[Avodah] Purchase of Tzitzit by a Messianic

[Micha Berger]

R' Ben Hecht posted the following. I thought it would make a solid
conversation piece.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

JVO: Purchase of Tzitzit by a Messianic
Tuesday, 3 July, 2012

Jewish Values Online (jewishvaluesonline.org) is a website that asks
the Jewish view on a variety of issues, some specifically Jewish and
some from the world around us -- and then presents answers from each
of the dominations of Judaism. Nishmablog's Blogmaster Rabbi Wolpoe and
Nishma's Founding Director, Rabbi Hecht, both serve as Orthodox members
of their Panel of Scholars.

This post continues the weekly series on the Nishmablog that features
responses on JVO by one of our two Nishma Scholars who are on this
panel. This week's presentation is to one of the questions to which
Rabbi Hecht responded.

* * * * *

Question: My girlfriend runs a business selling hand-spun tzitzit
(fringes for a ritual prayer shawl). Recently, a customer asked her
if he could send her his tallit (prayer shawl) and have her tie the
new tzitzit directly onto it. She agreed, but was surprised to find,
when the tallit arrived, that it was a Messianic (a non-Jewish, fully
Christian group that usurps Jewish ritual and incorrectly incorporates it
into non-Jewish worship) tallit, complete with a New-Testament quote on
the atarah (the neckpiece). Would it still be OK to sell tzitzit to this
customer? On the one hand, we're profiting from an arguably idolatrous
practice, but, on the other, she's helping a (presumably) fellow Jew
(albeit an apostate one) fulfill the mitzvah of wearing tzitzit. What
Jewish values are at work here? And what should we do?

Rabbi Hecht's answer

(A Caveat - While there are actually a variety of halachic issues embodied
within this scenario, I have chosen, in response to this question, to
focus solely on the issue of a Messianic Jew attempting to do a mitzvah
[as I believe that to be the essence and purpose of this question from
which we should not deviate]. I would ask the reader, as such, not to
necessarily form conclusions of my opinion in Jewish Law regarding other
aspects of this question. In the same vein, I have also not considered
the possible repercussions in secular law, if there are any, for refusing
to service or sell to a specific customer in these circumstances. By
extension, I also did not deal with issues related to when there may be,
as such, a conflict between secular law and Torah law.)

There is a fallacy in the minds of many Jews that Halacha is solely
about practice and not thought. As such, many Jews have the incorrect
idea that intent in the performance of a mitzvah is irrelevant; that
the focus of Jewish practice is solely on behaviour and not what one
is thinking. This, however, is not the case. T.B. Rosh Hashanah 28a,b
(amongst other places in the Talmud) discusses the concept of mitzvot
tzrichot kevana, questioning whether, to count as a fulfillment of a
mitzvah, an act must be performed with the proper intent or not. For
example, if someone happens to pick up a shofar on Rosh Hashanah and blows
into without any thought that he would thereby be fulfilling a mitzvah,
would this blowing of the shofar be deemed to have fulfilled the command,
the mitzvah, to blow shofar on Rosh Hashanah? The conclusion of Jewish
Law is actually no. Especially in regard to Biblical commandments, the
dominant view within Halacha is mitzvot tzrichot kevana, to fulfill
a command an act must be done with proper intent that one is thereby
fulfilling the Will of God. As such, given that this person would not be
wearing tzitzit with the proper intent, in approaching this question we
should first recognize that there is no argument that through providing
the tzitzit this woman would be helping a fellow Jew fulfil a mitzvah. She
would not. Should she, though, still, do this? Can she do this?

T.B. Pesachim 50b (again amongst many other places) raises the idea of
lo lishmah bah lishmah, that a deed even if performed without the proper
intent may eventually still lead to a performance with the proper intent
-- and, as such, performance without the proper intent should still be
encouraged. This argument was actually one of those at the root of the
Lubavitch tefillin campaign - that even though it could not be guaranteed
that those putting on tefillin had the proper intent, there was still a
possible educational or behavioural value in promoting this behaviour
although, without the proper intent, it could not truly be defined as
a mitzvah. (An additional argument that Lubavitch presented was that,
in these circumstances, the minority opinions that declared that proper
intent was not necessary in fulfillment of a mitzvah should also be
relied upon.) Perhaps one could maintain that a similar argument of lo
lishmah bah lishmah would be possible in our case and that it would be
appropriate to supply this tzitzit as this behaviour may lead to an
eventual proper fulfillment of this mitzvah with correct intent. The
further problem in this case, however, is that we are discussing what
would be halachically defined as a negative intent.

