[Avodah] Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh, hashgacha pratit, and free will

[Micha Berger]

On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 12:00:04AM -0500, Chanoch (Ken) Bloom wrote:
: Though interesting, this idea of a Yirat Shamayim dictating all of one's
: actions, even down to the choice of a living room end table isn't the
: same thing as Hashem's hashgacha choosing your living room end table in
: spite of your decision (yetzer harah?) otherwise.

In fact, it's quite different -- opposites.

For such a person who acheived tif'eres, "chutz meyir'as Shamayim" would
exclude every decision. Therefore, Hashem's hashgachah is withheld,
because everything this person does is touched by his yir'ah.

I think this is true of all people, to varying degrees. No one's mind
is so absolutely compartmentalized that two topics in the same head have
absolutely no connecting associations.

:> The problem you hit WRT the amendation to Chullin 7b "No one bruises
:> (or even lifts) a finger down below unless a proclamation is issued from
:> above" is one I hit chasing a few of RIS's quotes.

: After looking more extensively into the hebrew word used here "nogef",
: it seems that the best English translation of this is "strike" (rather
: than "bruise") which suggests two possible modes of injury. In one mode,
: an object moves to be in the path of the finger, and the finger hits it.
: This one clearly comes from Hashem...

Unless you follow the Rambam, and the person's yedi'ah is insufficient
to get such levels of HP (hashgachah peratis). But since I don't know
too many people today who hold like the Rambam on this, I would
agree. (Just not use the word "clearly".)

:                                     In the other, it seems that the
: person is careless and strikes his finger becuase he wasn't paying
: attention to where it was going. Can we say this is truly under the
: person's control? If we are to take the Gemara to its logical extreme,
: perhaps we must say that Hashem takes over and decides where his finger
: should go when he isn't moving it intentionally.

This touches on R' Dessler's position that only decisions that require
a conscious battle are included in bechirah chafshi. Thus, unconscious
decisions about where one's finger is aren't part of bechirah.

You also need to analyze the Kuzari's (5:20) types of events in a
person's life: E-lokis, Tiv'is, Miqreh and Bechirah. The actions
of a child, a sleeping person or someone insane are miqreh, not
product of bechirah. See my post at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n142.shtml#10>, part of
a discussion about things that happen to us do to others' bechirah,
and how it relates to hashgachah.

To get back to my problem... None of this is actually muchrach from
the gemara, and we're backreading the position we're associating with
the Bilvavi back into shas. That's still not what the sefer itself is
doing -- using the gemara as a proof for the position as though the
gemara itself were incontravertably saying what he was.

And now the same, on MY ch 1:

: > I think it's R' Shraga Simmon's translation, but my confusion stemmed
: > from reading it in the original, and is not due to translation
: > subtleties):
...
: In the translation of this chapter, deveikut is translated using the
: words words union, unity, and united (depending on the grammatical form
: of deveikut in the text).
...
: > So, as I read the Ramchal, a Jew does NOT really have in life - closeness
: > to Hashem and deveiques to Him". That's what he has in Olam haBa. In
: > life, all a person has is the opportunity to become the kind of person
: > capable of that closeness, and capable of enjoying it.

: But the word deveikut doesn't appear anywhere in those three paragraphs
: that you have just quoted.

: In fact, the word deveikut appears in active form two paragraphs later:

:         וכפי השעור אשר כבש את יצרו ותאוותיו ונתרחק מן המרחיקים אותו
:         מהטוב ונשתדל לדבק בו - כן ישיגהו וישמח בו.

:         To the extent that he has subdued his evil inclination and his
:         desires, and withdrawn from those factors which draw him further
:         from the good, and exerted himself to become united with it, to
:         that extent will he attain it and rejoice in it.

... in the world to come, as per the paragraphs I quoted that lead into
this one. Not that kibush hayeitzer is itself attaining closeness to HQBH.
Not that deveiqus /is/ the kibbush hayeitzer. Rather, as he was saying
until now, more kibbush now and even more attempts at deveiqus now means
actually acheiving enjoyment of His presence later.

(I don't like the "it" in this translation, and would have said "united
with Him ... rejoice in Him".)

But the question isn't so much defining deveiqus, it's whether the Ramchal
sees the task of olam hazeh in terms of closeness to Him in some vague
sense altogether. And he doesn't. He says that the more one searches for
sheleimus in this world, the more he will be able to attain and rejoice
in HQBH in the next. And yes, sheleimus INCLUDES tzam'ah nafshi lEilokim.

: Look one chapter earlier, to the Ramchal's introduction, and you will
: see that lists deveikut as part of a list of other goals that we are
: able to accomplish in our lifetime.

And in this paragraph that you quoted "nishtadel lidvoq bo". But that's
saying that part of a program of sheleimus is trying to cleave to the
A-lmighty. Not that "all we have in this world" is such closeness. Just
your words "as part of a list of other goals" is enough to contradict
the Bilvavi's interpretation.

Which is why I am not clear on the reason for your whole detour into
exactly what deveiqus means. It's not so much what is deveiqus as
much as whether he sees this life's goal in terms of wholeness or
in terms of closeness (keeping that vague) to Hashem.

If in a situation where you're forced to choose between davening bekavanah
or davening earlier but before you have the yishuv hadaas for kavanah,
would the Ramchal choose connecting to the Almighty, or developing the
middah of zerizus? We saw this become a pragmatic difference between
chassidim and misnagdim.

The Bilvavi portrays the MY as one who would tell you to go for the
kavanah. The MY himself doesn't look like that to me.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes
micha at aishdas.org        "I am thought about, therefore I am -
http://www.aishdas.org   my existence depends upon the thought of a
Fax: (270) 514-1507      Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch