[Avodah] Habituation

[Chana]

RRM writes:

> Rn' Chana explained how the AhS could hold there is an absolute issur
> of exposing hair for a married woman, but not for an unmarried one. In
> short: the sugyot regarding Sotah and divorcing one's wife speaking
> only of married women, and furthermore say nothing about hirhur. By
> contrast, he sugya in Berakhot speaks of hair in general (married or
> not), and speaks of hirhur. It is thus possible, but not obligatory,
> to say (as I do) that hair-covering applies to ALL women (married or
> not), and is mitigated by hergel.

> Thank you, then, for that explanation. I still hold by my position. I
> tend to prefer the positions that reconcile as much as possible.
> Furthermore, I prefer a few kelalim to many peratim - Occam's Razor.
> So I'll still prefer my own position, viz. that hair-covering applies
> to married and unmarried women equally, but that hergel mitigates the
> issur. This is the simplest explanation, and has more kelalim and
> fewer peratim.

Well it is even more possible, but not obligatory, to say, as the pashtus of
the Rambam and the Shuchan Aruch would seem to suggest, that hair covering
applies to all women (married or single) and is not mitigated by hergel and
that would seem to give you even more kelalim and fewer peratim.

This sort of segues into the other discussion you are having in which you
said:

>So I'm not sure why Rabbi Kaminetsky thinks it is obvious that the
non-scholar will answer that a non-Jew is preferable. It appears to me that
no, the >non-scholar will answer that the Jewish woman who violates niddah
is preferable.

>So I'm confused. Why does Rabbi Kaminetsky believe (wrongly, IMHO) that the
non-scholar will answer that a non-Jew is preferable?

The point is though, that RYK is not talking about a non scholar, or even,
IMHO a beginning or inexperienced scholar.  He is talking about a full
fledged scholar.  But I would disagree slightly with RRW's example of 2 plus
2 equalling four, as I think it is a bit more complicated than that and that
while the gist is the same, I will try and give what I hope is a better and
more nuanced example.

If you genuinely are a non scholar, you are highly unlikely to miss the wood
for the trees (to use the common English phrase and take it further),
because you can't access the trees as individuals.  Thus you are
unquestionably going to identify a wood as a wood.  Even an inexperienced
scholar, knowing how much more wood there is out there than the few trees he
knows well, will probably more easily relate to the wood than the trees.
But an extremely knowledgeable scholar, who has examined every single tree
in detail and in all its leaf ramifications and can recall each and every
one of them and marshal each reference to each tree as and when required,
can sometimes in the course of it forget about seeing the wood as a whole.
What, IMHO RYK is saying is that a gadol has to, by definition, be somebody
who knows the detail of each and every tree in the wood, but *still* never
forget that at times you need to look at the wood as a whole.

That said, as I have said when this question has come up previously, I have
a certain difficulty with RYK's example, because, quite simply, it requires
a judging of the teshuva unlikelihood of the couple in question.  Clearly
marriage between two Jews is infinitely superior if the woman does teshuva
and decides to keep taharas mishpacha.  On what basis is anybody, Talmud
chacham or not, permitted to pre-judge that likelihood.  After all, if a man
known to be a rasha says to a woman that I am mekadesh you on condition I am
a tzadik, we consider her married, because perhaps he did teshuva.  If we
assume at all times that the Jewish woman might do (or indeed has done)
teshuva, then the answer to the question as which is preferable becomes
obvious to all.
And add to this, as a snif l'hakel if you like, that, especially today,
there are numerous occasions where a woman might nullify the issur kares
without even intending to.  After all, it is accepted that intention is not
needed for a valid tevila, nor indeed are bathing suits generally considered
a chatzitza d'orisa.  In which case, if you live in a locality in which sea
swimming is common and the weather is clement (or advise moving to such a
locality) you may well have a high probability of mitigating the risk of the
issur kares at least even without any actual teshuva.

Anyhow, that is a tangent, because while I may have a problem with the
specific example, I think the general point made, as understood in terms of
the wood and the trees, is a very valid one.  

And I think that is what is bothering me particularly about your particular
dismissal.  You need to have a working knowledge of the trees before any
real conclusion about the wood would seem appropriate.  And yet you have so
clearly not grappled with the original sources that the basis for the Aruch
HaShulchan's position is a revelation to you.  Given that it is the basis
for the general achronic approach to hair covering, it should hardly come as
a surprise if you had indeed worked through the rishonim and achronim on
this.

Now, I would contrast that to R' Broyde's approach which can be found at
http://traditiononline.org/news/article.cfm?id=105511 in his article Hair
Covering and Jewish Law: Biblical and Objective (Dat Moshe) or Rabbinic and
Subjective (Dat Yehudit)?

He actually comes out not a million miles from where you are (or at least
argues that there is a limud to say this based on the Rishonim, although he
agrees that the other limud is the dominant one amongst the Achronim).  But
this is based on very very close readings of the gemora in Ketubos that I
cited to you, the Rambam, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (among many other
sources).  He is able therefore to link together statements such as that of
the Trumat HaDeshen explaining the Rambam as holding that hair covering is
d'rabbanan with an explanation as to why it might be so, and similarly
explain the position of the Tur (and then Shulchan Aruch) as implicitly
based on a Rosh in Gitten (90b) which states that hair covering is rabbinic
(this Rosh was a complete revelation to me, it makes the arguments vis a vis
the Tur so much more compelling).  You then fascinatingly end up with the
Shulchan Aruch's triumvirate as arguably being two rabbinic to one d'orisa
(although it is clear that the Bach's understanding of the Rambam is
different which would then point the triumvirate the other way - but still a
Bach versus a Trumat HaDeshen is an valid maklokus).

Now the motivations driving R' Broyde are, IMHO, not a million miles away
from yours either, it is about a "wood" type concept that where Jews who are
otherwise meticulous in their fulfilment of halacha are systematically
appearing to violate a particular halacha (as would seem to have occurred in
the Lita of yesteryear and hair covering), there must be some genuine basis
permitting that violation (if they are not prophets, they are sons (or
daughters) of prophets).  But he does this by an extremely extensive
treatment of many many sources.

But where one senses that there is no real knowledge of the make-up of even
some of the key trees in the wood, conclusions about the nature of the wood
as a whole does come across as somewhat premature.  Perhaps more normally
somebody attempting to be a genuine scholar puts their ideas of the nature
of the wood on hold while they learn about each and every tree, and what RTK
is, IMHO doing, is reminding somebody at the end of that process that they
then need to stand back and look at the wood as well, but, I suspect he
might say, only then.

> Michael Makovi

Regards

Chana