[Avodah] sevara vs. psak

[David Riceman]

<<Then R' Yochanan says that two who vote zakai because of different
pesuqim -- only one is counted. Not because two sevaros can't both be
valid (as you write, look at Eruvin 13b), but because each ruled out
a different issur. One must be wrong IF we are assuming he is only
standing trial for one of the two issurim -- wrong in the sense of
addressing the wrong topic.>>

I think you misrepresent the sugya here.  The point of the sugya is that votes in a capital case have to be intellectually independent (more about this below).  R. Yohanan is discussing the case of "ta'am ehad mishnei mikraos" - - not two sevaros but one - - and his objection is that two psukim are insufficient for independence, we also require two ta'amim. [I see you make this point in a different context two paragraphs later]

<<Are you citing the fact that 12:2 doesn't mention stating which avreirah
and which pasuq is being violated? Just that it's an aveirah and what
the onesh is? I was under the impression thatnot knowing which pasuq
he's about to violate is the textbook hasra'as safeiq.>>

There are actually a pair of machloksim you are confusing - - one is whether the witnesses have to cite a pasuk, or even a specific type of execution, or whether it suffices to say that it's a capital crime, the other is whether the witnesses need to know which crime the accused is committing.  See Kessef Mishna on H. Sanhedrin 12:2, and see H. Sanhedrin 16:4.  The Rambam paskens in both cases to make it easier to convict (l'humrah?).

Your initial question, however, is a good one.  If you hold hasra'as safek lo shmeih hasra'ah how can you understand the sugya in Sanhedrin? Here's a tentative answer, which I like but for which I have no evidence:

We find very often in Tanach that the same mitzva, or the same moral trait, is discussed numerous times (see R. Avraham ben HaRambam's book "Sefer HaMaspik l'Ovdei HaShem" for lots of examples of the latter).  If, indeed, the Torah is parsimonious, why does this happen? I suggest that it happens because there are many different perspectives on a mitzvah or a deiah, and each passage is displaying a different perspective about its subject.  [You'll notice, for example, that you and I often agree on conclusions, but we use very different methodology.]

The reason we require courts to be staffed by multiple judges is so that they, too, can display multiple perspectives (its not a coincidence that "70 panim laTorah" and 70 judges sit on the Sanhedrin).  The requirement of different mikraos and ta'amim is precisely to ensure that they are performing their function of displaying different perspectives.  But they can all still be talking about the same issur.

For example, the passuk "kol d'mei ahicha tzo'akim elay min ha'adamah" shows a different aspect of murder than does "lo sirtzah".

Hasra'as safek is when the witness doesn't know which prohibition is being violated; here we know the prohibition, it's just that each judge is emphasizing a different aspect of it.  The poor criminal not only gets executed, he's forced to hear 13 mussar schmoozes first!

IIRC the Maharal says something a little like this when he discusses Hacham adif minavi.

<<But I'm talking about
multiple of the 613 from the same phrase.>>

I don't know if you've ever read Ibn Ezra's little book "Yesod Mora".  He argues that there can't be a unique enumeration of the mitzvos; I think pashut pshat in the gemara in Sanhedrin is like him.

David Riceman