[Avodah] New Brachos

[Chana Luntz]

RRM writes:

RAM writes:

> Here's another way of looking at my problem:
> 
> Let's say that the issurim of Bracha L'vatala and Bracha She'eina
> Tzricha only apply when someone recites a bracha which has already been
> established, either in general context, or with specific text, and then
> he misuses that bracha in some manner -- but that these issurim do not
> apply to a bracha which is not "on the books".
> 
> If so, then how could anyone hold that Bracha L'vatala is an Issur
> D'Oraisa? Such a combination would happen only if he said Birkas
> Hatorah or Birkas Hamazon wrongly. But surely, the poskim who hold
> Bracha L'vatala to be d'Oraisa extend it far past these two cases,
> don't they?

I hear your questions, and I am not sure if I can provide satisfactory
answers, but my understanding of this as per the other view is to go back to
the pasuk on which the issur d'orisa is established, namely lo tisa (Shemos
20:7).  The prohibition is on taking the shem Hashem "l'shav".  A lot of the
discussion surrounding this pasuk is about shevuos.  If you go the Mishna in
Shevuos (19b), you get a description of four types of shavuos - shevuah
sheochal, shevuah shelo ochal, shevuah sheachalti and shevuah shelo achalti,
(see the discussion on 20b about which of these apply to this pasuk).

As you say:

> Let's consider the literal meanings and classic examples of these two
> prohibitions. The lesser prohibition, "bracha she'eina tzricha", is an
> "unnecessary bracha", such as if I would say "shehakol" on a steak
> during a Hamotzi meal. This is considered an unnecessary bracha,
> because the steak (having been covered by the Hamotzi) does not need a
> bracha. The greater prohibition, "bracha l'vatala", is a "wasted
> bracha", such as if I would say, *not* during a meal, "shehakol" on a
> steak, with no intention of eating that steak. This is considered a
> wasted bracha, because even though my intention was to praise HaShem
> for this beautiful and delicious steak, that is not the function of
> this bracha. The function of this bracha, as intended by Chazal, was to
> permit eating the steak, and because I did not use the bracha for its
> intended function, it is considered as wasted.

If you understand this in the context of the discussion vis a vis shevuos,
you can understand that if a bracha is the formula to be said to permit
eating the steak, then if you say the bracha and you do not eat the steak,
then you are effectively making a statement, using the Shem Hashem, which
says sheochal, and then you do not eat, which is shav indeed (or sheker, but
I don't think it really matters which pasuk we are talking about here - note
that the gemora there prefers to use shav to describe sheachalti, or shelo
achalti, ie about the past, which would seem to make the terms sheker more
applicable.  Note also that on 21a it understands shav to apply only when
the statement is to contradict that which is well known with the other
psukim applying to the four references to eating).

If you said a brocha during the meal then while you did not need to say it,
if you do indeed eat, this is not the equivalent of false testimony, and it
is only something prohibited d'rabbanan, because they did not want people
going around using the Shem Hashem when it was not needed.  

[Of course the alternative way of understanding all this is that if it is
not necessary to say the Shem Hashem, then any saying of it is in vain ie
understanding the concept of shav differently, which would seem to be the
pashut explanation of the gemora in Brochos, and, to be honest, the way I
would have aunderstood the pasuk itself from its pshat.  But if so, then how
do you explain the whole discussion surrounding 19-21 in Shevuos - if one is
over an issur d'orisa from using the name of Hashem by walking down the
street and commenting on the pretty rocks he has made, a statement that is
true, then why do we need to establish the truth or otherwise of the various
oaths discussed there - if he didn't need to say the name of Hashem, then he
should get flogged whether or not the statement is true].

So how about your rock case.  

> But suppose I am walking down the street and I see a very pretty rock.
> It is so pretty that I want to praise HaShem for it, so I say, with
> Shem and Malchus and in Hebrew, "Baruch Hashem Who makes pretty rocks."
> That's NOT assur.

How is this different from all of these oaths that get mentioned in gemora
Shevuos and elsewhere, where people go around saying all sorts of things and
appear to be using the shem Hashem and they only get punished, at least
d'orisa, if their statements are in fact untrue?

D'rabbanan you could say it - you could perhaps say it is not a necessary
brocha (because Chazal decided we didn't need a brocha on rocks).  But that
then means you have to scope the extent of the d'rabbanan.   There would
seem to be a number of different ways of scoping it.  I actually thought
that my suggestion "- we are dealing with a situation where under the rules
there ought to be a brocha except that the metzius of the situation means
that if one
said the normal expected brocha except that the metzius of the situation
means that if one said the normal expected brocha, one would actually be
saying a sheker," was not fundamentally different from RAF's:

> > Based on my recent investigation into these matters, I believe
> > that we do not generally hold that Chazal legislated the exact
> > wording of blessings. Rather, they decreed particular forms we
> > must observe. Thus, there is a discussion in the gemara about
> > whether one says motzi le'hem min ha-aretz or *ha*motzi...
> > ... This same reasoning may be what prompts the 'al neqiyut
> > yadayim and 'al peirot haadamah.

