[Avodah] Not livid with anger

[Micha Berger]

This topic line allows me to open for discussion here something I asked
the va'ad. (I'm sending this email to both Avodah and AishDas's e-vaad,
apologies to those who will be getting two copies. Please try to make
sure both avodah at aishdas.org and evaad1 at aishdas.org are both in your
"To:" list in any replies.)

I blew my cool on the subway one morning this week, and frankly until the
I got some emails back on the va'ad's email list, I was proud about it.

I got on the train, took a hold of the pole, and rapidly noticed that
the woman next to me was very pregnant, on wobbly legs, and yet still
picking up one leg, rotating her ankle, switching to the other leg to
rotate that one.

So, I turned to the gen Y-ers in the seat nearby, and yelled at them
for not getting up and yeilding the seat.

Now I realize that I was supposed to only express anger, not actually
feel it. However, thinking about the situation, that seems wrong. There
should be some kind of strong negative feeling in that circumstance. One
can't be apathetic kalter-Litvakim when faced with injustice.

So, if anger is not the appropriate emotion when dealing with injustice,
particularly injustice meted out to others, what is? What is it I'm
supposed to be feeling when expressing anger at those young 20-somethings
who couldn't give up a seat for a woman in her third trimester?

After posing the question to the va'ad, it was pointed out that my
reaction was wrong -- as is typical for ka'as -- for two reasons:

1- I assumed they were mechutzafim, rather than considering the
possibility that they simply didn't notice.

2- Because I flew off the handle, my response did nothing to help the
next pregnant woman, sr citizen or handicapped person they leave standing
in the train. Instead of making them reconsider, I gave them a guy they
could easily dismiss as a flake.

However, I think the underlying question stands.

To me it seems there is something fundamentally wrong with facing
injustice, particularly injustice where someone else is the victim,
with equanimity. It's a kind of apathy toward the suffering of others.
And yet sifrei Mussar eg Alei Shur's ve'adim on ka'as speak of eliminating
all ka'as and only allowing expressions of ka'as.

My confusion seems to flows from two differences in ideals:

1- Is the yeitzer hatov defined as responding with thought, or as
responding with the right middos?

Related:

The Gra in Even Sheleimah refers to sheviras hamiddos and fighting
middos, without ever specifying middos ra'os in particular. Also, in
Igeres haMussar (a/a/a Ohr Yisrael ch. 10), RYS opens "Haadam chafshi
bedimyono, ve'asur bemuskalo." -- switching to translation for the rest
for legibility -- "His unbridled imagination draws him misrchievously in
the way of his heart's desire without yir'ah for the uncertain future --
the time when Hashem will examine all his affairs."

Both appear to be identifying the yeitzer hatov with seikhel.

And yet, RYS also writes of tiqun hamiddah, changing the middah
(typically through hergeil) into something positive. The Orchos Tzadiqim
makes a point of showing where each middah has a positive use, some are
constructive more often than others, bet every middah is assigned some
context in which it's positive.

More starkly contrasting is REED's model of nequdas habechirah, in which
he lauds moving the nequdah over to the point where good deeds need not
require conscious thought. Better to not need seikhel to come to the
right choice, be such that it happens preconsciously!

2- Is the ideal, particularly WRT ka'as? Is it the Rambam's middah
beinonis or the Orkhos Tzadiqim's case-by-case some middos are tavlin,
good in small amounts, others are more like the basar? Or is it total
eradication?

The Rambam himself appears to take both sides. I explore this in
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/10/anger-and-the-golden-mean.shtml>.
The Rambam, Hil Dei'os 1:4 introduces the concept of middah beinonis for
each dei'ah, and gives ka'as as one of his examples. And yet in 2:3,
the Rambam writes "veyeish dei'os she'asur lo le'adam linhog bahen
beinonis... vekhein ka'as"!

Here are snippets of the answers I gave on Aspaqlaria:
> The Lechem Mishnah understands the Rambam to be recommending the
> Middle Path in all cases. However, since anger and egotism are so
> dangerous, one end of the spectrum is far more hazardous than the
> other. Therefore, the Chassid chooses to err on the side of caution,
> and lean toward avoiding them rather than stay in the ideal, the
> middle. The Lechem Mishnah makes a linguistic note. By most dei’os,
> the Rambam refers to pursuing the beinonis. But here the middle is
> described as emtza’is — it is not the middle distance between both
> extremes, but the mean taking into account the severity of either
> side. This distinction is the point of chapter 2.
...
> Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igeros Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:54) ... understands
> the Rambam 1:4 as speaking of getting angry over important matters, so
> that his display and attitude prevent their repetition. However, when
> one can’t readily see the error, the anger just seems inane and
> doesn’t help anyone. In this case, one should follow the advice in
> chapter 2, and avoid anger.

> Unfortunately, I was unable to satisfy my own frustration at
> understanding the Rambam since I couldn't fit either suggestion into
> his words. ...
> A possible resolution that seemed more straightforward to me is
> suggested by the Rambam's words (also from 1:4). Obviously, advice
> about how to be a good Jew carries more weight when informed by the
> Lechem Mishnah's knowledge or Rav Moshe's, but....

> Maimonides is defining two possible paths: the Chakham (Wise), and the
> Chassid (Pious). Both laudable ideals. In the majority of chapter 1, he
> addresses the path he himself took, that of the Chakham -- finding the
> middle. In chapter 2, when he discusses modesty he clearly describes the
> Chassid approach. It would seem the same would be true of his discussion
> of anger in chapter 2.
...
> Another possibility is that chapter 2 isn't focusing on an ideal, but
> rather on how to cure a defect in one's middos. From the previous law
> in that chapter:
>     2) How do they cure?...
> Contrast that to the advice in 1:6, that the person "is obligated to
> accustom oneself to them"...

And then I suggested a possible combination, that the chassid is bending
over backward because he's the one working to fix the middah, training
it like a vine on a trellis (to borrow a mashal from the Rambam).

One can reframe my 2nd question as follows:
The chassid's approach to ka'as appears to violate what seems to me to
be very reasonable about the chakham's approach -- that every middah
has value and its proper place. As the O"Tz writes, and as the Rambam
himself says at the end of pereq 1, that "vehalakhta bidrakhav" means
the midah habeinonis.

To me it would seem that rachamim on others implies a role for ka'as.
If not of the sort that takes over and prevents the seikhel from
stopping stupid ideas.

Thoughts?

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It is our choices...that show what we truly are,
micha at aishdas.org        far more than our abilities.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - J. K. Rowling
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