[Avodah] ain Od Milvado v. Bechira

[David Riceman]

>> RMB:
>>> In Izhbitz thought the only bechirah we have is whether we interpret
>>> our decisions as being in concert with that Plan, or in rebellion.>>
> Me:
>> Is this any different from Spinoza?
> RMB:
>
> However, Spinoza taught pantheism, whereas lehavdil Chassidus teaches
> panentheism.
RZS:

<<Very different.  Spinoza says that "elokim" is just another word for
Teva, while Torah says that "teva" is just another word for Elokim. >>

I was unclear.  It's true that Spinoza has a law-like version of 
determinism, and, while I don't know about Izhbitz, the versions of 
Hassidus I think I understand have a Kalam-like version of determinism 
(see MN I:75, the third argument).

What they seem to have in common is their way of harmonizing absolutist 
determinism with free will: free will consists exclusively in assenting 
to the inevitable (which, in turn, presupposes a Cartesian mind-body 
duality).

David Riceman