. ("Jack") Hilgard, he was 75 years old and I was 19. That is a gap of 56 years. Moreover, that was during an era of forced retirement at 65; past that age, the university would not pay your salary and you had to fund yourself thru grants. Yeshivoth, in contrast, never had that policy. Moreover, in Torah learning, 19 is a late age at which to begin an apprenticeship; normally an apprenticeship would start years earlier than that. So a 60-year gap in the chain of Torah is not implausible, although many such gaps would be statistically unlikely. Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter 6424 N Whipple St Chicago IL 60645-4111 (1-773)7613784 landline (1-410)9964737 GoogleVoice jay at m5.chicago.il.us http://m5.chicago.il.us "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur" From arie.folger at gmail.com Tue Feb 26 12:28:05 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2019 21:28:05 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: Dear Ovedim, According to Sotah 9a, the beams of the mishkan Moshe made were never destroyed, but were rather stored in a secret space in a hollow on Har haBayit. Presumably, those beams could survive the churban of Shilo because, as the Mishna Zevachim 14:6 explains, Shilo used the tapestries of Moshe's mishkan, but not its beams. However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Feb 27 09:28:19 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:28:19 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Should Shiurim be Corrected to Archeological Data In-Reply-To: <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> References: <20190221185710.GH21715@aishdas.org> <20190222185817.GA24000@aishdas.org> <20190226155600.GB28869@aishdas.org> Message-ID: RMicha Berger wrote: > Here's a link to the AhS, to tempt people into making sure that > what was a big chiddush to me was what RYME meant. > https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim.363.32-35 > > The AhS opens se'if 34 by saying "lo nitenah haTorah lema'akhei hashareis" > and no two people will end up measuring exactly identically. There is > a limit to the precision halakhah expects of us. And this is what he > is saying in the previous se'ifim, with a margin of +/- 1/48 (1/2 etzba > per ammah). And then 34 continues with this argument about individuals' > arms -- but that's much more than 1/48. > > And thus -- don't take my word about peshat in the AhS without checking > yourself!!! > The AhS absolutely says what you report about him. And indeed he is only speaking of anatomical measures, and we do not know what his position would be regarding other shiurim. -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From zev at sero.name Wed Feb 27 13:06:33 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 16:06:33 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Chain of Mesorah In-Reply-To: <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> References: <20190225162141.GA25815@aishdas.org> <20190226110824.GA30030@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <880fb349-8fc4-0f66-1a56-b2f42ef49ce0@sero.name> On 26/2/19 6:08 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > By the Seder Olam's rechoning, Pilegesh begiv'ah (2535 AM) was only 47 > years after crossing the Yardein (2488). Pinechas had to have been less > than 86, as he wasn't born yet when his father was made kohein. On the contrary, had he not been born yet he would then have been born a kohen, and would not have had to receive it as a special gift. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 13:41:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 16:41:57 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] 2 Women working on Rosh Chodesh questions In-Reply-To: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> References: <2DF78174-8BCD-4928-8E18-127157ED4402@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190228214155.GA28866@aishdas.org> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 08:59:14AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : 1. While the Shulchan Aruch Mentions the practice of women not working : on Rosh Chodesh in oc 417,His wording was of particular interest I : have not found this practice mentioned the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. The source is Rashi and Tosafos who take Megillah 22b's discussion of Rosh haShanah rest and relate it to women. I didn't see anything in the Rambam. So, perhaps the SA's "if it is a woman's minhag to rest, it's a wonderful minhag" (very rough translation) is his endorsement of a minhag he heard about some Ashkenazim having. The mechaber couldn't force the "minhag tov" on Sepharadim, but he did want to encourage it. Total guesswork, of course. BTW, the Bach says this minhag is only lehaqeil. That women can do any melakhos they want to do, even "melakhah keveidah". Rather, they cannot be asked to do a melakhah they don't want to do. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The worst thing that can happen to a micha at aishdas.org person is to remain asleep and untamed." http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Thu Feb 28 14:11:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 17:11:04 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 09:28:05PM +0100, R Arie Folger, the Noda baGoyim*, a/k/a der Vienner Rav, wrote: : However, where were they during the more or less 400 years from the : founding of Shilo until the construction of the Beit haMikdash? I'm confused, because this is the first I heard that Mishkan Shiloh wasn't the one built under Betzalel's leadership, just sitting in one location for centuries. I thought that after crossing the Yardein, they built the Mishkan in Gilgal (Zevachim 118), where it stood for the 14 years of qibush and chiluq haaretz. The gemara distinguishes between Ohel Mo'eid shebaMidbar with Ohel Mo'ed shbeGilgal that bamos were permitted during the latter. Indeed, that language4 does make it sound like two different structures, because it's not "keshe-beGilgal". But with rabbinic idiom, it might just be two distinct concepts, one object. Indicative of a new Mishkan, but not a proof Then it is moved to Shiloh (Yehoshua 18:1) for 369 years. When the Pelishtim take Shiloh it is moved to Nov, then once Do'eg haAdomi destroys Nov, to Giv'on -- for another 57 years total after Nov and Giv'on. But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua, "vayishkenu sham es Ohel Mo'eid". Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. So I'm thinking that it was indeed one Ohel Mo'eid -- despite the sound of Mes' Zevachim -- and reassembled. I'm back to my uninformed assumption that I have before reading RAF's post. So where was it during the founding in Shilo?h Operating in Shilo.h Tir'u baTov! -Micha * I hope I wasn't over an issur with giving RAF this kinui. It is meant as a humorously phrased complement, and hope it is taken as such. -- Micha Berger If you won't be better tomorrow micha at aishdas.org than you were today, http://www.aishdas.org then what need do you have for tomorrow? Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov From ddcohen at gmail.com Sun Mar 3 13:12:00 2019 From: ddcohen at gmail.com (David Cohen) Date: Sun, 3 Mar 2019 23:12:00 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei Message-ID: Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). R' Arie Folger replied: > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time it > comes up. "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, what do they read in Vienna? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com Mon Mar 4 10:43:36 2019 From: ellybachrach at mail.gmail.com (elly bachrach) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 12:43:36 -0600 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 4:13 PM Micha Berger wrote: > But looking at that pasuq in Yehoshua [(18:1)], "vayishkenu sham es Ohel > Mo'eid". > Sounds like they assembled the existing Mishkan at Shiloh. How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so the kerashim were not in use. Elly From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 4 11:52:37 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:52:37 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? In-Reply-To: References: <20190228221104.GB28866@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190304195237.GB9180@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 12:43:36PM -0600, elly bachrach wrote: : How did you learn the mishna zevachim 14:6? Same top, but stone bottom, so : the kerashim were not in use. Meanwhile, I didn't think about it when I learned Zevachim. My first thought is that the word choice in Yehoshua may be because the ohel mo'eid refers to the yeri'os more than the kerashim. And so, we're still left with the question of where the kerashim were stored in Shiloh. It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent? In any case, if, as the gemara implies, it was the permanence of the stone walls that made bamos assur during Mishkan Shiloh, then Nov and Giv'on had temporary wals because bamos were allowed again. But what? The original kerashim, other kerashim, or something else? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:09:19 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:09:19 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach. At the recent yarchei kallah He made a point of saying that he stresses in his Yeshiva that often times modern questions are not based on competing underlying rishonic conceptualizations (I assume he meant chakira) but rather on nuanced differentiations [That's what I pretty much heard] Do you agree with my assessment from your experience and, if so, how should that affect a YU/RIETS product evaluation of his psak. KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 5 19:11:10 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 03:11:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona Message-ID: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain why two mishnayot might seem contradictory. (This earlier version is "no long operative.") Rashi (Shavuot) explains this principle on the basis of oral transmission practicalities-the generations after Rebbi could not "forget" the earlier one due to its being known in widespread "nodes." Therefore, they left both versions intact and assumed that it was clear that the later version was the primary one. The Ritva (Yevamot 30a) uses the principles as an explanation as to why the two versions weren't cohered (but sounds like they did want to keep the earlier version as well). 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? 2. If Rashi is correct, why wasn't the earlier version dropped when the switch to written vs. oral transmission was made? 3. Who changes their mind these days? Kt Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From afolger at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:39:02 2019 From: afolger at aishdas.org (Arie Folger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 21:39:02 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] Haftara of Pekudei In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Sorry to disappoint you, but Minhag Vienna is to read Vatishlam. I checked with people who know what was done before the war. But that should not surporise, as Vienna follows Minhag Oberland, which is not identical with Frankfurt. On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 10:12 PM David Cohen wrote: > Three years ago, in the week of Parashat Pekudei, I inquired here about > which Ashkenazi communities in chu"l would be reading the haftara "Vaya'as > Chirom" (Melachim I 7:40) (as per the Maharash, Maharil and Eliya Rabba) > rather than "Vatishlam kol hamelacha" (Melachim 1 7:51). > > R' Arie Folger replied: > > Munich follows Frankfurt. Basel not always, but in this case the agree. > > Which means Strasbourg will also read the same, as Basel and Strasbourg > > are both Minhag Alsace. For Vienna I don't know yet. Ask me next time > it > > comes up. > > "Next time it comes up" is this week, so I'm following up. R' Folger, > what do they read in Vienna? > -- Arie Folger, Recent blog posts on http://rabbifolger.net/ * Koscheres Geld (Podcast) * Kennt die Existenz nur den Chaos? G?ttliches Vorsehen im J?dischen Gedankengut (Podcast) * Halacha zum Wochenabschnitt: Baruch Hu uWaruch Schemo * Is there Order to the World? Providence in Jewish Thought * What is Modern Orthodoxy (from a radio segment) -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 12:49:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 15:49:40 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Pikudei Clothing makes (or breaks) the man. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190306204940.GA23229@aishdas.org> On Sun, Feb 24, 2019 at 10:36:10PM -0500, Cantor Wolberg via Avodah wrote: : Part of this portion goes into meticulous detail regarding the 'bigdei : kehuna." The word "beged," in addition to meaning "garment" can also mean : "betrayal" ("bagad" to deal treacherously and "b'gidah" treachery). What : is this telling us? Clothing, garments or vestments like anything else : used improperly is a betrayal of what's right. I suggested in that beged is garment in the sense of uniform or other symbol. And thus they /bgd/ the person by hiding them behind the office. This is in disinction to the other word used in chumash for clothing -- kesus. Like the kesus of the Gen Eden story, a kesus is for tzeni'us. Which is why the Torah tells us to put "tzitzis al qanfei bigdeihem" but the more constrained and knotting "gedilim taaseh lekha al 4 ganfei bigdekha. Then there is levush, while used as a verb earlier in Tanakh (lilbosh), isn't a noun until Esther. And even then, specitically for levush malkhus, the garments of a king -- who in this case wasn't accepted as fit for office even with all the "tekheiles and white, and a crown of gold and a wrap of linen and purple". A failed beged? Either way, it wasn't in scope for my discussion of the two presentations of the mitzvah of tzitzis. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger You are not a human being in search micha at aishdas.org of a spiritual experience. You are a http://www.aishdas.org spiritual being immersed in a human Fax: (270) 514-1507 experience. - Pierre Teilhard de Chardin From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 6 13:08:36 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:08:36 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:09:19AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : Many RIETS/YU Rabbis are very machshiv Rav Asher Weiss. I'm just curious : if you have any thoughts on his psakim being based on an approach : which differs from the one I assume they received. I've heard him say : in the past that he is not enamored with the tzvei dinim approach... It wasn't too central to Rav Shimon's derekh, who was just as likely to discuss how the two factors worked together behitztarfus. Just saying, since Rav Dovid Lifshitz, and to some extent Rav Shimon Shkop, are also RIETS. And that is where I learned R' Shimon's derekh. But on to my point... Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the job as Brisker dayan. RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara. Learning AhS was eye opening to me, to see an entirely different way of analyzing halakhah than the lomdus of the yeshiva. AhS Yomi finishes in the beginning of April be"H, I am very tempted to move my commute learning to Tur - BY - SA - nosei keilim. BUT.... I haven't found editions of the relevant books that my back could handle shlepping back and for each workday. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From hankman at bell.net Wed Mar 6 21:57:21 2019 From: hankman at bell.net (hank) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 00:57:21 -0500 Subject: [Avodah] Where was the Mishkan stored? Message-ID: <20190307055723.BEO77906.mtlspm02.bell.net@[IPv6:::ffff:192.168.2.56]> R. Micha Berger wrote: ?It is possible that Mishkan Shilo had both -- kerashim surrounded by stone, so that the wals were both authentic to the tzivui in Shemos and yet permanent?? Chaim Manaster notes that regardless of whether the kerashim were encased in the stone walls or the walls were only of atone and the kerashim were ganuz somewhere, the calculus of the overhangs of the yerios will not be the same as in the Mishkan since the stone walls would have been much thicker than the one amoh of the kerashim alone. So we must assume that the overhang details were not part of the essential tzuras haMishkan and were not me?akeiv if they were not the same as in the Midbar. One could then wonder if in the Mishkan itself whether the 28 (30) amoh width of the lower covering (yerios Izim) were meAkeiv as well despite the specific dimensions given in the chumash (which of course they followed) which would be a major chidush IF true. Ie., was the given dimension of 28 (30) amohs the ikar, or the resulting details of the desired overhang the ikar which then governed the width specified. The only covering that would not be affected by the width of the stone walls was the one of Trchashim (and eilim) as it only covered the interior dimension of the Mishkan even in the Midbar. Kol tuv, Chaim Manaster Sent from Mail for Windows 10 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Wed Mar 6 23:47:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:47:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: 'RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds the sevara.' In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. So I'm not sure why anyone would accept R Weiss as a posek based on his attitude to Brisker lomdus. That's just not the criteria by which the olam is machshiv a posek. Even at RIETS. Ben s -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 6 23:24:38 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 07:24:38 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> References: <84191b9556f448fdaf0518dd402af7db@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com>, <20190306210836.GC23229@aishdas.org> Message-ID: > Lomdus isn't usually how pesaq is done. RARakkefetR has repeatedly pointed > out that RCBrisker wasn't the poseiq in Brisk. When he took the job of > Rav, he convince R Simcha Zelig Riger to come along. Where RSZR got the > job as Brisker dayan. > RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And > his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of > your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence.... Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue in psak. As the Ramban famously said there are no slam dunk proofs in Halacha. Life is inherently uncertain and one must learn to make decisions in this context. If anything I'd prefer someone who can see multiple approaches yet select one over someone who is so sure they are right they can't see anything else. The inability to do so may be a personality thing or a process-but if you accept that there is uncertainty but still need to be chosheesh for minority opinions,you still need some algorithms to determine how and when to do so (unless you take a schichina shoreh non definable approach) Kt Joel rich From JRich at sibson.com Thu Mar 7 07:12:32 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:12:32 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. /////////////// I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei dsatrei. Of course if you say that they already knew the Halacha and were just looking for something to pin it on this is less of a question except where did the original come from? Kt Joel rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 8 12:15:39 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2019 20:15:39 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] =?windows-1252?q?Q=2E_What_is_included_in_the_mitzvah_of?= =?windows-1252?q?_kibud_av_v=92aim_=28honoring_parents=29=3F?= Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is included in the mitzvah of kibud av v?aim (honoring parents)? A. The mitzvah of honoring parents includes serving them food and drink, helping them get dressed and come and go (if they need assistance), making sure their home and clothing are clean, as well as shopping and cooking for them. In general, the mitzvah entails taking care of all of the needs of one?s parents. Sefer Chareidim (Mitzvas Essai, 1) writes that inherent in the mitzvah is that children think of their parents as outstanding and distinguished individuals. One should stand up for parents when they enter the room. Chazal give examples of honoring parents, even to an excessive and extreme degree (see Kiddushin 31b). There is an additional mitzvah to revere one?s parents. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:2) gives the following examples of reverence: not sitting in a parent?s seat, contradicting them, or calling them by their name. