[Avodah] Local, Non-Global or Global Flood
Micha Berger
micha at aishdas.org
Fri Nov 19 10:45:12 PST 2010
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 11:20:34AM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
> RMB:
>> But from a process and acceptability point of view, my problem is with
>> the creation of new peshatim where there is no TORAH reason to do so. I
>> find that kind of force fitting to another discipline beyond my personal
>> range of acceptibility. (Meaning that it doesn't even feel to me like
>> "a different but valid shitah".)
> See RAK's Handbook of Jewish Thought vol 1 p. 145 item 7:75 and the
> sources he cites. IIRC I pointed out in the previous go around that this
> is a machlokes rishonim...
I just gave my own how things feel to me. I was pretty clear on that.
I didn't accept or deny a machloqes rishonim, I mentioned where my
instincts were. Probably said more about my upbringing than anything
else.
As for RAK's handbook, here's the quote:
7:75 There are times when the Torah speaks in allegory and
metaphor. [180]
There are four conditions under which there is a tradition that the
Torah is not to be taken according to its literal meaning: [181]
1. Where the plain meaning is rejected by common experience.
2. Where it is repudiated by obvious logic. [182]
3. Where it is contradicted by obvious scripture.
4. Where it is opposed by clear Talmudic tradition. [183]
180. Moreh Nevukhim, Introduction, from Hosea 12:11.
181. Emunoth VeDeyoth 7:2 (83a).
182. As in the cases of anthropomorphisms; Moreh Nevukhim 2:25. See
above, 2:23.
183. Cf. Minchath Chinukh 232:4; and Zohar 3:85a; Minchath Pittim,
Orach Chaim 156; Makor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim 673:1.
The question is whether scientific experiment is included under what
RAK meant by "common experience". More on this later, in reply to
RMShinnar. But #1 can't be applied to creation, the flood, anything
called a "neis", or has text in some other way saying "this was a break
from common experience".
3&4 speak of evidence internal to the Torah, 2, by speaking of logic,
rules out that which is implied by the claim itself or by the Torah.
All, internal evidence.
But more importantly, we aren't talking about literal vs allegory.
Yom literally means era, as in "lifnei ba yom Hashem hagadol vehanora".
Or a more significant example to our case, in Bereishis 2:4, the creation
era is called a yom -- "beyom asos H' E-lokim eretz veshamayim" --
not 7 of them!
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 12:29:22PM -0500, Zvi Lampel wrote:
> *"Yom" in the context of the Creation account not meaning a regular has
> no such mesorah. On the contrary, the mesorah is clear that it is a
> regular day....
We've debated this numerous times. And I still believe you're mistaken.
> *The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim (**2:30**) invokes the unanimous position
> of---
> *[a]ll our Sages...that all of this [the creation of Eve from Adam, the
> tree of life, and the tree of knowledge, and the account of the serpent]
> took place on the sixth day.... None of those things is impossible,
> because the laws of Nature were then not yet permanently fixed.*
Neither is the concept of day possible because time wasn't created yet.
That pereq begins, emphasis mine:
There is a difference between first and beginning (or principle). The
latter exists in the thing of which it is the beginning, or co-exists
with it; IT NEED NOT PRECEDE IT; e.g., the heart is the beginning
of the living being; the element is the beginning of that of which
it is the basis.
...
We find that some of our Sages are reported to have held the
opinion that time existed before the Creation. But this report
is very doubtful, because the theory that time cannot be imagined
with a beginning, has been taught by Aristotle, as I showed you,
and is objectionable. Those who have made this assertion have been
led to it by a saying of one of our Sages in reference to the terms
"one day," "a second day." Taking these terms literally, the author
of that saying asked, What determined "the first day," since there
was no rotating sphere, and no sun? and continues as follows:
Scripture uses the term "one day"; R. Jehudah, son of R. Simon,
said: "Hence we learn that the divisions of time have existed
previously." R. Abahu said, "Hence we learn that God built worlds
and again destroyed them." This latter exposition is still worse than
the former. Consider the difficulty which these two Rabbis found in
the statement that time existed before the creation of the sun. We
shall undoubtedly soon remove this difficulty, unless these two Rabbis
intended to infer from the Scriptural text that the divisions of time
must have existed before the Creation, and thus adopted the theory
of the Eternity of the Universe. But every religious man rejects
this. The above saying is, in my opinion, certainly of the same
character as that of R. Eliezer, "Whence were the heavens created,"
etc., (chap. xxvi.). In short, in these questions, do not take notice
of the utterances of any person. I told you that the foundation of
our faith is the belief that God created the Universe from nothing;
that time did not exist previously, but was created: for IT DEPENDS
ON THE MOTION OF THE SPHERE, AND THE SPHERE HAS BEEN CREATED.
