[Avodah] Or Sameiach on HaKol Tzafui

[Micha Berger]

On Sun, Mar 22, 2009 at 08:26am EDT, I wrote:
: I found this week's VBM email  from R' Yitzchak Blau very interesting.
: On the centrality of bechirah chafshi in the Or Sameiach's worldview.
: See <http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/modern/19modern.htm>.

On a totally different topic, I reread the essay in the Or Sameiach in
Hil' Teshuvah pereq 4 titled "HaKol Tzadui vehaReshus Nesunah". I still
see it differently than RYBlau did.

To quote:
> The very fact that R. Meir Simcha penned a lengthy analysis of this
> topic in the Ohr Sameach is noteworthy and quite unusual among modern
> halakhic giants. Furthermore, the discussion reveals knowledge of the
> philosophy of Rambam, Ralbag, R. Hasdai Crescas, Maharal, kabbalists
> and others. R. Meir Simcha read widely and thought deeply about the
> ideas he encountered. Meshekh Chokhma also reveals a similar range of
> reading interests.

> R. Meir Simcha provides many arguments on behalf of free will. As noted,
> some of the arguments begin with religious assumptions about God. Humans
> experience their freedom to choose. Why should a person toil to succeed
> if God's knowledge predetermines success? If people do not truly choose,
> why did God create the evil of immoral behavior? Why would God create
> wicked people? In a world of compulsion, mitzvot become pointless, and
> reward and punishment lack justification. What kind of glory could God
> receive from righteous people who act due to compulsion?

> He anticipates objections to a few of the arguments and responds.
> Regarding the last proof, a critic might point to the angels that act from
> necessity and yet contribute to God's honor. R. Meir Simcha counters
> that the angels are not compelled by divine foreknowledge. Rather,
> they are purely spiritual beings who comprehend God's grandeur to the
> extent that they can only adhere to His command. That kind of necessity
> reflects divine glory. However, a flesh and blood human who simply acts
> without freedom due to what God already knows contributes nothing.

> One potential response limits divine providence and foreknowledge, but
> R. Meir Simcha rejects this approach. He states that all of Tanakh teaches
> an acute sense of individual providence, and if he started to cite verses
> to prove this point, he would have to copy the entire Tanakh. Once we
> accept this pervasive level of providence, denying foreknowledge leads to
> the idea that God changes over time as He accumulates knowledge. This,
> too, flies in the face of traditional beliefs as taught in Tanakh and
> Chazal, so R. Meir Simcha cannot accept it.

> Earlier authorities receive sharp critique from R. Meir Simcha. Maharal
> argues that we cannot say anything positive about God's essence. We cannot
> identify God's essence with knowledge, as the philosophers did. Therefore,
> talking about God's knowledge changing does not indicate that His
> essence changes. In an analogous fashion, God acts in various ways at
> different times but this does not entail a change in God's essence.[17]
> R. Meir Simcha denies this analogy. God's actions are truly not physical
> movements on God's part but rather manifestations of His will. His will
> does not change over time; it carries out actions according to the
> eternal providential plan based on what is happening in contemporary
> human history. Therefore, the different actions do not reflect a change
> in God. Shifts in the accumulation of knowledge, on the other hand,
> would indicate that God changes.

> R. Meir Simcha also evaluates the resolution based on the idea that
> God transcends the boundaries of time. According to this approach, we
> do not make choices because of divine foreknowledge. On the contrary,
> God knows what will happen because we will choose it. He correctly
> finds this answer in Tosafot Yom Tov and mistakenly attributes it to
> R. Sa'adia Gaon as well. Though he shows some appreciation of this
> approach, R. Meir Simcha ultimately finds it lacking.

> At the end of the day, he sides with Rambam's answer. God's knowledge
> is not something external to Him but part of His essential being. We
> cannot comprehend how divine knowledge works; therefore, it is not
> surprising that we cannot resolve this dilemma. Ra'avad criticized Rambam
> for introducing a challenging question and not offering an answer, but
> R. Meir Simcha counters that Rambam did provide an answer. We can prove
> that something we cannot understand exists, even though we are left not
> understanding it. Thus, he ultimately affirms full freedom along with
> compete foreknowledge.

I think that at the end of the day, RMShKmD doesn't fully reject all
those answers. He explains the difficulties, but then also shows how
far each works. In particular, the Tosafos YT's answer, that Hashem's
Knowledge is outside of time, and therefore His Knowledge of the future
doesn't compell the present any more than His Knowledge of the past. He
raises a problem, but still AFTERWARD writes of its merits.

In the end, the OS writes that the answers are like trying to keep two
people warm in a jacket that barely fits one. It's simply not large
enough. When you pull it over to cover one, you uncover the other. It's
not a metaphor for falsity, but incompleteness. An answer that is correct,
but incomplete because our minds can't get it.

Therefore the OS doesn't end up with the Rambam's answer. Yes, the Rambam
says that we don't get it because we don't understand what it means
that He, His Knowledge and the Knowing are one. But the OS seems to say
what we can't understand is more tangible -- how these semi-answers fit
together. IOW, the mystery is about how the Timeless interacts with time,
not unity of G-d and time.

(I find this distinction important because of another religion making
a Diiving Mystery out of the unity of God and Logos (and a third guy).)

Personally, I think the Tosafos YT's answer is more solid than the OS
gives it credit for. It's not only that Hashem relates to the future
the way He relates to the past. It's also that Hashem doesn't know "now"
what we will do tomorrow, because He has no "now". We can't tie a "when"
to the tzipiyah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "The worst thing that can happen to a
micha at aishdas.org        person is to remain asleep and untamed."
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