[Avodah] Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin

[H Lampel via Avodah]

R. Micha Berger maintained that R. E. Wasserman was not positing a 
formal proof for G-d's existence, formal proofs not being the only way, 
or even the superior way, to establish truths. I cited a passage in the 
Moreh Nevuchim to support this concept. But as is occasionally the case, 
R. MB disagrees with me, even when I attempt to defend him:

ZL: Indeed, the Rambam himself in the Moreh Nevuchim recognizes this

: distinction and supports the superior validity of the non-formal

: approach. Chapters after he devotes chapters to formal philosophic

: proofs for Creation ex nihilo, he describes how a healthy (and

: unbiased) mind thinks:

:

:And know that one of the strongest proofs for Creation ex nihilo, //for 
//one who ismodeh al ha-ememmes// (RMB substituted an ellipsis for this 
:crucial clause)

:is his confirming the fact that every one of all natural entities

:serves a specific purpose, with each one benefiting still another;

:and that this fact is a proof for the purposeful intent of an

:intender, and that such purposeful intent necessarily implies the

:production of something new [and not something that always existed

:along with the one who bears the purposeful intention for its

:existence]. (MN 3:13)

RMB: There is here an actually a reference to a formal proof. The Rambam 
recaps a point made in 2:19-20.

In 2:19-20 Rambam makes no reference to each component or entity in 
nature providing a benefit for another, and certainly does not use that 
there as a proof for Creation ex nihilo. *(Section II is devoted to 
developing the argument against a naturally necessary eternal world 
based on ''particularization,'' the differing formations and behaviors 
of things despite their being made of the same materials.) *

**

*Perhaps you are referring to the fact that in both the argument there 
and here the crucial concluding step invokes the mindset that purposeful 
intention on G-d's part (which Aristotle as well attributes to G-d) 
indicates *a changeable will on His part (which indication Aristotle 
denies) that allows for and indicates Creation ex nihilo. But just as in 
3:13 the Rambam describes that crucial mindset as something that is 
possessed by those who are modeh al ha-emmess, so too in 2:19-20 the 
Rambam first describes it as something that is ''pashut'' (KPCH) or 
''mevuar" (Ibn Tibbon), which he will then proceed to demonstrate 
through more formal proof:

It has already been shown that according to Aristotle... the Universe is 
not the result of intent of choice and desire; for if this were the 
case, they would have been non-existing before the intent had been 
conceived. We [proponents of Judaism—ZL], however, hold that it is 
/pashut\mevuar/ that all things in the Universe are the result of 
intent-not-of necessity; and it is possible for that Intender to change 
them and have a different intent.

But in this chapter, my intent is to show by arguments almost as 
forceful as real proofs, that the Universe gives compelling evidence of 
being [freely] intended by an Intender:

RMB: And for that matter, if the Rambam was talking about not really needing

formal proof, despite spending much of sec. II on just that, why would it

be buried in a chapter that focuses on something else?

I did not posit that the Rambam's intent was to make the point that 
formal proof is unnecessary. That indeed is not his purpose. After all, 
the explicitly stated primary purpose of the Moreh is for those (himself 
included) who yearned to defend and support the mesorah through 
philosophical approach of his day. He is not interested in dismissing 
the project.

He explicitly describes this /modeh al ha-emmess/ statement /as a 
tangential interruption/: After that statement, he says, ''I will now 
return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the ultimate cause [i.e. 
the purpose behind the universe being as it is--ZL].''

My point was that we nevertheless see that the Rambam recognizes that 
there is another approach to verifying truth, namely that which follows 
the non-formal mindset of those who are /modeh al ha-emmess/. It is a 
reference to those who do not restrict their acceptance of truth to 
things provable through formal logic, settling for healthy, unbiased 
reasoning (and who thereby see the truth of Creation ex-nihilo as a 
simple conclusion from the fact of the purposeful hierarchy of nature).

RMB: 3:13 is about how the universe has its own purpose. It is not just 
an arena designed for the purpose of humans. He argues here with Aristo 
who says that plants exist for the purpose of animals, and in general, 
that things exist for the purpose of other things.

He does not argue with Aristotle on this point, as is clear in the 
passage from 3:13 that I originally quoted, and as he elaborates in the 
introduction to his Mishnah commentary.

The disagreement (outside of the parenthetically mentioned one) revolves 
around the /ultimate/ purpose behind the existence of everything, and 
the question of why the intermediate steps in this world that lead to 
its finale of the hierarchy must exist, rather than the finale existing 
alone.

(According to Aristotle, every component of nature is simply a necessity 
whose non-existence is absolutely impossible. It is impossible for G-d 
to maintain anything but the universe and its entities as they are. 
According to the Rambam, although every sub lunar being contributes to 
the existence of another such being, until we get to Man (and then the 
Ish Shalem), G-d could nevertheless have created that final being 
directly, without creating the intermediary plants and animals. Why He 
in His wisdom decided to do it as He did, and why he decided to create 
the heavens as He did, we cannot know.)

RMB: Besides, the Rambam writes in 3:51 in the mashal of the palace, that

people who believe because of tradition without having proof are like

those who wander around the chatzer, whereas someone with a proof is

like one who entered the prozdor.

The ''modeh al ha-emmess'' proof, building upon careful observation of 
the world and and its components and creatures and theorizing as to how 
it all works, is also a proof. The inferior knowledge that does not lead 
to optimum closeness to Hashem is pure tradition without proof.

Not[e] Aristo's epistomology didn't analyze issues of proof vs other

justification. But clearly Reliabilism, trusting an idea found in a

source that has already been found to be reliable (hama'aminim ... derekh

qabalah), is not being considered good enough justification to fully

accomplish life's goal.

I did not refer to emunah b'derech kaballah. That's not what I meant by 
''ha-modeh al ha-emmess.'' I meant what I said: the healthy thinking of 
an unbiased mind, meaning the thinking of such a mind informed by 
knowledge of the things that exist in the world and their behaviors, and 
explanations of how they operate.

Zvi Lampel



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