[Avodah] Truth and the Rambam

[Zvi Lampel]

  Re: Truth and the Rambam

ZL: The idea that in transmitting the mesorah, the legal status of objects,

: actions or thoughts should conform to a single original Intent predates

: Aristotle and goes back to Moshe Rabbeynu and beyond. The entire

: enterprise in the Gemora that pits one Mishnah or speaker against another

: and concludes either that the later speaker is in error or that one of

: the statements must be modified so that they conform, assumes that there

: is a single original idea that must be complied with.

RMB: What about the notion that eilu va'eilu reflects that fact that HQBH's

Original Intent (kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum of opinions

by the time it reaches the human mind?

ZL:
The rishonim and acharonim treat "eilu v'eilu" as logically untenable, 
indeed incomprehensible, if it is taken to mean at face value that 
contradicting halachos of identical scenarios are both true. Those who 
offer an explanation (such as the Rashi you quoted, more on that later) 
all modify the face value of "eilu v'eilu" so that the two sides are not 
actually talking about the same scenario (Rashi), and/or they explain 
that the truthfulness attributed to each side does not refer to the 
predominate halachic character of the matter, whereas the final halacha 
does.

(Two blind men who, by feeling different parts of an elephant, each come 
to a different conclusion about what the totality of the elephant is, 
are both wrong. If each admits that the part he is feeling is a 
different one, and therefore has different characteristics than that 
felt and described by his fellow blind man, then each realizes that they 
are not arguing, and will not think that the characteristics he 
perceives form a kushya against what the other is describing.)

This is why Chazal refer to forgotten halachos being restored to their 
[original] status. If something had really been both totally or 
predominantly tamei and tahor in the identical scenario, depending upon 
which diffracted view of the original intent one maintains, what was 
there to restore?

So whatever is meant by the notion that HQBH's Original Intent 
(kavayakhol) is diffracted into a spectrum of opinions by the time it 
reaches the human mind, one cannot deny the fact---held not only by the 
Rambam but by every rishon in the world, and indeed every Torah 
source---that Judaism is defined by the transmission of what Moshe 
Rabbeynu received from Sinai, the laws of which he presented to the 
people there "as a shulchan aruch." He did not transmit to us 600,000 
conflicting rulings or conflicting sevaros on each case.

As the Yahm Shel Shlomo (Int. to BK) emphasizes, "she-lo yatsa ha-davar 
mi-pi Moshe le-olom lih'yos shnei hafachim b'nosei echad."

And as the Drashos HaRan #3 says, "Since the words of those who declare 
something tamei and those who declare it tahor are intrinsically 
contradictory (hefchiyim b'atsmam), it is impossible for both of them to 
be conforming to the truth (ee-efshar sheh-sh'nayhem yas-kimu l'emmess); 
how can we say that all [the opinions] were said to Moshe mipi 
HaG'vurah? Is there any uncertainty in Heaven?"

Even the Ritva on Eruvin 13b, who famously quotes the kabbalistic piece 
about "eilu v'eilu" comments, "V'nachon hu l'fi ha-drash, u-b'derech 
ha-emmess yeish taam sod b'davar," which indicates that this concept is 
not to be taken at face value.

Rabbeynu Peretz on Eruvin 13b prefaces the Midrash (as he refers to it) 
by asking how one can say "eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim, since, "if 
it is asur, it isn't mutar; and if it is mutar, is isn't asur. And he 
follows up on the Midrash by saying, "Nevertheless, there is a kushya 
[on the face value of this Midrash] from things that already were, such 
as the Mizbayach---for one authority brings proof for it being 60 amos, 
and one brings proof for it being 20 amos....V'yesih lomar ... "eilu 
v'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim" means that from the pesukim there is basis 
to darshan like each opinion, but certainly there was only one way [it 
could have been].

Rashi actually avoids the problem by focusing on the language of the 
statement, that Moshe Rabbeynu's receiving of 49 reasons one way to 
posken and 49 reasons to posken otherwise, and his helplessness over 
what to accept as the halacha, all took place only before he received 
the Torah. The implication is that upon receiving the Torah he was 
informed of the correct sevoros; and the need for future Chachamim to 
decide between sevoros would be due to their eventual forgetting the 
original halacha and appropriate sevara to use.

One cannot deny the fact that the principle methodology by which the 
poskim and Talmud determine the halacha is through citing precedent and 
assuming that there is an original intent to reach for. Otherwise, it 
would be pointless for any amora to pit a contradiction to another from 
an earlier and higher authority. His opponent could always answer, 
"Hah!...that's the way you, or Aharon HaKohen heard it at Sinai, but I'm 
saying how I, or Nachshon ben Amindava heard it at Sinai!"

So if it is true that the souls of the arguing tannaim and amoraim 
witnessing the Sinai revelation literally received different messages as 
to, say, the kashrus or permissibility of something (and that the source 
of halacha was their individual receptions of the revelation, rather 
than Moshe Rabbeynu's transmission of the revelation he alone received) 
first we must say that the dispute can only be concerning things that 
were not stated explicitly. You must admit that this can only be true of 
corollaries of the distinct halachos that Hashem told Moshe Rabbeynu. 
Surely you do not doubt that all the minds at Sinai did get it clear 
that animals with split hoofs that chew their cud are kosher and the 
others are not. You must admit that all minds at Sinai got it clear that 
melacha on Shabbos is assur, and no one received a diffracted idea that 
it is mutar.

Secondly, the same kabbalistic sources also state it becomes the task of 
the Chachamim to determine what the halacha is. As I already noted, we 
see the methodology for doing this is eidus: tracing authoritative 
statements as far back as possible and checking their consistency and 
accuracy. What is this methodology aiming for, if not one authentic 
halacha? It would be a fatuous and futile exercise if the halachic 
status of each given case originally had 600,000 diffracted opinions 
perceived by the tannaim's and amoraim's souls at Sinai.

