[Avodah] Tzeni'us and gender roles

[Meir Shinnar]

me
>
> : You adopted this argument, and out of this Brisker argument developed
> : a far reaching theory of modesty - and one practical implication of
> : this is the consequence for women - and positions such as maharat.
RMB
> I didn't really extend RHS's argument as much as shift it. RHS argued in
> Brisker terms of chalos, and thus stating it directly in the language
> of pesaq (although one shouldn't confuse a parashah sheet essay with
> a teshuvah). I was adopting in more Telzher terms, or perhaps more
> accurately outright mussar terms, and therefore was stating in terms of
> the need for a "political pesaq" to preserve Jewish norms. The difference
> in worldview between a Brisker and myself meant that the notion was
> severely recast in translation from RHS's statement to mind.
>
> FWIW, I think the practical implication on men is far greater. Because
> it implies that men, who already occupy leadership positions, are called
> upon to make sure that their leadership is really warranted. Do they
> bring something to the table that others can't or aren't, or is much of
> it a pursuit of kibud?
I understand the desire to preserve Jewish norms, and agree that there
has to be a discussion.  However, we have to be sure that in order to
preserve Jewish norms, we do not destroy other norms......
That has certain specific meanings.  First, there is the issue of our
limited ability to issue general gzerot in the post talmudic area.
This has specifc issues for the notion of political psak - because
political psak is essentially such a gzera - extending the limits
beyond the text -  and as such, is one that is only valid for one's
own community - not in general.  Furthermore, stating it as a
political psak immediately concedes  that the problem is not intrinsic
with the issue at hand - otherwise one would could do a real psak - an
but with broader goals - and here the quesiton is what those goals
are.

But the second is that the Jewish norms involved have to be authentic
Jewish norms.  I understand the novelty in pulbic roles for women -
but you are basing your opposition on a norm that is not a Jweish
norm, and even created out of whole cloth. TO
> : Objections.
> :       a) This model of modesty is one that in practice is not followed by
> : the general Jewish community. (I and many others have pointed out many
> : examples)
RMB
> I don't consider this relevent.
It is extremely relevant - because it argues that the opposition is
not based on classical Jewish norms as understood by the community -
it is invented for the sake of the opposition - and is as much a
novelty as what it is trying to oppose  (Indeed, a stronger case can
be made for a political psak against the norm that you are proposing -
becuase, as argued later, such a norm is destructive to the Jewish
community..)Oppposing one change because one wants another change is
legitimate - but it is hardly persuarsive as preserving of our norms.

> :       b) Not only is it not followed in practice, it is not viewed as an
> : ideal that we are unable to fully implement, and there is literature
> : against it.
>
> This I think is due to an oversimplification of my position. As is this:
> :       c) Not only is it not viewed as an ideal, it actually represents an
> : ideal that is profoundly immoral, dangerous to the Jewish community,
> : and of foreign origin.  ((t is this last point that made the
> : discussion so heated - and I confess that I find it difficult to
> : understand how someone so morally sophisticated and sensitive adn
> : Micha could adopt such a position)
>
This is not an oversimplicfication.  In pubilic policy terms, it it is
the actual, practical implication of your policy.

> And the bottom line about what's missing from RMS's depiction of my
> position is that I agree with:
> :       d) Even if one were to accept this definition of modesty with its
> : restrictions as an ideal, it actually doesn't solve the issue of
> : women's roles - because the underlying issue of public roles for
> : women, such as yoetzet halacha, to'enet, high school tanach teacher,
> : or maharat (all revolutions in some form or other), is not satisfying
> : the base need for public adulaton of the individual - as viewed by
> : some of the critics - but satisfying a communal need that has been
> : identified by its leaders.  The question then becomes of what are the
> : needs of the community.
>
> Very much so. I'm saying that such decisions need an active encounter
> with the change, and a real assessment of pros vs cons. I am saying that
> while RHS presented the notion in Brisker terms, the idea of tzeni'us /
> anavah / avoiding kibud is an identified and significant "con".

