[Avodah] dina demalchuta

[Eli Turkel]

Zeev continually asserts without sources that one need not "volunteer"
to pay taxes.
I have several times referred to the article of Eli Clark which is ignored.

Apologies for the length but obviously just attaching the link doesnt
work as it gets ignored
So I will attach portions of it here

Thus, the Gemara establishes that evading a fixed tax collected by a
government tax collector is prohibited by Halacha. The Rambam
formulates this rule in his Mishneh Torah (Hilchot Gezelah ve-Avedah
5:11), where he explains that tax evasion constitutes stealing from
the king. He adds (ibid. 5:18) that this rule applies only to a king
whose currency is accepted throughout the territory, which reflects
that the citizens have consented to his rule and accepted that he is
sovereign over them. This requirement, which is codified in the
Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 369:6), assuredly is satisfied by the
government of the United States or any other democratically elected
government.4 In the case of a gentile tax collector, some authorities
suggest that indirect tax evasion may be permitted.5 This position is
based on the statement of the Gemara (Bava Kama 113b) that it is
forbidden to steal outright from a gentile, but indirect theft (for
example, failing to repay a loan) is permitted. However, where such
indirect theft could result in chillul Hashem, it is unanimously
prohibited. Moreover, one is forbidden from cheating a gentile tax
collector who is honest 6or acting solely as the king's agent.7

In contemporary times, poskim (decisors) have also taken a clear
position on the issue. For instance, R. Moshe Feinstein writes to a
person who engaged in tax evasion that it is "vadai (certain)" that he
must repent for his actions and never do so again.8 The context
suggests that the individual's tax evasion occurred in the United
States.

Because tax evasion is a violation of Halacha, it is likewise
forbidden for a Jew to enable another Jew to evade tax. This
prohibition derives from the Torah's command (Vayikra 19:14), "Lifnei
iver lo titen michshol," do not put a stumbling block before a blind
person. The Gemara (Pesachim 22a) explains that this rule prohibits
extending a cup of wine to a Nazir (who is forbidden to drink wine) or
the limb of a live animal to a non-Jew (who is forbidden to eat such a
limb). However, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 6b) also limits the
prohibition regarding providing wine to a Nazir to a case of "trei
ibrei de-nahara," two sides of the river, i.e., where a river
separates the Nazir from the wine he wishes to drink. In other words,
one violates the prohibition of lifnei iver only when the Nazir or
other prospective sinner is unable to commit a particular sin without
one's assistance. Yet, where others are available to assist a person
in committing the sin, one who provides such assistance would not
transgress the Biblical commandment of "lifnei iver," though one
would, according to most authorities, violate a rabbinic prohibition
against "mesaye'a yedei ovrei averah," assisting the committers of
sins.9

If one makes a purchase from a Jewish merchant who does not collect
and pay sales tax, one has enabled the merchant to violate the law
which, under the principle of dina de-malchuta dina, constitutes a
violation of Halacha as well. Indeed, this case clearly resembles the
one addressed in the Gemara (Bava Metzi'a 75b), which states that
every individual who facilitates a loan transaction involving the
payment or collection of interest is guilty of lifnei iver, including
the witnesses to the loan and the scribe who draws up the loan
document. So too in the case of the person who patronizes a
tax-evading merchant, the shopper's payment for the purchase enables
the merchant to violate the Halacha.

As we have mentioned, whether such facilitation constitutes a Torah
transgression or a rabbinic one depends on whether the merchant would
be able to commit the sin of tax evasion without one's assistance. How
does this rule apply to purchasing from a merchant who evades sales
taxes? Two possibilities present themselves. It is possible that the
willingness of other customers to patronize a particular merchant may
reduce one's own purchases to a violation of the rabbinic prohibition
rather than the Biblical one. On the other hand, the Halacha may deem
each individual customer to be violating the Biblical prohibition,
because each separate sales transaction that goes unreported to the
tax authorities may represent a separate transgression on the part of
the merchant. According to R. Herschel Schachter, R. Joseph B.
Soloveitchik z.t.l. stated that patronizing a Jewish merchant who
cheats on his taxes violates the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver.

Halachically speaking, there is no question about the permissibility
of the evasion of taxes. Tax evasion is both a sin and a crime. It
violates numerous biblical prohibitions, including that of chillul
Hashem. In addition to active tax evasion, Halacha prohibits enabling
others to commit the transgression. These rules unquestionably apply
in the United States and most Western countries, where the tax system
is administered in an even-handed and objective fashion. Therefore,
the halachic community must not -- cannot -- tolerate the continued
evasion of taxes in our midst. If one would not patronize a restaurant
owned by a religious Jew who serves non-kosher food, then one should
not patronize a store owned by a religious Jew who cheats on his
taxes. Even paying cash for an item is forbidden where circumstances
suggest that the purchase will not be reported to the appropriate tax
authorities. Nor is tax evasion justified by a motive to dedicate the
extra money to a mitzvah, such as tzedaka (charity) or supporting
talmud Torah (Torah study). As is well-known, the Torah invalidated
the mitzvah ha-ba'ah ba-averah, the mitzvah that is brought about by a
transgression.13

The Torah demands absolute integrity in business matters. According to
the Gemara (Shabbat 31a), when we face Divine judgement, we are asked
a series of questions about how we lived our earthly lives. For
example, we are asked: Kavata itim le-Torah? Did you establish time
for Torah study? Tzipita le-yeshu'a? Did you anticipate the
redemption? It seems fair to assume that the questions are ranked in
order of importance. Yet, the first question is not about Torah study
or awaiting the coming of Mashiach. The first question we are asked by
the Divine Judge is: Nasata ve-natata be-emunah? Did you conduct
business honestly?

In summary Zeev disagrees with RMF, RHS, RYBS among others. Instead of
being so strident I suggest he prove his point instead of attacking
others

-- 
Eli Turkel