The rishonim and acharonim teach the nigleh and logical approach that 
logical contradictions are unacceptable, and that our source for the 
Torah's explanations is Moshe Rabbeynu's clear teaching of specific 
halachos. They---the rishonim and acharonim---should be our guide in 
approach towards understanding the esoteric and paradoxical kabbalistic 
sources, and therefore we should adjust the face value of these 
perplexing sources the nigleh sources, rather than the other way around. 
So, we need to understand and interpret the kabbalistic sources that 
state that machlokess is a result of the souls of the tannaim and 
amoraim being at Sinai, each having received its own understanding of 
the revelations' laws.

RMB: See Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, s.v. "ha QM"L"), Ritva (Eiruvin 13b "eilu

va'eilu") and every other rishon I know of (aside from the Rambam)

on plurality in machloqes.

...

ki peligi terei amora'ei bedin or be'issur veheteir,

kol chad amar hakhi mistaveir taama,

ein kan sheqer.

Kol chad amar sevara didei...

Ve'ika lemeimar "eilu ve'ulu DEC"H"

zimnin deshayakh hai ta'ama vezimnin deshayakh hai taama.

Rashi's opinion works because he holds that halakhah is a legal process,

not a single truth to be mined out of the sources.

ZL: I disagree, one reason being the immediately preceding part of that 
Rashi you left out:

D'ki peligei terei aliba d'chad---mar amar hachi amar ploni, u'mar amar 
hachi amar ploni---chad mi'niy-hu MESHAKER.---When two amoraim are 
arguing over [what another] one [said]---one saying this is what he 
said, and another saying this is what he said---one of the two is saying 
something false.

Then Rashi continues with the piece you cite:

But when two amaoriam are arguing over the din or in the prohibited and 
permitted, each one saying "Hakchi mistaveir taama (This understanding 
is more probable)---there is no falsehood (ein kam sheqer)---each one is 
stating his own sevara: one offers the reason for which he holds 
something to be permitted, and one offers the reason for which he holds 
it is prohibited; one compares cases like this, and one makes compares 
it another way. And [therefore] one can say "Eilu V'eilu divrei Elokim 
chaim." Sometimes this understanding is more appropriate and sometimes 
this understanding is more appropriate, because the [correct] 
understanding changes in response to subtle changes in the things [i.e., 
the situations---ZL].

Why must one of two people attributing opposite opinions to someone be 
saying sheker, but neither of two people holding opposite opinions about 
what he feels is logical is saying sheker? Because the in the second 
case neither is attempting to identify something that had actually 
occurred previously or that was already established---they are reporting 
their own opinions. One must still be sheker relative to what was 
actually said, but neither is sheker in terms of what is being reported: 
the sevara that makes sense to the speaker. And, in that second case, 
the true appropriate sevara to apply is determined by subtle differences 
in the case at hand. And while the subtle properties of the scenario at 
hand really calls for one sevara to be the determining one---and 
therefore only one opinion of the halacha is really accurate---at other 
times similar scenarios subtly different will make the other sevara, 
producing the opposite halacha---the appropriate one. This, Rashi holds 
, is the meaning of "eilue v'eilu." Each sevara is correct in a certain 
scenario. But both sevoros cannot be correct in the same scenario.

So there is no doubt that if there are opposite reports or conclusions 
about what someone already declared the halacha to be---and Moshe 
Rabbeynu accurately transmitting Hashem's Torah laws was such a 
person---then one of those conclusions must be false. The aim of the 
tannaim and amoraim was to determine what that original intended halacha 
and sevara producing it was.

If according to Rashi the aim is merely to follow some "legal process" 
without regard to original intent of what the correct sevara is, why 
does the validity of a sevara depend upon its appropriateness at some 
times? What indeed makes it appropriate, if there is no original intent 
to match up to? Let each opinion be valid solely on the basis that it 
was expressed by a tanna or amora whose mind perceived the diffracted 
version of the halacha at Sinai he expressed!

The legal process IS the attempt to determine the original intent.

And this is why an amora who was still alive could inform his talmidim 
that some understood him correctly and others got it wrong---and that 
the erring talmid was not merely in touch with some other equally true 
diffracted version of Hashem's original intent.

RMB: RMB: See Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, s.v. "ha QM"L"), Ritva (Eiruvin 13b "eilu

va'eilu") and every other rishon I know of (aside from the Rambam)

on plurality in machloqes.

ZL: Well, not the Tosefos and Rashi discussed, nor the Ran, Ritva or 
Rabbeynu Peretz. What rishon do you have in mind? And not the Maharal, 
Yam Shel Shlomo, Reb Yisrael Salanter or Ohr Gedaliahu (see Dynamics of 
Dispute). They all modify the face value of "eilu v'eilu" so that the 
two sides are not actually talking about the same scenario, and/or they 
explain that the truthfulness attributed to each side does not refer to 
the predominate halachic character of the matter, whereas the final 
halacha does.

RMB: Which I'm saying is unlike the Rambam.

ZL: The Rambam says the same thing as Rashi, that a halacha/sevara 
assigned to a given scenario either matches the original intent or does 
not; but if that halacha/sevara is not extant, it can be debated over 
with each side having a reasonable chance of matching the original.

"Machlokess occurs with those halachos they brought out through derech 
ha-sevara...and this will happen when analysis differs. And for this 
reason they said: If it is a [decided received] halacha we will accept 
it; but if it is derived through analysis, we have logical basis to 
disagree" (Hakdama L'Payrush HaMishnayos).

Zvi Lampel


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