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From akivagmiller at gmail.com Sun Mar 10 11:38:12 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2019 14:38:12 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Does "ben" mean "son" or "child"? Message-ID: . I had asked: > It seems to be a universal practice that the Mah Nishtanah is > given to the youngest "ben" (however you want to translate it) > at the table. Obviously, we are excluding those who are too > young, and those who for some other reason are incapable of > saying it. But does anyone know how this came to devolve upon > the *youngest*? I found a source! For this information, I thank the Haggada Yaynah Shel Torah by Binyamin Adler (all-Hebrew, 1978 Feldheim) In the Haggada section, prior to Mah Nishtana, his directions state, "v'katan hamesubim shoel - and the smallest/youngest of the diners asks". In the Halachos section, #3:15:10, he gives his source: "ayen Chayei Adam klal 130, v'od". Before I quote the Chayei Adam, let's see how this is phrased elsewhere. Mechaber 473:7 lists several options for Mah Nishtana, and the descending order of preference is clear: tinok asks spontaneously / father teaches the ben to ask / wife asks / one asks himself / even talmidei chachamim ask each other According to Aruch Hashulchan 473:21, the order of preference is: son asks spontaneously / father teaches son to ask / daughter asks / wife or someone else asks But Chayei Adam 130:7 gives this list: tinok / ben / friend / wife There are many diyukim one can find by comparing these lists carefully. For example, the Aruch Hashulchan unambiguously puts the son and daughter at two different points on the list, and would answer my Subject line by saying that "ben means son". It is also noteworthy where each of these sources places the wife. But finally, to answer my question about the source for "the *youngest* at the table" -- One can argue whether the Mechaber considers "tinok" and "ben" to be synonyms, but the Chayei Adam clearly gives preference to "tinok" over "ben", and what could be the difference if not age? Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 11 08:24:25 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 15:24:25 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so). If they refuse, a Jewish court of law may force him to do so. Ordinarily, a Jewish court does not coerce someone to honor a parent (e.g., to stand up for a father or mother), because beis din does not coerce for mitzvos that have a specified reward (honoring parents is rewarded with long life). Why is kibud av v?aim different? The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide for parents who are destitute. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 12 07:11:09 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 14:11:09 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. Can a parent be mochel (relinquish) the honor that is due to them? A. Yes. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:19) writes that it is forbidden for a parent to be overly strict regarding the honor that is due to them. If a parent is strict, the child will find it difficult to fulfill his duties and the parent will be causing the child to sin. Rather, a parent should be forgiving and turn a blind eye and even relinquish their honor if necessary. Rebbi Akiva Eiger (ibid.) cites the Radvaz who writes that if a parent relinquishes his honor, this will save the child from being punished if he does not display the proper honor, but if the child does honor his parent, he will still be rewarded. The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:13) proves that a parent can also be mochel the fear that is due to him. Parents may permit their children to sit in their seat or to contradict them. However, even though parents can forgo their honor, they cannot be mochel on their embarrassment or on their pain, and embarrassing a parent is always forbidden. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 06:53:22 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 09:53:22 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is a child required to pay for food and clothing for his parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190312135322.GA14416@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 03:24:25PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : A. Shulchan Aruch (YD 240:5) writes that although a child is required : to feed and clothe his parents, the expense must be borne by the : parents. However, if the parents cannot support themselves, the children : are obligated to provide the funds (if they are capable of doing so)... This is an involved sugya in Chazal (Mishnah Yevamos 7:5, Y-mi Yevamos 42a, Bavli Yevamos 69b, Qiddushin 32a, Pesiqta Rabasi 31:1). "Mishel av" and "mishel atzmo" become something of buzz-phrases. : ... The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:6) : explains that beis din has the authority to coerce members of society to : maintain social welfare, and children have a moral obligation to provide : for parents who are destitute. And leshitaso, supporting one parents mishel av, or feeding children who have reached adulthood, can come from one's tzedaqah funds. And they are first in the "aniyei irekha qodmin" type sequence. See AhS YD 251:3-4. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Life isn't about finding yourself. micha at aishdas.org Life is about creating yourself. http://www.aishdas.org - George Bernard Shaw Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 12 09:48:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:48:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak In-Reply-To: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> References: <4B8FFD3F-9F46-4531-AB11-0B0A6BADCBCB@sibson.com> Message-ID: <20190312164840.GD21552@aishdas.org> (Replying to 3 posts in one email. If one answer bores you, scroll down.) I On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:24:38AM +0000, Rich, Joel wrote: :> RARR opined that this is because lomdus makes it hard to pasqen. (And :> his theory seems to make a lot of sense to me.) In lomdus the focus of :> your learning is to see how both sides make sense. The better you are : > at it, the harder it is going to be to pick sides. Brisker chumeros, : > being machmir to be chosheish for all shitos, is a natural consequence. : > But pasqening requires picking a favorite. And it requires giving some : > level of credance to precedent, not only to how compelling one finds : Yes I've heard him say that many times and it is the heart of my issue, : I don't see why being able to see the 70 sides should be an issue : in psak... As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. Eiruvin (among Ashkenazim, where 60 ribo dates back to Rashi), tzitzis on a tallis qatan birshus harabbim on Shabbos, etc... There are many such cases where everyone else says the law is closed and lequlah, and they're busy being chosheish for some rejected shitas harishonim. So to me, the "why" is really the only question. Not the "what" -- choosing a pesaq is a problem for Briskers. They lent their name to a whole category of chumeros because of it. (In fact, R Chaim famously spoke about some of his pesaqim not being qulos in Shabbos or Yom Kippur, but chumeros in piquach nefesh. Again, all about the chumeros, not about finding one side the more compelling sevara.) So, here is my suggested "why" after more thought: 1- It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult to choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them equally compelling. 2- Something specific to Brisk... I think they inherited from the Gra a disbelief that questions posed after "Ravina veR' Ashi sof hora'ah" are really ever fully closed. To quote a translation I found on chabad.org of R' SY Zevin's Ishim veShitot, pg 33 in the 2007 edition: Why were the rishonim called rishonim ("the initiators")? Because they were the formers and creators. They quarried the depths, pierced the mountain, penetrated to the very foundations [of the Talmudic discussion]. The rishonim did not become tangled with far fetched argumentation, rather they gave us "it itself," the plain truth. R. Chaim leaped backwards through the generations and returned to the rishonim, albeit with a different expression and parlance, yet treading the same path, in the same fashion. With his clarity of explanation and strength of logic, he penetrated to the essence and root of the entire Talmudic corpus, transforming it into sifted flour. The point of truth, the pure truth-this was his portion, this he sought and located persistently ...To separate and to join together, this was the strength and merit of R. Chaim. To dissect something with the sharp chisel of logic and to investigate it thoroughly. To break it down to its elemental components and thereby to erect it in its clearest purity upon the point of truest truth, without any extraneous mixtures. This was the way paved by R. Chaim. In this way he shone as a giant tower of light upon the entire great sea of the Talmud and its many commentaries... 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. 1- textual strength a- compilling sevara b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR Aqiva meichaveiro, or the "obvious" difference between the shitah of the Rambam and some baal Tosafos we only hear from once) 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a swath of the qehillah? 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview. When halakhah allows two options, this could / should be a tiebreaker. Such as the Zohar saying that wearing tefillin on ch"m is qotzeitz bintiyos. For those whose hashlafah spends a lot of time looking at the Zohar, that's reason to pasqen against wearing them. For Litvaks and Yekkes, not so much. But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a pesaq should accomodate.) II On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 07:47:54AM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : In more general terms I've never heard or seen anyone accept a posek : or otherwise on the basis of his shita in learning. It seems to be more : a question of overall breadth and depth of learning plus aptitude for : halacha l'maaseh in the eyes of contemporaries. I think your last clause has much to do with that 4 way balance I listed above. Turning divrei Elokim Chaim into halakhah lemaaseh isn't only about sevara. It might also explain why derekh halimmud isn't given that much weight. But really, I drifted away from my original point (in a prior email). Lomdus of any flavor is a different kind of animal than the learning Tur-Beis Yoseif-SA -- Rambam vs Rosh -- one finds more of in posqim (or the AhS). I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. III On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example : if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to : derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did : not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei : dsatrei... In practice, no. Around the end of the zugos, few dinim were established by derashah. For R Yishmael and R Aqiva, derashah was a post-facto way of proving a din. Which is why the gemara can ask "but according to Beish Shammai where do /they/ learn..." -- because the pesaqim are already givens. For that matter, so is lomdus a system for explanation of already known shitos. But derashah is less impactful than lomdus. Derashos don't have nearly as many implications about how to apply known din to new cases. Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui umi'ut. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The same boiling water micha at aishdas.org that softens the potato, hardens the egg. http://www.aishdas.org It's not about the circumstance, Fax: (270) 514-1507 but rather what you are made of. From akivagmiller at gmail.com Tue Mar 12 14:43:34 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 17:43:34 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed Message-ID: . In Maftir of Pekudei, we read: 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. >From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and "Mishkan" are two different things. My starting point is that there are two distinct structures that might have these names. One is the central building that was 30 amos long and 10 amos wide and was covered with various skins and fabrics. The other is the outer enclosure that was 100 amos by 50 amos and was basically a long curtain. My question is which name refers to which structure. (The Chatzer HaMishkan refers to the area between the two, but that could be its name regardless of whether the Mishkan is the central structure or the outer enclosure.) On Shabbos, I asked several learned people which is which, and I was surprised by the wide variety of answers. 1) Some confirmed my understanding, which is that the Ohel Moed is the central structure, while Mishkan refers to the outer enclosure. But if so, then I was confused. The pasuk says that Moshe could not enter the inner Ohel Moed, which implies that he *was* able to enter the Chatzer. How could he have entered the Chatzer if the Kavod Hashem was filling it? 2) Some said I had it reversed: The Mishkan is in the center, and the Ohel Moed is the entire enclosed area. That would make sense, because the cloud fills the whole area, and it is the cloud which creates the issur to enter, even though the Kavod Hashem is only in the central building. But frankly, I always presumed that the OHEL Moed would have a roof. Is it possible that the entire corral is called an "ohel" on account of the main pavilion? 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. 4) Some said both terms are used inconsistently, and one must always check the context. In any case, the structure of these two pesukim begs to be explained. The Kavod Hashem seems to be an effect caused by the cloud, and Moshe's inability to enter is also an effect caused by the cloud. A simple reading of the pesukim would NOT support the idea that the Kavod Hashem was a direct cause of Moshe's inability to enter. ANYWAY, I guess my first question has to be which is which. And THEN I will see what the psukim mean. Thanks in advance! Akiva Miller -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Wed Mar 13 01:50:44 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 08:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] psak Message-ID: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> I suppose this is blatantly obvious to others, but I've updated my mental psak model. In the past I've used a delicate dance analogy between the poseik and his community (TBD) as to his acceptable range in psak and what the community will accept. This could have also been expressed as a two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = outside consensus of other poskim?) Thoughts? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:38:00 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:38:00 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] psak In-Reply-To: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <586e3ee2359649e1a6d6dd60fa28ecc5@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190313183800.GK16107@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 08:50:44AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : This could have also been expressed as a : two circle Venn diagram (but where in the intersection do you land?) It : occurs to me we need a third circle (or maybe this is better expressed : as two magnetic fields pulling on a piece of metal = the poseik), which : represents what other poskim would find acceptable. This would explain : R' Schachter's reference to poskim we disregard (e.g., Rogatchover, : R'Avi Weiss?) because they are something like "too creative" (me = : outside consensus of other poskim?) Then there are the people who are so creative, they are playing by the wrong set of rules. Whereas I think you are focusing on going too far with the valid rule set. Before either of your examples, Rabbi Meir (or R Nehorai, R Nechemia or R Elazar ben Arakh, if one of those is his real name. - Eiruvin 13b) That is, when he is indeed called Rav Meir and is not stam mishnah, or the attribution is his possible real name, or is Acheirim. So, Rabbi Meir from the time in his life when he rose to the sobriquet "Rabbi Meir" until his participation in the attempted coup against R Shimon b Gamliel. This is why halakhah keRabbi Meir begezeirosav (Kesuvos 15) but iin general, we have the rule of Rav Acha bar Chanina (same sugya in Eiruvin): It is revealed and known to the One Who "Spoke" and the world was that there was no one in R Meir's generation who was like him. And why didn't they establish the halakhah like him? Because lo yakhlu chaveiro la'amod al sof da'ato. For he could say al tamei tahor, and bring proof, and al tahor tamei and bring proof. Rashi: They couldn't understand which of hus rulings were correct. R Meir was just too bright for them to follow. (Or maybe, he was just too much into lomdus, and when he was done they could see both sides. ) If it wasn't for RAbC I would have simply said the reason why we don't hold like R Meir is because when we do hold like him, it's a stam mishnah. The only times we use his name is when we don't. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger A sick person never rejects a healing procedure micha at aishdas.org as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what http://www.aishdas.org other people think when dealing with spiritual Fax: (270) 514-1507 matters? - Rav Yisrael Salanter From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 13 11:10:55 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:10:55 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) Message-ID: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #23: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 1) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" The principle of halakhic pluralism appears in the context of the disagreements between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. The gemara states: R. Abba said that Shmuel said: For three years, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed. These said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion, and these said: The halakha is in accordance with our opinion. A Divine Voice emerged and proclaimed: Both these and these are the words of the living God. However, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. (Eiruvin 13b) We find this phrase in the context of Aggada as well: It is written [with regard to the episode of the concubine in Giva]: "And his concubine went away from him" (Shoftim 19:2). [What occurred that caused her husband to become so angry with her that she left him?] R. Evyatar says: He found her responsible for a fly [in the food that she prepared for him]. R. Yonatan says: He found her responsible for a hair. And R. Evyatar found Elijah [the prophet] and said to him: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing now? He [Elijah] said to him: He is engaged in studying the episode of the concubine in Giva. [R. Evyatar asked him:] And what is He saying about it? He [Elijah] said to him: [God is saying the following:] Evyatar, My son, says this, and Yonatan, My son, says that. He [R. Evyatar] said to him: God forbid, is there uncertainty before Heaven? [Doesn't God know what happened?] He [Elijah] said to him: Both these and these are the words of the living God. [The incident occurred in the following manner:] He found a fly in his food and did not take umbrage, and later he found a hair and took umbrage. (Gittin 6b) This concept is also found, in different words, in a passage describing the nature of Torah study: "Those that are composed in collections [ba'alei asufot]" (Kohelet 12:11) - These are Torah scholars, who sit in many groups [asupot] and engage in Torah study. These [Sages] render something ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid. Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah [when it contains so many different opinions]? The verse states that they are all "given from one shepherd." One God gave them; one leader [Moshe] said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, blessed be He, as it is written: "And God spoke all these words" (Shemot 20:1). [The plural form "words" indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments.] So too, you should make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. (Chagiga 3b) >From a moral perspective, it is certainly virtuous to respect all the divergent halakhic opinions and honor all Torah scholars. Philosophically, however, this concept is difficult to understand. In the context of Aggada, it is easy enough to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. After all, as in the story of the concubine of Giva, perhaps more than one infuriating mistake was made, or more than one conversation transpired between the characters, or more than one motivation led the personalities to act as they did. But in the realm of Halakha, when something is either permissible or forbidden, it is more difficult to understand how both sides of the argument can be correct. If something is permissible, it is certainly not forbidden, and if something is forbidden, it is certainly not permissible. The Chida: Instrumental Pluralism """ """""" """""""""""" """"""""" One approach to resolving this difficulty that minimizes the extent of true halakhic pluralism is quoted by the Chida.