It is not a con for tzedaka dinners, it is not a con at weddings, it
is not a con for any other aspect of Jewish life  - and the one place
where one can argue (I think wrongly, as in previous go rounds), that
it is codified - that is, for asking shliche tzibbur to daven - it is
routinely ignored because of tircha detzibbura - suggesting that it
does not take much public need to over ride this.  My argument is not
an oversimplification of your argument - it merely points that no
matter how sophisticated the position, putting an extra barrier in
front of public service - even one as well intentioned with good
mussar reasons - ends up making it more dificult for people to do
public service, and fewer will - and therefore has not been a Jewish
value (it seems far more of a Christian ideal...)

You find this new value compelling - and if everyone were like you, it
might not be destructive of public enterprise - but our history, and
nature of public practice

> Also, that this worldview is diametrically opposed to the western one
> where significance is too often identified with prominence. And third,
> that much of feminism derives from this identification as well.

Besides the fact that signficance and prominence have an
identification in tradtional Jewish sources as well (as RDR
documented..), I think you are misrading the issue (and misreading
feminism).
The issue is not prominence but participation - being part of.the community.

> So the question for every step that changes the role of women, from Beis
> Yaakov to seminaries to yoatzot to WTGs to Maharat, is whether we can
> define an offsetting pro. And moreso, a positive associated with that
> claim that doesn't presume the conclusion.

You haven't defined a con.

>
> And so, it's not placing personal development ahead of the kelal until
> one decides that the con of pursuing kibud outweighs the pro of serving
> the kelal -- and I never said anything remotely like that!

It is the natural implciation of your position

> Rather, I said that one must actually identify a pro of equal import
> to the negative of making major societal changes to accomodate a value
> directly derived from a person's right to assume prominence.

I agree that one has to identify a pro to justify social and religious
changes.  What I disagee with is the nature of the con - as well as
what you assume the proposed social changes are.

Again, a con that does not figure realistically (even if it is a value
- over which we disagree) in any practical decision making (even
though it clearly could) in any other area is not one thqt is one that
I worry about - the pro I can identify (and that RCL also identified)
are clearly of gerater weright than most of the pros that routinely
overweigh this value.

This does not mean that one has to accept the pro - but you have
misidentified the con.
I would add that viewing the primary issue of the right of the
individual to prominence betrays teh focus on the individual t - but
is an utter misread of the situation.  A woman who invites her
teacher, say, to read the ketuban under the chuppa is not looking for
prominence - is looking for particiaption of her representative - not
because her teacher is a publicity hound (or that RHS is a publicity
hound for reading the ketuba when he is honored).  A better model is
the classic one of rabbanim allowing semicha of korbanot to women for
nachat ruach - recognizing that sometimes, participating and being
part of the action (even if only secondary) is important.



> (This being the distinction between encountering an idea and accepting it,
> this time on the side of whether one grapples with tzeni'us or simply
> follows it, rather than on the side of confronting moderinity rather
> than assuming it as a given.)
>
> It is unsound to say that we should accomodate rather than work to
> remove a desire for Maharatot because there are women who feel they
> belong in the role and women who feel they want to turn to someone in
> that role. That circularly presumes that the religious desires involved
> are positive ones -- the very notion under question!

The issue is not women who feel that they belong in the role  - but a
community that thinks that they need women in the role. That is the
major distinction.  Again, one can argue against hthe changes - but
you are again focusing on the individual rather than the community.

> Speaking of which, I feel to see the distinction recently posted by
> RJJB in the name of RMT:
>> That's the R' Tendler expansion on RMF's letter that theoretically
>> allows women's tefillah groups. RMF allowed them if the motivations of
>> the women were pure, not driven by feminism. RMT clarified that this
>> was pure theory, that RMF didn't believe such women could exist.
>
> Isn't that a false dichotomy? Let's assume, since we have no reason not
> to, that the motives are purely religious. (It's unfair to assume we're
> dealing with women who care more about making some feminist point than
> tefillah.) However, those motives are based on a particular worldview. If
> the worldview is suboptimal, then the purity of the motive doesn't redeem
> it from being consequentially suboptimal.
First, suboptimal is different from trafe.  Second, the issue is to
develop religiously - and the question is, how do you develop
religiously, given one's background.  One can argue (a la mussar) for
a complete reworking of the individual first - but one can also argue
that for a given individual of a given background, a certain approach
will achieve the desired religious effect better.


