micha at aishdas.org
Sat Mar 30 19:52:26 PDT 2013
(BTW, if you keep the subject lines more constant, people could more
readliy follow the discussion in the archive.)
My position is my understanding of the Rambam as explained by RYBS: that
halachic authority stems from the acceptance by the masses of a ruling
based on halachic theory.
On the one side, this puts me at odds with RMR, who believes that halakhah
should be what's reasonable to me. Which implies that there is no binding
nature to rulings my community accepted that do not make sense to me.
On the other side, Lisa is arguing that I should not be bound by the
authority of accepted legislation or interpretation, but by the Truth.
Which of course means the Truth as I determine it to be -- and so
the two discussions overlap. But my main concern in my discussion with Lisa
is whether a halachic ruling based on errors in fact are still valid
and binding halachic process. IOW, that the process is about the legislation
and interpration of law, not fact, and thus can have incidences where the
law requires something we wouldn't have mandated had we known the facts
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 04:40:12PM +1100, Meir Rabi wrote:
: Reb Micha suggests that it IS a Chiddush as we can see from the Gemaras
: need to justify Rav's breaking the convention --
: "Rav tan hu upalig" is only necessary because otherwise it /would/be a
: And I say that ANYTHING that is a change from what we are familiar with is
: a Chiddush. I was and continue to refer however, to Chiddush as in change
: from the Gemaras and the Halachas basic principles, which are that we MUST
: stand by our own understanding and conclusions. So the REAL Chiddush is
: that such a convention was initiated and implemented.
Only to someone who accepts your given, rather than using the existence
of the convention as a proof that deferring does NOT violate any "basic
principles", that in fact, thinking for yourself is of value because
talmud Torah is of value, but not always the right way to decide halakhah.
: Reb Micha also disagrees with the principle that we MUST stand by our
: understanding of Halacha and not just accept the rulings of those we
: consider greater than us.
: Reb Micha suggests that perhaps this Chiyuv does not apply at all times. He
: proposes that there are those who are far more informed and far more in
: line with the right modes of thinking to decide Pesak and we should
: therefore suspend our own judgement.
No, I said there is no such chiyuv. We follow a law. Law means at times
being bound by what others legislated or interpreted.
: Otherwise Lo BaShaMaYim Hi.
??? Who said we should listen to prophecy? Irrelevent quote.
On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 02:02:28AM +1100, Meir Rabi wrote:
: R Arie deems my example as a proof that dismantles my argument, namely,
: that even if BD erred or even intentionally declared rosh chodesh on the
: wrong day, their date is binding.
: But I must disagree. On the contrary, IN SPITE OF THE FACT that they were
: entitled to Pasken as they please re Rosh Chodesh, and consequently which
: day is YKippur, nevertheless, he did not insist that they eat and make a
: LeChaim to compel compliance; how much more so in a case where this special
: power is not given to BD i.e. to Pasken and make a determination even when
: they know it is wrong.
R' Gamliel made him violate hotza'ah (aside the derabbanan of muqtzah)
on YK. Is that different than had it been an invitation to a se'udah?
And it's clear from R' Aqiva's response that the point was to force him
to accept BD's qidush hachodesh. Not just make a reconciliatory display.
I just don't think the power to be meqadeish the chodesh is one of pesaq,
and that this is generalizable to pesaq. Also, as per R' Aqiva's citation
of a calendar-specific pasuq.
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 07:45:17AM -0400, Meir Shinnar wrote:
:> I disagree. See my most recent blog post
:> The topic is the implications of the difference between a legislative
:> process and a fact-finding one, including the need to think in terms
:> of what gives a ruling authority, not what makes the most sense from
:> a historical or scientific perspective.
: Wadr, while the Sanhedrin, & probably tannaim & amoraim, are viewed as
: having real legislative powers, the legislative authority of I rishonim
: & achronim is in general viewed as quite limited to communal takkanot -
: & is normally NOT applied to the general halachic process.
Legislation and interpetation. In general I was careful to write both.
You picked up one of the few times I didn't remember / bother. As above,
I'm following RYBS in the assertion that the pesaqim in the SA have
[non-absolute but real] authority because the Rambam's statement about
a community accepting a halakhah applies to both new legislation and
to interpretations of existing law.
: The question of trying to understand what the Gemara & poskim meant -
: especially in terms of realia - has a long history - & I doubt you will
: find anyone prior to, say, 1800, who will so readily disassociate Halacha
: from objective truth or discounted attempts at discovering past practices
: - whether search for artifacts or manuscripts...
I though I forestalled this argument by (1) showing how many rishonim
were Constitutivists, ie believe that the law is defined by pesaq,
not pre-existing to be discovered by posqim; and (2) even the sole
known (to me) non-Constitutivist rishon, the Rambam does himself follow
the authority of the qabbalah of the ge'onim over the computed year
If you can explain why you do not believe Shemittah 1:4-6 isn't a
pre-10th cent example of accepting halachic process produced results
over a computation of truth, I would appreciate it.
I also mentioned the mizbeiach in bayis sheini that was based on a pesaq
about nisuch which would invalidate the mizbeiach in bayis rishon. And,
for that matter, the tubes in the mizbeiach in bayis sheini also would
be excluded by pesaq in use during bayis rishon. Were AKhG not yotzei,
because they didn't know the old-style mizbeiach? And if so, why didn't
chazal switch back once they realized the switch happened?
: The closest to rmb's position comes from the chazon ish's position that the fate of certain manuscripts, texts,& practices reflect divine hashgacha - which is thematically related to
: the idea of continuous revelation..
Or the source I gave -- the Rambam's haqdamah, as explained by RYBS.
Which has nothing to do with siyata diShmaya. Not that I am denying the
notion -- just saying that I didn't go there. My whole point was that
halakhah is created by communal endorsement of a textual halachic-process
based pesaq, not by Divine Approval, not by historical study of prior
states of halakhah, etc...
: The idea of the community being able to determine its own norms to
: achieve meaning & redemption is appealing, but has a history. I doubt
: RMB is truly willing to endorse it..
I think you are inviting me to conflate textualism and mimeticism more
than the Rambam would.
Micha Berger Today is the 4th day
micha at aishdas.org in/toward the omer.
http://www.aishdas.org Netzach sheb'Chesed: When is Chesed an
Fax: (270) 514-1507 imposition on others?
More information about the Avodah