[Avodah] Women covering hair

[Michael Makovi]

The Aruch haShulhan ruled that since we are accustomed to seeing women's
hair, it is no longer an impediment to the saying of Shema; but all
the same, he ruled that uncovering the hair is still prohibited. But
if people are used to seeing their hair, and it is no enticement (vis
a vis Shema), then why is it still prohibited in the first place?

For indeed, the Maharam Alkashar has said ("Kol b'Isha with
a current perspective", Rabbi Avraham Shammah, part 2 (reply
to critiques), http://www.kolech.org.il/show.asp?id%484
(Hebrew original), www.jofa.org/pdf/uploaded/1529-GHKB8620.pdf,
pp. 11ff (English translation); the English PDF also has part 1
(the original article), while the Hebrew original of part 1 is at
<http://www.kolech.org.il/show.asp?id%318>), "Response: Indeed,
there is no concern about that hair [that is outside of the braid being
uncovered], because it is customary to reveal it... and that [which
is said] 'a woman's hair is a sexual enticement' is only referring
to hair that it is usual to be covered, but a person is accustomed
to that which is usually uncovered [and therefore is not aroused] and
it is permitted... Likewise, the Ravya"h wrote that all those [things]
that we mentioned for [concern about] sexual enticement are specifically
for things that are not customarily exposed... all is according to the
customs and the locations."

Regarding the AhS, if people are used to seeing their hair, and it is
no enticement (vis a vis Shema), then why is it still prohibited in the
first place?

Obviously, today, for us, it will still be prohibited to uncover the
hair, since, as my rabbi has put it (with regard to a prominent Sefardi
posek (I forget who) who ruled that women need not cover their anymore,
since most women do not, and it is no longer enticing), most Orthodox
women today (unlike many women a few decades ago) DO cover their hair. It
would seem to me personally, that even if their hair is NOT an enticement
(this seems likely to me; plenty of non-Jewish and non-Orthodox women
leave their hair uncovered, and it seems reasonable that we are inured
to their hair), nevertheless, covering the hair, per se (aside from any
hirhur), is a sign of Orthodoxy. That is, even though womens' hair will
not lead to hirhur, nevertheless, covering the hair is a sign of modesty
done by Orthodox women, irrespective of
any hirhur.

But for the AhS, whose women did not cover their hair, why was it still
prohibited to behave in this way?

[Email #2. -mi]

In my previous post, I cited Rabbi Avraham Shammah's article, regarding
kol 'bisha. I may as well say a few words on this as well.

In brief: before I saw Rabbi Shammah's article, I saw Rabbi David
Bigman's article on Rabbi Marc D. Angel's website (Rabbi Angel
is probably the closest I have to someone I consider my own rav),
<http://www.jewishideas.org/rabbi-david-bigman/new-analysis-kol-bisha-erva>.
Rabbi Bigman's thesis is that if kol b'isha is like an etzba ketana, then
it is prohibited only for hana'a. Numerous authorities would support
such an assertion (before I saw Rabbi Bigman's article, a friend of
mine, who goes strictly by Rambam exclusively, showed me the same in
the lashon of the Rambam - the irony is, of course, fantastic; Rambam
rules yeiharog v'al ya'avor on a mere sexual lav, but this friend, who
goes like Rambam, shows me the kol b'isha heter!). Indeed, kol b'isha
could theoretically include even mere speaking (as Rabbenu Hananel and
others indeed ruled), and those who excluded speaking from kol b'isha,
did so on the grounds that speaking has no hana'a. And Rabbi Weinberg,
following the Sdei Hemed, following the Divrei Hefetz, ruled that the
singing of zemirot and dirges has no hana'a. If so, cannot we say the
same of certain other singings, at least in certain situations?

Cf. footnote 22 of Rabbi Shammah's article, in the English version:
"R. [Yehiel Yaakov] Weinberg cites Maimonides Hilkhot Isurei Bi’a (Laws
of Forbidden Sexual Relations) 21:2, in which Maimonides states that
“one who looks even at a woman’s little finger with the intent to
derive [erotic] pleasure is as if he looked at her privates and even to
hear the voice of a forbidden woman or to see her hair is forbidden.”
R. Weinberg points out that the meaning of Maimonides’ words is that
the prohibition to hear a woman’s voice is only if there is intent to
thereby derive erotic pleasure."