>
> On Sat, Aug 1, 2009 at 11:46pm BST, Rn Chana Luntz replied to my post:
> : So, I was asking you to do that - and specifically about the change that has
> : gone on in the lives of young women -prior to their marriage.  As I tried to
> : indicate, the reality is in non charedi circles, young women are spending a
> : decade or two post puberty but prior to marriage.  Obviously at least the
> : first two to four years of that is indeed forced upon us (depending on the
> : dina d'malchusa dina of wherever it is you live - in England you need to be
> : 16, but other parts of the world differ).   Please explore whether the rest
> : is indeed forced upon us?  Do the pros of later marriage outweigh the cons?
> ...
>
> Yes, this determination has to be made. (You invoked my children, but
> that just demonstrates that you don't have children of that age yourself,
> yet. My daughter came back from sem, and all I can do is give points of
> information, not make decisions.)
>
> I find this and your post in general off-topic, since there are different
> pros and cons with each change. Saying that we need more yoatzot doesn't
> mean we need Maharatot, and saying that girls need more role models of
> their own geneder doesn't imply we need more of either.
>
> The Maharat is a unique invention in that it intentionally shadows
> the rav in both education and future job. It is on those criteria in
> particular that I question its net positive value. If the woman would be
> a yoetzet, or give classes to the women in shul with no more a title than
> Nechamah Leibowitz's, would anything be lost? Would she be any less of
> a crush-proof (for the girls and single women in her class) role model,
> any less of a contributor?

If the main issue is one of kavod, why does it matter whether the
maharat shaodws a rav or not, if both are public positions with
kavod????  YOur argument here suggests that you see that there are
other issues involved - and I do agree that there are other issues -
but they are not what you identify as kavod

> learning pragmatic halakhah due to this change in metzi'us.
>
> On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 02:55pm EDT, R David Riceman joined the conversation:
> : I think one of the problems here is, in the mythical saying of Tonto,
> : "Who do you mean by we, paleface?" In the mythical past all Jews in one
> : small town followed the same customs and consulted the same Rabbi.  Ever
> : since 19th century Warsaw, if not earlier, and certainly nowadays in the
> : US and Israel, we live cheek by jowl with lots of different types of
> : Jews as well as non-Jews.  Expecting conformity beyond halachic norms
> : strikes me, in our context, as both unjust and absurd.
> ...
>
> And yet, we're discussing a societal change. I see only three outcomes
> for the future of American O on this question: either we accept the
> institution of Maharatot, we do not, or we end up two movements.

That mat be a self fulfilling prophecy.  However, on this basis, the
question is just as much whether one community should accept
maharatot, versus whether the other community should reject them - and
if the only argument is a polilical psak based on a value that is
clearly not of significance - this is more an indictment of the
rejectionists....

> (BTW, I'm not that pale.)
>
> ..
> : women.
>
> As above, I think the advantage of RHS's formulation that it's not about
> "man lecturing woman". It has as much to say to someone like myself, who
> manages to work bragging about my teaching gigs into more conversations
> than necessary -- as you yourself pointed out earlier in this thread.
>
> Second, I am nervous when I hear someone turning this into a gender-war
> thing, that turning to a rav for hora'ah is somehow related to abusive
> men who use gender norms to self-justify their controlling natures

HOwever, basing the disucssion on a admitted political psak on a value
that is not utilized anywhere else in halacha is exactly proof for
this proposition.......

Again, one can make legitimate arguments against the innovation of
women's roles.  I think that those opposed have to come up with
alternative, realistic solutions to the real changes of the community,
but that is a different discussion.  However, the discussion based on
an invented model of  tzeniut is not, IMHO, a tenable argument, and
does suggest " abusive men who use gender norms to self justify their
controlloing natures" - which is so completely out of character for
RMB that this discussion puts me at a loss..

Meir Shinnar