[Avodah] Truth and the Rambam

[Micha Berger]

On Mon, Oct 04, 2010 at 09:05:42AM EDT, R David Riceman wrote:
> Someone asked for a summary, but they're all fairly dense discussions of  
> the Rambam's dependence (both in psak and organization) on the Ri  
> MiGash, the Rif, and the Geonim.

But what about the Rambam's own declaration of independence?

Yes, he might have lemaaseh agreed with earlier sources, but the Rambam
himself tells you that by the time he got to the Yad, no one after
Rav Ashi and Ravina (that's the Rambam's naming order) added weight to
his shitah because he said it.

On Sun, Oct 03, 2010 at 10:39:17PM EDT, R Zvi Lampel wrote:
>>: (1) The Rambam, in explaining talmudic texts and poskening therefrom,
>>: originally practiced in principle a "legal-process approach"
>>: of uncritically following the Geonim's decisions and explanations
>>: of talmudic passages...

>> RMB:
>> Not "uncritically". However, just as a contemporary teshuvah would cite
>> the Shach or the Taz, assuming their opinion of what was said before is
>> more authoritative than our own, so too the Rif does so WRT the geonim.

> The Rif? We were talking about the Rambam!

The Rif stands in contrast. The Rambam says he abandoned the path
he took in the Peirush haMishnayos, while acknowledging that that is the
mehalekh of rabbanim before him. I chose the Rif simply as a well-known
link in the chain between the geonim and the Rambam.

To continue what I replied to RDR -- the Rif WOULD consider a shitah to
be more likely to be peshat in chazal just because a gaon or a rishon
before him said it. Or at least, that's the Rambam's description of how
the Rif did things.

...
> But the fact the Rif preceded the Rambam in arguing with previous geonim  
> shows that the Rambam in doing so was following precedent, and shows  
> that the Rif's methodology--and I maintain that of all the geonim and  
> rishonim--was no less "Aristotelian" than the Rambam's...

The difference is that the Rambam considered his havanah an equal of
theirs, and therefore looked to them for suggestions, but will equally
go with his own havanah whether it's one they suggested or not. (Again,
this is what he claims in the teshuvos in question)

By implication, the Rif did what the rest of us would do -- consider
his understanding the gemara better than the geonim to be an unusual
event that would require extremely strong proof, working on trying to
make sense of their peshat and then failing, etc... Which is how later
acharonim treat the Shach, Taz and the acharonim before them. We CAN
disagree with them, but only with significant justification.

The Gra had no such reluctance. But the Gra isn't explained in terms of
finding the truth in the text, as the Rambam explains himself. Rather,
his talmidim consider him a "throwback", a historically displaced part
of the stream of mesorah.

The Rambam, by saying that one looks for the best understanding of the
text relying only on one's own mind, is talking about seeking truth.
In contrast, a legal system that gives authority to precedent would
give priority to opinions given in earlier generations.

Note: Priority -- not consistently bowing to it.

The Rambam considered his own havanah the arbiter of shitos. Which
makes sense when speaking of truth. What makes sense to me is obviously
what I'll end up believing. It's kind of difficult to picture people
being capable of operating differently than that.

However, WRT law... If someone else's understanding *defines* the law,
because precedent makes law, an argument I find less convincing but that
drove precedent would still be of higher priority.


>> The Rambam's approach in the Yad would be the same as a teshuvah that
>> ignores the early acharonim, feeling that this reliance on earlier
>> rabbanim to understand those even earlier introduces too many errors.

> The Yad is a code, not a teshuva. Comparing apples to apples would  
> entail comparing the Rambam's teshuvos to the teshuvos of the geonim,  
> and seeing if there is a difference in how they relate to previous  
> geonim's pesakim and their methodologies in reaching them...

Why? The Rambam tells us that until him, his rabbeim did things one way,
in the peirush hamishnayos (at least initially) he did as well, and in
the Yad he did things differently. So we don't need to compare the two
to know the methodology is different. The Rambam tells us the unstated
sevaros that would have been written out in shu"t format is different
in methodolgy.

> support your thesis about the Rambam's change of policy between the  
> Payrush HaMishnayos and the Yad, we should compare his teshuvos before  
> and after...

It's not "my thesis". It's a quote, spelled out by the Rambam himself.
I fail to see how we can argue the point as though I'm theorizing. He
tells you he changed methodologies, and that this change involved not
relying on geonim when their opinions are wrong, or to state it less
subjectively -- appear wrong to him.

>                         ... And in fact, in the Rambam's very next  
> teshuva to the one you are quoting in in Rav Sheilat's  
> chronologically-arranged collection (p. 650), The Rambam's first piece  
> of evidence for his pesak is the Rif. Next is the Ri Migash. Is this not  
> a continuation of a policy of examining the opinions of former  
> authorities, rather than a new policy of totally ignoring them? ...

"Totally ignoring"? No -- they're useful sources of ideas for the Rambam
to consider and judge *for himself*.

Mashal: When you write a PhD thesis, you must cite prior work. Not because
in science, someone famous saying something proves its correctness. But
you wouldn't bother creating a new scientific theory without reading prior
work and building upon it -- including deciding they erred.

Quoting prior work doesn't mean you believe it any more because it was
their idea first. And since the Rambam tells you explicitly that he
didn't...

So it really boils down to how to understand those particular two
teshuvos, and I'll skip to there:
> Perhaps you are misled by an ambiguity introduced by RMShapiro's  
> translation, "I was influenced in this by the Sefer HaMitzvos of  Rav  
> Chefetz, z"l, and the mistake was in his [analysis], and I just   
> followed after him without verifying." The Hebrew reads, "V'nimshachnu  
> b'zeh ha-maamar acher mah sheh-zachar baal sefer hamitzvos...."  By the  
> words, "b'zeh ha-maamar" the Rambam was referring to the specific pesak  
> based on Rav Cheyfetz's take on a specific gemora--not the methodology  
> of following geonim uncritically. RMS did not translate the word  
> "ha-maamar."

I would say that "nimshachnu" describes how others due halakhah quite
explicitly. What I call "the stream of tradition" and "the orality
inherent in TSBP" the Rambam is calling "be pulled after" those who came
before him.

Bezeh hamaamar vs bezeh is a distinction without a difference -- "In
this statement" vs "in this"? In either case, he is discussing the
words and pesaq in question. The Rambam says he changed methodolgy,
and the instance the sho'el asked about (why the PhM and Yad differed
on a given maskanah) was one case where the old methology led to error.


Now on to a second instance of the Rambam's interpretation of halakhah
as truth rather than law, whether to explain to fit the gemara to one's
understanding of the mishnah, or the mishnah to one's understanding of
the gemara...

...
>> The Rambam gives more weight to the original than to later interpretation
>> not only when he is second-guessing geonim but also when comparing the
>> mishnah and the gemara.

>> This is a denial of the flow of interpretation, a continuity down
>> the genarations. I'm saying the Rambam's methodology is so radically
>> different, it doesn't really fit the generally accepted definition of
>> "halachic process"!

> You're repeating this, but I fail to see any evidence for it. I'll  
> repeat what I said: The methodologies of the Rambam and Rashi in the  
> examples we discussed differ in what they understood the amoraim on the  
> mishnayos to be saying. They differed over whether we should take the  
> wording of the mishna to modify our understanding of the words of the  
> amoraim (Rambam's approach), or take the words of the amoraim to modify  
> what the mishnah seems to say (Rashi's approach). But there is no reason  
> to deny that both Rashi and the Rambam agreed that the amoraim were  
> continuing the "flow of [accurate] interpretation" of the Mishnah's  
> true, original intent.

The question is where should a rishon *begin* his analysis. With where
the stream of mesorah "pulled us" until this point, or with the initial
text?

Rashi chose the latter.
Rambam the former.

It's leshitasam -- the Rambam treats the mishnah as holding a truth to
be known, and therefore applied his mind to the mishnah first, and then
to the gemara.
Rashi treats the halakhah as a stream through time, and therefore
looks at the mishnah almost entirely through t

>> ZL:
>>: The idea that in transmitting the mesorah, the legal status of objects,
>>: actions or thoughts should conform to a single original Intent predates
>>: Aristotle and goes back to Moshe Rabbeynu and beyond. The entire
>>: enterprise in the Gemora that pits one Mishnah or speaker against another
>>: and concludes either that the later speaker is in error or that one of
>>: the statements must be modified so that they conform, assumes that there
>>: is a single original idea that must be complied with.

>> RMB:
>> What about the notion that eilu va'eilu reflects that fact that HQBH's
>> Original Intent (kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum of opinions
>> by the time it reaches the human mind?

