[Avodah] Avodah] New Brachos

[Chana Luntz]

RAM writes:

> I want to know why these Ashkenazi practices don't count as Bracha
> L'vatala.

The starting point for this would seem to be the Tosphos on Rosh Hashana 33a
"dha rabbi Yehuda v'Rabbi Yosi" - which states, inter alia, that the drasha
of Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish on Brochas 33a is only an asmachta.  That
drasha is that one which says a brocha sheaino tzricha is over on lo tisa
[es hashem Hashem l'shav].

The Rosh says similarly (Kiddushin perek 1 siman 49).

However the standard Sephardi approach appears to view a brocha sheino
tzricha as in violation of the d'orisa of lo tisa.

> Or, better phrased: How do the Ashkenazim define of Bracha L'vatala?
> Their definition, whatever it is, must surely exempt these many cases,
> right?

I think the base line is that a brocha which is not necessary is not defined
as equivalent to a bracha l'vatala (ie an issur d'orisa).  The classic case
of a brocha sheaino tzricha is saying an extra brocha over a food during the
course of the meal which is not necessary because of the earlier brochos
said at the beginning of the meal.   

As I understand Tosphos and the Rosh, they are saying that such brochos are
not actually forbidden d'orisa, not real brochos l'vatala, but are only
forbidden d'rabbanan.  And that the further kinds of brochos you are
discussing are not even brochos sheino tzricha (it is not as though they are
covered by other brochos) and hence they are allowed.  Note the Tosphos
quoted above is specifically discussing women saying brochos on mitzvos aseh
shehazman grama as is the Rosh.  The point of this would seem to be that if
you had a mitzvah, any mitzvah, there would be no problem you making up a
brocha from a d'orisa or even d'rabbanan point of view, were it not for the
additional rule that we cannot institute new kinds of brochos post Talmud.  

> The second exception was mentioned in the thread about the Bracha
> Acharona on granola bars. Namely, the possibility that we might have to
> say an unheard-of bracha. Now, this is not a new halacha; I learned it
> -- and the Tosfos it is based on -- decades ago in regard to Puffed
> Wheat cereal. But I never understood it. What is the havamina to say
> such a bracha?
> 
> Even further: What is the havamina that I might be OBLIGATED to say
> such a bracha? Let rephrase that: What is the havamina  that there
> might possibly exist a law which requires me to do something which no
> law has ever prescribed? What were Tosfos thinking? Where did this
> bracha ("Al Ha'adamah, v'al pri haadamah") come from?

And RRW writes:

> R Zev Sero:
> > If you're collecting post-talmudic brochos, here's another one:
> > R Akiva Eiger, who was surely aware of the rule against post-talmudic
> > brochos, holds that if one moves into a house that already has
> mezuzos,
> > and so one can't say "likboa mezuzah", then one says "lodur bevayis
> > sheyesh bo mezuzah".  That bracha is surely not mentioned in the
> gemara.
> > Now I've never heard of anyone actually following this psak of RAE,
> but
> > that is how he paskens, despite the rule.
> 
> And even the Ro"Sh himself - who as per Ta"Z apparently decries adding
> brachos after "siddur Rav Ashi" - adds "al n'qiyyus yadayim" when one
> has no water. And this is pasqened by the Tur

I just wanted to note, and I am not sure if this is an answer (and certainly
whether it is the whole answer) but in the two last cases mentioned here,
"lodur bvayis sheyesh bo mezuzah" and "al n'qiyyus yadayim" - we are dealing
with a situation where under the rules there ought to be a brocha except
that the metzius of the situation means that if one said the normal expected
brocha, one would actually be saying a sheker - because you are not affixing
the mezuzah, it is there already, and you are unable to wash the hands with
water as there is none.  What it seems to me is going on here in these two
cases is a tension between the need/requirement to say the brocha, and the
need/requirement to tell the truth (backed up by things such as mdvar sheker
tirchoq) - with the additional wrinkle that it would then involve
associating the shem Hashem with a lie.  I therefore wonder if the Rosh
would not explain the al niqyiuus yadayim as not being a new brocha, but
rather that it is *really* an old brocha that just has to be changed the
minimum possible to retain its truth.

And (and perhaps this is a further stretch) maybe you could say the same
thing about the Granola bar.  Its nature is of the nature of something
Chazal were metaken, just that one cannot say the particular words that
Chazal were metaken because it does not fit the metzius, so it has to be
changed.  But that this is different from creating a new kind of brocha, or
a new circumstance in which brochos are required.

> Akiva Miller

Regards

Chana