[Avodah] Rambam omitting sources and Rambam regarding Prophecy (Was: Re: Prophecy)

[H Lampel via Avodah]

> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 09:53:02PM -0400, H Lampel via Avodah wrote:
>: The Rambam, in his response to the criticisms of R' Pinchas HaDayan,
>: addressed this issue explicitly...

>:> See how explicit it is! -- that it is /improper/ to mention anything but
>:> the finally decided-upon halacha alone, and it was only necessary to
>:> mention opposing opinions during those times that some practiced one
>:> way, and others practiced a different way, when some obtained the law
>:> according to one sage's opinion, and some according to another sage's
>:> opinion...

On 8/1/2016 5:19 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> I am unclear how the Rambam gets this peshat in the mishnah.

> Edios 1:4 says the motive for mentioning both shitos in machloqesin
> between batei Hillel veShammah is "to teach future generations, so that
> a person does not stand on his words. For even the avos holam did not
> stand on their words."

> To teach middos, that others learn for Beis Shammai's (and occasionally
> BH's) example about how to lose a machloqes. Middos without which the
> kelalei pesaq wouldn't work.

First, to clarify, the mishna's question is why the previous mishna(s)
mention(s) the opinions of Shammai and Hillel (not Beis Shammai and Beis
Hillel) *l'batala/l'vatlan,* i.e. when they only to go on to report that
both opinions were ultimately rejected by the Sages.

And in explaining the answer, M'leches Shlomo and Tifferess Yisroel
do take the subjects of "'lo omdu" to be Shammai and Hillel, and
understand the mussar lesson and how we get there as you presented it,
but Rambam (followed by Tos. Yom Tov) and Raavad take the subject of "lo
omdu" to be the Sages, who despite the status of Shammai and Hillel,
the "avos ha-olom," rejected both Shammai and Hillels opinions when
presented with a vetted testimony as to the final decision of the previous
links in the mesorah (and in one case despite the lowly occupation of
those who presented it.) The mussar-lesson is a different one (although
not, of course, a conflicting one).

But to the point of your question: In any case, the Rambam's point is
that the premise of these mishnayos, which their answers do not abandon,
is that the Mishna was primarily composed to present the contemporary
settled and unsettled decisions, not to report formally rejected opinions
and who held them, and only reported disputes if Rebbi considered them
still unsettled, or if people were still somehow practicing the rejected
halacha . The previous three aberrational mishnas are meant to teach
a mussar lesson and are the exceptions that prove the rule. The Rambam
explains that in his Mishneh Torah he follows this system, and we see
that he also only rarely presents a mussar lesson. The issues unsettled
in Rebbi's time were mostly settled since through the darkei pesak of
the Gemora, and the practice of rejected opinions ceased, and so the
Rambam inscribed the legitimate halachos in his Mishneh Torah without
noting the opposing opinions or practices of the past.

> 1:5 goes on to explain other rejected opinion, is particular daas yachid
> when there is a rabbim, although it could be other quashed opinions
> equally.

> And this is because some day, there may be a beis din empowered (gadol
> mimenu bechokhmah uveminyan) who may choose the other side.

Again, not quite the Rambam's payrush on the mishna. The Rambam and
Raavad in his first payrush take it that the first Beis Din, after
deliberation, ultimately accepted the daas yachid. The chiddush is that
a later Beis cannot override the decision of the first Beis Din, *even
to resurrect the former Beis Din's original daas rabbim,*without being
gadol mimmenu b'chochma u-b'minyan. The Raavad supports this payrush
with the Tosefta on this mishna, although he does go on to suggest your
take as an alternate one. (And even so, this limitation, according to
the Rambam (and followed by Tos. YT) is only speaking about laws that
are not derived through darshonning pesukim.)

> Speaking even more generally, the AhS makes a point in preserving the
> full fuzziness of the law. You don't know when you might need a senif
> lehaqail or a din for a seh'as hadechaq, and you need to know the full
> field of divrei E-lokim chaim.

According to the Rambam's letter, this is the function of Gemora, but 
not a halacha code such as the Mishna or his Mishneh Torah.

> The Rambam's desire to avoid that fuzziness derives from his uniquely
> Accumulative approach to halakhah. The majority of rishonim believe
> that halakhah is Constitutive. IOW, the Rambam believes correct pesaq
> is discovered by the poseiq, whereas the dominant position is that it is
> invented. To the inventor, other positions are pieces that go into
> the construction. To the discoverer, they are wild geese to chase.

"Invention" is an ill-chosen word, although if it is to be used at all
it would apply to the Rambam's explanation of a Besi Din Gadol's ability
to re-evaluate the meaning of pesukim. The enterprise of the Tannaim,
Amoraim, Geonim and all Rishonim is to identify (without utilizing
post-Sinaitic Heavenly revelations) and follow the principles behind
the decisions of the previous links of the mesorah, tracing them back to
Sinai to apply them to current situations. I don't understand what you
mean by rishonim using "pieces" to "invent" or "construct" halachos in
a way different from how the Rambam does so. Can you give any specific
examples of pesak contrasting Rambam's with the alleged dominant position?

Zvi Lampel