[Avodah] staam daat

[Akiva Miller via Avodah]

R' Joel Rich asked:
> ... Is there an equivalent theory in interpersonal issues? (e.g.,
> I want you to take possession of this object, whatever chazal
> says works, that’s what I want to think/occur). [related to daat
> makneh and koneh issues]

I think Mishne Berura 649:15 might be exactly what you're looking for. I am
paraphrasing him, and he was paraphrasing the Magen Avraham and Pri
Megadim. But basically, the point is:

>>> Suppose it is the first day of Sukkos, and you want to use someone
else's lulav, but you can't, because on the first day you need to own it
yourself. So l'chatchila, the best option is make it explicit that you want
to acquire his lulav in a "matana al m'nas l'hachzir" (gift on condition of
returning) manner.

>>> But b'dieved, if you borrowed it in a "stam" manner so that you could
be yotzay with it, then we presume that he gave it to you intending to do
it in whatever manner would allow you to be yotzay, namely, "matana al
m'nas l'hachzir".

>>> However, if you explicitly used the word "borrow" rather than "gift",
then you would not be yotzay. Also, if the lulav's owner is unaware that a
borrowed lulav is pasul, it would not work then either.

(End of Mishne Brura.) Here's my commentary: There are two requirements for
"stam daas" to help us here. The first is that the conversation must be
vague, because if it were explicit we would not be able to assign a meaning
to the words.

But the second requirement is very relevant to RJR's question: The lulav's
owner has to be aware that a borrowed lulav is pasul. If the owner does
have that awareness, then we say that his stam daas was to grant ownership
to you. But if the lulav's owner is not aware of this halacha, then his
stam daas is to *lend* the lulav, which would not be valid. We see from
this that "stam daas" is not a magic wand that can be applied conveniently
to any vague comment. Rather, it is applied with a lot of care and
understand of what the person's likely intention really was.

Please read the MB yourself and see what he means. Even better, check out
the MA and PM that the MB was summarizing (because I did not go into that
much depth. Maybe over Shabbos.)

[Press Pause button... Okay, continue...]

I have now reread RJR's post, and I noticed that while the MB ruled how the
halacha views these two people and the lulav, RJR's post is much more
"me"-oriented. He asks about the case where
> I have in mind “whatever HKB”H wants me to have in mind
> without actually knowing what that is ..."

It seems to me that this is an explicit vagueness. If "stam daas" works
where outsiders are trying to figure out what Ploni probably meant, it
should certainly work where Ploni himself is being deliberately vague.

I never studied Logic to the depth that R' Micha and other have, but even I
can see a serious flaw in the above paragraph. In the MB's case of the
lulav, the owner had *something* in mind, and we are presuming to know what
it was. But in RJR's case, the individual made an effort have nothing in
mind at all, and I can easily understand someone who says that this simply
won't work.

I would suggest this as a practical solution: One should never say simply,
"I have in mind whatever Hashem wants me to have in mind," because that is
essentially admitting that he really has nothing in mind. Rather, one
should use an explicit tenai: "If Hashem wants me to have A in mind, then I
do have A in mind; but if He wants me to have B in mind, then I do have B
in mind."

Akiva Miller





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