[Avodah] Geirus

[Chana Luntz]

RMYG writes:

> Maybe the lack of Kabalas Ol Mitzvos (KOM) of an adult is a repudiation of
> the Geirus, because it's like the Geir is saying, "I want to be a Jew and
> not listen to Hashem." While the lack of KOM of a child is not any sort of
> repudiation of the Geirus, because - like you say - the Katan has no Daas,
> anyway. So it isn't that KOM is required, as much as that lack of KOM - by
> a
> Gadol - is contradictory to the Geirus process, intrinsically. If this is
> true, we can't get away from the requirement of KOM by a Gadol.

Part of the problem here is that once you start talking about KOM, you also
then need to define what it means.  This is a problem because the gemora in
Yevamos 45 and on discusses KOM (for a free person, and for a slave), but it
is certainly not clear from that sugya that this means what we are taking
KOM to mean, as this seems there more to be a discussion about coming of
one's one free will rather than being coerced (although this might have
modern implications if say the Russians did not want to convert).

What we take KOM to mean in our discussions is closest to what is stated in
Bechoros 30b "oved kachovim sheba l'kabel torah chutz m'dvar echad ain
mekablin".  There though, the statement is a) that they are not to be
accepted (ie l'chatchila), not about what happens if they do get accepted
(whether by mistake or not).  And b) further, it is not exactly clear the
extent to which this statement translates into halacha l'ma'ase (especially
given its absence from the codes - given the clear cut nature of this
statement, one would have expected, if it was halacha l'ma'ase, then it
would have headed the list of requirements in the Shulchan Aruch). If you
take the viewpoint of an REB, then you say that while this non acceptance is
a good general policy decision, because of the problematic nature of
converts, it is one which can be overridden in circumstances where the dayan
feels there are reasons to do so - such as in the case of Hillel accepting
the convert who was explicitly only prepared to convert if he could be cohen
gadol, actions which clearly involve numerous issurim.  As the Shach puts it
in Yoreh Deah siman 268 si'if katan 23 -  "from here [ie the case of Hillel
accepting the convert] can be learnt that all is according to what is seen
by the eyes of the beis din" (see the sources he quotes there).  On the
other hand, explicit statements in the gemora, whether then brought
explicitly in the Shulchan Aruch or not, carry quite a lot of weight.

But even more, this is before we get into the modern day question about what
happens if the convert claims to be coming to accept the whole Torah, but
show by their actions that they don't (the classic modern case of the
potential ger who flies into Israel, has an appointment before Beis Din on
the Friday on which they complete the conversion procedure, including making
a statement of acceptance of all the mitzvos and then flies back to chutz
l'aretz on the immediately following Friday night on the return flight which
they had already booked when they flew in to convert - pretty hard to argue
that they ever had any intention about being shomer shabbas, not matter what
they said in front of beis din).  In order to render a decision here, you
clearly need to extrapolate to rule out a conversion on the basis of
actions, when none of the cases (except perhaps that below of the Kusim)
deal with actions in this way (or to the extent they do, they seem to point
to actions as not invalidating the conversion, see the immediately preceding
sugya in Bechoros).

But let's throw in yet one more case to further show the complexity.  Take
the case of the Kusim.  All over the gemora there is a machlokus as to
whether they were gerei emes or gerei arios - true converts or converts
because of lions.  But seems that this is a question of fact, if they were
in fact gerei emes, then they are to be treated as renegade Jews, if they
were gerim due to lions, then they are not.  So something must be able to
invalidate a conversion, which presumably was done in front of a proper beis
din etc, because otherwise how could they be having the machlokus?  But then
again, what the Kusim seem to have wanted to do is tried to add Hashem to
their pantheon of gods, if you like, right from the beginning (which is why
Tosphos seem to have a problem with the very idea that they could have been
considered a true convert, based on the pasukim).  And it is hard to be sure
what else, beside lion fear (and/or mamash avodah zara as per Tosphos),
falls within this category.

The case of the katan is far simpler, which is why I brought it - to avoid
all this.
 
> KT,
> MYG

Regards

Chana