Or rather, I was saying that if Chazal decided that the particular
circumstance called for a bracha, then it was by definition "not
unnecessary".  But then if the wording was not correct for the circumstance,
it was axiomatic that it would need to be changed to reflect the truth
(especially given the shav issues underlying all this).

RAM then writes:

> Yes, I have heard of this before, that we don't write new brachos. But
> until the past few days, I never perceived it as a separate independent
> halacha, but only that new post-Talmud brachos would simply be
> *examples* of a bracha l'vatala. Where is this additional rule
> mentioned? What are the reasons behind it?

Well one place to start is on the question of saying "hanosen l'ayef koach"
(Shulchan Aruch Orech Chaim siman 46 si'if 6 and following). The Mechaber
says that there is a custom to say it, but rejects its saying.  Of course
the Rema says that in Ashkenaz we say it.  The Taz there on the Shulchan
Aruch (si'if katan 12) explains the Mechaber's reasoning as being that
despite the Tur giving a reason for the custom in Ashkenaz to say it, there
is a problem because the bracha is not found in the gemora. Once you have
looked at this section, work back and forwards through the various birchas
hashachar and the various discussions by the nose keliim, and their sources
and you will see that this is not the only place where there is an issue of
a brocha that is not from the gemora the commentators cite this rule and try
and explain the situation.  Ie it is an issue, and indeed it is an issue for
the Ashkenazi commentators, that needs discussing (even if minhag or perhaps
a takana of the gehonim might be able to overrule this rule).   Note that in
the middle of si'if katan 12 that I cited previously the Taz brings the
Tosphos and the Rosh (that I keep citing) that there is no chashash of a
bracha l'vatala even though the shem Hashem is mentioned - ie the Taz is
worried about the rule about no brochos which are post gemora even though he
is not worried about a bracha l'vatala (on the other hand, while the Taz may
be explaining the Mechaber, the way somebody like ROY explains the Mechaber
is that indeed he is worrying about a bracha l'vatala).

RMB then writes:

> I think this analysis slices the matter in a confusing angle, which is
> why I proposed looking at two distinct questions:
> 1- Does the situation call for a berakhah?
> 2- Is this berakhah an established nusach?
> 
> In the case of making shehakol on steak that was already included
> within
> the hamotzi on the meal as a whole, the answers are "no", and "yes",
> respectively. The berakhah is levatalah because that's what question
> #1 is all about. The fact that the text said is an established coinage
> doesn't change it from being sheim H' lashav.

But it is not lashav according to Tosphos and the Rosh, they say this
explicitly, that this is only an asmachta.   

> Ashk and Seph debate as tp when birkhos hamitzvah are said; is the
> defining feature "asher qidishanu" -- thus including the einah metzuvah
> ve'osah -- or "vetzivanu" and thus only on chiyuvim/issurim.

Yes, agreed, but this is only the second aspect of Tosphos's discussion.  It
seems clear from Tosphos that if in fact saying a brocha sheino tzricha is
an issur d'orisa, then women could not say it.  Once they have eliminated
this as a problem, they move on to discuss how can one say "vetzivanu" -
because potentially that is an issue of sheker.  That lashav is a separate
issue can be seen from the Taz's citation of the two in relation to hanosen
l'ayef koach where there is no "quidishanu" or "vetzivanu" at stake at all.

 While the
> Ashk position has a broad definition of when a situation "calls for" a
> berakhah and thus saying sheim Hashem, so does picking up a spice for
> the sole purpose of having a reason to say "borei minei besamim". We
> don't demand strict minimalism.

But even somebody like ROY, who states explicitly that there are issues of
bracha l'vatala allows for picking up a spice for the sole purpose of having
a reason to say borei minei besamim - in fact a fair bit of multiplication
of brochos is encouraged to get to your 100 brochos.  So in that sense
nobody has strict minimalism.  

And note that hanosen l'ayef koach would seem to violate both of your
questions: - does the situation call for a beracha? - no it would seem
according to the gemora, which does not mention it.  Is it an established
nusach?  Not at the time of the gemora.

Now of course is it a minhag Ashkenaz - ie Catholic Israel, or at least the
Ashkenazi portion of it, have accepted it.  And this, it would seem, appears
in Ashkenaz to trump the rule about not having new brochos.  Would they have
been prepared to let a minhag trump an issur d'orisa?   Not clear but not
necessary to consider in this case.  But the Mechaber is against it.  So
there are two possibilities in the Mechaber.  He regards minhag as being
weaker than they do in Ashkenaz, or he regards the saying of non gemora
brochos as stronger.  ROY certainly understands the latter - ie that he
understands it as being because he holds that there are bracha l'vatala
issues, and there would seem to be strong support from the Rambam and the
Rif at least.  Ie minhag can only go so far, but against an issur d'orisa it
does not triump.  But that does, it seems to me, raise the question as to
how come Chazal were able to be metaken brochos in the first place in the
face of a d'orisa - unless you say that there was a kind of exception under
the requirement to listen to the rabbonim.  And how do you explain the
gemora in Shavuos?  Ie in many ways I find the Ashkenazi position much
easier to understand than the Sephardi one.

Regards

Chana