[Avodah] Geonim, Rambam and Other Rishonim on Mesorah and Pesak and RMH's essay

Micha Berger via Avodah avodah at lists.aishdas.org
Mon Nov 21 14:07:27 PST 2016


[In a private email, RZL sent me some sources in the original: the
Maharal, the Chinukh #78, Chagiga 3b [highlighting Rashi], and Berakhos
19b [highlighting R Nisim Gaon]. I put them up at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/mesorahPsakSources.pdf>
-micha]

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 12:41am EST, RZ Lampel wrote (instead of sensibly
sleeping):
: RMB:
:> Pashut peshat in Chazal is that machloqes is understood in these
:> terms as well.

:> "Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim, vehalakhah keBH."

: You take it as " pashut peshat"that "divrei E-lokim chaim"means 
: "true [despite being contradictory]," but the rishonim I will cite 
: below hold that what you consider "pashut peshat" is not correct peshat.

I am not sure what you mean by this last sentence -- that pashut peshat
is NOT as I take it, so there is no indication that both shitos are
truely what Hashem Said? Or that this is pashut peshat, but you will
bring rishonim to meet the burden of proof that correct peshat isn't
what the words would seem to mean to the naive reader.

More sources the gemara from the Y-mi already cited about 49 ways to find
something tamei and 49 ways letaheir has a parallel in TB Eiruvin 13b
before getting to the famous bad qol of "eilu va'eilu".

See also Gitin 6b: Eliyahu tells R Aviatar that HQBH discussed both
sides of his debate with R Yehudah about pilegesh begiv'ah. RA himself
said the levi was getting rid of her because he found a zevuv. R Yonasan
said he found a hair.
    Amar Lei: Chas veshalom! Umi ika sefeiqa qamei Shemaya?
    Amar Lei: Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim hain

He found a fly but wasn't maqpid about it, and he found a hair, over
which he was maqpid.

Notice that eilu va'eilu is being used to mean both sides are true. This
is an actual historical question, not even one in din. But thanks to
there being many ways to look at someone's motives, both sides could be
true even while appearing to contradict.


Chagiga 4b: "Ba'alei asufos" (Qoheles 12:11) -- there are the talmidei
chakhamim who sit in many gathings and are osqin baTorah. These are
metam'ei, and these are mitaheir. These make asur, and these make mutar.
These make pasul, and these make kasher.

Should a man say -- how can I learn Torah from now?

Talmud lomar: "Kulam nasnu miRo'eh echad." One G-d gave them, one
source/leader said them, miPi Adon kol hama'asim barukh Hu.

As it says (Shemos 20:1), "Vaydaber E-lokim es kol hadevarim ha'eileh".


I really find it pretty compelling -- that simple peshat in Chazal is that
H' literally gave us both shitos.

I would have preferred to have this conversation in a more organizaed,
shelav beshlav, fashion.

But since you rushed off that groundwork I was trying to lay about the
non-compelling nature of Western Classical Logic and consequently how
many shitos were given at Sinai, I will reply to your other points.

: MAHARAL

: You invoke the Maharal, but the Maharal (be'er HaGolah, be'er rishon) 
: explains that halacha is like Hashem's creations...

    ... And Hashem yisbarakh created everything, and He created the
    matter so that is has in it 2 bechinos. Only when it comes to
    halakhah lemaaseh that there is no doubt that one is more iqar than
    the second, like the Acts of H'. Even when something is a compound,
    in any case this is not like the other -- one is more central. For
    wood, which is a compound of four elements, the overpowering iqar
    is the element of wind, as is known.

The first two sentences (before the highlight in your scan) make the
point that I was trying to lay down in that first, groundwork email --
Hashem gave us both shitos. Is this not a reinforcement of the literal
read of evilu va'eilu? Hashem made 2 bechinos, and only when it comes
to lemaaseh we have to choose one.

...
: CHAZAL

: You haven't addressed my point that every Gemora's kushya, or at least 
: every tiyuvta-tiyuvta, is assuming the Law of Non-Contradiction....

Because halakhah requires a single pesaq. I think you are assuming that
"tiyuvta" must mean that we cannot find the one shitah given at Sinai and
then presenting my not sharing that assumption as question.

Tiyuvta could mean we cannot figure out which shitah is more consistent
with other pesaqim already made. It could mean any of a lot of different
ways we reach a stalemate.

: Aristotle was wise enough to recognize the truth of this logic, that is 
: to his credit. But it is a logic that everyone from Adam to Moshe 
: Rabbeynu and on has been expected to use to determine truth. Chazal 
: taught the Sinaitic rule that if two pesukim are in contradiction, a 
: third one comes to qualify them, to add conditions to one or both of 
: them so that they no longer contradict.

But this is a rule of derashah. Meaning, you can decide which shitah
to make halakhah using the kasuv hashelishi.

I pointed out cases where Aristo's logic doesn't work. (Quantum Physics
neither, but I don't think that's more than a curiosity for this discussion.
Quantum uncertainty and its violations of De Morgan's Laws are far smaller
than the bugs we ignore in our water.)

That was a central point of that email. In a real world, where categories
have fuzzy edges, and when dealing with the human condition ride with
antinomies, dialectics and ambivalence, two-values logic doesn't work.

Point 2- Halakhah doesn't conform to the Classical 3 Laws of Thought when
    it comes to safeiq.

Point 3- Pashut peshat would lead you to believe the same is true WRT
    shitos in machloqes. And thus the burden of proof is on those who
    want to show a rishon does not believe on such plurality.

Then in the followup email (part II) I intended to show that the burden
is not met.

: RASHI
...
: When Rashi (Kesubos 57a) explains eilu v'eilu by saying /sometimes/ this 
: consideration is appropriate and /sometimes/ that one is, because the 
: considerations change over according to /slight changes in 
: circumstances/...

Both are true, and sometimes a slight change in circumstance would change
which we should follow lemaaseh. (In Maharal-speak, which yesod becomes
iqar.)

:                 he is working with the logic that "2 or more 
: contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the 
: same time not (A and not-A)." And that is why he says that if there two 
: Amoraim are arguing over what their mentor held, one of them is saying 
: "sheker,"and we /cannot/ apply "eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim" to 
: such a situation.

But when the machloqes is over sevara rather than the contents of a quote,
neither is sheqer.

Here's a related quote from R Tzadoq haKohein, Resisei Laylah #17:
    Whenever a new thing about the Torah is found by a wise person,
    its opposite simultaneously arises... When it comes to the realm
    of po'el, it cannot be that two [contradictory] things are true
    simultaneously. In the realm of machashavah, on the other hand,
    it is impossible for a person to think about one thing without
    considering the opposite,

...
: When RITVA on the same daf quotes Rashi as the correct peshat, it is 
: because he too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction .(Yes, the 
: same Ritva who elsewhere quotes the kabbalistic teaching about Moshe 
: being told 49 considerations pointing to opposite conclusions,  but who 
: concludes that "that is correct by way of drash, but in the derech 
: ha-emes there is ta'am v'sod ba-davar." And pardon me, but I cannot 
: accept that any one of us can decipher what he means, either in the 
: beginning or the end.)

This is not some qabbalistic esoterica -- it's in both Talmuds and Mes
Soferim! Chazal benigleh say that Moshe was given both set of arguments.

You want to argue that these rishonim did not take those gemaras at
face value, do so. But "I cannot accept" or our inability to decipher
is insufficient reason to take a gemara at anything but what it says.
When the Ritva is confusing, we should start by assuming that whatever
he means, it's consistent with the gemara. Especially when he himself
quotes it.

And as I already noted, it makes sense to me to read this Ritva as
talking about being correct in terms of derashah (emes la'amito), but
not the way to pasqen. Which is why he quotes a gemara about acharei
rabbim being a rule to pick between two shitos each given -- with their
numerous raayos -- to MRAH.

But in any case, I was arguing that any take on Rashi or the Ritva
that says that Hashem did not give us multiple shitos ion Sinai is the
side that needs proof. And you fail to give any; you just express your
inability to accept the alternative.


: RAMBAN on Devarim 17:11 says that one should not be afraid to follow 
: Beis Din Gadol even if one thinks they erred...          He is working 
: with the assumption that the mikreh has a specific intent that is 
: subject to error.

Or a range of valid intents that a Sanhedrin could miss. Or, like the
amoraim who argue over a quote, they mistake what the rov of an earlier
Sanhedrin pasqned, and they are not greater bechokhmah uveminyan. Or...

Saying there can be multiple right answers doesn't mean all answers are
right. (That way lies Conservative Judaism...)

Which ties in to what I said above about tiyuvta. 

: TOS RABBEYNU PERETZ (Eruvin 13b)begins by taking eilu v'eilu as you do, 
: but cannot accept it because it is illogical. "If something is assur it 
: cannnot be muttar, and if something is muttar it cannot be assur." He 
: too is working with the Law of Non-Contradiction. He therefore concludes 
: that Eilu V'eilu merely means that one must follow the chachmei hador. I 
: take it that he means that both shittos of a machlokess are worthy of 
: consideration.

Or, that both are emes, but you cannot in practice hold both.

: SEFER HACHINUCH states that by commanding us to follow the majority 
: opinion, the Torah teaches us the fact that the majority opinion will 
: always conform to the truth more than the minority.

Well, we can't be surprised when the Chinukh follows the Rambam...

But like the Ritva, "the truth" doesn't necessarily mean "the sole shitah
given at Sinai". Once the idioms emes le'amito and emes lehora'ah exist,
a Non-hyphenated use of the word "emes" doesn't prove a rishon read in
a non-literal read of the gemaros.

Really, though, I expect the Chinukh did indeed follow the Rambam on
this too.

:> Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 4:2 (a similar passage in Tractate Sofrim
:> 16:5): R' Yanai said: Had the Torah been given decided, we wouldn't
:> have a leg to stand on. Where? "And Hashem spoke to Moshe." He said
:> before Him: Master of the World, tell me what is the halakhah. He
:> responded "Decide according to the majority...." So that the Torah be
:> interpretable 49 ways tamei and 49 ways tahor.

: I don't have peshat in why we would be at a disadvantage if we were 
: explicitly given a pesak for each and every situation that may arise. 

... aside from it being physically impossible. Not a limitation on the
RBSO, but on human language. There isn't enough room on the planet for
microfilm of text to cover every possible case.

: Probably the thought is that it would be beyond out ability to carry all 
: those details and instead we were given klallim through each situation 
: could be halachically solved. This does not contradict the fact that 
: there is a correct conclusion to reach for.

Except that you're working with a Hashem gave both conclusions to Moshe.

: Heavenly revelations are no longer valid for determining halacha.Why 
: then was there a bas kol by tanur shel Achnai? Among the explanations 
: given are two by Rav Nissim Gaon ( (Brachos 19b). (1) When the Bas Kol 
: declared the halacha follows R. Eliezer b'kall makom, it meant usually, 
: but not necessarily here, or someting similar. (2) It was a test for the 
: Chachamim to withstand the temptation to transgress the principle of lo 
: bashamayim hee, similar to when Hashem grants a false prophet the 
: ability to perform a miracle (or the appearance of one).

It was a test, because halakhah lemaaseh is acharei rabbim. But do you
really think the RBSO lied to them? And if the point is to find the emes,
why would there be a rule that halakhah lemaaseh is sety by acharei rabim,
against what the RBSO reveals?

This is takeh a question on the Chinukh. If acharei rabbim is just to
maximize the chance of being correct, hayitachein a neis wouldn't outrank
rov? The Chinukh would have to say HQBH lied lekhavod R Eliezer,
misled them by giving a general kelal that in this case didn't hold.
Which could well be valid grounds for meshaneh es ha'emes.

But that's a pretty big structure for me to make up there.

...
: --you invoke the RAN, and cite RMH's translation, which ends
: > Yet [God] also gave him a
: > rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor the majority
: > opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit, for the decision
: > had already been delegated to them...
...
: The last sentence reads, in Hebrew,
: /aval massar lo klall yivadda bo ha-emmess/.
...
:   But [God] gave him a rule /through which one knows the truth/, 'Favor 
: the majority opinion'...

: And the context removes all doubt that the Ran explicitly denies that he 
: is referring only to "Emes leHoraah.vs Emes leAmito. To wit (and this 
: is again something I already cited last time but repeat again.

How do you get that? The Ran says "the decision was delegated" to the
sages of the generation. How would that be anything but emes lehora'ah?
A fact finding mission wouldn't place delegation over any other tool
at your disposal. (As I asked about the tanur shel akhnai.)

: In Drash 5 and 11 the Ran poses a quandary:
...
:> The Torah took means to prevent a misfortune that can always arise, and ‎
:> that is the divergence of opinions and the creation of machlokess, ‎
:> almost creating a situation of two Torahs. The Torah's remedy for this ‎
:> ever-present danger was to hand over to each generation's Sages the ‎
:> right to resolve halachic questions. /For in the majority of cases this ‎
:> will result in both a remedy [of the problem of machlokess] and the ‎
:> correct decision/.... And even though there is the extremely remote and ‎
:> practically absurd possibility that they may make a mistake, the Torah ‎did
:> not concern itself with that remote danger. The risk is worth taking for ‎
:> the benefit accrued.‎

>From just before that, in derashah 5:

    It is a known fact that the entire Torah, written and oral, was
    transmitted to Moses, as it says in the tractate Meggilah, R Hiyya
    bar Abba said in the Name of R. Yohanan: The verse:...and on them was
    written according to all the words...." teaches that HQBH showed
    Moses the details prescribed by the Torah and by the Sages...
    The 'details' provided by the rabbis are halakhic disputes and
    conflicting views held by the sages of Israel. Moses learned them all
    by Divine Word with no resolution every controversy in detail. Yet
    [HQBH] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor
    the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit,
    for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
    'And you shall come to the priest the Levites , and to the judge
    that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".

Moshe got both shitos, with no pesaq.

    Yet [HQBH] also gave him a rule whose truth is manifest, i.e., 'Favor
    the majority opinion'....as the sages of that generation saw fit,
    for the decision had already been delegated to them as it is written:
    'And you shall come to the priest the Levites , and to the judge
    that shall be in those days' and 'You shall not deviate....".

Which is the Y-mi.

In any case, is not the point of the Ran that metaphysical truth does
not decide halakhah? That even if beis din picks the metaphysically
more damaging shitah, following pesaq is more important?

The Ran is explaining why the law of contradiction would not apply to
halakhah even if it applies to metaphysics. Not that one shitah is
divrei E-lokim Chaim and the other not, since he oturight says MRAH
got both shitos, with no pesaq "every controversy in detail".

...
: Down to the Yam shel Shlomo, who wrote (Introduction to Bava Kamma) 
: "Never did two opposite predicates for one subject escape the lips of 
: Moshe" ("shelo yatza hadavar mipi Moshe l-olom lihyos shnei hafachim 
: b-nosei echad")...

Which he contrasts with that which is deduced from what Moshe said
    ... because nothing emerges from the seikhel hapo'al,
    which does not arise sensible seconds and thirds.

(Sounds kind of like R Tzadoq, no?)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             You are where your thoughts are.
micha at aishdas.org                - Ramban, Igeres haQodesh, Ch. 5
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507



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