[Avodah] The Main Idea of Judaism

[David Riceman]

RCL:

<<But even before one gets to analysing the words of any of the 
meforshim, think the issue through. If you have a situation where a 
women (let us say a married woman) is initially raped (let's say she was 
asleep and in no way solicited it) and then woke up and started enjoying 
it (let's say it was somebody whom maybe she would have fancied, but 
would never have done anything about because she does not believe in 
committing adultery - I am trying to make the case a bit believable) - 
then, according to you the act would change midway from something where 
she is blameless to something where she is blameworthy? Is that your 
contention?>>

No, I think there are two loopholes.  The first is passivity, and the 
second is coercion.  R. Yohanan's hava amina in the Yerushalmi is that 
the only legitimate response to coercion is passivity, and his 
conclusion is that one can be coerced into participating.

> <<I am not disputing that the Maharasha and Tosphos could be read as 
> understanding that the reason that Yael was praised was because she 
> did not enjoy the encounter>>

No, she's praised because she was doing it for a positive goal; the lack 
of enjoyment is what makes her act qualitatively different from the acts 
of the Imahos.

Me:
>> <<Admittedly Hazal's explanation of why she didn't enjoy it is cryptic: "d'ka
> shadi bah zuhama (Yevamos 103b)",>>
RCL:
> <<Well, it is only really cryptic if you insist on understanding hana'ah as
> relating to pleasure. That is clearly one way of understanding hana'ah (and
> clearly one that jibes better with the modern mind), but it is not the only
> one.  An alternative way (although I admit it is a difficult one for the
> modern mind, as we do not understand relations this way) is to translate it
> as benefit.  Ie there is as a side effect, a (and this is where your
> physical reality comes in, although it is not an *act* of the woman)
> physical benefit to a woman from relations, they are actually good for her,
> even if she does not solicit or want them - but only of course if you don't
> get zuhuma in the process.  Once you do, then the side effect benefit goes
> out the window and so clearly Yael was more praiseworthy than the Imahos,
> who got this side benefit.>>

  I don't understand the point your making.  Surely she could get both 
benefit and disadvantage from the same encounter, just as she could get 
both pleasure and pain from the same encounter.  It's the absolute lack 
of hana'ah, whether pleasure or benefit, which induces the heter, not 
the net disadvantage.

Incidentally, I still find the concept of zuhama cryptic (more below).
> <<Now, again I think you are misreading this Tosphos, but to 
> understand this aspect, you need to go to the gemora in Baba Kama 
> which this is drawn (32a). The gemora there makes a husband liable for 
> any damage that he does to his wife during the course of tashmish. But 
> a query is raised, why is it the husband's problem and not the wife's, 
> since the husband is permitted to have tashmish - answer - but it is 
> only the husband who is doing an act - "kavid ma'aseh", so he is 
> responsible for hurting her, and she bears no liability.>>

Admittedly this is a plausible reading of the gemara there, but, as you 
say below, it makes no sense.  See Rabbi Heller's comments on the Rosh 
ad. loc. (Pilpula Harifta S.K. reish); he suggests an okimta: that the 
gemara is discussing only the case where she is passive.  And, indeed, 
the language of Tosafos fits Rabbi Heller's okimta.

And this suggests that we're arguing about whether the gemara construes 
passivity as a normative description of how women behave during 
tashmish, as you imply, or whether it's an option, but by no means an 
exclusive option, as I think they imply.  See Rabbi Heller's evidence 
from Massaches Kallah (evidence, if we needed any, that he was a hacham, 
since he cited Masseches Kallah in a halachic context).

> <<But the problem with that is if you take it too far, as I suggested 
> in my earlier post, then you ought to get women off scot free from 
> committing adultery, because they never do any act, it is always the 
> man doing it all.>>
And here you've made it explicit.


<<Note by the way that the Tosphos further up on Nazir 23b (d"h "Tamar") 
also supports this understanding, the gemora describes Tamar has having 
"zinsa" and Tosphos's comment is "niskavanan l'shem shamayim .." that is 
why she is praised - it is her kavana that makes it different from the 
situation with Zimri, who also zinsa.>>

I agree that this is a puzzling gemara: it's especially puzzling 
according to your opinion, since Zimri was male and Tamar was female.  
But there are many other differences - - the one similarity is that 
neither Tamar nor Kozbi was married (even if you think there was zikas 
yibum kodem matan Torah that is at worst a lav).  I'll brood about that 
one some more.
> <<In a way this gets into the hutra d'chuya discussion. But consider 
> this scenario. Let us say that Yael had relations with Sisera because 
> she found him overwhelmingly attractive and didn't like her husband 
> much - but the consequence was that Sisera was weakened and able to be 
> killed. Now according to you and your understanding of the Maharsha, 
> is what Yael did still OK? If Ok, would she still be praiseworthy? She 
> would still seem to have got zuhuma.>>
I'm at a disadvantage here because I don't know what zuhama is.  As I 
implied before, however, I think the gemara's point is that it's not a 
situation where you have to balance advantages and disadvantages - - if 
there is zuhama she won't find him attractive.

> <<A related case, if you want a modern one, might be if somebody 
> wilfully and deliberately was mechallel shabbas but in doing so saved 
> somebody's life>>
See Menachos 64a, H.Shegagos 2:16, "nafal tinok bayam upireis metzudah 
l'ha'alos dagim v'he'elah tinok".  There are four options there (two 
leshonos about what Rabba and Rava were disputing). Again I think this 
is a red herring; the mahlokes there is about whether he needs to bring 
a korban, our gemara is discussing the purity of Yael's action.

<< Note also that your understanding of the Maharsha would seem to 
suggest that any woman having relations, even willingly and solicited 
relations, with somebody who would give her zuhuma would not be 
technically prohibited (and there are billions out there today, so it is 
quite a heter).>>

I agree that that follows; as I said before, I don't know what zuhama 
is, but I think, by definition, no one would voluntarily accept it since 
it implies the absence of any pleasure (or benefit).  So it's not much 
of a heter unless your primary goal is rebellion against God, for which 
there are many more pleasant resources.

<<Does it really not matter what is going on somebody's head?>>

Where did I ever say that? What I said was that I do math for pleasure 
and that is not a kiyum mitzva.  RLL implied that I ought to do math as 
a form of avodas hashem, and I pointed out that that attitude, taken to 
an extreme, deconstructs the central trope of mitzva and aveirah.  You 
cited "gadol aveirah lishmah" as a certified form of such a 
deconstruction, and I showed that the Maharsha demonstrated that it 
wasn't actually referring to an aveirah.

Shogeig vs. meizid, however, clearly are defined by what's in a person's 
head.

David Riceman