[1] According to this approach, only one opinion can actually be correct. For example, only the opinion of Beit Hillel is 100% correct, and the opinion of Beit Shammai is correspondingly 100% incorrect. In what way, then, are the words of Beit Shammai "the words of the living God"? The Chida explains that just as light is only recognized and appreciated by means of contrast with darkness, the true halakhic interpretation can only be properly understood and appreciated by contrasting it with the incorrect interpretation. It is for this reason, he explains, that when Moshe went up to Mount Sinai to receive the Torah, God told him all the divergent viewpoints regarding every halakhic dispute - in order to explain to Moshe which view was correct and to clarify exactly how and why it was more accurate than the contrasting view. Therefore, one must work hard to understand even the rejected viewpoint, for one cannot properly understand the accepted viewpoint if one does not consider the alternatives, understand the exact ways in which the accepted opinion diverges from the suggested alternatives, and know the logical reason that the true opinion is accepted and the mistaken opinions rejected. According to this understanding, there is no true pluralism within the halakhic system. The rejected viewpoint is called "the words of the living God" only because it is instrumentally useful in the intellectual endeavor of understanding the one correct viewpoint. R. Moshe Feinstein: Practical Pluralism "" """"" """""""""" """"""""" """"""""" A second interpretation is explicated by R. Moshe Feinstein in the introduction to his magnum opus, Responsa Iggerot Moshe. He explains that only one opinion can correspond to the authentic Divine will, and it is revealed in Heaven which opinion is correct and which opinion is incorrect. Nonetheless, for practical halakhic purposes, both opinions are equally valid and legitimate. R. Moshe references the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi,[2] according to which God does not expect us to follow the heavenly halakha, which corresponds to absolute truth, but rather to follow the earthly halakha, as explicated by the halakhic process that is given over to human hands. If a qualified Torah sage, expending maximal effort and suffused with fear of Heaven, reaches a halakhic conclusion, then that halakhic conclusion is operatively true for himself and for all his followers, whether or not it corresponds to the ultimate truth. According to this theory, there is no room for pluralism in the realm of theoretical truth, but on the practical plane there is ample room for halakhic pluralism. If truth is defined for practical purposes as legitimacy, as a conclusion which was reached by following the proper halakhic process, then two mutually contradictory opinions can both be legitimate and valid for practical halakhic purposes, so long as they are both the product of the halakhic process as properly practiced. Tosafists and Ritva: True Pluralism, No Objective Truth """"""""" """ """""" """" """""""""" "" """"""""" """"" A third approach is quoted in the name of the French sages, i.e. the Tosafists, by the Ritva.[3] The Ritva explains that when Moshe went up to the Heavens to receive the Torah, he was taught multiple possible interpretations of each halakha, leading to divergent possible rulings on practical halakhic questions. When he asked God which interpretation was actually correct, God answered him that it would be up to the Sages of each generation to vote and decide what the halakha would be.[4] The Ritva seems to hold that there is no objective heavenly truth. God has no opinion as to what the halakha should be; He leaves it entirely up to us to determine the content of the halakha. If, in fact, there is no objective truth, then there is room for true pluralism, as every interpretation is equally valid. Both opinions can be the words of the living God, because God Himself intended neither interpretation, but rather revealed many options for interpreting the Torah and required only that we follow one of those options.[5] This denial of objective halakhic truth is somewhat radical, as pointed out by the Chavot Yair.[6] Mainstream Jewish philosophy assumes that the mitzvot of the Torah were not decreed arbitrarily, but rather were commanded by God because He, in His infinite wisdom, knew exactly which actions bring spiritual benefit to our souls and which actions are spiritually detrimental. It is therefore difficult to understand how God Himself could have no objective knowledge as to which interpretation of the Torah maximizes the spiritual benefit to our soul and avoids spiritual damage. Additionally, the Chavot Yair expresses bewilderment as to how the majority vote of the Sages of each generation, who are only human and therefore fallible, can successfully avert the harmful effects of following an interpretation that may not actually correspond to the underlying spiritual reality of the world. We could defend the Ritva by suggesting, as the Chavot Yair concludes begrudgingly, that the commandments are arbitrary, and that spiritual benefit accrues not from the particular action of any mitzva, but rather from the experience of obeying divine commandment; our souls are damaged not from the particular action involved in any transgression, but rather by the experience of transgressing a commandment. Therefore, it is not necessary to identify the correct interpretation of any mitzva, so long as there is an authoritative interpretation that we can accept and obey. Alternatively, we can posit that all possible interpretations of any halakha are known by God to be equally beneficial to our souls, and therefore He allows the Sages to choose between them. Additionally, one could suggest, as does the Chavot Yair himself parenthetically, that God adapts reality and refashions the world in accordance with the interpretation of the sages of each generation,[7] and therefore any interpretation adopted by the majority of the sages automatically corresponds to spiritual reality. In the next shiur, however, we will suggest a different understanding of the Ritva that avoids this problem entirely. Summary """"""" We have seen three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion can be correct, and the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion can be theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions can be correct even in the realm of ultimate truth, and there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. In the next shiur, we will elucidate a fourth approach to understanding halakhic pluralism which differs fundamentally from these three understandings. ------------------------ [1] R. Chayim Yosef David Azulai (1724-1806, Israel and Italy), Petach Enayim, Bava Metzia 59b. The Chida quotes this interpretation in the name of "the Rishonim." He also quotes the interpretations of Rashi and Ritva, elucidated below. [2] See our previous shiur for a full elucidation of this concept. [3] Eruvin 13b. This explanation appears explicitly in the commentary of one of the Tosafists, R. Shimshon of Sens ("Tosafot Sens"), to Eduyot 1:5. [4] This idea has its roots in the Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2. R. Shimshon of Sens concludes that a Rabbinic court can rule in accordance with an opinion that was rejected by the majority of the sages of a previous generation, even though the earlier sages were greater and more accomplished, because God expressly granted the sages of each generation the right to rule as they see fit for their generation. [5] This does not mean that God has no opinion as to how we should act in this world. There clearly are behaviors that are completely outside the realm of possible interpretations of the Torah and absolutely contravene God's will. However, within the circumscribed realm of all possible interpretations of the Torah, God Himself has no preference as to which interpretation we should follow. [6] R. Yair Chaim Bachrach (Germany, 1639-1702), Responsa Chavot Yair 192. [7] This idea is elucidated by the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, quoted in the previous shiur. In that shiur, we also quoted the Ran, who offered two justification for following the majority vote of the Sages in spite of their fallibility. However, the Ran's view does not explain why God Himself would have no opinion as to which interpretation corresponded better to the spiritual reality. From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:40:51 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:40:51 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. I did not show proper honor to my parents. Must I ask them forgiveness? A. One who transgresses a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro? (between man and his fellow man) must ask forgiveness both from Hashem, for not heeding His commandment, and from the friend that was wronged. For a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom? (between man and Hashem), one need only ask forgiveness from Hashem. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) is uncertain if honoring a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. On the one hand, a mitzvah of ?bein adam l?chaveiro? generally applies equally to all people and perhaps the extra honor that is due to a parent is a mitzvah ?bein adam la?Makom?. On the other hand, maybe the mitzvah creates a unique obligation to the parent. The Minchas Chinuch above leaves the question unanswered. Elsewhere (Mitzvah 364), the Minchas Chinuch writes that honoring parents falls under the category of mitzvos ?bein adam l?chaveiro?. In practice, if one did not show proper respect, one must ask forgiveness from their parents (Yalkut Yosef, Kibud Av V?aim1:12). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 14 05:33:28 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 12:33:28 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Common Modern Purim Misconceptions Debunked Message-ID: Please see https://goo.gl/6gssWF -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Thu Mar 14 19:31:40 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 22:31:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim Message-ID: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> I have been sitting on https://jewinthecity.com/2019/03/orthodox-jews-heres-how-to-stop-making-a-chillul-hashem/ from Jew in the City for a while. A snippet: Orthodox Jews: Here's How to Stop Making a Chillul Hashem by JITC Staff March 05, 2019 Baruch C. Cohen, a Los Angeles civil litigation attorney, has taken a special interest in creating awareness in the community about the dangers of chillul Hashem, which literally means a "desecration of God's name" and is used when a Jew does something that bring shames to Judaism... ... Whether from in-fighting, condescension towards other Jewish communities, or trying to beat the system and take shortcuts, the culture of chillul Hashem is rampant in some places. The culture of perfectionism is also detrimental. "When people operate with the pressure that it's A+ or nothing, they'll also tempt their yetzer hara to want to take that shortcut and compromise their values because that A+ is the [goal] outcome." This poisonous root sends people in the wrong direction. Cohen feels that if the root evils are corrected, a lot of the bad behavior will end as well. Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for All Orthodox Jews: 1. The World Does Not like Jews - we do not need to encourage more people to dislike us 2. Wearing a Yarmulke - carries with it an extra measure of responsibility 3. We Must Be More Honest - more careful, more courteous & more prudent 4. When We Screw-Up, it Gets Magnified - the "Cringe Factor" (ie., Frum Slumlords) 5. Having Good Intentions Is Not a Legitimate Excuse - for breaking the law 6. Bad Behavior for a Good Cause - a lie for a good reason & a Mitzvah is still a lie 7. The US Government Is Not the Enemy - we're not in Europe during WW-II 8. Stop Dehumanizing "the Other" - the victims of fraud are not on a lower human level 9. Stop our Elitist Views - Adopt the Rambam's "Gam Hem Keruyim Adam" 10. Stop our Inflated Sense of Entitlement - "Es Kumt Tzu Mir" self-sabotages success 11. We Cannot Pick & Choose the Rules We Live by - no smorgasbord Baruch C. Cohen's Rules for the American Orthodox Jew: 1. Keep Your Word - do what you what you say you're going to do 2. Document Everything - confirm everything in writing 3. Follow the Rules - be a law-abiding citizen - know the laws - serve on a Jury 4. Don't Think You're Smarter than the Law & Won't Get Caught - you will 5. Myth of Shortcuts - work hard; there's no express elevator to the Penthouse Suite 6. You're Not Right Because You're Orthodox - you're right because you're honest 7. Establish Credibility - "Man Up" & admit when you're wrong 8. Listen to Your Internal Compass - if it sounds to good to be true, it is; 9. Consult Before Taking Action - not after 10. Believe in Yourself, Act with Courage & Confidence - but never with arrogance 11. Stop Being Nosy - "but I'm just asking" is no excuse for prying 12. Give Unconditionally - with no expectation of anything in return 13. Insert Bais Din Arbitration Clauses in Your Contracts - believe in our Torah 14. Stand up Proudly for Judaism & Eretz Yisroel - never apologize about either 15. Pause, Before Pushing "Send" on Emails and Texts - it could save your life For more information, email Baruch Cohen at bcc4929 at gmail.com. I only disagree with the basic presenration. If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about it first. Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, not the real problem. Allegedly. What do you think? Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger The mind is a wonderful organ micha at aishdas.org for justifying decisions http://www.aishdas.org the heart already reached. Fax: (270) 514-1507 From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Fri Mar 15 06:01:42 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 13:01:42 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: If I can also respond to a number of points in a slightly unorganised fashion: R Micha wrote: > As I noted, we see this in practice in Brisker Chumeros. > - It is only an issue in a style of lomdus that makes it difficult > o choose sides. Not that one can SEE both sides, but that one finds them > qually compelling. > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 03:12:32PM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: >: I understand that's the case, I just don't understand why. For example >: if you lived back in the day and your tanna was doreish klal prat uklal to >: derive Halacha , how could you be accepting rulings from someone who did >: not but rather used ribui umiyut ? Wouldn't that likely lead to tartei >: dsatrei... R micha wrote: > Besides, don't take the "compeating" lists of derashos too seriously. We > find R' Aqiva using rules of kelal uperat (eg R' Aqivah on Y-mi Eiruvin > 18b or Bavli Pasachim 36a) and (less often) R' Yishma'el using ribui > umi'ut. Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? A criteria for being a member of the Sanhedrin was being able to metaher a sheretz. That for sure takes lomdus of whatever style, and yet is seen a essential for one of the poskei hador. As R Micha noted, R Meir could perform the kind of analytical wizardry which confounded his peers, and even if we don't pasken like him when stated by name, it didn't stop him apparently having own clarity in halacha l'maaseh. In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be some comtemporary debate about this issue. Given the inability to enter the world of drasha after the closing of the gemara I'm not sure how this relates to our topic but I can't see how it's the same issue as style in learning. It's seems to be a much more technical issue of the actual mechanics of Torah She'Bal Peh, and therefore subject to genuine, classic eilu v'eilu which doesn't inhibit halacha l'maaseh any more than any other aspect of machlokes in chazal. All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Ben From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 15 04:53:50 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 11:53:50 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] How to Avoid a Chilul HaSheim In-Reply-To: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> References: <20190315023140.GA21183@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <0d9b9e05234a4257bf254d6cea43a73e@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> [Micha:] > If we make the need to be considerate to others about chillul hasheim, > we aren't teating people to develop consideration for other people. > But that is a primary value in-and-of-itself, and arguably the highest > primary value, ask Rabbi Aqiva about klal gadol. If not "derekh eretz > qodmah le...Torah" would still say it's the value we have to worry about > it first. > Second, I don't think it can work. If we don't teach people the importance > of consideration in-and-of itself, there is insufficient motive to pay > attention to and hone the appropriate middos. That's just the side-issue, > not the real problem. Allegedly. I agree with you and would just add it's sad that 95% of this even has to be said. Kt Joel rich From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:05:15 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Not Embarassing Others -- Social Media Message-ID: <20190317030515.GB15918@aishdas.org> I just posted on the Other-Focused Orthodoxy - Mevaqshei Tov veYosher group on Facebook: Two shiurim by Rav Yonatan Ziring should be required reading for any Jew who wants to be both Torah observant and a user of social media. Shiur #22: The Dangers of the Shame Storm - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part I https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-22-dangers-shame-storm-public-humiliation-halakha-part-i ... Shiur #23: Cyberbullying - Public Humiliation in Halakha Part II https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-23-cyberbullying-public-humiliation-halakha-part-ii Rabbeinu Yonah's position (discussed there) is that Tamar's protecting Yehudah was halachic, rather than lifnim mishuras hadin. Hamalbin penei chaveiro is a kind of retzichah, and therefore included in yeihareig ve'al ya'avor. So I was wondering... Would Rabbeinu Yonah go so far as to say that a Ben Noach who knowingly embarasses another is chayav misah? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger What we do for ourselves dies with us. micha at aishdas.org What we do for others and the world, http://www.aishdas.org remains and is immortal. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Albert Pine From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:18:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] VBM-Hashkafa- 22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi In-Reply-To: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> References: <20190313181055.GI16107@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190317031801.GA28281@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 02:10:55PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : We've had too many people raise this topic over the years not to share : this section of R' Bednarsh's series on-list. : : So I give you, Avodah's 24th or 25th "eilu va'eilu" discussion! Except I realize now I should have started with the previous shiur, on lo bashamayim hi. -micha PHILOSOPHY Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh. Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #22: Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi """""""""""""""""""""""""""" The well-known principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, which teaches that the halakha is not determined in Heaven, is found in the following passage: We learned in a mishna there (Keilim 5:10): If one cut [an earthenware oven widthwise] into segments, and placed sand between each and every segment, R. Eliezer deems it ritually pure. [Because of the sand, its legal status is not that of a complete vessel, and therefore it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.] And the Rabbis deem it ritually impure, [as it is functionally a complete oven,] and this is known as the oven of akhnai. [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of akhnai, a snake, in this context? R. Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is characterized in that manner due to the fact that the Rabbis surrounded it with their statements like this snake [which often forms a coil when at rest] and deemed it impure. The Sages taught: On that day [when they discussed this matter], R. Eliezer answered all possible answers in the world to support his opinion, but the Rabbis did not accept his explanations from him. [After failing to convince the Rabbis logically,] he said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, this carob tree will prove it. The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. The Rabbis said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from the carob tree. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the stream will prove it. The water in the stream turned backward [and began flowing in the opposite direction]. They said to him: One does not cite halakhic proof from a stream. He then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, the walls of the study hall will prove it. The walls of the study hall leaned inward and began to fall. R. Yehoshua scolded the walls and said to them: If Torah scholars are contending with each other in matters of halakha, what is the nature of your involvement in this dispute? [The gemara relates:] They [the walls] did not fall because of the deference due R. Yehoshua, but they did not straighten because of the deference due R. Eliezer, and they still remain leaning. He [R. Eliezer] then said to them: If the halakha is in accordance with my opinion, Heaven will prove it. A Divine Voice emerged from Heaven and said: Why are you differing with R. Eliezer, as the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in every place that he expresses an opinion? R. Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: [It is written:] "It is not in heaven" (Devarim 30:12). [The gemara asks:] What is the relevance of the phrase "It is not in heaven" in this context? R. Yirmeya says: Since the Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, we do not regard a Divine Voice, as You already wrote at Mount Sinai in the Torah: "After a majority to incline" (Shemot 23:2). [Since the majority of Rabbis disagreed with R. Eliezer's opinion, the halakha is not ruled in accordance with his opinion.] R. Natan encountered Eliyahu [Ha-Navi] and said to him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do at that time [when R. Yehoshua issued his declaration]? He said to him: He smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me. (Bava Metzia 59a-b) Scope of the Principle: Two Tosafist Views """"" "" """ """""""""" """ """""""" """"" First, we will analyze the scope of this principle. The gemara in Yevamot 14a tells us that a bat kol, a heavenly voice, rang out and announced that the halakha follows Beit Hillel whenever they argue with Beit Shammai. The gemara there assumes that R. Yehoshua, who ignored the bat kol in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," would hold that the halakha does not follow Beit Hillel, as the halakha is not determined in Heaven. Tosafot wonder: If, in fact, we follow the conclusion in Bava Metzia, in which God Himself endorses the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi, why does the halakha follow Beit Hillel?[1] Tosafot suggest two approaches to resolving this difficulty. According to one answer in Tosafot, the general rule is that we do, in fact, decide the halakha based on a heavenly voice or other supernatural proof. Only in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai, where R. Eliezer demanded explicitly that a heavenly voice attest to the correctness of his opinion, do we suspect that the heavenly voice might have fibbed in order to preserve the honor of R. Eliezer. Tosafot assumes that God is so concerned for the honor of Torah scholars that He would even send out a false message to protect R. Eliezer's honor -- even though R. Eliezer foolishly backed himself into a corner by demanding heavenly evidence -- and that God would rely on the assembled Sages to know better than to heed this white lie (and, indeed, they did know better). According to the second opinion in Tosafot, we accept the conclusion of the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" and assume that supernatural evidence cannot override the normal workings of the halakhic process. The heavenly voice that favored R. Eliezer has no authority to override the principle of majority rule that was referenced by R. Yehoshua. However, we do grant authority to the heavenly voice that decided in favor of Beit Hillel, because, as mentioned in the gemara there, there was no clear majority on the side of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel was numerically larger than Beit Shammai, but it was universally acknowledged that the Sages of Beit Shammai were sharper that those of Beit Hillel. Apparently, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed regarding the question of whether the halakha should follow the school with the larger population or the one with more intellectual prowess. This created a logical conundrum, for according to Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Hillel was in the majority and therefore should be followed, but according to Beit Shammai, Beit Shammai constituted the majority and their opinion must be followed. In such a case, where the standard halakhic process has no way of resolving the dispute, there is room for a heavenly voice to intervene and tell us what to decide. According to this opinion, supernatural evidence does have authority within the halakhic process, but only when it does not contradict the accepted rules of halakhic decision making. Scope of the Principle: Rambam """"" "" """ """""""""" """""" The Rambam seems to have a third opinion about the scope of this principle. He writes that if anyone were to bring supernatural proof to buttress a claim that we should add, subtract, or modify a mitzva of the Torah, he is to be considered a false prophet and is liable to receive the death penalty. Likewise, adds the Rambam, even if this person were merely to claim that the halakha should follow a particular side of a dispute, he is considered a false prophet, because he contradicts the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[2] The Rambam thus assumes that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi is universal and allows no exceptions. Even in the case of an unresolved halakhic dispute, where there may be no clear halakhic precedent that dictates whom the halakha should follow, it is anathema to bring supernatural evidence and involve the Heavens in an earthly halakhic dispute. According to the Rambam, the heavenly voice that favored Beit Hillel is granted no authority whatsoever. We must therefore conclude that the halakha follows Beit Hillel not because of any heavenly voice, but rather because the majority of Sages in the later generations agreed with the logic of Beit Hillel, in accordance with the normal halakhic process. Scope of the Principle: Summary """"" "" """ """""""""" """"""" We have seen three opinions about the scope of the disqualification of supernatural evidence within the halakhic process. One opinion in Tosafot holds that supernatural evidence is always admissible, except in cases in which there is strong reason to suspect an ulterior motive, such as to save a Torah scholar from embarrassment. A second opinion in Tosafot believes that supernatural evidence is admissible only when the halakhic process cannot arrive at a firm conclusion, but not when the accepted halakhic principles suffice. A third opinion is found in the Rambam, who holds that supernatural evidence is never admissible in the halakhic process. It is interesting to note that one of the Tosafists, R. Yaakov of Marvege,[3] wrote an entire work, titled Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, Responsa >From Heaven, which reports halakhic decisions that he received from the heavenly academy in his dreams. Such a work could never have been written by the Rambam, as he does not give credence to the halakhic opinion of the heavenly academy. However, according to the Tosafists, it is logical that R. Yaakov of Marvege ruled based on what he learned from the heavenly academy, as these rulings were not given to protect anyone's honor and presumably only dealt with undecided halakhic issues that could not be successfully resolved through the earthly halakhic process.[4] Justification of the Principle """"""""""""" "" """ """"""""" A second question that emerges from the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" relates not to the scope, but rather to the justification of the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. If God revealed His halakhic opinion by means of a heavenly voice or other objective evidence, how can we rule otherwise? To paraphrase the language quoted in the name of God Himself, how is it legitimate for us to "triumph over God" if the goal of halakhic observance is to fulfill God's will? Shouldn't the overriding principle of the process of determining halakha be the wish to fulfill the will of God? Justification: Two answers of R. Nissim Gaon """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" "" """""" """" This question is raised by R. Nissim Gaon.[5] His first answer is that, in fact, we did not rule in contradiction to the heavenly voice. He points out that the heavenly voice announced, seemingly verbosely, that the halakha follows Rabbi Eliezer in all places. While we may have understood (and so indeed understood R. Eliezer himself) that the heavenly voice intended to relate that the halakha followed R. Eliezer in this particular dispute, and it merely added that the halakha follows him in all places in order to further bolster his credibility, R. Nissim Gaon understands that the heavenly voice meant this formulation as a hint that the halakha follows R. Eliezer in all other places, but not in this dispute. The majority of the Sages, then, were not contradicting the heavenly revelation, but rather following its true intent. R. Nissim Gaon also suggests a second approach in which he admits that the Sages disregarded the heavenly voice, but claims that they nonetheless did not contradict the opinion of God Himself. He points out that the Torah itself states unequivocally that God may grant a false prophet supernatural powers in order to test the Jewish People (Devarim 13:2-6). Even an authentic heavenly miracle, if brought in support of a position that contradicts the Torah, is merely a test to see if our loyalty to Halakha will remain steadfast even in such extreme circumstances. Likewise, the heavenly voice that supported R. Eliezer was in fact sent by God, but did not represent His true halakhic opinion. The Sages were being tested to see whether they would follow the misleading heavenly voice or the true will of God as revealed through the halakhic process, and they passed the test. Both interpretations given by R. Nissim Gaon dull the philosophical edge of this principle. We ignore heavenly proclamations not because we prefer human reasoning over divine logic, but because the heavenly voice -- though it originates in Heaven -- does not necessarily represent an authentic heavenly conclusion. The Sages did not literally triumph over God by ruling against R. Eliezer, but only overruled the deceptively formulated or disingenuous heavenly voice in order to successfully discern the true will of God. The impression given by the story of the "Oven of Akhnai," however, does not support the reading of R. Nissim Gaon. The closing scene, in which God Himself says that the Sages triumphed over Him, implies that God indeed ruled in accordance with R. Eliezer, but He was nonetheless pleased that the Sages followed human logic and the majority vote in disregard of Divine truth. Apparently, following the earthly halakhic process is more important than fulfilling the halakha in accordance with God's original intention. God Himself was pleased that we followed His will regarding the proper procedure for resolving halakhic disputes, even though it negated His will regarding the substance of the particular halakhic question at hand. Justification: Two Answers of the Ran """""""""""""" """ """"""" "" """ """ The Ran, in his philosophical work Derashot Ha-Ran,[6] understands the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi in the context of a broader principle derived by Chazal regarding the commandment, "Do not stray from the matter that they tell you, neither right nor left" (Devarim 17:11). Chazal derive from the verse that one is obligated to follow the rulings of the Sanhedrin, the highest court, even if they were to tell you that right is left and that left is right.[7] The Ran understands that one should follow the authorized halakhic decisors not only if it merely seems to him that they are mistaken, but even if they are actually completely wrong. Even if their ruling is as erroneous as the statement that right is left and left is right, one is nonetheless commanded to follow them. Therefore, the Sages followed the majority opinion over the opinion of R. Eliezer, even in the face of valid proof that he was correct, because we are commanded to follow the standard halakhic procedure based on human logic, whether it represents ultimate truth or utter falsehood. The Ran suggests a number of reasons why the Torah would command us to follow human reasoning over supernatural revelation in deciding Halakha. First, it is impractical to make the Halakha dependent on the power of prophecy or access to the supernatural, because not every generation merits prophecy or supernatural providence, and we would then be unable able to reach firm halakhic conclusions. Intellectual understanding of Torah, however, can be found in all generations. More importantly, logical reasoning can be analyzed and rebutted and subject to a degree of scrutiny that would ferret out any vacuous arguments or hidden errors. Supernatural proofs, however, can easily be falsified. It is not difficult for a charlatan to convince the gullible masses, and even great Sages, that he is a prophet or miracle worker, producing what seem to be signs and wonders to buttress his claim. We are much more likely to achieve accurate halakhic rulings, not to mention religious stability, if halakhic authority is restricted to logical reasoning, to the exclusion of supernatural proofs. Even in the case of the "Oven of Akhnai," in which R. Eliezer's proofs certainly seemed legitimate, it is preferable to rule inaccurately with regard to one particular oven, while preserving the stability of the halakhic process for eternity. The Ran is still bothered, however, by the audaciousness of knowingly ruling and practicing halakha in violation of the actual will of God. He points out that according to mainstream Jewish thought, every positive commandment in the Torah was commanded by God because its fulfillment generates some substantive spiritual benefit, and every transgression forbidden by the Torah was forbidden because its performance causes substantive spiritual damage to our souls. If so, asks the Ran, how can we justify following the accepted halakhic process when it reaches a conclusion that is known to be incorrect? Just as a medical consensus that poison is harmless cannot save one who ingests it from the damaging effects of the poison, so too, no rabbinic consensus can save our souls from the objective damage caused by following an incorrect halakhic ruling. The Ran's first solution to this problem is based on a philosophical premise found already in the Rambam's Moreh Nevukhim:[8] The Halakha is not meant to benefit everyone who follows it in all circumstances, but rather to benefit the world as a whole. The Halakha brings spiritual benefit to most people under most circumstances, but not in all circumstances. Therefore, the halakha of lo ba-shamayim hi dictates that in the exceedingly rare occasion of a mistaken ruling on the part of the highest halakhic authorities, individuals bound by those rulings should indeed incur spiritual damage by following those rulings, in order to preserve the system and bring spiritual benefit to themselves and to the rest of the Jewish People in the 99.9% of cases in which the halakhic authorities decide the halakha correctly. According to this theory, it is not theologically problematic if the spiritual medicine of halakhic observance causes detrimental side effects in exceedingly rare circumstances. The Ran's second approach to dealing with this problem assumes that the Halakha is universally beneficial, and that even in the rare circumstances covered by the principle lo ba-shamayim hi, one would never suffer spiritual damage by following the Halakha. One who follows the majority opinion of the Sages, even if it contradicts the actual halakhic truth as known in Heaven, will not be spiritually harmed at all by his defective observance, because the salutary effects of accepting rabbinic authority will negate any possible spiritual harm that could ensue from the specific defective action he performs. The Ran points out that just as in the realm of physical health, ingesting unhealthy substances can be harmless under certain conditions, even an act that would otherwise be spiritually harmful may in fact be harmless in the context of upholding a principle that is greatly beloved by God and exceedingly beneficial for spiritual development. Both explanations of the Ran agree fundamentally that the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi obligates us to give preference to global, procedural principles over specific substantive accuracy, and that it is worthwhile to act wrongly in a particular matter in order to preserve and protect the system of Halakha. Any spiritual harm that would ensue from such wrong action is either very rare and a worthwhile sacrifice, or will be neutralized and rendered harmless from the outset. Justification: Ketzot Ha-Choshen """""""""""""" """""" """""""""" The Ketzot Ha-Choshen advocates a bolder perspective on the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi.[9] He begins by presenting a conundrum: The Zohar praises the creative accomplishments of those who innovate "chiddushei Torah," novel Torah insights. However, ask the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, how can we add anything new to the Torah? Anything that is true is already found in the Torah, and that which is false is not worthy of being propounded! He answers by quoting the Ran and adding that by giving the Torah to human beings, who are fundamentally incapable of fully understanding Divine wisdom, God redefined the nature of ultimate truth and elected to prefer the truth that emerges from the best efforts of human logic, however imperfect and inaccurate it may be, to the ultimate truth found only in Heaven. In fact, by creating man and making our service of God the goal of creation, God expressed His desire for human "truth" over the ultimate truth favored by the angels who argued against the creation of man.[10] God wants us to be His partners in developing the truth of the Torah, and that goal is so valuable that it overrides the value of ultimate truth. The Ketzot Ha-Choshen interprets the language of our daily birkot ha-Torah, "an everlasting life He implanted in our midst," as an answer to the Ran's comparison of following an incorrect ruling to ingesting poison. When one ingests poison, it remains poison. But God implanted everlasting life in our midst by giving us the Torah; He implanted within us the ability to create everlasting life via novel Torah interpretations. When the Sages, following proper halakhic process, declare something permitted, then even if previously it was spiritually poisonous, it becomes benign or even beneficial. The very human process of halakhic development has the power to make certain actions spiritually beneficial or detrimental, and if that requires a rewiring of the spiritual workings of the heavenly and earthly realms, then God has committed Himself to adapting His reality to the decisions of the Torah Sages. According to this bold theory, the Sages in the story of the "Oven of Akhnai" indeed triumphed over God, and this is precisely what God intended when He gave the Torah to human beings instead of angels. The mystery of why God desires the partnership of human beings in developing His Torah transcends our intellectual grasp, but the Ketzot Ha-Choshen is convinced that it is this mystery that underlies the meta-halakhic principle of lo ba-shamayim hi. Summary """"""" We have seen three basic approaches to understanding the philosophical basis of lo ba-shamayim hi. According to R. Nissim Gaon, our goal is to discern and follow the will of God in accordance with heavenly truth. However, in order to do so, we must sometimes discount ostensible supernatural proofs, and the principle of lo ba-shamayim hi teaches us that not everything that appears to reflect divine revelation indeed does so. According to the Ran, we are obligated on rare occasions to discount the actual heavenly truth and act deficiently in specific situations, out of concern for preservation of the halakhic system as a whole. It is worthwhile sacrifice, or perhaps not even a sacrifice, to err in a particular matter in order to preserve halakhic integrity and religious unity. Finally, according to the Ketzot Ha-Choshen, it is not only necessary but desirable to diverge from the ultimate heavenly truth and follow the conclusions of human Torah logic. If God wanted heavenly truth, he would have listened to the angelic lobbyists who urged Him to keep the Torah up in Heaven. God gave us the Torah so that we would be not only His subjects but His partners in bringing spiritual truth into the physical realm, and it is precisely on those occasions in which human truth overrides heavenly truth that we realize our destiny and become God's partners in revealing the Torah. -- [1] Tosafot, Yevamot 14a, Bava Metzia 59b, Chullin 44b. See also Tosafot, Berakhot 52a and Pesachim 114a. [2] Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah 9:1-4. [3] Marvege, France, 12-13th century. [4] R. Ovadia Yosef, however, rules that one should definitely give no credence to the Shu"t Min Ha-Shamayim, because even Tosafot only gave credence to a heavenly voice or other objective supernatural event that is observed by a multitude of people. Dreams, in contrast, have no credence whatsoever, as they represent merely the thoughts of the dreamer himself and are not necessarily sent from Heaven (Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 1, Orach Chaim 41). [5] R. Nissim ben Yaakov (Tunisia, 990 -- c.1060), commentary to Berakhot 19b. [6] R. Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona (Spain, c. 1320-1376), Derashot Ha-Ran, ch. 11. [7] Sifrei, ad loc., quoted by Rashi, ad loc. See also Yerushalmi, Horayot 1:1, and the comments of the Divrei David and Ha-Ketav Ve-Ha-Kabbala to this verse. [8] Moreh Nevukhim 3:24. [9] R. Aryeh Leib Heller (Galicia, 1745-1812), Ketzot Ha-Choshen, introduction. [10] Bereishit Rabbah, Parashat Bereishit 8:5. From isaac at balb.in Thu Mar 14 23:15:36 2019 From: isaac at balb.in (Dr. Isaac Balbin) Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2019 17:15:36 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk Message-ID: On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:48:40PM -0400, Micha Berger wrote: : 3- I more than once expounded the model that there are 3-sheheim-4 : categories of concerns that a poseiq needs to consider. : : 1- textual strength : a- compilling sevara : b- source authority (acharei rabim lehatos or halakhah keR ... : 2- mimetic strength -- what are people doing? How broad of a : swath of the qehillah? : 3- hashkafic argument - only as a fall back, but what best fits : the sho'el's or poseiq's worldview... : But lomdus doesn't take #2 into account. And #3.... Brisk is pretty : much a hashkafah of not having a hashkafah! (With RYBS's existential : exploration in post-facto "halachic hermeneutics" -- as he puts it -- : lessons we can take from the din, not really an exception. Because they : are just that, post facto lessons, not claims of possible reality a : pesaq should accomodate.) The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? Sent with brevity and typos from my iPhone From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 16 20:40:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 23:40:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Brisk In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190317034048.GB1733@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 05:15:36PM +1100, Dr. Isaac Balbin wrote: : The Mesora is huge in Brisk. Not sure how you discount the mimetic : tradition? Look at the brouhaha regarding Techeiles... Not mimeticism. RYBS and RHS use the word "mesorah" to refer to the rishonim and acharonim who enter the room when Rav Moshe Soloveitchik gave shiur, or the dialog down the ages RYBS experienced during his shiurim. To RHS, it's the flow of the pesaq. If it's mimetic at all, it's the mimetic tradition of posqim, passwed down from mentor to apprentice. For that matter, R' Chaim Brisker's objection to techeiles wasn't about mimeticism. Rather, it was about halakhah having to stand pristine, not subject to external first principles. Archeology cannot change the din; only if halakhah would somehow prove the identity of the chilazon would the identification have halachic import. (No, I don't know how this would have worked.) But could you picture a Brisker making an argument like the AhS's that the widespread acceptance of community eiruvin is as clear as a bas qol that they must be permitted? : In that matter I think R Asher Weiss made up his mind and then formed : a Psak relying on the inauthenticity of archeology... RYBS said he did this himself. And what about when the Rambam says "nir'eh li"? I would think it's the one non-controversial use of what has come to be called "daas Torah". One would expect soeone who spent decades mastering a topoc to have a feel for how the question is going to be answered even before working out a line of reasoning to justify that answer -- or occasionally surprise them by showing the instinct was wrong. But that instinct in the Brisker case isn't informed by "the masses can't be *that* wrong". Mimeticism doesn't enter it much. And that's why so many people now wait for a friend before saying Vayekhulu Friday night. Or stand when saying it in Qiddush. : Would you not say Rav Schachter pasken through the Rav's lens? There si some similarlity, but not the same lens. You mentioned tekheiles. That's a pretty good counter-example. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes micha at aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am - http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch From llevine at stevens.edu Sun Mar 17 07:17:48 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Sun, 17 Mar 2019 14:17:48 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin. (Please note that all extemporaneous symbols and misspellings were in the email that I received.) PURIM MOMENT: HaRav Shimon Schwab, Z"tl (Rav Schwab on Prayer, Artscroll, p.526) poses a question: Why does the Megillah in some detail, and why do Chazal subsequently in Ahl HaNissim, spend the time and effort to describe that Haman was hung on a tree, and that his 10 sons were hung on the tree almost a year later. Why do we have to remind ourselves of this every year in the Megillah and in the Ahl Hanissim so many times?? Indeed, Rav Schwab points out?even in the Maoz Tzur off Chanukah we sing ???Rov Bonov Vekinyanav Al Hoetz Tolisa?Haman and a good number of his sons were hung on the tree.??? What special significance does the tree have to this very special day? Rav Schwab answers: Chazal (Chullin 139B) teach that Haman is alluded to in the Torah with the Eitz HaDaas--Hashem asks Adam:? ???Hamin Hoetz Asher?---Did you eat of the tree which I commanded you not to eat?? What is the relationship of Haman to the Eitz HaDaas ?is it merely a play on words of Haman and From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 07:49:06 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:49:06 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Autonomous Vehicle vs. Bor biRshus haRabbim Message-ID: <20190318144906.GA30557@aishdas.org> The Torah says that baal habor only has to pay the nezeq his bor caused if the injured is a person or an animal, not keilim. And in fact even when it comes to animals, we learn that since a healthy animal walking in the daytime watches where it foes, any hezeq done to the animal in such a circumstance would be the animal's fault. People, OTOH, our eyes don't point down at the floor, and even when we try to watch where we're going, we can be distracted by other thoughts. Animals don't have such distraction. (And yet adam mu'ad le'olam? Why is it that when speaking of an outright maziq, a person is culpable for not watching his own klutzy elbows, but here...? Anyway, back to the question...) Keilim would only fall into the bor if someone was transporting them through a reshus harabbim, either by hand or by animal. But when porting, the person carrying would normally be paying attention to where they are going, and the baal habor can't be held accountable if they didn't. Notice here I'm saying two conflicting explanation of the din. The opening sentence makes it out to be a gezeiras hakasuv, but Chazal provide explanations for the various aspects of the din. Now we get to autonomous vehicles. Say my self-driving car hits a pothole someone else made in the road and incurs damage. (I picture reparing those things won't be cheap!) Let's assume further it isn't the kind of pothole most mass produced cars would notice, so it's like more an animal going in the dark. Does the baal habor have to pay, because there was no human porting my keli and thus it has the din of a beheimah? Or is it a keli and thus exempt because of the gezeiras hakasuv? -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From llevine at stevens.edu Mon Mar 18 07:40:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:40:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. Q. Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? A. There is a Torah obligation to honor a step-mother or a step-father so long as one's father or mother is still alive. Once the parent passes away, there is no further obligation to honor the step-parent. However, the Gemara (Kesubos 103a) relates that Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi instructed his children before his passing to continue to show honor to their step-mother, and this is the accepted practice of all G-d fearing individuals even though it is not a formal obligation (Aruch Hashulchan YD 240:43). The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their father, and the birth mother's objections do not remove this obligation. However, Halachos Ketanos (1:28) writes that if there is a question of who should be honored first (e.g., one's mother and step-mother both ask for a drink of water), one is obligated to honor one's mother first. Though they are both Torah obligations, the honor that is due to a parent is greater than that due to a step-parent. From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 08:22:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 11:22:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Is there a mitzvah to honor step-parents? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318152257.GB4471@aishdas.org> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 02:40:10PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis. ... : The Birkei Yosef (YD 240:16) writes that one is obligated : to show honor to their step-mother even if their birth mother : objects. Honoring their step-mother is a means of honoring their : father... Similarly, one is obligated to show kavod to one's rebbe's wife, as it is part of the chiyuv of showing him kavod. Although, if you truly believe in the zekhuyos accorded to the Zevulun in a Yissachar-Zevulun relationship, why wouldn't we be obligated to stand for the rebbetzin because "sheli veshalekhem, shelah hu?" (But that's not how the SA phrases the chiyuv to stand for her.) -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From micha at aishdas.org Mon Mar 18 09:57:35 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:57:35 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 01:01:42PM +0000, Ben Bradley via Avodah wrote: : R Micha wrote: : > I think lomdus is more in the style of Tosafos, focusing on how we : > understand the gemara, with "only" implications about practice. Rather : > than focusing on getting to a lemaaseh. It's just a different subject. : Firstly, I think we overemphasise the chidush of lomdus. Granted, R' : Chaim's derech and subsequent Brisker development was something new in : its explicit conceptual tools. But to say that being able to see all : sides of a sugya with great clarity is a new thing, well isn't that : part and parcel of classic ameilus batorah? ... Except I didn't. I likened it to Tosafos, a precedent. The use of a tool for understanding shitos in a straight ameilus beTorah as though it were a tool for pesaq -- that's a chiddush. ... : In general, the impression one gets is that the basic learning of the : batei medrash of the amoraim was to to do exactly what we call lomdus, : just that the format of the gemara doesn't record exactly how that process : happened, presumably to maintain the oral/mimetic nature of the process : of learning Torah. Nonetheless we don't find that this amoraic/tannaitic : lomdus inhibited the ability to arrive at halacha l'maaseh. What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) of lomdus? : Slightly derech agav, drashos on pesukim seem to be used both to create : new halachos and also verify oral traditions. The Netziv in the hakdama : to Vaykira in Haemek davar makes this explicit and the Rambam in the : Shorashim (2 or 3?) seems to say the same, although there seems to be : some comtemporary debate about this issue... I think it's use to verify runs to the end of shas or so, but the use of derashos to create halakhah dies off well before then. Perhaps with the composition of the mishnah. Rav Meir had already closed the door on darshening cheseiros and yeseiros for pragmatic reasons. The gemara (Pesachim 66a, nr bottom) invokes ein adam dan gezeira shava le'atzmo to a maaseh involving Hillel. (There it's contrasted to qal vechomer, where one may. So what about the other rules of derashah -- like g"sh, already put to rest, or like qv"ch?) Li nir'eh, though, that it's safe to say amora'im weren't creating new dinim or interpretations of dinim using derashos. ... : All of which still leaves me uncertain as to why (some) Briskers find it : so hard to pasken rather than cover all bases. Of note, despite claims : by some talmidim that RYBS wasn't really a posek, more a Rosh Yeshiva, : because he changed his mehelach in gemara sugyos freqently, a la Brisk, : it's clear that he was very clear and consistent in many issues of psak : over a long period of time when dealing with shailos for the RCA rabbonim : as recorded in their documentation. So at least one Brisker didn't have : trouble paskening l'maaseh despite his aptitude in lomdus. Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his own pesaq on the moreh de'asra. But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is one example that really caught on in some YU circles. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "As long as the candle is still burning, micha at aishdas.org it is still possible to accomplish and to http://www.aishdas.org mend." Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:13:21 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:13:21 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] derech psak Message-ID: While much of the discussion has centered about Brisk I mention two others. First the Chatam Sofer was a major figure both in lomdus and psak and had no trouble combining the two ( I do not mean to dismiss many others) Second while there was a claim that R. Chaim wa like a rishon some would disagree and give the example of Chazon Ish who was more like a rishon in a straightforward explanation of the gemara (and of course was a gadol in both sevara and psak) -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From bdbradley70 at hotmail.com Tue Mar 19 05:56:54 2019 From: bdbradley70 at hotmail.com (Ben Bradley) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:56:54 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> References: , <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: From: Micha Berger Sent: 18 March 2019 04:57 > What do you call the shaqla vetarya of the gemara if not Rav and Rav > Yehudah's (as founders of Sura & Pumpedisa, respectively) style(s) > of lomdus? Not sure of your point. My point was exactly that lomdus is implicit in classic ameilus batorah. The shakla v'tarya of the gemara leaves so much work for us to fill in that we can't be sure what the shakla v'tarya of a beis midrash in the amoraic period sounded like in practice, what conceptual tools they used etc. The written record we have just doesn't give us information to do more than work out our own approach to the material. The closest we have is probably the small number of mishnayos scattered through shas which give a direct recording of a conversation in one place and time, and which differ in style from any discussion in the gemara. Eg mishna in brachas 'dayo lavo min ha din lihiot ka'nidon'. I think they all involve comparing and contrasting agreed cases to derive a din for the case under machlokes. > Boston, a lot more often than the RCA. Think how much more often people > had questions about their kitchens or taharas hamishpachah compared to > the number of questions RCA faced. And for individual RCA rabbanim, > RYBS often (usually?) helped them reach their own pesaq than impose his > own pesaq on the moreh de'asra.' > But I think he did show signs of Briskness. How many other posqim > (beyond Brisk's influence) would tell balebatim to observe yahrzeit in > both Adars? And as for ignoring mimeticism.... Sitting for Havdalah is > one example that really caught on in some YU circles. I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. Ben From eliturkel at gmail.com Tue Mar 19 03:39:55 2019 From: eliturkel at gmail.com (Eli Turkel) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 12:39:55 +0200 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations Message-ID: << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Tue Mar 19 08:53:47 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? A. This is the subject of a well-known dispute. Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) explains that the Purim story took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in personal feuds and do not get along with one another. This is alluded to in the verse ?yeshno am echad mefuzar umeforad bein ha?amim?, there is one nation which is dispersed and scattered among the nations, i.e., lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given to one?s friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will among the Jews. This demonstrates that we do not engage in personal feuds; on the contrary, we engage in acts of friendship, by gifting our food to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), however, explains that the purpose of giving one?s acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim. Although most people are not poor and therefore do not need food given to them for their Seudah, Chazal instituted that Misloach Manos be given to wealthy people as well, so as not to embarrass the poor (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196). -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 13:00:23 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 16:00:23 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] mishna rishona In-Reply-To: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> References: <262fda9cea9748bc8abb6472f024e229@VW2K8NYCEXMBX4.segal.segalco.com> Message-ID: <20190319200023.GC4139@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 06, 2019 at 03:11:10AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : The Gemara in a number of places (e.g., Shavuot 4a) uses the principle : "Umishna lo zazah mimkoma" (the [original] Mishna did not move) to explain : why two mishnayot might seem contradictory... : 1. What's the purpose of keeping the earlier version? Wouldn't it serve the same functions as Edios's (1:4-5) why record Beis Shammai and other rejected opinions in a machloqes among contemporaries? ... : 3. Who changes their mind these days? I was going to answer this, but I decided not to. Tir'u baTov! -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:14 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] The Emphasis on Empathy Message-ID: <20190319210714.GA31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (First, note that this email is being shared with the Avodah discussion group, although I hid your address from them.) I was quite thrilled with your recent post, The Emphasis on Empathy . It has obvious overlap with Rav Shimon's notion of expanding one's "ani". Compare your words: Being concerned with the wellbeing of an insect is a low rung on the empathy ladder. The ultimate and most powerful concern for "the other" is for other people. ... People gauge gadlus ha'adam by many things. But the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy. The severely empathy-impaired, like the young woman on the bus line (and psychopaths), are essentially infants. For members of Klal Yisrael, the import of empathy is evident in Rabi Akiva's statement (quoted by Rashi) that the passuk "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra, 19:18) is a "great principle of the Torah." And in Hillel's response to the man who insisted on learning the entire Torah on one foot: "What is hateful to you do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and study it" (Shabbos, 31a). But dedication to an "other" is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other. We are born selfish; and meant to strive toward concern for our fellows, but, ultimately, for the will of Hashem. With Rav Shimon's description of the measure of a soul: ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?????? ???, ?? ??? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??????, ???? ??? ????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????, ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ????, ?????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???????, ????? ????? ?? ?? ???? ?????, ?????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ????? ????????. ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???, ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ????, ??? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?? ?? ?????, ??? ?? ?????? ????. ?????? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ????... And now in transaltion, because the Avodah digest tenst ot mangle Hebrew: This means [a person must] have clear for himself and accept the truth of the essence of his "I," for with it the statures of [different] people are differentiated, each according to their level. The entire "I" of a coarse and lowly person is restricted only to his substance and body. Above him is someone who feels that his "I" is a synthesis of body and soul. And above him is someone who can include in his "I" all of his household and family. Someone who walks according to the way of the Torah, his "I" includes the whole Jewish People, since in truth every Jewish person is only like a limb of the body of the nation of Israel. In this [progression] there are more levels for a fully developed person, who can ingrain in his soul the feeling that the entire world is his "I," and he himself is only one small limb of all of Creation. Then, his self-love helps him love the entire Jewish People and [even] all of Creation. In my opinion, this idea is hinted at in Hillel's words, as he used to say, "If I am [not] for me, who will be for me? And when I am for myself, what am I?" ... But there are two differences. To Rav Shimon, the ladder of empathy begins with becoming aware that I am more than my body. He doesn't really discuss compassion for insects beyond its inclusion in "ve'es kol heberi'ah kulah". But more noted is your last paragraph in my above quote, "But dedication to an 'other' is, in its most sublime form, expressed as selfless dedication to the Other." I think Rav Shimon would argue that our truest selfless dedication to the Other is climbing up that scale of empathy! As he opens, "?????? ????? ?????? ??????, ???? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????, ?????? ?? ??????, -- Who created us in His Image and in the likeness of His Structure, and planted eternal life within us, so that our greatest desire should be to benefit others." This is the very iqar of the Torah, to empathetically share the RBSO's Good with others. As Hillel, Rabbi Aqiva and Ben Azzai say. And not that we climb a ladder of empathy with others on a path to Him. Similarly, your write that "the most essential marker of human growth may well be how far one has progressed from the selfishness that defines us at birth toward true empathy." WIthout the last paragraph, you could have been saying, as Rav Shimon does, that the measure of a soul is the number of people you identify with. But as you end, it seems you meant "marker" as a siman, not the definition. Of course, Rav Shimon's derekh hachaim isn't the only one by far. But I was struck how you could say something so similar that yet had profound differences. Continuing with thoughts on your next CC post in my next email. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 14:07:25 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 17:07:25 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: <20190319210725.GB31360@aishdas.org> Dear Rabbi Shafran, (Still including Avodah...) I have a practical idea I want to suggest in respons to the next CC post, "Gripes and Grumbles" You write: I also have a bimah-full of gripes revolving around shul. Talking during davening is wrong. Not just disturbing to others and not just impolite. Wrong. Ditto for literally throwing tzedakah literature in front of people trying to daven. Double-ditto for those who don't bother to turn off their phones before entering a mikdash me'at, treating it more like a shuk me'at. ... Not only would davening be stopped at the slightest hint of a conversation, but I would disallow chazzanus at the amud. Spirited, heartfelt singing would be fine, even invited. But "performances" would be canceled mid-concert. The tefillos, sir, just the tefillos. ... What is more, I would lock the doors once davening began. Yes, lock them, so that no one could enter. There is a real problem when people come late, rush out, some have to break in the middle for a qiddush to make it through a Shabbos, or check Facebook or Whatsapp on a weekday. But I don't think your tongue-half-in-cheek suggerstions will help. The people who would find the resulting minyan painfully boring will find fewer occasions to come. If I were the rav of a shul, rather than stop minyan until the noisy people stop talking, I would invest my energy teaching what davening is. Once I learned it myself. I am too often among the board... Or as one of my rabbeim would say, "Micha, it's called 'chazaras hasha"tz', not 'chazaras hasha"s!'" Yes, I know lakol zeman va'eis. But... I would suggest a three pronged approach, feel free to suggest more prongs (and thus my CC-ing the larger chevrah on Avodah for their ideas): 1- Shiurim in peirush hamilim. The siddur is literally a palimpsest of meanings, there is something there to connect to and says what you want to say regardless of mood and how life is going. 2- I think those of us who can't feel like davening is really talking to Avinu shebashayim need practice doing Breslov-style hibodedus. Yes, it feels weird in the beginning, but once I got used to talking to Hashem in my own words, it was an emotion I can sometimes tap into when davening. 3- Two words: tefillah behispa'alus. (Why not fuse Rav Nachman and Rav Yisrael?) Actually, I have much more than two words to say about this, but I just wrote about this at some length, and it's not really for an email. But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to give the tzibbur self-motivation. We need to teach how to daven, not complain that people boringly go through the minimal motions. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger If a person does not recognize one's own worth, micha at aishdas.org how can he appreciate the worth of another? http://www.aishdas.org - Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoye, Fax: (270) 514-1507 author of Toldos Yaakov Yosef From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 12:55:01 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 15:55:01 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Derech psak In-Reply-To: References: <20190318165735.GC4471@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <20190319195501.GB4139@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 12:56:54PM +0000, Ben Bradley wrote: : I was thinking of his role as posek for the RCA as a whole rather : than for individual rabbonim. Those decisions are recorded. I have no : idea how many Boston baaleibatim asked routine shailos in yoreh deah or : otherwise in the 60s and 70s. Nor how how he paskened for them. But obviously as a shul rav for the entire community, he fielded more question than the dozen or at most 20 RYBS fielded for the RCA. : Re Yahrzeits, keeping it in both Adars is a Maharil brought by Rama, so not a Brisk thing. : In any case, point was being a Brisker lamdan doesn't have to limit decisiveness in pask. And yet, a shul rav in a place like 1950s Boston would never give such a pesaq. Your textualist answer is consistent with my point. If you take mai ama devar our of the formula, you do have a lot more open questions. And so yes, people from Boston have a very different impression of who RYBS was than do his talmidim from YU and the RCA do. Compare the modus operendi of someone who usually engages in lomdus (eg RYBS-NY), and thus in a style of ameilus baTorah that is for understanding shitos lehalakhah velo lemaaseh with, for example, the analysis of the Ahs (YD 402:16). "Ha'iqar lehis'anos beAdar rishon. Vaf al pi sheyeish cholqin -- kakh hu ha'iqar." When do you ever hear R Chaim mention the concept of their being an iqar hadin? Possibly never, because he's not hunting for applicability, he is hunting for a way to understand shitos. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Time flies... micha at aishdas.org ... but you're the pilot. http://www.aishdas.org - R' Zelig Pliskin Fax: (270) 514-1507 From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 19 15:16:44 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:16:44 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190319221644.GD31360@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 19, 2019 at 03:53:47PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis : .... Manos Halevi (Megillas Esther 9:16-17) R Shelomo al-Qabetz, author of Lekha Dodi. : explains that the Purim story : took place because Haman maligned the Jews, saying that they engage in : personal feuds and do not get along with one another.... : lacking unity. To demonstrate the falsehood of this libelous charge, : Mordechai and Esther instituted that Mishloach Manos should be given : to one's friends and acquaintances, to foster camaraderie and good will... : to others. Terumas HaDeshen (1:111), R Yisrael Isserlin, one of the Rama's primary sources. (In the text below I reversed the order; I guess my instinct was to put the rishon before the acharon.) : however, explains that the purpose : of giving one's acquaintances Mishloach Manos is to ensure that poor : people enjoy a festive and lavish Seudas Purim... The CS gives this two step thing, we give to the poor, and to the wealthy so as not to embarass the poor. But IIRC, the Terumas haDeshen just says "kedei sheyehei lekhol echad dai". It's not clear just how much Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz is actually disagreeing with the ThD. Why are we making sure everyone has food for the se'udah? Beyond matanos le'evyonim? Isn't that to practice achdus? Especially if we don't assume like the Chazon Ish, and we take the Terumas haDeshen at face value, the focus isn't on tzedaqah, just trying to think about everyone. So to my eye the machloqes is: The Terumas haDeshan holds the mitzvah is an act of achdus. The point is the bein adam lachaveiro. Rav Shelomo al-Qabetz holds the mitzvah is "symbolic" of achdus, in response to Haman's accusation against us. The point is more bein adam laMaqom. -Micha -- Micha Berger "'When Adar enters, we increase our joy' micha at aishdas.org 'Joy is nothing but Torah.' http://www.aishdas.org 'And whoever does more, he is praiseworthy.'" Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 19 17:31:37 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 00:31:37 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] implicit mechila post death Message-ID: We generally hold that mechila (waiver) granted by an individual (e.g., parent for child honor issue) continues unless specifically revoked. We also have a concept of it being a mitzvah to listen to the command of the niftar. Question: What if, in retrospect, one believes the niftar would have changed his mind had he fully understood the implications of his waiver. Should one still honor the waiver/request? Even prior to ptirah, if the individual cannot make his own decisions, do we follow his last wish in a similar case? KT Joel Rich THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 06:58:30 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 09:58:30 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> So the following line of thought his me this morning, and it makes me wonder about exactly how much of a rasha Haman haRasha was. What if: There is a nation out there that almost a millennium prior took an oath to wipe your nation. About 500 years ago they nearly succeeded in doing it. Your nation has been on the verge of extinction for the past 150 years by a forced assimilation program imposed by a conquering empire. You reach a position of power, but one of thsoe guys sworn to genocide your entire people refuses to show you the respect your office commands. You had enough. "They want us-vs-them? I got power, no problem!" So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" puts him in a pretty select group. (All of the above assuming "haAgagi" is a genetic statement, and not describing his ideology. As a follower of Agagi ideology, the whole thing would explain both his being a rasha, and give him more personal blame for picking on the Jews.) Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger Feeling grateful to or appreciative of someone micha at aishdas.org or something in your life actually attracts more http://www.aishdas.org of the things that you appreciate and value into Fax: (270) 514-1507 your life. - Christiane Northrup, M.D. From llevine at stevens.edu Wed Mar 20 07:54:44 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:54:44 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? Message-ID: Please see the video at What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 11:45:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 14:45:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190320184557.GA28401@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 02:54:44PM +0000, Professor L. Levine via Avodah wrote: : Please see the video at : What are the Rules of Drinking on Purim? : Since all of R' Elefant's problems with drinking on Purim have been true since before the days the chiyuv was created, there is a missing piece of explanation here. If we accept his arguments (and as someone who doesn't enjoy drinking, I wish I could): How did Chazal create a chiyuv that risks piquach nefesh and chilul hasheim? -Micha From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 20 12:51:24 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:51:24 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] "Atheism is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method" Message-ID: <20190320195124.GA25146@aishdas.org> What's interesting is not that there are physicists who believe in G-d. Even among Templeton Prize winners, the population is big enough that any depiction of groupthink outside their own field is unrealistic. The news here is that SciAm would carry this interview, despite it having gone well down the road philosophers call "scientism". (Which the interviewee defines as "the notion that science can solve all problems." I would have said it was the drift from "scientific method works", to "only scientific method is reliable", to "only the kinds of claims scientific method can verify are real truths".) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/atheism-is-inconsistent-with-the-scientific-method-prize-winning-physicist-says/ or -Micha Scientific American Atheism Is Inconsistent with the Scientific Method, Prize-Winning Physicist Says By Lee Billings on March 20, 2019 [Abstract:] In conversation, the 2019 Templeton Prize winner does not pull punches on the limits of science, the value of humility and the irrationality of nonbelief ... Scientific American: You've written and spoken eloquently about nature of reality and consciousness, the genesis of life, the possibility of life beyond Earth, the origin and fate of the universe, and more. How do all those disparate topics synergize into one, cohesive message for you? [Marcelo Gleister:] To me, science is one way of connecting with the mystery of existence. And if you think of it that way, the mystery of existence is something that we have wondered about ever since people began asking questions about who we are and where we come from. So while those questions are now part of scientific research, they are much, much older than science. I'm not talking about the science of materials, or high-temperature superconductivity, which is awesome and super important, but that's not the kind of science I'm doing. I'm talking about science as part of a much grander and older sort of questioning about who we are in the big picture of the universe. To me, as a theoretical physicist and also someone who spends time out in the mountains, this sort of questioning offers a deeply spiritual connection with the world, through my mind and through my body. Einstein would have said the same thing, I think, with his cosmic religious feeling. [SA:] Right. So which aspect of your work do you think is most relevant to the Templeton Foundation's spiritual aims? [MG:] Probably my belief in humility. I believe we should take a much humbler approach to knowledge, in the sense that if you look carefully at the way science works, you'll see that yes, it is wonderful - magnificent! - but it has limits. And we have to understand and respect those limits. And by doing that, by understanding how science advances, science really becomes a deeply spiritual conversation with the mysterious, about all the things we don't know. So that's one answer to your question. And that has nothing to do with organized religion, obviously, but it does inform my position against atheism. I consider myself an agnostic. [SA:] Why are you against atheism? [MG:] I honestly think atheism is inconsistent with the scientific method. What I mean by that is, what is atheism? It's a statement, a categorical statement that expresses belief in nonbelief. "I don't believe even though I have no evidence for or against, simply I don't believe." Period. It's a declaration. But in science we don't really do declarations. We say, "Okay, you can have a hypothesis, you have to have some evidence against or for that." And so an agnostic would say, look, I have no evidence for God or any kind of god (What god, first of all? The Maori gods, or the Jewish or Christian or Muslim God? Which god is that?) But on the other hand, an agnostic would acknowledge no right to make a final statement about something he or she doesn't know about. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence," and all that. This positions me very much against all of the "New Atheist" guys-even though I want my message to be respectful of people's beliefs and reasoning, which might be community-based, or dignity-based, and so on. And I think obviously the Templeton Foundation likes all of this, because this is part of an emerging conversation. It's not just me; it's also my colleague the astrophysicist Adam Frank, and a bunch of others, talking more and more about the relation between science and spirituality. [SA:] So, a message of humility, open-mindedness and tolerance. Other than in discussions of God, where else do you see the most urgent need for this ethos? [MG:] You know, I'm a "Rare Earth" kind of guy. I think our situation may be rather special, on a planetary or even galactic scale. So when people talk about Copernicus and Copernicanism-the `principle of mediocrity' that states we should expect to be average and typical, I say, "You know what? It's time to get beyond that." When you look out there at the other planets (and the exoplanets that we can make some sense of), when you look at the history of life on Earth, you will realize this place called Earth is absolutely amazing. And maybe, yes, there are others out there, possibly-who knows, we certainly expect so-but right now what we know is that we have this world, and we are these amazing molecular machines capable of self-awareness, and all that makes us very special indeed. And we know for a fact that there will be no other humans in the universe; there may be some humanoids somewhere out there, but we are unique products of our single, small planet's long history. The point is, to understand modern science within this framework is to put humanity back into kind of a moral center of the universe, in which we have the moral duty to preserve this planet and its life with everything that we've got, because we understand how rare this whole game is and that for all practical purposes we are alone. For now, anyways. We have to do this! This is a message that I hope will resonate with lots of people, because to me what we really need right now in this increasingly divisive world is a new unifying myth. I mean "myth" as a story that defines a culture. So, what is the myth that will define the culture of the 21st century? It has to be a myth of our species, not about any particular belief system or political party. How can we possibly do that? Well, we can do that using astronomy, using what we have learned from other worlds, to position ourselves and say, "Look, folks, this is not about tribal allegiance, this is about us as a species on a very specific planet that will go on with us-or without us." I think you know this message well. [SA:] I do. But let me play devil's advocate for a moment, only because earlier you referred to the value of humility in science. Some would say now is not the time to be humble, given the rising tide of active, open hostility to science and objectivity around the globe. How would you respond to that? [MG:] This is of course something people have already told me: "Are you really sure you want to be saying these things?" And my answer is yes, absolutely. There is a difference between "science" and what we can call "scientism," which is the notion that science can solve all problems. To a large extent, it is not science but rather how humanity has used science that has put us in our present difficulties. Because most people, in general, have no awareness of what science can and cannot do. So they misuse it, and they do not think about science in a more pluralistic way. So, okay, you're going to develop a self-driving car? Good! But how will that car handle hard choices, like whether to prioritize the lives of its occupants or the lives of pedestrian bystanders? Is it going to just be the technologist from Google who decides? Let us hope not! You have to talk to philosophers, you have to talk to ethicists. And to not understand that, to say that science has all the answers, to me is just nonsense. We cannot presume that we are going to solve all the problems of the world using a strict scientific approach. It will not be the case, and it hasn't ever been the case, because the world is too complex, and science has methodological powers as well as methodological limitations. And so, what do I say? I say be honest. There is a quote from the physicist Frank Oppenheimer that fits here: "The worst thing a son of a bitch can do is turn you into a son of a bitch." Which is profane but brilliant. I'm not going to lie about what science can and cannot do because politicians are misusing science and trying to politicize the scientific discourse. I'm going to be honest about the powers of science so that people can actually believe me for my honesty and transparency. If you don't want to be honest and transparent, you're just going to become a liar like everybody else. Which is why I get upset by misstatements, like when you have scientists-Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss among them-claiming we have solved the problem of the origin of the universe, or that string theory is correct and that the final "theory of everything" is at hand. Such statements are bogus. So, I feel as if I am a guardian for the integrity of science right now; someone you can trust because this person is open and honest enough to admit that the scientific enterprise has limitations-which doesn't mean it's weak! [SA:] You mentioned string theory, and your skepticism about the notion of a final "theory of everything." Where does that skepticism come from? [MG:] It is impossible for science to obtain a true theory of everything. And the reason for that is epistemological. Basically, the way we acquire information about the world is through measurement. It's through instruments, right? And because of that, our measurements and instruments are always going to tell us a lot of stuff, but they are going to leave stuff out. And we cannot possibly ever think that we could have a theory of everything, because we cannot ever think that we know everything that there is to know about the universe. This relates to a metaphor I developed that I used as the title of a book, The Island of Knowledge. Knowledge advances, yes? But it's surrounded by this ocean of the unknown. The paradox of knowledge is that as it expands and the boundary between the known and the unknown changes, you inevitably start to ask questions that you couldn't even ask before. I don't want to discourage people from looking for unified explanations of nature because yes, we need that. A lot of physics is based on this drive to simplify and bring things together. But on the other hand, it is the blank statement that there could ever be a theory of everything that I think is fundamentally wrong from a philosophical perspective. This whole notion of finality and final ideas is, to me, just an attempt to turn science into a religious system, which is something I disagree with profoundly. So then how do you go ahead and justify doing research if you don't think you can get to the final answer? Well, because research is not about the final answer, it's about the process of discovery. It's what you find along the way that matters, and it is curiosity that moves the human spirit forward. [SA:] Speaking of curiosity... You once wrote, "Scientists, in a sense, are people who keep curiosity burning, trying to find answers to some of the questions they asked as children." As a child, was there a formative question you asked, or an experience you had, that made you into the scientist you are today? Are you still trying to answer it? [MG:] I'm still completely fascinated with how much science can tell about the origin and evolution of the universe. Modern cosmology and astrobiology have most of the questions I look for-the idea of the transition from nonlife, to life, to me, is absolutely fascinating. But to be honest with you, the formative experience was that I lost my mom. I was six years old, and that loss was absolutely devastating. It put me in contact with the notion of time from a very early age. And obviously religion was the thing that came immediately, because I'm Jewish, but I became very disillusioned with the Old Testament when I was a teenager, and then I found Einstein. That was when I realized, you can actually ask questions about the nature of time and space and nature itself using science. That just blew me away. And so I think it was a very early sense of loss that made me curious about existence. And if you are curious about existence, physics becomes a wonderful portal, because it brings you close to the nature of the fundamental questions: space, time, origins. And I've been happy ever since. From zev at sero.name Wed Mar 20 16:02:53 2019 From: zev at sero.name (Zev Sero) Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:02:53 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> References: <20190320135830.GA26106@aishdas.org> Message-ID: <3b6ee835-723b-9e1b-3572-9b4d3d13d1b0@sero.name> On 20/3/19 9:58 am, Micha Berger via Avodah wrote: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting to > exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate an > entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Because Chazal did not have the universalist ethics that you are trying to impose on the situation. Haman's sin was *not* "genocide", any more than that was the Nazis' sin. Their sin was trying to wipe *us* out. Haman's reasons are irrelevant. By trying to wipe us out he made himself our enemy, and therefore he was a rasha and we celebrate his downfall. Had he tried to wipe out some other nation it would be none of our business. -- Zev Sero A prosperous and healthy 5779 to all zev at sero.name Seek Jerusalem's peace; may all who love you prosper From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 03:05:15 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 06:05:15 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger asked: > So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting > to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate > an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. > And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" > puts him in a pretty select group. Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's babies be?!" To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah. A Gezeras Hakasuv requires us to do certain acts, and feelings like nekamah or victory or joy are out of place. (This does not contradict how we should feel on Purim. Haman and his gang *were* reshaim, and when evil is put in its place, that *is* something to celebrate.) Akiva Miller From akivagmiller at gmail.com Thu Mar 21 02:56:40 2019 From: akivagmiller at gmail.com (Akiva Miller) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 05:56:40 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles Message-ID: . R' Micha Berger wrote: > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to > give the tzibbur self-motivation. On the one hand, I feel very much as you do about the problem. As regards a solution, though, I'm stumped. It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something internal. How can that be given from an outsider? How can we give *any*thing to someone who is uninterested in it? How can we make someone *self*-motivated, without making them feel scolded or imposed upon? The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding and imposing. Akiva Miller From llevine at stevens.edu Thu Mar 21 08:18:10 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2019 15:18:10 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] The Purim Seudah Message-ID: Please see http://personal.stevens.edu/~llevine/llevine1/The%20Purim%20Seudah.pdf YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From arie.folger at gmail.com Fri Mar 22 03:43:10 2019 From: arie.folger at gmail.com (Arie Folger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:43:10 +0100 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? Message-ID: RProf. LLevine posted two sources, each one giving a different reason for Mishloach Manot. Based on Tanakh, I am unconvinced by both reasons. First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh haShana, and send one another food. This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. I find issue with the second reason, too, given by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvos Chasam Sofer OC 196), namely that MM are a form of Matanot leEvyonim. My issue with that stems from the Megillat Esther itself. The holiday of Purim seems to have developed by fits and starts (see the beginning of Megilla for some elucidation of this idea), with the people spontaneously celebrating the first year on the 14th of Adar and in Shushan on the 15th (Esther 9:17-18), but afterwards, it seems only villagers living in unwalled cities celebrated, and only on the 14th. For that occasion, the day had been declared a "Yom Tov", and they did send Mishloach Manot and did Mishteh veSimchah (ibid. verse 19). However, by comparing this earlier observance with the later observance which became accepted in all of Klal Yisrael (ibid. verses 20-22), suddenly the condition "Yom Tov" disappears, while "uMatanot leEvyonim" appears. Which means that matanot leevyonim is something separate from mishloach manot. I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the more so on 3 regalim. Shushan Purim sameach & good Shabbos, -- Arie Folger, Visit my blog at http://rabbifolger.net/ -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Fri Mar 22 06:43:41 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 09:43:41 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] What is the reason for the mitzvah of giving Mishloach Manos on Purim? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190322134341.GA7931@aishdas.org> On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:43:10AM +0100, Arie Folger via Avodah wrote: : First of all, Manot Halevi's suggestion (Megillas Esther 9:16-17), that MM : come to prove Haman wrong by showing we are more united than is usually : acknowledged. The problem I have with this, is that Mishloach Manot is : known from elsewhere in Tanach, where Haman is totally absent: In Sefer : Nechemya 8:12, the Jews of Jerusalem are instructed to rejoice on Rosh : haShana, and send one another food. : : This difficulty may be answered by positing that here, too, it was : important to proclaim Jewish unity, though other than the fact unity is a : good thing, there is no hint why this should have been an issue on that : Rosh haShana or on RH in general, any more than any other day of the year. ... We could tie in the more favorable judgement the qehillah gets to the judgment one would get standing alone. Or the need to get mechilah from other people before one can get HQBH's. Taamei hamitzvos rationales allow for so much darshanut. Although that's not where I would go here. : Alternatively, the reason of MM in Nechemya is to rejoice, and Purim being : a rabbinic holiday ought not to merit MM, but it was instituted anyway : because of the need to assert unity on Purim in particular. ... : I'd like to suggest that Mishloach Manot is indeed that which we most : commonly assume, an expression of shared joy, and that it is appropriate : for every Jewish holiday, even on such a minor holiday as Purim, all the : more so on 3 regalim. I would say that the chiluq between the MhL's suggestion and the one you prefer is merely whether the emphasis in "shared joy" is on the sharing or on the joy. Why do we share joy in general? Why do we feel a need to invite the world to a chasunah? Or for a qorban tamid to be so large as to necessitate sharing, or a qorban pesach (if each member of the chaburah is to only get around a kezayis)? I think the bonding people in sharing our joy, or increasing the joy by sharing it (which presumes bonds), is quite a subtle distinction. Not quite a hainu hakh, but why need it be one to the exclusion of the other? (Yeah, Telzh vs Brisk to the rescue!!!!) The point is to share joy, because it's the hitztarfus of sharing and joy which brings unity to the two goals of mishloach manos of being more joyous and more unified. :-)BBii! -Micha -- Micha Berger If you're going through hell micha at aishdas.org keep going. http://www.aishdas.org - Winston Churchill Fax: (270) 514-1507 From JRich at sibson.com Fri Mar 22 10:59:14 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:59:14 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] vaccinations In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: See Minchat shlomo 2:29:4. Quoting r Akiva eger. Mahadura kama 60 on the one in a Thousand threshold Kt Joel rich CAUTION: This email originated from outside of The Segal Group. Do not respond, click links, or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Do not forward or reply to this email unless you know it does not contain confidential information. If you require further assistance, contact the IT Help Desk. << The vaccination is not like that ? even when made and used > correctly, we still expect about 1 in 1,000,000 children to die from it. > That?s pretty scary, Everything in life has some risk. Travelling by car probably carries a risk greater than 1 in a million. Safek pikuah nefesh is docheh shabbat. Obviously one can't violate shabbat for every minuscule problem. I have heard in the name of R. Elyashiv that anything less than 1 in a thousand is not considered in halacha. -- Eli Turkel _______________________________________________ Avodah mailing list Avodah at lists.aishdas.org http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE ADDRESSEE. IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE. Dissemination, distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is strictly prohibited. If you received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message. Thank you. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From llevine at stevens.edu Fri Mar 22 09:11:16 2019 From: llevine at stevens.edu (Professor L. Levine) Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:11:16 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] Honoring One's Eldest Brother Message-ID: >From today's OU Kosher Halacha Yomis Q. My brother, who is the eldest child in our family, says I must show him honor and may not contradict him. Is this correct? A. The Torah (Shemos 20:12) writes, ?Honor your father and your mother.? The Gemara derives from the word ?and? an obligation to honor one?s eldest brother. Showing honor to one?s eldest brother is a form of honoring parents. However, poskim point out that there are many differences between how we must honor our parents and how we must honor the eldest brother. The Beis Meir (YD 240:23) writes that the mitzvah to honor the eldest brother includes only acts of honor (kavod), such as serving them food, but does not include acts of ?mora? (reverence) such as not sitting in their seat or contradicting them. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 33) writes that it is logical to assume that the mitzvah to honor a parent and a brother are not identical and have different guidelines. For example, a parent may not be called by their name, but a brother may be called by his name. The Minchas Yechiel (3:107) explains that it would be a dishonor to one?s parents if one were to extend the same level of honor to one?s brother as one does for a parent. There is no mention of honoring one's eldest sister. Is this also a requirement? YL -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:19:07 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:19:07 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] Mishkan vis a vis Ohel Moed In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324031907.GA21559@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 05:43:34PM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : 40:34) The cloud covered the Ohel Moed, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : 40:35) Moshe was not able to enter the Ohel Moed, because the cloud rested : on it, and Kavod Hashem filled the Mishkan. : From this repetitious wording, it seems clear me that "Ohel Moed" and : "Mishkan" are two different things... : 3) Some said both terms refer to the same central structure. I think that Ohel Mo'eid refers to the enclosed structure of the Miskan, when it refers to the Mishkan. If the term included the chatzeir which has no roof, calling it an "ohel" would be odd. However, Ohel Mo'eid is a more generic term for a structure where the Shechinah could be experienced. Moshe's place of prophecy when it was outside the camp was also called an Ohel Mo'eid. Shemos 33:6-11. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger One who kills his inclination is as though he micha at aishdas.org brought an offering. But to bring an offering, http://www.aishdas.org you must know where to slaughter and what Fax: (270) 514-1507 parts to offer. - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:29:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:29:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [CC] Gripes and Grumbles In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032948.GC21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 05:56:40AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: : R' Micha Berger wrote: : > But the only way to get out of this hole is to get away from : > scolding mispallelim or to impose decorum as a rule, and to : > give the tzibbur self-motivation. ... : It seems to me that "to give self-motivation" is a contradiction in : terms. "Self-motivation" means that it springs from something : internal. How can that be given from an outsider? You can teach people what they should be self-motivated about. Most people have a desire to be able to connect to davening, they just can't. If more of us not only knew that davening was special, but could tap into that specialness and "get energy" from the experience, the self-motivation to come on time, leave only when it is fully over, and be quiet and pay attention in between, would follow. : The only idea I can come up with is to do absolutely nothing - : nothing! - aside from trying to set a good example. In my experience, : this procedure tends to have a depressingly small success rate. But : that's still better than the negative results that come from scolding : and imposing. People won't learn what it is that works for you and not for them that way. Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure. micha at aishdas.org It preserves health, promotes convalescence, http://www.aishdas.org and helps us cope with adversity. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei" From micha at aishdas.org Sat Mar 23 20:25:57 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 23:25:57 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] In defense of Haman -- NOT Purim Torah In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190324032557.GB21559@aishdas.org> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:15AM -0400, Akiva Miller via Avodah wrote: :> So, okay, Haman was indeed a rasha. But he wasn't simply attempting :> to exterminate an entire nation -- he was attempting to exterminate :> an entire nation that was out to exterminate his own people. :> And yet Chazal portray him as some unfathomable monster. "Harasha" :> puts him in a pretty select group. : : Your question is a good one, but I don't think it is new. I think it : is just a new variation on an old theme, and it is usually phrased in : terms like: "But what about the children?! How evil can Amalek's : babies be?!" I don't see the comparison. I am not asking about the obligation to kill an Amaleiqi, I am asking why Chazal consider him Haman haRasha when his acts -- while evil -- are understandable. The reply: : To me, the answer is that if an individual Amaleki appears to be : innocent [whether we are talking about babies, or about an Amaleki : whose motivation is no more evil than genuine self-defense], we must : still do our mitzvah, but we must remember to do it very lishmah... Would only make sense if I asked about the mitzvah, but actually I asked about the "is not more evil than genuine self-defense." Or at least something closer to self-defense, tainted by a love of power and the honor of his office. (After all, Mordechai refusing to bow sets him off.) But do we have any indication things would have gotten this out of hand if we didn't have a mitzvah that keeps us in Amaleiq's cross-hairs, and self-preservation wasn't part of it? Gut Voch! -Micha -- Micha Berger "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole micha at aishdas.org heart, your entire soul, and all you own." http://www.aishdas.org Love is not two who look at each other, Fax: (270) 514-1507 It is two who look in the same direction. From micha at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 04:05:46 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 07:05:46 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] [VBM] Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) Message-ID: <20190326110546.GA24024@aishdas.org> Topics in Hashkafa Rav Assaf Bednarsh Adapted by Leora Bednarsh Yeshivat Har Etzion Shiur #24: Halakhic Pluralism (Part 2) """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" In our previous shiur [Posted on Avodah in v37n19 -mb], we saw three different understandings of the principle of "these and these are the words of the living God." According to the interpretation quoted by the Chida, only one opinion is actually correct; the incorrect opinion is only instrumentally valuable in deepening our understanding of the correct opinion. According to R. Moshe Feinstein, only one opinion is theoretically correct, but any opinion that results from the proper application of the halakhic process is correct for practical purposes. According to the Ritva and the Tosafists, both opinions are essentially true, and it seems that there is no objective correct answer to a halakhic question. Rashi and Maharal: True Pluralism, Multifaceted Truth """"" """ """""""" """" """""""""" """""""""""" """"" A fourth approach to understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism is found in Rashi.