And the after the one you quote:
There are, however, some utterances of our Sages on this subject
[which apparently imply a different view]. I will gather them from
their different sources and place them before you, and I will refer
also to certain things by mere hints, just as has been done by the
Sages. ...
So, while it's not impossible, the Rambam finds hints in Chazal that
it's not what the Torah teaches.
And the Abarbanel on Bereishis:
... Thus the Rambam does not understand the word day to be a temporal
day and he doesn't read Bereishis to be describing the chronological
sequence of creation.... This is the view of the Rambam which he
considered as one of the major secrets of the Creation. In fact he
tried hard to conceal this view as can be seen in his words in Moreh
Nevuchim (2:30). In spite of his efforts the Ralbag, Navorni and
the other commentators to Moreh Nevuchim uncovered his secret and
made it known to the whole world.... However, despite the Rambam's
greatness in Torah and the apparent support from Chazal, this view
of the Rambam is demonstratably false....
The Narvoni (as the Abarbanel notes) and the Shem Tov on the Moreh
understand the Rambam this way (that it's 6 steps in logical sequence,
not time), as does the Aqeidas Yitzchaq (Bereishis sha'ar 3), Ralbag
(Milchames Hashem 4:2:8),the Alshich (Bereishis 1:1) and RJBS.
...
> "But from a process and acceptability point of view, my problem is with
> the creation of new peshatim where there is no TORAH reason to do so. I
> find that kind of force fitting to another discipline beyond my personal
> range of acceptibility. (Meaning that it doesn't even feel to me like
> "a different but valid shitah".)"
The question of whether the Rambam crossed that line is an old one --
the Gra and RSRH both wrote that he did.
>> RAs is an entire "this isn't literal" approach to the pereq as a whole.
> *---an approach that is not applied to the days of Breishis by any
> classical commentator besides the Ralbag. The Ralbag bases himself on
> the Chazal that everything was created fully-formed, and on the Chazal
> that everything was created simultaneously....
And this could well be Rashi as well. We've been here done that. The sun
was placed in the sky on day 4, according to Rashi, not created then.
But if the mishnah says we can't comprehend maaseh Bereishis, than
anything we understand to be the literal meaning of the verse's
description of history is in error.
This is my own position -- not that the Torah is allegorical to the
exclusion of historical, but we can't fully understand either, nor the
scientific data. Therefore, all we can glean from the pasuq is lessons,
not history. The process took six days, in a way, and 13bn years, in a
way. And that seems to contradict -- nu, people are finite.
> Akeides Yitchak and the Abarbanel---who
> often repeats the former's comments without attribution---attribute this
> view to the Rambam as well, and go on to condemn it with several proofs
> that it is untenable with the pesukim. The Abarbanel later reinterprets
> the Rambam to conform with the meaning of day to be day.
??? See the quote above. The Abarbanel explicitly states that he and
the Narvoni do not see Moreh 2:30 as assertin a sequence in time.
> *--Which is the stated position of Rav Saadia Gaon, the Rambam, Sefer
> Ikkarim, and the approach practiced by all the rishonim, with the
> baseline that words be taken at their primary meaning unless
> contradicted by here-and-now sensual perception or logical construct.*
And, as above, appears to be the center point behind the Gra's rejection
of Hil' Yesodei haTorah and the Moreh.
On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 12:27:54PM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: > But from a process and acceptability point of view, my problem is with
: > the creation of new peshatim where there is no TORAH reason to do so. I
: > find that kind of force fitting to another discipline beyond my personal
: > range of acceptibility. (Meaning that it doesn't even feel to me like
: > "a different but valid shitah".)
: The problem with this approach is how one defines what is a TORAH
: reason - and one of the TORAH reason that I (and I think many
: rishonim) subscribe to is that the TORAH has a monistic view of truth
: - truth from the torah and from other valid sources can't be in
: conflict...
Yes. So the question is which do I assume was misunderstood, the science
/ philosophy, or the Torah. I'm arguing that if you have to change the
Torah ONLY because you need to eliminate the conflict, then to my mind
(or should I say "to my gut instinct?") you should instead wait for the
science to be ammended.
Or, just wait with the question altogether, seeing as we lack the tools
to find the single truth.
But not to modify the Torah. How then can you claim Toras Hashem temimah,
if it's not complete enough to point to correct peshat without scientific
help?
The issue isn't a rejection of monism, it's epistomology -- how much
weight do you give to the "evidence" of mesorah vs that given to
scientific data and theorization? At which point do you consider one
more likely to be in error than the other? And at which point do you
realize the whole topic is beyond our ken, and our understandings of
BOTH must be limited enough to cause the apparent problem.
(I repeatedly suggested a generic answer based on the Maharal about
the nature of miracles (pardon that turn of phrase) and suggested that
according to his formulation, they would leave never evidence behind
that could be experienced by anyone who doesn't live with the miraculous.)
:-)BBii!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger Take time,
micha at aishdas.org be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm
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