[Avodah] dinosaurs

Wed Nov 4 13:11:11 PST 2009

I'm replying to four posts sent yesterday, Tue Nov 03, 2009 CE. Also,
sorry for that faulty "send" earlier today. I have no separate mod to
reject my own errors.

At 11:55am EST, R' Chaim Manaster wrote:
...

I'm going to skip down to what I think is the fundamental point, and
then skip back to the beginning of RCM's email to use that to explain
the other issues.

:> That way, we can blame eilu va'eilu on the human
:> ability to entertain conflicting thoughts, to be ambivalent, to hold
:> dialectics and antinomies.

: So you are saying EvE is not a sublime truth in Torah, but rather a
: reflection of human failing?

The way I understood the Maharshal and Maharal is that it is a sublime
truth of Torah AND a reflection of human limitation. Divrei E-lokim
Chaim is inherently infinite. Man is finite. Torah has to bridge the gap
from infinite to finite.

Thus it's the nature of Torah to allow us to grasp simplifications --
models, shadows, whatever you wish to call it -- that is as much of
Hashem's Infinite "Thought" that can fit in our world. This is part of
the sublimity of Torah AND a consequence of our being human.

Notice I wrote about human limitation, not human failing. It's not an
error; it's the point of Torah to be a human-sized snapshot of the
Infinite.

People may come up with different fully accurate snapshots of the bigger
Truth.

That's why I like the metaphor of a shadow. A 3D object contains an
infinite number of 2D slices -- it is infinite compared to any of its
shadows. Shadows taken from different angles might be very different.
We each look at the Torah from where we stand, so some difference in
"shadow", in how we understand the halakhah should go, is inevitable.

But that's how the Torah is supposed to be. (According to this explanation
of machloqes.) Because man is supposed to be finite.

Jumping back now:
:> Usually eilu va'eilu isn't about a question of truth, but of law. You
:> could have two valid rulings that contradict, each flowing from TSBP
:> following the proper rules of pesaq.

: You seem to take solace in the fact that the rules of TSBP can lead to
: inconsistent pesak (but not inconsistent truth) under EvE. (BTW this
: seems to contradict your previous position vs R'nTK)...

I'm not sure why. I'm saying there that labeling something kefirah means
that it's not even a proper shadow. Saying there is a plurality of
truths doesn't mean everything is true. And saying something is kefirah
is, AFAIK, assuming that it isn't a product of the process we call TSBP.
And is in fact, incompatible with any such product -- otherwise, why is
the belief "dangerous" enough to be assur?

:                                                       Shifting the
: paradox from ultimate truth to Halacha does not put me any more at ease
: with the problem of understanding EvE. Halacha reflects the underlying
: truth so in principle nothing has really changed with inconsistent pesak
: (in cases with no middle ground such tamei or tahor, mamzer or not etc)

Halakhah is a human construct that must be consistent with a shadow
of a Truth that doesn't fit in our world. That's a looser connection
than "reflects". The idea of halakhah is to bring us ever closer to the
Truth. "Emes mei'eretz *tatzmiach*" -- "vechayei olam *nata* besocheinu".
(As per the haqdamah to the Qetzos.) Truth, like perfection, is a goal
we'll never actually reach, since we're betzelem of the Infinite.

This is also captured by RYBS, when he calls halakhah as creative
partnership between man and G-d. There is an element of human creativity,
which means that Hashem left room for a variety results that the person
creates one of.

:> Someone who can only see shadows could see two very different shadows of
:> the same object. Both shadows accurately represent a mapping of G-d's
:> supernal truth to the limitations of human experience, even though
:> they contradict.

: This does not help me much in understanding EvE either (with all due
: respect to the Maharal). First of all, you have now introduced a case
: that DOES have a middle ground, which here is the whole that neither A
: or B sees in its entirety. (eg. think f(x,y,z), but A only sees f(x,y,k)
: while B sees f(x,k',z)). But more to the point, EvE still leads to paradox
: because you now need to explain the reason for different perspective,
: why A saw only points "a" while B chose to see only points "b." If EvE
: tells us both are right in their choice of perspective, you have not
: answered anything.