[1] Rashi points out that if each side of a halakhic debate has a logical basis for its position, then neither side is completely wrong. If there is a logical reason to think that something is permitted and also a logical reason to think that something is forbidden, then both sides must be true. Therefore, in some circumstances the matter should be forbidden, and in others permitted, as the halakha often depends on the subtle difference in circumstances between one case and the next. Rashi is suggesting here a new model for understanding the nature of halakhic pluralism. We need not choose between assuming either that one side is 100% correct and the other 100% incorrect, or that both sides are 100% correct. Rather, each side of the debate is partially correct, and the ultimate halakhic truth emerges from a combination of the two positions. This idea can be understood based on Maharal's understanding of the gemara in Chagiga.[2] Maharal explains that the phenomenon of disputes between Torah scholars is not a failure of the system, but rather a strategy for attaining ultimate truth. God created each individual with a unique personality, and therefore different people have different perspectives and different ways of thinking. Maharal explains further that nothing in the world is simple; complexity is present in every aspect of our existence. Even those matters that are good have some negative aspect to them, and even bad things have a positive aspect. Nothing is purely good or evil in the world, and therefore the true objective answer to any halakhic question is never a simple yes or no. There are always different facets to every issue that reflect the complexity of the real world. Therefore, the halakhic perspective on any issue must also be complex. The function of Halakha is not to oversimplify reality and ignore the complexities of the real world, but rather to reflect that complexity and teach us the authentic divine perspective on that complexity. However, no one human being is broad and complex enough to discern everything the Torah has to say about the complexities of the real world. Therefore, God arranged a system in which a multitude of Torah scholars would analyze every new halakhic question that arose. Because everyone is created differently, different scholars would focus on different facets of the truth, and each would argue for the truth of his perspective. If the community of Torah scholarship, in that generation or a future generation, joins together all the disparate views on a particular issue, we can thus get as close as possible to the ultimate objective truth, which is the combination of all the different perspectives on the issue. In this complex world, the only way for limited human beings to find the objective Divine truth is through such a system. Only if Torah scholars take disparate positions and each side argues for the correctness of its perspective can we clarify the cogency and power of each position, and thereby achieve an integrated understanding of all the different facets of the ultimate truth. We therefore understand why, according to Rashi, both opinions can be halakhically authoritative, each in subtly different circumstances. If in fact the truth is complex and each opinion represents an aspect of the truth, then it is logical that the practical halakhic ruling should sometimes be determined by one facet of the truth and in other circumstances by another. According to this theory, the true meaning of halakhic pluralism is not that each opinion has its own parallel truth, but rather that any human opinion can, by definition, only contain part of the ultimate truth. "These and these are the words of the living God," because only by adding together all of the partial truths represented by the disparate halakhic perspectives can we come close to the ultimate truth.[3] An oft-quoted parable illustrating this idea speaks of four blind men and an item that they struggle to identify. One blind man feels the item and declares that it is a wall. Another claims that it is a tree trunk. A third identifies it as similar to a fire hose, while the fourth claims that it resembles a vine. It may seem like they disagree about the identity of the item in question, but in fact, if they combine their perspectives they might realize that they have encountered an elephant -- whose body is broad and high as a wall, whose legs are thick and round as a tree, whose trunk resemble a fire hose, and whose tail is similar to a vine. Only by combining the partial truths represented by each perspective can we properly understand reality. According to this approach, we understand why different schools throughout Jewish history had consistently different perspectives on Halakha. For example, Beit Hillel was almost always lenient compared to the pervasive stringency of Beit Shammai. This is not because Beit Hillel had an agenda of leniency and Beit Shammai one of stringency. Rather, as Maharal pointed out, God created people to think differently and endowed each of us with his own personality, perspective, and ways of thinking. Beit Hillel were spiritual optimists who naturally saw the good in everything and appreciated the aspect of permissibility in various halakhically questionable matters. Beit Shammai, on the other hand, were natural pessimists, who saw the authentic aspect of spiritual danger in various halakhic matters. Any person or school can, by definition, only see part of the truth, and God created each of us to be able to recognize a different aspect of the ultimate truth. It is therefore no wonder that throughout Jewish history we find that halakhic decisors rule in accordance with their particular perspectives. This is not evidence of a political agenda corrupting the pristine halakhic truth, but rather the proper workings of the halakhic process. Everyone sees his aspect of the truth, from his own perspective, and then, by combining all of those aspects, the later generations can achieve a holistic perspective that approaches the complete divine truth. Rereading of the Ritva """"""""" "" """ """"" In light of this interpretation, perhaps we can offer a different understanding of the Ritva cited in the previous shiur. Perhaps the Ritva's intention was not that God has no opinion as to the correct halakhic interpretation and left it up to the arbitrary whims of the Sages of each generation, but rather that the multifaceted nature of truth leaves room for flexibility within the halakhic process. The Kli Yakar,[4] following the approach of Maharal, explains that since there are different sides to every issue, the majority vote of the Sages of any particular generation combines with that aspect of the truth which corresponds to their decision to constitute a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of their ruling. In other words, it may be that in one generation God intended for a certain matter to be permissible, because the aspect of permissibility is most relevant to the circumstances of that generation, while in another generation God meant for the same matter to be forbidden, either because in the circumstances of that generation the pernicious effects of such action are more pronounced, or because that generation could easily be stringent and avoid an action that has even a slight negative aspect. Indeed, throughout Jewish history, halakhic authorities have permitted certain actions based on the needs and circumstances of their time and place, while other generations forbade the same actions. Perhaps this is what the Ritva had in mind. The halakhic process does not arbitrarily come up with rulings that are convenient for the communities who request them. Rather, in different generations, a different facet of the truth might shine more brightly relevant to the circumstances of that generation. Therefore, God told Moshe Rabbeinu that the final decision would be left to the Sages of each generation, who would be able to intuit which facet of the truth was most relevant to their time and place, and thus discern the true will of God for their contemporaries. Understanding the History of Halakha """"""""""""" """ """"""" "" """"""" This perspective on halakhic pluralism leads to a deeper understanding of the history of Halakha. The majority of the halakhic questions discussed in the Shluchan Arukh are subject to dispute, and there is perhaps no chapter of the Shulchan Arukh where the later authorities do not disagree over the proper interpretation of the gemara or the application of Talmudic principles to new circumstances. Often, the final ruling of the Shulchan Arukh or the later authorities will be a compromise, such as ruling that a matter is permissible but one who is spiritually sensitive should be stringent, or that we forbid something but in cases of monetary loss we are lenient, or that there are those whose custom is to permit and others whose custom is to be stringent. One could take a cynical view of this process and see the entire history of Halakha as an exercise in confusion and ignorance. One could conclude that we don't know the right answer to any of the difficult halakhic questions, and we constantly hedge our bets in practice because we can't figure out the right answer. However, according to the approach we have elucidated, the history of Halakha is not an accumulation of ignorance and confusion, but rather an exercise in sophistication and a gradual unfolding of a multifaceted truth. If reality is complex and the world is not black and white, then the Halakha should be complex as well. Accordingly, when commentaries argue regarding the correct halakhic ruling, this represents not a lack of clear knowledge but a deeper knowledge of the multivalent truth about this particular halakhic matter. The complex rulings of the later poskim are the proper applications of that multifaceted truth. When the negative aspects of a certain matter clearly outweigh the positive aspects, we rule for practical purposes that it is forbidden. Likewise, when the positive aspects vastly outnumber the negative aspects, we rule that it is permitted. But at times, when both facets are significant, we will emerge with a sophisticated ruling that reflects the complexity of the issue, and we will be lenient in some circumstances and stringent in other circumstances, depending on the exact balance and relative strength of the conflicting aspects. The complex rulings that emerge from the halakhic process are thus reflections of authentic truth, which is necessarily complex and dependent on the circumstances. This perspective on halakhic pluralism also gives us new insight into the role of the individual in the halakhic process. According to the approach we have elucidated, the voice of every Torah scholar contributes one facet of the truth, which may not have been revealed even by other scholars who are greater and more learned than him. The Maharshal writes that these and these are literally the words of the living God, because every Jewish soul was present at Sinai and received a unique revelation of a unique perspective on the Torah suited to his particular soul.[5] If the Maharshal is correct, then every Jew possesses a unique share of revelation, and our understanding of Torah is enriched by the contributions of every Torah scholar, whether great or small. Additionally, we can emerge with a deeper understanding of the relationship between different Torah scholars or schools of thought. Based on the approach we have elucidated, the relationship between conflicting halakhic opinions is not a battle between truth and falsehood, or even a competition between different valid options, but a partnership between complementary truths that need each other for their completion. It is thus clear why Chazal tell us that Torah scholars who battle fiercely in the intellectual arena emerge from the encounter as loving friends, for each side can find ultimate completion only in the wisdom of its rival. Summary """"""" Based on Rashi and Maharal, we have understood that truth is complex and multifaceted, and that each side of a halakhic debate represents an authentic facet of the truth, but never the entirety of the ultimate truth. Any individual can only see one facet of the truth, and therefore only the combination of the different opinions of the multitude of Torah scholars can capture the multifaceted truth of the Halakha as applied to the complex world in which we live. These and these are the words of the living God because each opinion represents a facet of the true will of God as revealed via the Torah. The process of halakhic debate and the complex rulings that emerge from the interplay of the different opinions thus represent not a lack of clarity, but a sophisticated expression of multifaceted truth. This idea is expressed beautifully in the introduction to the Arukh Ha-Shulchan, a halakhic code that emphasizes the range of views among the earlier authorities. He explains that the Torah is metaphorically called a song because the beauty of music emerges from the harmony of the different voices in the choir. If the choir all sang the exact same notes, they could never produce beautiful music. Likewise, the true grandeur of the Torah is only revealed by the interplay of conflicting interpretations, which combine to form a glorious whole.[6] ---- FOOTNOTES: [1] Ketubot 57a. [2] R. Yehuda Loew ben Betzalel of Prague (Poland and Czech lands, c. 1520 -- 1609), Be'er Hagola, part 1. [3] This understanding of "these and these are the words of the living God" is consistent with its usage in aggadic contexts in Gittin 6b, where the actual story of the concubine in Giva combined both opinions as to the nature of her wrongdoing. Likewise, Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 27a, uses this phrase in the context of the debate regarding the date of Creation, combining the two opinions to conclude that God planned the Creation in Tishrei and carried out His plan in Nissan. Maharal, however, holds that the phrase "these and these are the words of the living God" refers only to disputes like those of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, where the two facets are of precisely equal strength. Only the passage in Chagiga, which states that the disparate opinions "are all given from one shepherd... from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He," refers generally to all halakhic disputes. [4] R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz (Eastern Europe, 1550-1619), Kli Yakar, Devarim 17:11. In this passage, he also uses this concept to explain why the Rabbis can abrogate Torah law in emergency situations. He explains that because even a forbidden matter possesses a minor aspect of permissibility as well, that aspect can be relied upon in emergency situations. [5] R. Solomon Luria (Poland and Lithuania, 1510-1573), Yam Shel Shlomo, introduction to Massekhet Bava Kama. [6] R. Yechiel Michel Epstein (Lithuania, 1829-1908), Arukh Ha-Shulchan, introduction to Choshen Mishpat. From sholom at aishdas.org Tue Mar 26 10:41:14 2019 From: sholom at aishdas.org (Sholom Simon) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 13:41:14 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini Message-ID: The Biur Halacha holds that irui k'li sheini can cook kalei habishul -- if the water is yad soledes bo (if lower than yad soledes bo, then he's not sure) RSZA holds that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, and therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits everything in a k?li shlishi. My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? *If* he holds, like RSZA, that that a k?li shlishi has the same status as irui k?li sheini, then he would hold that an irui k?li sheini doesn't cook. But that would be against the Biur Halacha. It would seem that the only other option is that he agrees with the Biur Halacha (that irui k'li sheini cooks) but disagrees with RSZA (that they don't have the same status), and therefore RMF would hold that: "yes, al pi the Biur Halacha, irui k'li sheini can cook, but contra RSZA a k'li shlishi never cooks." Am I thinking this through correctly? Thoughts? Thanks, -- Sholom -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From JRich at sibson.com Tue Mar 26 17:58:26 2019 From: JRich at sibson.com (Rich, Joel) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 00:58:26 +0000 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. Message-ID: [Email #1] While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. [Email #2] Rashi in Megilah 23b sv rashei chadashim is interesting -- do we have any idea who added the parentheses quoting Tosafot? I also assumed that Rashi goes on at such length because there is no source in the bavli that talks about women only not doing work on rosh chodesh. KT Joel Rich From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:07:04 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:07:04 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] women not doing work on rosh chodesh. In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327070704.GA16694@aishdas.org> On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 12:58:26AM +0000, Rich, Joel via Avodah wrote: : While the Shulchan Aruch mentions the practice of women not working on : Rosh Chodesh in OC 417,His wording was of particular interest -- I have : not found this practice mentioned in the Rambam but was wondering if : anybody else is aware of him mentioning it. According to his BY, it's in the Rif and the Rosh. As for the wording... IIRC, it was an Ashkenazi minhag. Apparently the SA liked it and wished Sepharadios would adopt it as well. Thus his "shenohagos lo laasos bo melakhah hu minhag tov". He couldn't actively require a minhag his target audience didn't accept, so the Mechaver advertises for it. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "Someday I will do it." - is self-deceptive. micha at aishdas.org "I want to do it." - is weak. http://www.aishdas.org "I am doing it." - that is the right way. Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Reb Menachem Mendel of Kotzk From micha at aishdas.org Wed Mar 27 00:16:48 2019 From: micha at aishdas.org (Micha Berger) Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 03:16:48 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] irui k'li sheini In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20190327071648.GB16694@aishdas.org> On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 01:41:14PM -0400, Sholom Simon via Avodah wrote: : RSZA holds that a k'li shlishi has the same status as irui k'li sheini, and : therefore one may not put an egg, tea leaves, halei habishul, etc. into it : as long as it is yad soledes bo. (So, use tea essence to make tea, e.g.) : RMF holds that a k'li shlishli doesn't cook anything. (You don't need tea : essence). My understanding is that the Yalkut Yosef also permits : everything in a k'li shlishi. "Keli shelishi" is modern coinage, not an actual halachic category. So the question is whether the list of keli rishon and keli sheini is because a keli shelishi is too far removed to be worth discussing (RMF, ROY), or if it is a keli sheini -- all non keli rishon are alike (RSZA). If we look at irui keli rishon as being an extreme case of keli sheini, then the MB is taking the latter position as well. Irui keli sheini is irui into another keli sheini, and therefore it's all keli sheini. : My question is: where does RMF (and/or ROY) stand on irui k'li sheini? And if my description of the lomdus is something I remember from a reliable source (I remember hearing it; can't remember where), they would have to be meiqil. The MB's chumerah is based on the other sevara. Tir'u baTov! -Micha -- Micha Berger "The most prevalent illness of our generation is micha at aishdas.org excessive anxiety.... Emunah decreases anxiety: http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation; I will Fax: (270) 514-1507 trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya From michaelpoppers at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 18:59:42 2019 From: michaelpoppers at gmail.com (Michael Poppers) Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:59:42 -0400 Subject: [Avodah] A Purim Thought From Rav S. schwab Message-ID: In Avodah V37n21, RDrYL quoted from the Hakhel bulletin: > remember that 50 Amos high tree-- look up to its top < What happened to not being able to Halachically 'see' above 20 *amos*? -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From meirabi at gmail.com Sun Mar 31 22:40:59 2019 From: meirabi at gmail.com (Rabbi Meir G. Rabi) Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 16:40:59 +1100 Subject: [Avodah] Spare Cohen Spare Wife of Cohen Message-ID: at the start of Mishnah Yuma why is there a discussion re the spare Cohen's wife which concludes Im Kein Ein Ledavar Sof but no such conclusion with the Cohen himself and his spare Cohen Best, Meir G. Rabi 0423 207 837 +61 423 207 837 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: