[Avodah] Not livid with anger

[Micha Berger]

On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 02:50:10PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: My impression is that the Rambam removes anger from his normal scheme of 
: the golden mean because of "kol hako'es k'ilu oved avoda zara"...

Perhaps that's why the Rambam includes it in his list. But it's not
unique, he has 2 other exceptions: anavah (2:5) because Moshe is
"anav me'od"; ka'as (2:6), because "kol hako'eis", shetiqah (2:8) --
"veqol kesil berov devarim", and "siyag lechokhmah", etc...

Given the list of three, so resembling Pirqei Avos, I'm thinking there
is significance to the set as a set.

: >1- Is the yeitzer hatov defined as responding with thought, or as
: >responding with the right middos?

: Here is where it gets complicated, since you are trying to harmonize 
: different opinions in mussar.  For the Rambam the yetzer hara is the ego 
: (see MN I:2).

That wasn't really my instent. I was trying to spell out two differen
chiluqim: (1) an ideal of thought vs an ideal of having the right middos,
and (2) an ideal of the "right amount" WRT every middah vs declaring
ka'as and some other middos as being exceptions where the "right amount"
is zero.

(This then had a tangent about the OTz comparing "right amount" to a
recipe -- much more of some things than others, vs the Rambam's lifting
Aristo's notion about middles. More about that when I get to RDSchatz's
article. Speaking of whom -- I know him from the same aforementioned
shtiebl!)

My real problem is that I have a hard time accepting the usability of the
YHT = seichel approach. Where are ahavah, yir'ah and bitachon, anavah,
rachamim, chemlah, etc...? It is better not to develop the "opposing"
middah and rather be more calculating? Where's the passion?

I once argued that Avraham Avinu's "ha'af tispeh tzadiq im rasha" --
throwing out a rhetorical question in complaint to the TBSO (about Sedom
et al) was not only justifiable anger, but actually *laudible* anger at
the RBSO! (But recall that much of my position on how to respond to
tragedy was formed while in aveilus for a daughter, so some of it may
be self-justification.) A snippet from
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/10/angry-at-g-d.shtml>:

    It would seem that there is an appropriate time for anger. When
    someone hears of something that seems like a great wrong, it would
    be insensitive of him not to respond with outrage. Although it's
    interesting to note that in both examples, the injustice would have
    been aimed at a third party. There is no personal motive in either
    case. And Hashem even lauds examples of where that anger is directed
    at Him!

    Anger is part of any relationship. We are called into partnership
    with Him in finishing His creation -- of the world, of ourselves,
    even of expounding the Torah. Can a human being participate in a
    successful partnership without ever feeling angry at their partner?
    Marriages are not built on avoiding fighting, but on learning how
    and when to fight productively.

BTW, WRT anger as AZ because it's about one's own will being thwarted
in contrast to accepting His...

What does "asei Retzono kirtzonkha" say about that? What if (in another,
hypothetical, situation) I had been angry because His Will was thwarted?
Is such anger impossible? And if possible, would you say it's negative
and ke'ilu oveid AZ?

:>More starkly contrasting is REED's model of nequdas habechirah, in which
:>he lauds moving the nequdah over to the point where good deeds need not
:>require conscious thought. Better to not need seikhel to come to the
:>right choice, be such that it happens preconsciously!

: Now you're mixing apples with oranges.  REED, as far as I recall, never 
: mentions the nekudas habehira in the context of emotions.

The whole bechirah-point thing is a starker contrast to identifying the
yeitzer hatov with seikhel than identifying it with positive middos.
Because REED is saying the ideal is to do good without needing to think
about it. And to constantly be including more and more good in that
territory. The nequdat habechirah is in opposition to the Rambam's
ideal of acting through thought, and seems to be in opposition to the
opening paragraphs of Igeres haMussar (but I would bet REED understood
the igeres accordingly and was not rejecting his understanding of a
central pillar of his own tenu'ah).

...
: >And yet, RYS also writes of tiqun hamiddah, changing the middah
: >(typically through hergeil) into something positive.

: There's a machlokes between Aristotle and Hume about whether the 
: intellect controls the emotion, or visa versa.  I find RYS's writing 
: provocative, but too 19th-century-Germanic-flowery to think I understand 
: it, but I do think I understand the writings of his student, the Alter 
: from Kelm.  For him the point of mussar is to change the Humesean human 
: ("ayir pere adam yulad") into an Aristotelian human.

Personal introspection leads me to side with Hume. That's why I coined
the aphorism in this post's subject line. I also think Riha"l would
agree, had he addressed the question. He believes that philosophy can
prove anything, which is why any sound argument by one philosopher is
bound to be conflicted by antoher sound argument presented by another
(Kuzari 1:1). We accept the postulates and arguments we are predisposed
to accept, and so reason follows, not leads.

I did not hand-select that quote. I was about to replace the signature
on with the one referred previous paragraph. But I didn't have to -- der
Herrgolt wurfelt mit Krumme Wurfel (G-d plays dice with loaded dice; in
contrast to Einstein's inability to accept QM and it's non-deterministic
features on the grounds that "der Herrgolt wurfelt nicht -- G-d does
NOT play dice").

To touch on RRW's point on this thread:
And while Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and its predecessor Rational
Emotive Therapy both link emotion to a preceding thought, AFAIK, they
do not begin the cycle at thought. Rather, they identify thought as an
easier place at which to interrupt the cycle. But they do work on behavior
(hergel) as well.

I think CBT and Tenu'as haMussar have another of methodological elements
in common. So did RYBS at one point in his life, although the paper he
sent me once was written many years ago.

While mentioning RET and Albert Ellis, he famously had clients walk a
banana through Times Square, as a way of breaking them about concerns
about how they are perceived. Novhardok would be proud.

...
:>And then I suggested a possible combination, that the chassid is bending
:>over backward because he's the one working to fix the middah, training
:>it like a vine on a trellis (to borrow a mashal from the Rambam).

: The problem with that is that even a tzaddik does that when he has a 
: problem.  The answer I once gave, in an unpublished essay, is that a 
: hassid goes out of his way to combat potential genetic and environmental 
: influences, while a tzaddik does not.

IOW, that a chassid is predisposed to be in fix-it mode, and therefore
tending toward one qatzeh? (Rephrasing to check: Did I understand you
correctly?)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha at aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (270) 514-1507