Rabbi Shammah's article argues more ideologically and less halakhically
than does Rabbi Bigman. Rabbi Shammah notes that the same paragraph of
the Shulhan Aruch which forbids kol b'isha, also forbids bachelors from
teaching children, and forbids mixing the marketplace, both of which
we permit today. Rabbi Shammah says that to forbid kol b'isha today is
simply self-righteous religious hypocrisy.

Obviously, Rabbis Bigman and Shammah both agree that not ALL kol b'isha
is mutar. Rabbi Bigman says it must be judged on the woman's clothing,
lyrics, and gesticulations, and Rabbi Shammah says one must follow the
Ritva and sincerely ask himself what gives himself hana'a, and refrain
from such.

[Email #3. -mi]

I earlier asked how the Aruch haShulhan could rule as he did. I asked
my Gemara ra"m, whose rabbi is Rabbi Henkin himself, and my ra"m answered:

Rabbi Henkin in his article on hirhur and community norms, holds that
while some laws of tzniut depend on hirhur, others are intrinsic. My
ra"m says the Aruch haShulhan is being likewise: while the law against
saying Shema with a woman's hair uncovered is based on hirhur, the law
of hair covering per se, is (contra Maharam Alkashar) an intrinsic one
that has nothing to do with hirhur.

On the other hand, another one of my rabbis would agree with the Maharam
Alkashar, that tzniut is only conventional, and not intrinsic. He notes
that Rambam, in Moreh Nevuchim, says that drinking alcohol overmuch is
intrinsically disgusting (morally), since it clouds the human intellect,
but the morality against public defecation is only conventional. I.e.,
defecation is purely natural, and only because society says it is
disgusting, is it so. He said modesty is the same; only because society
says such-and-such a body part must be covered, and only because society
says that part is immodest if uncovered, is it so. Were people to be
capable of looking at that part without getting sexual pleasure (for
example, in some parts of Africa, women are almost naked, but this
is ordinary, and the men derive no pleasure), then there'd be nothing
immodest in leaving this part unclothed. (I must, however, emphasize
one point (I did not hear this from my rabbi, but I assume he'd agree):
it is not that something's being the norm makes it permissible; were
all women today to suddenly be unclothed by communal decision, it would
still be prohibited! Were all college students to agree to have co-sex
restrooms, it'd still be prohibited! Rather, something's being the norm
means it (eventually) won't lead to hirhur, and once it has no hirhur,
it is permitted. Thus, gradual natural evolution, rather than sudden
cataclysmic change, will occur in tzniut. It is not that norm-->mutar;
rather, norm-->no hirhur-->mutar.)

Apropos of all this, my first rabbi (the Rabbi Henkin-ist) described
another machloket:

The right-wing sector of the dati community, led by Rabbi Avraham Shapira,
et. al., holds that if we are so habituated that there is no hirhur (as
per Rabbi Henkin), there is a problem. That is, the ideal is to have men
and women be unable to resist being sexually aroused. When this is the
case, the husband and wife will have a stronger sexual bond. If anyone
today is habituated to the opposite sex, this is something to bemoan
and fight against. (Personally, I'd say like Golda Meir, that if so,
let the men stay home and women go out into the marketplace, if this
is so great. My rabbi replied that they advocate separate-but-equal,
and I replied this already failed with the blacks.)

On the other hand, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow of Yeshivat Petah Tikva and
Tzohar, said the ideal is to have everyone be as habituated and mixed
as possible. (This very much resonates with me; I myself have said that
I don't believe G-d intended for men and women to be separate species; I
cannot imagine that He is pleased when men and women are unable to mix. So
I was delighted with Rabbi Cherlow.) My rabbi noted that Rabbi Henkin
would disagree; Rabbi Henkin explicitly says, with his co-education heter,
that this is only a post-facto justification of an existing practice,
and we cannot try to introduce further reforms in this area.

Michael Makovi