In regard to the discussion of mitzvot tzrichot kevana, while the debate
focused on proper intent or simply no mitzvah intent, it was generally
accepted that if there was negative intent - intent not to do a mitzvah,
not to fulfil God's Will, intent for some idolatrous purpose - there would
clearly not be a mitzvah. This is the case here. We are not just dealing
with a case of no intent or a secular intent (such as, for example,
blowing a shofar because one simply wants to blow a horn).

In our case, the intent is further problematic for it represents a
contrary theological perspective than that of Halacha. One would not
just be wearing tzitzit for some other reason but with a reason contrary
to Torah thought - one, it could be said, is using the law in a way to
defy the law.

The fact is that Jewish Law looks very negatively on the usurpation of
Jewish religious ideals by foreign religious concepts especially if done
by a Jew. Perhaps the most powerful example of this is the Shulchan Aruch,
Yoreh De'ah 281:1 which states that a Sefer Torah written by a heretic is
to be burnt. Even though, this Sefer Torah contains the name of God and,
in every detail, looks exactly like any other Sefer Torah, the call is
not just to not use it and not just to bury it but to actually destroy
it. Intent matters, even to this extent. A holy object such as a Sefer
Torah created with intent contrary to the recognition of its specific
holiness within the parameters of Torah thought is to be burnt. The
bottom line, as such, would be that there would seem to be no Jewish
value in providing this tzitzit to this individual. In fact, it would
be contrary to Torah values to do so.

So the straightforward answer would seem to be that you should not
affix this tzitzit to this prayer shawl or in any way be involved in
his manipulation of Torah into another religious system. In affixing
this tzitzit to this tallis that reflects the views of another religion,
one would really be called upon to desecrate Torah values and it would
be clearly inappropriate. What if, though, the Messianic simply wished
to buy the tzitzit and would affix them himself (or get someone else
to do so)? My belief is one should still refrain from doing this as
well, especially given the knowledge that the tzitzit would not be used
properly. The issue here is not simply that you would be assisting a
fellow Jew in doing an aveira, a sin, but also that you would be involved
in the desecration of a Jewish religious object.

Simply, Torah standards do not allow for you to be involved in providing
tzitzit in this manner.

I should note in conclusion, though, that within cases such as this,
a further consideration must always be the unique, personal situation.

Perhaps, for example, through this sale you would be making a connection
with this person and as a result perhaps could lead him away from these
views contrary to Torah. The issue is actually a much broader one. How
can anyone who sells Jewish religious items know for certain that all
his/her customers will use the purchased items respectfully? Yet, if
every time someone went to purchase an item of this nature they would
face a third degree interrogation the result could be a strong decrease
in interest in Torah. Every case of this nature has unique policy
considerations and, as such, it is important in such matters to consult
a Rabbi to discuss the particular circumstances and to determine the
best possible alternative. Still, even the desire to do something good
and bring a person back to the fold does not allow for transgression,
especially of such a serious matter as profaning Jewish religious objects.

Posted by Rabbi Ben Hecht at 6:19:00 PM
Labels: JVO

1 comment:

4 July, 2012 10:15 AM
Ben of Ben's Tallit Shop said...

As an online tallit and tzitzit dealer, I have often been in a similar
situation.

I appreciate Rabbi Hecht's thoughtful response, but I was a bit puzzled
by Rabbi Hecht's extended discussion of proper intent when performing a
mitzvah, since the Gemara specifically addresses the case of a non-Jew
who wants to buy a garment with tzitzit, and tells us dealers to refrain
from selling to them - but not for reasons that have anything to do with
their intent in performing the mitzvah.

That said, I cannot understand why, if you assume the customer in question
is in fact Jewish, you would refrain from selling the tzitzit. How can
you keep a Jew - even a terribly wayward Jew - from doing a mitzvah?