[Avodah] Geirut

[Micha Berger]

The story so far...

I think we're shown that the vast majority require QOM, even bedi'eved.

The Rambam is the subject of a machloqes acharonim. Some understand
him as saying that QOM is a necessary prerequisite for geirus to be
chal. The most noted of the ones we cited, the Bach, says it's only a
lekhat-chilah. But this is the Bach's peshat in the Rambam, not the Bach's
own position lehalakhah, which follows the SA in following Tosafos and
the Rosh in requiring a formal QOM in front of a functioning BD (with
all the rules of mishpat, as RnCL would put it).

This is different than asking what QOM must entail. RnCL reiterated that
part of our discussion in her recent email, so I'll see what I can pull
from that section of RZLifshitz's article.

Beis Yitzchaq (YD 100) concludes that QOM means every mitzvah. His
reasoning is interesting. The BY is unsure what Bekhoros 30b means by
"ein meqabelin oso". He could see both that a BD ought not accept him as
a candidate, a lekhat-chilah (as RMShinnar saw the gemara); and that he
isn't accepted as a Jew (as the gemara seemed to me).

The BY then brings from Rashi (Shabbos 31a). Hillel accepted the geir
who only wanted TSBK. (Not learning like the Rashba.) However, Rashi
then makes a point of showing how this candidates wasn't a case of chutz
midavar echad! So Rashi defuses any chance of using Hillel as a maqor.

Finally, the turns to AZ 64b, the Acheirim who hold that a geir toshav is
someone who accepts every mitzvah but neveilah. Thus, chutz midavar
echad can't be a geir tzedeq!

The Achiezer (III #26) actually agrees, but he dismissed the gemara
in AZ as a ra'ayah. After all, the geir toshav wasn't taval, and it
would seem from Rashi and the Nemuqei Yoseif, not mal either. However,
misevara, the Achiezer couldn't see how QOM could mean anything but --
what is a partial ol mitzvos?

RMF (YD II #124) also rules that the person would not be a geir. He says
(ibid #106) that Hillel's geir accepted TSBP as binding, but considered
it human in origin, and thus it was not chutz midavar 1. Later (in time;
EhE II #4) he adds to this that a lack of qabbalah due to ignorance,
as opposed to active rejection of a law he knows of, is still with
QOM. And similarly (YD III #106 again), rejection of a law he knows
is on the books, but is commonly violated (RMF's case is peritzusdik
clothing.) As well as non-performance of a law mishum oneis (ibid #108).

RMF in summ: QOM is a necessary precondition for geirus, and it includes
not actively rejecting any mitzvah from one's desired behavior. (And as a
side issue, someone who thinks derashos are miderabbanan isn't a kofeir.)

R' Yoseif Goldberg in Shuras haDin (III pg 171) beings a proof from the
Sifra (Qedoshim par 8) on "ke'ezrach mikem yihyeh lakehm hageir hagar
itekhem" (Vayiqra 19:34). The derashah is that just as an ezrach accepted
every mitzvah, so too a geir. He thus concludes that the requirement to
accept every mitzvah for geirus to be chal is min haTorah!

The only choleiq:
RAYK (Da'as Kohein #152) uses Tosafos (Chullin 3b) WRT kusim to conclude
that bedi'eved he would be a geir.


In sum, those who would allow that a candidate who rejected a mitzvah
is still bedi'eved a geir are the Rambam according to the Bach (but not
the Bach himself), and RAYK.

I noticed that RZLifshitz doesn't cite anyone who holds that QOM doesn't
mean accepting mitzvos as an end in itself.


On Wed, Sep 24, 2008 at 03:50:05PM +0100, Chana Luntz wrote:
: > position of Tosafos repeated in the SA (above)?

: What it points to is that Tosphos understands KOM as being not equal to
: Bechoros 30b - ie it opens up the meaning of KOM according to Tosphos -
: remember at least one of the arguments on this topic is that while KOM is
: required, it does not mean Bechoros 30b, but wanting to join the Jewish
: people...

Given Rashi, RMF (and the Rashba), we can conclude nothing from the
story of Hillel, including whether it means anything to Tosafos WRT
nidon didan. But in either case, not requiring every mitzvah isn't the
same as saying QOM is about joining the Jewish people.

: Yevamos 47a quoted almost in its entirety [is there any significance to the
: minor differences, or was it a girsa difference] in the Shulchan Aruch  in
: Yoreh Deah siman 268 si'if 2 "when he comes to convert we say to him,  what
: did you see that you come to convert? ...

I still believe that motivation is an issue not as an end in itself,
nor (as RnCL is assuming) as identical to QOM. Rather, ulterior motive
is a factor that if present makes the chance of QOM pretty iffy. And
therefore bedi'eved, if we have no reason to question the QOM, everyone
would accept the geirus.

My position shifted as this discussion forced me to read the sources
from more viewpoints, but I saw no reason to understand this particular
issue differently.

: Rashi's main comments on Bechoros 30b is itself not found there but on
: Shabbas 31a....
: He then explains on "and he converted him"  - that this is not similar to
: "chutz medevar echad shelo haya kofer be torah she baal peh ele shelo meamin
: shehi mepi hagvura.  Ie Rashi clearly understands there to be a maklokus
: regarding the meaning of Bechoros 30b between Hillel and Shammai - so that
: following Hillel it is OK for somebody to be converted in a circumstance
: where they do not believe that Torah she baal peh is from Hashem (and hence
: presumably are not preparing themselves to keep torah she baal peh), so long
: as they are not kofer in it.  From this we can see that he holds that the
: conversion happened before the full acceptance of torah she baal
: peh...

But, as RMF noted, /after/ accepting the bindingness of its mitzvos. Rashi
is making a point of reading an acceptance of every mitzvah into the
story of Hillel's geir.

...
: I am struggling to see how we can have an anan sahadei undermine and
: completely nullify a shavuah made to beis din, without consequences?  Can't
: you see what this does to the whole judicial process if applied more
: generally?

We're talking in a case of geir qatan, where the original geirus was al
daas beis din, and therefore who made what shevu'ah? The anan sahadi
says that a passive QOM by acting as a shomeir mitzvos at the time the
child becomes a gadol is sufficient.

What about the whole mishpat thing of 3 dayanim meeting during the day?
I don't know. Perhaps that's what was done on the qatan's behalf; that
QOM is in two pieces.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The Maharal of Prague created a golem, and
micha at aishdas.org        this was a great wonder. But it is much more
http://www.aishdas.org   wonderful to transform a corporeal person into a
Fax: (270) 514-1507      "mensch"!     -Rabbi Israel Salanter