I don't see the problem you're trying to describe. Nu, Beis Hillel had
one approach to the Torah and its goals, Beis Shammai a different one.
(Perhaps, as the mequbalim would say, it was chessed vs din. Or perhaps
R' Zevin's idea of actual vs potential. Or...) They therefore approached
the topics of their machloqesin from different perspectives, and got
different shadows of the same Emes (capital "E").

Why is there a paradox in that? Please explain further.

:> R' Tzadoq (Resisei Lailah #17) writes about how the law of contradiction
:> only exists bepo'al. When dealing in machashavah, a thought always
:> invites contemplation of its opposite. People believe contradictory
:> things all the time. 

: Again, I am left without an answer I can be happy with. Shifting the
: discussion to the realm of machashava doesn't help. It still must be
: rationally consistent. 2+2=5 isn't OK just because it is in
: machashava...

OTOH, people do believe both sides of a contradiction. Gadlus haadam vs
shefeilus haadam. Hashem is everywhere vs Hashem is in shamayim. RYBS
founded his entire philosophy on these: Every person is Adam I and Adam
II, cognitive man and religious man, etc...

In the world of thought, contradiction is NOT a show stopper.

That said I can't identify with R' Tzadoq's approach either. Aval Torah
hi, ulelemdah ani tzarikh.

..
:> Why invoke arcane physics when we can discuss halakhah in terms of the
:> roshem on people?

: Sorry, it was just a metaphor. I liked R'nTK's expression "Schrodinger's
: Mamzer."

:> dialectics and antinomies ....  Kantian or Hegelian dialectics 

: Now we are above my pay grade...

Just see what I said above about R' Tzadoq and how people often embrace
two sides of a contradiction / dialectic and it doesn't stop them.

At 7:11pm GMT, rabbirichwolpoe at gmail.com wrote:
: Ilana:
:> Even in straight halacha - does elu v'elu (in the sense that both are true
:> on a deeper level, but only one can actually be accepted as practice)
:> apply to every single machloket? Up to what point? The gemara? The
:> rishonim? Nowadays? Or are there some opinions that are just not true
:> at all? The posek made a mistake - and perhaps eventually realizes
:> this himself and retracts his opinion. Would we say elu v'elu before
:> the retraction, but not after? Or would we say that this is beyond the
:> bounds of elu v'elu?

: Most Posqim assert that Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam Tefillin are mutually
: exclusive.

: In this week's Ben Ish Chai, the author quotes the Arizal stating they
: are BOTH valid! [Not really as alternatives, rather al pi sod - one
: NEEDS both]

: This is beyond plain vanilla EvE.

: The case of BH and BH re: EvE is AISI more about Talmud Torah than
: practice, but see below

: Halachically we follow only ONE derech - viz. BH. Rather learning the
: opinion of BS is of equal value - which seems to contradict learning
: Torah ONLY for Halachah lema'aseh

: Yet here too is a paradox. Even though
: BS is lav aliba dehilchesa, a through analysis of their sheeta may yield
: theoretical constructs useful in the same or in other contexts.

At 5:26pm IST, Rn Ilana Sober Elzufon wrote:
: And what we are discussing here is the trickiest case - a machloket
: about the halachot of what is considered kefirah. The boundaries of
: what is acceptable (even if incorrect) belief, vs. what is heresy are
: not unanimously agreed upon. So does elu v'elu break down in this area
: of halacha? ANY machloket about what is or isn't kefirah raises this
: question.

My understanding of kofeir baTorah is that it's saying
1- the idea is wrong,
2- it's not part of our derekh, and
3- it had to be eraticated because it can't be part of any derekh.

I was arguing that it did simply because it is no longer a statement
about the permissilibity of something, but any prohibition is based
upon the idea being outside of EvE and in fact inconsistent with any
definition of following the Torah.

