[Avodah] Women reading the ketuba

[Micha Berger]

On Sat, Jan 03, 2009 at 10:16:49PM -0500, Meir Shinnar wrote:
: The problem with RHS's tshuva is that it can be read in either of two
: ways - both of which are problematic, albeit for different reasons.

: If one takes the maximalist understanding (that RMB seems to have) -
: that giving public kibud to a woman is a problem because of kol kvuda
: bat melekh - which is not overridden by other chiyuvim - the fundamental
: issue in the MO community (including the YU community) is why is this
: kibbud any different than any other public kibbud given to women...
:                              The question is why is reading the ketuba
: fundamentally different - because, after all, as RHS acknowledges, it
: has no technical legal status - and the sole issue then seems to be the
: public role for women.

I'mn the only one who conflated this thought with RHS's position on
women reading the kesuvah. He wrote it WRT the woman's role in shul,
or lack thereof. Actually, RHS said there was no problem, just as the
wedding would be kosher if a monkey or parrot read it. (It's easy for
me to remember RHS's position, since there were people who took that
as an offensive comparison, not his intent of the gemara's argument
ad absurdum.)

: Now, that is a point of argument of the MO with the haredi community
: ...                 RMB understands to RHS to be making essentially a
: similar argument. However, this argument has been rejected by the MO
: and YU community - and I believe was already rejected by RYBS - so it
: is difficult to make that argument here.

: A more minimalist reading is that there are certain kibbudim that one
: should intrinsically decline, but someone has to do them. However, as
: a practical matter, no one approaches these kibbudim in this fashion (I
: haven't heard of anyone going to their rav saying, I am sorry that someone
: has to read the ketuba..) which makes this reading seem disingenuous,
: at the least....

This was RJK's point as well, when he wrote:
> I've been a member of the O community for more than a few decades and
> have davened in all types of different O minyanim and been to hundreds of
> O weddings ... And it's my perception that almost no one believes that
> being a shli'ach tzibur or, indeed, reading the ketubah at a wedding,
> is a "necessary evil." ... It seems to me that if we truly believed
> this, then a shul without a permanent chazan would have only one or
> two people who sacrifice themselves to lead the davening so as to save
> the others from this supposed "necessary evil." And that at weddings,
> there would be someone from the caterer or the band to read the ketubah
> so as to save the rabbanim and RYs from this supposed "necessary evil."

Actually, the tochakhah is considered a less-than-complementary aliyah,
and there is a minhag to bedavka give it to the rav so that the person
getting it would not be insulted. But that's just an objection to RJK's
phrasing, not his thesis.

More to the point, the fact that people know you're trying to honor them
and are honored by that thought, whether it's reading the kesuvah or
being appointed shaliach tzibur, doesn't mean they're supposed to. Or,
that one is supposed to accept this fate accompli and widen its scope
to include people who have no overriding duty.

But back to RMS and his minimalist vs maximalist readings of RHS...
I would agree with his categorization. I'm not sure what the "certain
kibudim" of the minimalist read would be. RHS's point was tzeni'us means
not being in the lime-light. Why would this be an issue for some public
functions and not others? That's why I assumed RHS was speaking
maximally, of every public role.

In cases where /someone/ has to do it, and there is no greater chiyuv
on men than on women, one could argue that RHS would agree with the MO
stance. (Although I agree with the side issue that RHS and RMW aren't MO
as RMS uses the term, or as I did when I counted myself in that camp.
In fact, I left with them, the same "slide to the right", but ended up
elsewhere.)

: There is another problem with all of this shitta, because, contra RHS,
: there is a hiyyuv - to be mesameach the hattan and kalla - and if it
: is their simcha and oneg that woman X (and not rabbi Y) should read the
: ketuba, why should the woman refuse??

RHS doesn't say she should.

: RMB writes about the slippery slope and being poretz geder - but one has to
: be careful about the meaning of poretz geder - because there actually has
: to be a geder. Recall the Seride Esh's tshuva about bat mitzva, and the
: question of when we say lo ra'inu eyno ra'aya - and when we can say that
: lo ra'inu is a ra'aya....

This misses the intended thrust of my suggestion. If poreitz geder refers
the fence that keeps one off the slippery slope, the question is how
slippery is the slope, not whether an issur already exists.

I obviously wasn't sufficiently clear, as RHB appears to me to have
reached the mistaken understanding of my intent. On Fri, Jan 02, 2009 at
02:05pm PST, R Harvey Benton wrote:
: R. Micha Berger wrote:
:> How big of a breach
:> can mimetic halakhah absorb and still survive to guide us.