> Hmmm...I guess you have not internalized what I wrote in Dynamics of  
> Dispute on this...or you are not convinced....

Neither. In DoD you advocate a particular shittah. In the essays already
cited
R Moshe Halbertal on "Controversy in Halacha"
    <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/Gruss/halbert.html>
R' Michael ("Michl") Rosensweig's article "Elu Va-Elu Divre Elokim Hayyim:
Halakhic Pluralism And Theories Of Controversy"
    <http://www.lookstein.org/articles/elu_ve_elu.htm>

(RMH is a philosopher out of the Hartman Institute and Hebrew U.
RMR is one of the better known Rashei Yeshiva at YU.)

...
>> Or the Constitutive approach to
>> law of the Ramban, Ritva and Ran, which leads to their understanding
>> of machloqes?

> Constitutive approach? Nolo comprende.

FRom RMH's essay. He gives three schools of thought:
1- Retrieval: Machloqes is a consequence of forgetting (typical source
   text among many would be the numerous machloqesin of Batei Hillel
   veShammai being blamed on "shelo shimshu es rabbosam).
   There are geonim in this camp.

2- Accumultative: New pesaq is deduced from what was given. Therefore
   different minds could very well reach different conclusions. One
   source: R' Aqiva's mounds of halakhos derived from the tagim.
   Rambam.

3- Constitutive: Pesaq isn't the determination of the current halakhah, but
   part of the definition of which potential pesaq is correct. It's a power
   HQBH gave man. eg: the need to be able to find 49 ways letaheir as well
   as 49 letamei in order to qualify for Sanhedrin.
   Ramban, Ritva, Ran. (I noticed the Iqarim to, although RHM doesn't say
   so. But then, the Iqarim is usually quite close to the shitah of his
   rebbe, the Ran.)

RMR raises the question of whether HQBH gave a true plurality of
possibilities, a literal eilu va'eilu. He attributes this position to
Rashi, the Ritva, the Maharshal, and Maharal. I already cited his Rashi
(Kesuvos 57a).

When I wrote about "the notion that eilu va'eilu reflects that fact that HQBH's
Original Intent (kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum of opinions
by the time it reaches the human mind" I was describing the position
of the Maharal. He says machloqes is because Hashem's Emes can't fit in
this universe.

Because of vagueness, I was also describing R' Tzadoq's position, which
RMR doesn't mention. R' Tzadoq writes about the difference between
machashavah, where contradiction is not only possible -- but it's
difficult to spend time considering an opinion without also considering
it's opposite, and po'al, where such contradiction is called paradox.

RMR concludes with what RMH called the consitutive approach.

The contitutive approach must rest atop a true plurality -- Hashem gave
us 98 sevaros that lead to contradictory results as part of the tools
with which man should legislate -- "vehalakhah keBH".

The accumulative approach *could* be consistent with plurality -- both
opinions coexist because Hashem intentionally allowed for conflicting

Everything I said about the Rambam's approach to halakhah being
unique boils down to noting that the difference between accumulative
and constitutive approaches to machloqes. Add to that the Rambam's
insistance on a single right pesaq rather than plurality. This will
change how a poseiq views precedent:

Does he, at step N, look first to N-1, back to N-2, etc... in order
to understand a shitah? Or,
Does he go straight to the shitah, looking at the previous baalei
mesorah's comments as informative but not authoritative material?

To add more baalei mesorah to the list of those who would make a
different choice than the Rambam: The Chinukh's discussion of "lo sasur"
bizman hazeh, the Arukh haShulchan's statement that pesaq is only to
prevent two Toros, not that one is wrong. Which he then relates to a
zaqein mamre, who refuses to bring unity -- not about bowing to truth.
(Which in turn echos much of the Chunukh's "lo sasur".)

IOW, we do halakhah in a fundamentally different way than how the
Rambam describes what he did in the Yad.

Another mashal: The Qetzos was a very innovative thinker, and when
you learn his material, you are left thinking he presented what is
obviously the truth. However, because he was such a mechadeish, rather
than connecting to the stream and acounting for the authority given a
shitah by being the norm, how much impact (if any) did he have to the
world of pesaq?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Every second is a totally new world,
micha at aishdas.org        and no moment is like any other.
http://www.aishdas.org           - Rabbi Chaim Vital
Fax: (270) 514-1507