[Avodah] Rambam on free will

[Micha Berger]

On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 10:06:19PM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
[Quoting Friedlander's translation of the Moreh 3:17, "Fifth Theory":]
:> According to this principle man does what is in his power to do,
:> by his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to
:> any faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals
:> likewise move by their own free will....

I think this is a mistranslation. The Rambam can't be speaking of what
we would call "free will" and consider it "irrational" as well. To him,
decision centers around thought.

A bit of Aristotilian Physics I've discussed on Avodah before a few times
over the years, mainly to explain the Rambam's description of mal'akhim.
Taking from my blog entry "Maimonidian Qabbalah - Part III"
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2009/12/maimonidian-qabbalah-3.shtml>:
    The need for intelligences to perform action is part of Artistotelian
    physics. Aristotle didn't have a notion of momentum, which is
    conserved. Unsurprising, because in the real world momentum is
    generally turned into heat (the momentum of molecules) by friction,
    and thus we see motion dissipate. Instead, Aristotle taught that
    Intellects impart impetus to objects, which then continue moving
    until the impetus runs out. It is for this reason that the Rambam
    asserted that the spheres are intellects (Yesodei haTorah 2:7),
    since the stars and planets continue in motion eternally, there must
    be intellects repeatedly imparting impetus to them.

I understand the Rambam in 3:17 as saying that animals have intellects,
and their actions arise from their intellects. IOW, they have wills, but
they are not free in the sense that ours is free.

R Yosef el-Qafech ("Kapach")'s translation is available at
<http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mahshevt/more/c5-2.htm#3>. They emphasize the
key idea in purple, ayin sham. (BTW, I find the layout and colorization
nice tools for clarity not provided by the book edition.)

He renders it "cheftzam", nothing about freedom of that desire.
Justifying my assumption about the Rambam's intent in light of his
understanding of motion, the translation continues:
    sheyehei kol chai na becheftzo
    vesheyehi haadam baal yekholes al kol asher yechpotz o yivchar...

The comparison in the earlier "vekakh" is only in the fact that they
move by their own will. But "yivchar" is only used WRT people.

: 4. On an aside I read from R Zadok where he attacks Rambam for excluding
: animals from providence except for species. However, in the same maamar
: he quotes several times the Ari who says that every that that Ramban
: says is true. The problem is that Ramban also says that providence does
: not go to indivisual anaimals but only to the species as Rambam says

Actually, the LR thought that universal HP (hashgachah peratis, as opposed
to hashgachah tiv'is or hashgachah minis) was a chiddush of the Besh"t,
and over in Litta they credited that chiddush to the Gra. We've discussed
"universal HP" (suggested search term) numerous times.

I once proposed a resolution that doesn't involve a machloqes between
the centuries. I don't remember if it was here, though. So, to restate
quickly...

The rishonim lived in a world of classical philosophy. To them, the
concept of HP was dealt with on an ontological basis -- was this event a
direct product of G-d's Will, or indirect -- a product of His Will that
caused nature which in turn caused the event.

We live in a post-Kantian world, where there is far more mingling of
observer and observed. Just look at what Relativity and Quantum Mechanics
did to physics on that score! To us, the question of HP is more about
the thing one gets through bitachon, that obviates hishtadlus.

It's not that the dominant shitah (in terms of numbers both among the
hamon am and among the baalei machashavah) changed to one the rishonim
don't discuss. It's that we are really using a different definition of
the term.

An example: REED famously says that teva doesn't exist, it's a pattern we
find in how Hashem acts. However, he also holds that existence depends
on the observer, following the Maharal. That blood and water coexist in
maqas dam because observers at different spiritual planes can experience
fundamentally different realities. Blood didn't turn to water when
given to a Jew, it was always water in the Jew's version of reality,
and remained blood in the Mitzri's.

When reality is phenomenological (the thing as experienced), the
rishonim's version of HP is outside your realm of discussion. And, not
so coincidentally, you end up in a position much like the Rambam's --
the person capable of seeing Yad Hashem in more things will live in a
reality where Yad Hashem more directly impacts his life. Whether we're
talking about something as drastic as nissim geluyim (as the Maharal did)
or HP. Not that he reads HP into reality; he reads an HP-laden reality
into the unknowable things-in-themselves, beyond our perception of them.
Universal HP even for things that don't impact people? But things that
don't impact people aren't observed!

I'm saying that even the hamon am, who don't think in these rarified
terms, are influenced by the post-Kantian zeitgeist and are referring to
something different than the rishonim did.

Just as the discussion above of the Rambam's view of animals' wills
required backtracking to explain how he understood physics. The Rambam's
statement has no real analog in today's worldview. It's not that we
disagree, it's that we're playing a different game.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha at aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (270) 514-1507        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l