Once you go meta-level, making statements about statements, paradoxes
are possible. As long as statements deal with lower levels of logic,
eg statements about actions or objections, two people can disagree, but
you can't construct a paradox.

Bertrand Russel introduced the concept of types of sets to eliminate
the concept of paradox. (Principles of Mathematics, appendix B: "The
Doctrine of Types".)

>From <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell-paradox>:
    Some sets, such as the set of all teacups, are not members of
    themselves. Other sets, such as the set of all non-teacups, are
    members of themselves. Call the set of all sets that are not members
    of themselves "R." If R is a member of itself, then by definition
    it must not be a member of itself. Similarly, if R is not a member
    of itself, then by definition it must be a member of itself. 

Russel's resolution, which is generally rejected because it is too
limiting:
    Recognizing that self-reference lies at the heart of the paradox,
    Russell's basic idea is that we can avoid commitment to R (the set
    of all sets that are not members of themselves) by arranging all
    sentences (or, equivalently, all propositional functions) into a
    hierarchy. The lowest level of this hierarchy will consist of
    sentences about individuals. The next lowest level will consist of
    sentences about sets of individuals. The next lowest level will
    consist of sentences about sets of sets of individuals, and so on.
    It is then possible to refer to all objects for which a given
    condition (or predicate) holds only if they are all at the same
    level or of the same "type."
(See there for a fuller discussion.)

The term "this is kefirah" would be branded by Russel to be of a different
type than "this is chillul Shabbos", even though chilul Shabbos is ke'ilu
oveid AZ. Because it's a statement about statements.

Now, once shitah B says shitah A is kefirah, can shitah A include that
part of shitah A in its EvE? After all, it would be asserting that
I am part of plurality of opinions about whether I myself am part of
that plurality!

One simple way out is to show that there is a flaw in my identification
of kefirah with being outside EvE, not just outside our derekh.

I didn't even get to the uglier secondary effects... If A and B are each
concluding that the other uses a methodology or an attempt at daas Torah
or whatever that is unreliable because it can go beyond the range of EvE,
how can either rely on the other's pesaq for anything? Particularly if
it's about daas Torah or shiqul hadaas, where it's all one gestalt and
you can't isolate the flaw to a single domain?

: Even in straight halacha - does elu v'elu (in the sense that both
: are true on a deeper level, but only one can actually be accepted
: as practice) apply to every single machloket? Up to what point? The
: gemara? The rishonim? Nowadays? ...

See below, since you're now touching on what becomes the theme of
RZS's reply to your post (which I address next). The constructionist
model of halakhah of the Ritva and Ramban, the finite-human explanation
of the Maharal and the Maharshal, and the "man thinks in dialectics"
understanding of R' Tzadoq would apply even today.

At 4:42pm EST, Zev Sero replied to RnISE:
: "Elu Va'elu Divrei Elokim Chayim" was a message from Above about BH and
: BS, not about everybody. A similar message is recorded in Shu"T Min
: Hashamayim about the tefilin of Rashi and Rabbenu Tam. Other than these
: two examples I'm not aware of any guarantee that in any given machlokes
: both are DECh...

Except that my post referred to the Ritva (Eiruvin 13b), the Ramban,
Rashi (Kesuvos 57a, "QM"L"), the Maharshal, the Maharal and R' Tzadoq,
all of which assume that the norm for a machloqes is that both sides are
correct. They each might hold that there are rare machloqesin in which
one side erred and isn't Torah, I don't know but that seems reasonable.

BTW, the Ritva gets it from the 49 arguments for tamei and 49 letaheir:
    When Moshe ascended to receive the Torah, it was demonstrated to him
    that every matter was subject to forty-nine lenient and forty-nine
    stringent approaches. When he queried about this, God responded that
    the scholars of each generation were given the authority to decide
    among these perspectives in order to establish the normative
    halakha.
Same basic point, even if not using the EvE terminology.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Nearly all men can stand adversity,
micha at aishdas.org        but if you want to test a man's character,
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