: HB:
: In general, throughout history, what has guided the Jewish Nation in
: it's adoption and eventual acceptance of new Minhagim??...

: How are we supposed to know what is a valid practice, and what is a
: Minhag Shtus?  Do we only find out about a Minhag's validity after a 100
: years of its use??

(Side issue: I would say the only minhag shetus is one that is proven
to violate the din. One with no basis doesn't qualify. I belabored this
idea numerous times in the past)

If peritzas geder includes not only violations but also breeches in the
mimetic structure that leads down the slippery slope then the question
isn't what minhagim would be valid, or lo ra'inu eino ra'ayah. The
question is instead:
    Can we change our lifestyle in this drastic way without the whole
    system falling apart?

And for reading the kesuvah as a stand alone question, the answer is
probably yes. People with a better grasp of the social dynamic should be
able to give a more certain answer. However, as part of a broader swath
of societal changes to give women a greater role in issues of rite,
I'm equally inclined to believe we can't make those changes and still
preserve a viable observant community. The change is just to great and
too destabilizing, regardless of the justifixation of the content.

That's how I intended to equate slippery slope with poreitz geder.
According to this suggestion, are about not making changes that are
themselves technically justifiable, but destroy the means by which we
keep the project viable in the long term.

Now, is this really what "poreitz geder" means? On Sat, Jan 03, 2009 at
10:26pm EST, Rich, R Joel questioned:
: This would be a worthwhile research project but if you look at rashi on
: avodah zara 27b (uporetz geder) it seems to be defined based on being
: over on divrei chachamim, not on doing something new that was not
: practiced but was never banned.

This is also Rashi's position on Qoheles 10:8, "siyag shel chakhamim
la'avor al divreihem".

BTW, this discussion ties into our thread of last March, "shechtworthy".
In it we discussed the shocheit who kept halakhah, but was poreitz
geder. This then turned into a discussion of what PG means. RnCL
concluded, "the form of poretz geder that I could find seemed to be about
specific challenge to local rabbinic authority acting in their capacity
as such, more than just plain contrarianism. Nothing even remotely like
tableclothes, or galoshes, or even beard trimming."

Eating meat during whatever part of the 9 days your qehillah doesn't
is called peritzas geder (OC 551:11). Similarly, the AhS YD 89:7 uses
the term "poreitz geder" to someone who switched from a minhag of a
longer wait from meat to milk to a shorter one. No one is violating a
derabbanan either way, so that does broaden it somewhere beyond RJR's
and RnCL's phrasings.

But this is still the violation of a minhag.

The Kelei Yaqar (Bereishis 4:7) explains a Yalqut by calling Amaleiq
a "poreitz geder" because "zehu inyan pesichas hapesach shehizkarnu,
she'al yedei hapesichah rabim boq'in bo..." To the KY, as he continues,
poreitz geder is one who makes an opening for his yeitzer, by which his
yeitzer would do worse thing. Such as in Yuma 39b, a person who allows
himself to become a little tamei will be made very tamei.

The KY's example is one of issur, his definition is the possibility I
raised of slippery slope. Similarly numerous mefareshim use the term
"poreitz geder" WRT maaseh Zimri and his enabling others to say it's
not so bad.

ROY (YO vol 1 OC 38)defined the PG as someone who is meiqil on a minhag
"shekol minhag yeish lo shoresh vetzinor lema'alah".

So, it would seem that poreitz geder does refer to a slipper slope, but
only a violation of something, at least local pesaq/minhag, that enables
the slippery slope. A perusal of the Bar Ilan shu"t web site didn't show
up a definite maqor for using the term for slippery slopes in general.

The only possible exception is the Tashbatz (vol 2, 132,239) where the
mesacheiq bequbiyah is poreitz geder. There it's not clear there is an
issur, although since he can't give eidus, it's definitely considered
negative.

I still think, though, that even without the usability of the PG
concept itself, my basic thesis is still somewhat salvagable. There is
still a distinction made based on societal / political concern. They
aren't entirely divorcable from pesaq.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man can aspire to spiritual-moral greatness
micha at aishdas.org        which is seldom fully achieved and easily lost
http://www.aishdas.org   again. Fullfillment lies not in a final goal,
Fax: (270) 514-1507      but in an eternal striving for perfection. -RSRH