[Avodah] John Locke and Tzedaqa

[Micha Berger]

Here's where I see the basic difference in assumption:

1- RnTK addressed this first point, but I want to present a different
angle on it.

On Thu, Jan 07, 2010 at 11:15:30AM +0200, Michael Makovi wrote:
: And as I said, I'm sure that everything I've said so far is utterly
: foreign to the Tanakh, Gemara, Rambam, etc. If I started speaking
: about social contract theory to them, and my right to revolt against
: the government when I am not pleased with it, they'd think I'm crazy.
: Nevertheless, the Tanakh tells us that the PEOPLE choose a king. I
: feel quite confident that the basic roots of democracy are in the
: Tanakh, and indeed, it is from the Tanakh that John Locke derived his
: ideas. And as I said, a sevara is d'oraita. Everything I've said so
: far, sounds perfectly logical on paper.

Your reisha disproved your seifa. If the categories and first principles
are alien, who said the conclusion reached from them -- no matter how
sound the logic -- are not equally alien to Torah? This is something
that would require proving, rather than assuming that synthesis is
possible and interpreting Torah to fit.

I should point out that this is a general problem I have with people who
describe MO in terms of the adoption of modern ethics. Yes, modernity
can cast light on ignored Torah values -- but it our values aren't from
Torah, what then does it mean to follow Torah? At best, we're saying we
follow Torah as well as something else; but then keep Torah out of the
something else rather than interpreting them harmoniously.

That's the difference between RYBS's dialectic and resorting to
compramise. RYBS doesn't expect his Torah to explain his mada. They
exist in tension, not harmony.


2- There are two principles of gov't spelled out in the chumash. The
first, which is part of the 7 mitzvos benei Noach, is counted from
HQBH's praise of Avraham, that he would teach them "veshameru derekh H',
laasos tzedaqah umisphat" (Ber' 18:19).

It appears to be a system for getting people to be just, and not "ish
es rei'eihu chaim bal'o".

Notice it's not a social contract between people to keep each other safe.
It's an obligation imposed by a Third Party to get people to imitate Him
(veshameru derekh Hashem).

The second is more complicated. Som tasim alekha melekh -- which brings
us to the whole machloqes rishonim about Shemu'el's reaction to their
asking for one, and whether a melekh is a good thing, a necessary evil,
or inevitable so HQBH tells us how to minimize the damage. But on a
more clearly positive note is parshas Yisro, the 70 zeqeinim, and "kol
asher yorukha" -- the courts and rabbinate. But this isn't a social
contract either.

For this bullet item, I'm just pointing out that civil law as the Torah
expects it from any nation and Torah gov't are two different constructs,
and attempting to extrapolate one from the other can't just be assumed.

Lemaaseh, the US's system is perhaps the best secular gov't in history
at preventing people from swallowing their neighbors (although far from
perfect). That doesn't mean that G-d is speaking about rights, even
implicitly. It's "just" an effective tool for getting the job done.

3- Contract isn't the right model. A beris is a covenant, not a
contract. By which I intend to make the following distinction:

contract: two parties enter an agreement in order to share the burden
    of getting both of their needs met. A can't accomplish his own goals
    without B's help, B similarly needs A, so they enter into a contract
    to work together to accomplish both's needs.

covenant: two parties anter into a unity in order to accomplish that
    union's common goals. A beris is like a marriage, which is why matan
    Torah is allegorized as a chupah, and teaching nachriim Torah compared
    to arayos.

I would propose that there are three models for legal imperative under
discussion:

- rights based law. As RMM notes, it has no room for tzedaqah.

- duties based law, which can be contractual or imposed. The problem
  here is that power corrupts, and handing someone the authority to
  impose duties can dangerously lead to oppression E.g. The US chose
  a rights based system because the founding fathers of this country
  felt that King Charles III crossed that line. And so they abandoned
  duties-based gov't altogether.

- covenental law. Here there is grounds to obligate tzedaqah, because a
  person is obligated to better the community, the covenental whole. The
  kehillah exists to serve its members, and the members exist to serve
  the community -- all in a common goal, to follow the Torah.

A side-effect of the rights vs duties issue is whether society trains the
individual to watch that others do not step on their toes, or to watch
that one does not step on the others'. There is a causal connection
between the US's rights-based approach and the current culture of
entitlement. "Entitlement" is simply rights run amok.

Related to the previous item (#2), the beris Noach is a covenant between
HQBH and the individual. Therefore, the nature of law isn't to produce a
mutual service society, but to protect individuals.

4- A consequence of the Jewish community being founded on covenant is "kol
Yisrael areivim zeh bazeh". This is diametrically opposed to the western
ethic (derived from a rights-based approach) of "live and let live".
"Let live" is honoring their rights. The beris Sinai, or perhaps more
accurately the beris made be'eiver haYardein, is that of areivus.

I think that that difference in fundamental value is where your entire
argument fails. Locke may be a solid and very effective foundation
for implementing the Noachide mitzvah of having a legal system, but it
entire misses the point of beris, of the nature of the Jewish community,
and areivus.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow
micha at aishdas.org        man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries
http://www.aishdas.org   about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                       - Rav Yisrael Salanter