[Avodah] kosher switch

[Chana Luntz]

RET writes:

> While R. Rosen writes against the kosher switch, I note that Zomet does
> allow the use pf a dishwasher on shabbat subject to several restrictions
> 
> http://www.zomet.org.il/Eng/?CategoryID=250&ArticleID=105
> 
> Anyone know how accepted these conclusions are?

In theory or in practice?

In theory, I can't see anybody disagreeing with Zomet on this one on
*halachic* grounds (unless you consider disabling the safety switch a
pikuach nefesh risk and hence a halachic ground), unless you accept Rav
Moshe's position that we should not do anything with time clocks set before
Shabbat except lights.  

In practice, what Zomet have written is almost certainly not practical, as
it involves getting an engineer to disable the safety switch on the
dishwasher.  Now that is clearly not just a hassle, but, while safety
standards might well be lower in Israel than they are, for example, in the
UK, I would be extremely surprised if you would find a CORGI registered
electrician here who would be prepared to go disabling a safety switch of
this nature.  Such safety switches are put in for a reason, and I would have
thought it was not worth it for them to risk their reputation by doing so.
Not to mention that even if there is no pikuach nefesh risk in disabling
this, you would probably invalidate your house insurance policy, at least
vis a vis the dishwasher.

But I agree with RMB here, there is no comparison between a setting a time
clock *before* shabbas on a dishwasher that will then come on during shabbas
without any further human intervention, and a switch which involves the
element of human activity to occur on shabbas.

Where there may be a level of comparison is between setting a time switch on
a dishwasher before shabbas where the safety switch on the dishwasher has
*not* been disabled.  Because there you have one of the ways (albeit the
least innovative way) that this switch apparently attempts to avoid grama -
ie the removal of an obstacle.  

As I understand it, the discussion regarding grama centres on two cases: (a)
throwing wheat up into the air whereby the air separates the wheat from the
chaff.  This is an av melacha issur d'orisa, despite the fact that it is not
the human being who does the separating, but the wind, so arguably this
should be grama and permissible.  (b) if there is a fire, placing in front
of the path of the fire some barrels filled with water, because, when the
fire reaches them, it will burst them open and cause the water to come and
out and extinguish the fire.  This is understood by the gemora to be grama
and permissible on shabbas (at least, according the standard Ashkenazi
interpretation in a case of great need, such as the need to put out a fire).

Now it has been argued that even the case of the fire involves putting
something (ie the barrels) in front of the fire, thus ultimately causing the
barrels to break and the fire to go out, but that if it was merely a matter
of removing an obstacle (ie let's say that these barrels happened to be
anyway in the path of the fire, but there was something else in the way that
would divert the fire from them, and you took that something else away) that
is a step beyond what even the gemora describes, and thus can be understood
to be even better than grama, and hence (arguably) even according to the
Ashkenazi position, mutar l'chatchila.

Now note that in fact this psak of Zomet's regarding dishwashers clearly
rejects the idea that merely taking away an obstacle is better than grama
and hence mutar, because that is what is involved with dishwashers when you
do not disable the safety switch.  That is, even if you set the time switch
before Shabbat, so long as the door is open, the safety switch would operate
(if the power were on) to prevent the dishwasher working.  So by closing the
door (an action you will do on Shabbat) you would be taking away the
obstacle (open door) that prevents the dishwasher from working when the
power ultimately comes on, and this Zomet holds is not permissible.  On the
other hand, I believe there are others who do allow the removal of an
obstacle (ie shutting the door) even not in a case of great need (and noting
of course that this idea that you need great need to do grama on shabbas is
a Rema, so that, according to most Sephardi poskim, certainly shutting the
door on shabbas that might ultimately lead to the dishwasher working is
permissible).

But, it seems to me, the more innovative bit about this kosher switch is the
introduction of randomness.  The point being that, if you toss a coin, you
have a 50% chance of not getting a head.  If you toss it again, then you
only have a 25% chance of not getting a head on one of those two times.  If
you toss your coin again and again and again, the chances of you not getting
a head at least once gets smaller and smaller and smaller.  BUT the chance
that you never get a head remains (and will remain until infinity).   So in
theory this kosher switch might *never* work, it just means that the
probability of it never working gets smaller and smaller and smaller the
longer time goes on (and the more coin tosses are done).  Up until now, all
analysis' of grama, as far as I am aware, assume certainty of operation.
Indeed RYBS's analysis of what constitutes grama would seem to me to be
particularly impacted by this, because it particularly assumes a definite
force in motion, and it seems difficult to say that one has a force in
motion if at any particular time there is only a fifty per cent chance that
something will happen, depending on a coin toss (note that, as I have
written on this list before, I remain to be convinced that RYBS's analysis
actually works for the two cases in the gemora, or, at least to the extent
that it does, that the logical conclusion is not that eg adjusting time
switches on shabbas are not then within the permissible form of grama - ie I
remain to be convinced that using the analysis of RYBS, one gets to the
conclusion of the impermissibility of time switches that is generally drawn
from his analysis.)  But even assuming the correctness of the analysis as
people such as RHS assume it to be, it seems to me that this particular
addition marks a major extra fact that an RYBS type analysis needs to
grapple with, because the force that will turn the timeswitch on is not in
motion, and will not be set in motion unless and until a head has been
thrown.  It seemed to me that RGS missed this whole aspect in his discussion
on Hirhurim.

Now you could say that even winnowing relies on a level of randomness, since
winds are notoriously random, and the wind in question might just drop just
as you threw the wheat in the air.   But that is clearly a different level
and nature of randomness than only having something work (eg a wind blow) if
a coin is tossed and lands on heads.  It doesn't seem to me that Zomet in
this letter (or RGS) has really grappled with the implications of this
particular part of the switch.  That is not to say that there are not other
reasons not to use light switches even if they could be designed to be
halachically compliant (minhag yisrael is also a powerful halachic aspect,
and one that the makers of the switch do not grapple with).  Also the
suggestion that one should install these to minimise the chillul shabbas of
those in the household who are not frum I do find rather odd.  No doubt
installing LEDs rather than regular lights would also qualify, but we hardly
here a call to do that (in fact, I have yet to hear anybody advertise LED
lighting on the grounds that if one accidentally switch on a light, one is
less likely to be doing an issur d'orisa, which seems to me to have more
basis in our sources, ie minimising shogeg, rather than worrying about those
who are b'mezid).  But I think we need to separate out these kind of
arguments from what seems to me to be the extremely interesting halachic
ramifications of what does strike me as a new approach (although maybe it
isn't, and those working in the field of grama switches for hospitals and
the like have already been utilising aspects of this, perhaps those who work
in the field more intimately can tell me). 

> --
> Eli Turkel

K'tiva v'chasima tova

Chana