[Avodah] AN INSTANCE OF THE 7th KIND OF CONTRADICTION IN THE MOREH NEVUCHIM

[H Lampel]

On 7/3/2018 2:31 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> The Rambam of Strauss doesn't see himself as a heretic. Rather, as the
> continuation of existing tradition, if an esoteric one the masses can't
> handle. So, why wouldn't he think that Chazal believed similarly to
> he did and also hid their truth in contradition? Especially since they
> (unlike the Yad or the Moreh) already contain metaphor and parable?

I have not really studied Strauss. But in almost every description of the
Strausian approach I've seen, the Rambam, to avoid persecution, secretly
believed in Aristotelian eternity, a belief the Rambam vociferously fought
against as heretical, one that would undermine the entire Torah. And
it portrays the Rambam's 7th kind of contradiction as his hint that he
would be thereby secretly conveying this hidden heretical actual belief.

> the mal'akh the donkey saw could really be
> there. Although how the donkey could reach the level of knowledge the
> Rambam would say would be necessary to experience a seikhel nivdal like
> the mal'akh is beyond me. Leshitaso, was that the big neis?

L'fi HaRambam, the entire episode was Bilaam's vision. He saw this
story, including the donkey's seeing the angel and speaking to Bilaam
[which was actually happening in the spiritual world, as you explain]
being played out, meant to teach him the lessons he was meant to learn.
This is how Abarbanel (on MN 2:42) explains the entire episode of the
angels visiting Avraham, Sarai being in the tent and preparing food, etc.

>: (b) the term "angel" sometimes refers to a natural force. And a support
>: for the latter point can be found for those who subscribe to the Ramban's
>: premise.

> I think this is a distinction without a difference. An angel is an
> intellect that imparts impetus to a physical object that then moves or
> otherwise makes some potential, actual.

> It is therefore both a thing of the spiritual world and a natural force.
> Natural forces have their metaphysics, which are spiritual, and in
> Aristo's metaphysics, intellects.

I agree. But it's enough of a chiddush that the Rambam makes a point
of it.

> [RZL wrote:]...
>: Friedlander's inaccurate translation:
> ...
>: Pines' translation is more accurate:

> I do not know Medieval Judeo-Arabic well enough to compare the English
> against the original and say which is more accurate.

> What I am missing is what is material about the difference in translation.
> How does Pines's or your version's better buttress your thesis?

As I wrote,
>     The Rambam is explicitly speaking of contradicting /premises/ used
>     to give evidence for a point, not contradicting /points/. ...

The Rambam is not saying that he will be secretly contradicting
himself about the point he is expressly making. Only that sometimes,
to support that point, he will use premises that contradict premises he
uses elsewhere.

> the concluding points being made are all true, and do not
> contradict (if not in cases where one of the other reasons for
> contradictions apply).

In their Hebrew translations, Ibn Tibbon, Shem Tob, Efodi, as well as KPCH
speak of contradicting hakdamos. Pines accordingly speaks of contradicting
premises. Friedlander, however, speaks of contradicting solutions: "on
one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that
the metaphysical problem be ‎treated as solved in one way, it may be
convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite‎way."

Zvi Lampel