[Avodah] Geonim, Rambam and Other Rishonim on Mesorah and Pesak

H Lampel via Avodah avodah at lists.aishdas.org
Sun Sep 11 14:21:20 PDT 2016


On 8/16/2016 5:21 PM, RMB wrote:
> Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rambam omitting sources and Rambam regarding Prophecy

> Do you agree with RMH, though, that they do described what 
> machloqes and pesaq are in very different ways? He provides 
> translations and
>
...

My response:

For clarity's sake, Here's his thesis:

There are three incompatible views about what G-d revealed regarding
the details of the mitzvos, each of which leads to different views as
to what Chazal thought they were doing when determining halacha:

1. Retrieval: G-d revealed every single detail about how to perform
mitzvos and/or the halachic status of things and people in every
conceivable situation, but over time some information was lost. Chazal's
job was to retrieve the lost information through argumentation (and also
attach unlost oral material to its source in the Written Torah). This
he attributes to the Geonim.

2. "Accumulative": G-d did not give complete instructions as to how to
decide the halachic status of things and people in all situations,or
how to perform the mitzvos. Chazal in each generation, by their own
reasoning and by utilizing drashos of pesukim determined the halachic
status of things and people and determined heretofore unknown and unstated
details and requirements as to how to perform the mitzvos. Each generation
accumulated new information. He claims this to be Maimonides' view, and
that Maimonides was the first to assert this, in a departure from the
Geonim. And associated to this is the view that in generating halachos
through darshonning pesukim, a Beis Din Gadol has the right to differ
any previous one, regardless of stature.

3. Constitutive: G-d did not reveal any details of mitzvah observance.
He only provided numerous "panim," legal principles some of which
would lead to one halachic conclusion in a given situation, and some
of which would lead to a different one. This he attributes to Ramban,
Ran and others.

I don't agree, and looking back at a previous thread,(Re: [Avodah] Daf
Yomi raises doubts about the mesorah) beginning at V32 #8, I see you are
also ambivalent/ conflicted over it. You accept that the Rambam denies
that anything G-d revealed at Sinai could have been lost (I don't accept
that) but, putting aside what Rambam's position was, you suggest that all
three views of what Chazal thought they were doing in determining halacha
are compatible with each other. I agree not only to the possibility, but
I maintain that the sources confirm it. The primary sources he cites are
scant and present only a partial representation of their authors' views.

To wit: According to the template, to whom would one attribute the
following two statements?

‎

    1. [The sages of the Talmud] also had other ways in their talmudic
    ‎teachings to show how [there are] chiddushim (new things) and ‎anafim
    (branches)...and they darshonned verses and established ‎new halachos
    and tolados... ‎

    ‎2. A Beis Din may actually nullify the words of its fellow Beis
    Din, ‎even if it is not greater in wisdom and number....The Mishnah
    ‎that states that a Beis Din may not nullify...is [only] talking
    about ‎gezeyros and takkanos [but not interpretations of scripture,
    which ‎a lesser Beis Din may overturn].‎

Of these two quotes, both of which refer to laws newly derived by
‎hermeneutical inferences, the first was written by Rav Sherira Gaon
(Iggeres) ‎‎and the second by his son, Rav Hai Gaon.‎ ‎ The first is
no different in meaning ‎from the Rambam's reference to "norms that
were innovated in each generation -- ‎laws that were not received by
tradition -- but [were derived] through a midah of ‎the thirteen midot."

Just as the Rambam taught that when the sages generated ‎halachos through
darshonning pesukim and at times differed in their ‎interpretations,
they were dealing only with halachos that are "anafim," ‎‎"branches"
of what was received, so too Rav Sherirah Gaon taught that the sages
‎produced "chiddushim (new things) and anafim (branches)...and they
darshonned ‎verses and established new halachos and tolados." By no
means was the Rambam ‎‎"the first to claim that alongside the received
tradition from Moses, the sages ‎introduced new interpretations of the
Torah of their own invention."‎

And just as the Rambam famously stated that a Beis Din Gadol could
disagree with the drash of an earlier one, and posken differently,
even if it was inferior Beis Din, Rav Hai Gaon stated the same, and was
probably the Rambam's source.

And according to the template, to whom would one attribute the four
following statements?

1)Together with every mitzvah that /HaKadosh Baruch Hu/ gave to Moshe
Rabbeynu, He gave its /payrush/...and everything included in the
posuk...This is the meaning of the statement, "The general principles,
the particulars, and the details of the entire Torah were spoken on
Sinai" (/Sifra, Vayikra /25:1)," namely, that those matters which may
be extracted through the interpretive rule of "the general reference
written in the Torah followed by a particular reference," or through
any of the other interpretive rules, "were received by us through Moshe
[who received them from God] on Sinai."

2)Every /halacha/ Rebbi wrote [in the Mishnah] without attribution
consists of the words of other sages. And those other sages were speaking
not their own minds, but [reporting] from the mouths of others, and the
others from others, until Moshe Rabbeynu....the law is not the words
of the individual mentioned in the Talmud, such as Abbaya or Rava,
but is from multitudes, from the mouth of multitudes... [not as is
claimed by the] /Minnim/, who accuse us of basing ourselves upon the
words of individuals.

3)/Temura/states "1,700/kal vachomers /and /gezeyra shavvos /and /dikdukei
soferim /became forgotten during the days of mourning for Moshe, but
even so, Othniel ben Kenaz retrieved them through his /pilpul/...

4)Because of the long years and exile, the correct /teruah/ sound of the
shofar [required by the Torah] became doubtful to us, and we therefore
do it several ways.

Contrary to what one would suppose from the proposed template, ‎all four
passages, which refer to every detail being revealed to Moshe, ‎the laws
stated by the sages of the Talmud originating with Moshe Rabbeynu, ‎and
to eventually lost details being retrieved or made up for, were written
not by ‎any of the Geonim, but by the Rambam. It is simply untrue that
"according to the ‎Maimonidean accumulative view, the role of legal
reasoning is ‎not to retrieve but to derive."

As for the third view attributed to Ramban and the Ran, it is simply false
to say that either of them held that since the court ‎defines "what is
right and what is left" these rishonim held Chazal do "not recognize
an a-priori right and left.‎" On the contrary, both rishonim refer
to an original intent by Hashem as to the halachic status of objects,
and of course itis that intent that Chazal strove to uncover. A complete
reading of the Ramban (Devarim 17:11) and the Drashos HaRan 11 will show
that they held that the obligation to obey Beis Din rests in the supreme
confidence that in a given situation and time, the Beis Din is correctly
corresponding to the original intent.

One must strive to get a complete picture of a Gaon's or rishon's
position, and not stop at some broadly-worded statements, ignoring further
qualifications. This is especially so when the statement is responding
to an opposing opinion (such as that of the Karaites) that entailed
strongly-expressed verbiage. The Karaites accused Chazal of fabricating
"mi-libam" halachos and methods of scriptural interpretation. They
understood that a legitimate interpretation of pesukim, and that a
legitimate maintenance and analysis of the statements of past authorities
would not constitute fabrication. The response of the Geonim and Rishonim
was that the latter was the case with Chazal, and in that sense, what
Chazal said was not fabrication, but indeed the revealing of the original
intent of the revelation.

The Rambam begins the fifth chapter of Hilchos Teshuva with the
broadly-worded principle that Hashem never, ever, ever interferes with a
person's free will, yet goes on to qualify this in the seventh chapter.
In Moreh Nevuchim (the 7 kinds of contradictions), he explains such
methodology as a necessary educational tool.

We should not be simplistic in understanding the position of either
the Geonim, the Rambam, or Ran or any rishon, based upon an incomplete
collection of their broadly-expressed statements.

Zvi Lampel




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