[Avodah] RYBS on minui hakahal

[Chana Luntz]

RIT writes:

> >4) When drawing a distinction between converts and women, the article
> >notes that women all prohibited from serving in the capacity of minui
> >kahal - "community wide appointments" and from being entrusted with
> >serara - "discretionary authority," whereas converts are barred only
> >from serara. If that is the case, how is it that women are permitted
> >to serve in any of the positions mentioned above in, since those are
> >indeed communal positions and were only permitted to her by the Rav
> >because they lacked serara. Somewhere, the definition of serara and
> the
> >Rav's distinction within the Rambam between serara and minui kahal is
> >not completely clear.

And RAF responds

> Please read my article again and the Rav's shiur [or R. Gil Student's
> translation].  The Rav clearly distinguishes between "community wide
> appointments" and Serara.  He is forced into this because women are
> precluded from serving as communal dayanim, yet the Gemara indicates
> that a Ger can sit on a bet din to judge gerim. Hence a ger is not
> assur from minui kahal per se - only one of serara.  According to the
> Rav, minui kahal or serara is assur for women;  only minui kahal of
> serara is assur for  gerim.

I am not sure how it is that RYBS is "forced into this" - or indeed how he
derives it at all.

As far as I am aware, the generally accepted reason for women to be
prohibited from being dayanim (except, perhaps, in a kabala type situation
where a karov or a posul can also sit) is based on Mishna Nida 6:4 "all who
are kosher to judge are kosher to give testimony" - ie the prohibition on
women being dayim is based on the prohibition on eidus. See also Tosphos
Nida 50a, Shavuos 29b and a whole string of rishonim on Shavuos 30a (The
Rashba, the Ramban etc) all of whom cites this Mishna (and an explicit
Yerushalmi) as the basis for women's exemption from dayanus. As a
consequence a convert, who can give eidus, can therefore judge other geirim,
the only issue there becomes one of serarah.

Eidus however has nothing to do with minui kahal. An eid does not hold a
communal position.  So it would seem that RYBS, in positing this
distinction, is arguing with all of these rishonim as to the basis of
women's psul for dayanus.  But based on what?  While these rishonim have a
Mishna and a Yerushalmi to base themselves on, where is RYBS getting this
distinction from?  Where is even the concept of minui kahal coming from? The
"proof" brought in RGS's translation is about an alternative explanation in
the Kol Bo to that brought by the Beis Yosef.  Ie RYBS has to disagree with
the Beis Yosef's explanation in the Kol Bo in order to postulate this
distinction and get to his conclusion that this is what the Kol Bo really
meant.  But there is nothing in this translation that gives any hint as to
where, in the Torah or the Talmud or even the Rambam this concept of minui
kahal, distinct from serarah, is derived.  At least for serarah, there is a
Sifri and and Rambam, but as acknowledged, to the extent serarah applies, it
applies as much to a convert as to a woman.  Where this extension comes
from, I rather struggle to see.

> Dr. Aryeh A. Frimer

Regards

Chana


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