[Avodah] Kabbalah vs Scholasticism

[Micha Berger]

(In case anyone is wondering about the lack of my usual "Q" in the subject
line, I wanted something someone might actually find when hunting the
archives by subject line.)

On Wed, Jun 18, 2008 at 11:23am EDT, R David Riceman replied to me:
: This deserves a long, nitpicking post.  First of all Kabbalah itself was 
: extremely scholastic...

I would agree that my use of "scholastic" rather than "philosophical"
doesn't fully avoid the problem I was trying to side-step.

However, I will stick with the use of terms because scholasticism still
shows a greater indebtedness to the Greeks. We're talking about competing
philosophies, not philosophy vs. something else.

:                        Compare the Ramak's discussion of atzmuth 
: v'keilim in Pardes Rimmonim to Scotus' discussion of substance in his 
: essay "Concerning Metaphysics".  I used to think that the major 
: distinction to be made was the classical distinction between 
: Aristotelians and Platonists: do universals exist? ...

Well, there is reason for that. Mequbalim speak in terms of finding the
shoreshim of objects and events in this world, which implies that the
world of Ideals is more real and primary to this one.

: My current impression is less clearcut...

Here is how I understand the complication. The Sepharadi rishonim
who studied Aristotle did so from Avicenna's (ibn Sina's) translation.
Avicenna's Metaphysics closes with "The Theology of Aristotle", which is
really extract's from Plotinus's Enneads. Therefore, most of the Arabic
speaking Aristotilians, particularly the rishonim who would spend much
of their philosophical speculation on theology, end up sounding somewhere
between an Aristotilian and a neo-Platonist.

:                                           One of the things that's hard 
: to remember nowadays is that there were two competing physical theories 
: in those days, unlike today when modern scientists agree on the basic 
: principles.  When it comes to physical phenomena (the existence of 
: demons is a good example) the "philosophers" were Aristotelians and the 
: Kabbalists were neo-Platonists.  Both had a legitimate scientific theory 
: on their side (and today we would accept neither theory).

: When it comes to spiritual phenomena, however, I don't think I can come 
: up with a distinction that adequately differentiates the two groups...

I think my historical observation fits your thematic one very smoothly.

I think the big theological difference from which all the others emerge,
is that whlie both are capable of seeing existence as a causal chain
starting with G-d and ending with rocks and whatnot, the mequbal is
basing his life project on it, whereas the the scholasticist doesn't
relate to the process of creation in describing the tachlis.

Thus, the mequbal may speak of tiqun olam and raising nitzotzos, whereas
R' Saadia speaks of hakaras hatov to the Borei and the Rambam speaks of
knowing Him.

: >Scholasticism is only compatable with rationalism. You wouldn't see much
: >point in using philosophical tools to understand religion if you weren't
: >defining religion as something that is to be understood.

: See my remark above about the Ramak.  The kabbalists did think religion 
: could be understood, they just used a different conceptual framework.  

I didn't say that Qabbalah was only compatible with mysticism. Rather,
a scholast could only be a rationalist, and a mystic could only be a
mequbal (of those two choices), but one could be a rationalist mequbal.

: >I use the word "Scholasticism" rather than the word the rishonim did,
: >Philosophy, because the mequbalim also used philosophical terms: tzurah,
: >chomer, atzilus, etc... are all found in Aristotle and Plato as well.

: Where do Plato or Aristotle mention "atzilus"? Maybe there are some 
: parallels in Philo and Plotinus.

Plato mentions shadows of Ideals. But the Enneads are explicitly about
emanation. The Rambam takes it as a causal chain (Yesodei haTorah 2:5),
the mequbalim as the transition of the Or Ein Sof as it enters (and
becomes) lower olamos.

The mequbalim thereby give themselves a metaphysical mechanism and a
territory to travel. Each of which we distinctly think of as Qabbalah
-- from the sifrei haheichalos to the metaphysical causality of the
parent thread.

(Interestingly, once I had to articulate my position, it sounds
different than I thought it would.)

: >In contrast, the mystic's faith focuses on the incomprehensible. Religion
: >that is centered on G-d will have much that is simply beyond
: >understanding. Rather, the mystic aspires to experience and live religion,
: >and takes joy, not frustration, in the Divine Mystery.

: This is certainly the case for many Christian and Buddhist mystics.  Can 
: you cite any examples of Jewish mystics who fit this description?

Numerous chassidishe maiselakh including the am haaretz who asks HQBH to
weave his alef-beis into tefillos and the shepherd-boy playing his fluit.

To answer both this and your request for a source for my claim that:
: >In this sense of the term, Breslov is exceedingly mystical. They shun
: >philosophy. Thinking gets in the way of happiness and thus brings on
: >despair, which in turn is the road away from productivity in general and
: >avodas Hashem in particular. The philosophical study of G-d objectifies
: >Him; and thus interferes with emunah peshutah.

See, for example, the translation from Chayei Moharan at
<http://www.nachalnovea.com/breslovcenter/articles/article_higher.html>:
> Higher Than Intellect
> Translated by Avraham Greenbaum
> Tzaddik: A Portrait of Rabbi Nachman
> (Breslov Research Institute), 150
> Chayei Moharan

> My friend R. Naftali and I came into the Rebbe shortly before Shavuot
> 5565 (1805). 
...
> The Rebbe was saying that explanations like these have no substance to
> them at all, not to speak of the explanations given in philosophical
> works, which certainly have nothing in them.[4] The reason why the
> Rebbe forbade us to read even the philosophical works that are
> unimpeachable on religious grounds is because they raise very
> difficult problems about the ways of God and go into them at length,
> but when they come to answer them, the explanations they give are very
> weak and easily pulled down. Anyone who studies these works and tries
> to answer the questions rationally can be led to atheism when he
> realizes later on that the explanation is completely inadequate, while
> the problem continues to trouble him.

> The Rebbe told us to rely only on faith. If someone finds he has
> questions about such matters he should know that it is impossible to
> give any explanations, because with our human minds it is impossible to
> comprehend the ways of God. All we have is faith: we must believe that
> everything is certainly correct and right, only with our minds it is
> impossible to understand God's ways. Even the few explanations brought
> in genuine kabbalistic works written by holy Tzaddikim with deep
> perception and genuine spiritual powers are unable to solve the problems
> completely. Clearly the answers hang in the air and we have only faith
> to rely on.[5]

> This applies to all similar questions, such as the problem about how man
> can have free will if God knows what he is going to do ...

: >But for a rationalist who already found a basis for accepting the reality
: >of a G-d who can defy nature if He so chooses, maximalism is no less
: >rationalist than minimalism. Both are fully explanable from the same
: >first principles. It is no longer an issue of explanatory framework
: >or which issues bother me, but of whether I believe G-d minimizes His
: >interferance in the natural order.

: This is a nice distinction.  When did maximalism begin.  Can you, for 
: example, name a rishon who was a maximalist?

I can't. I think maximalism is a counter-reformational development, and
therefore 19th century. This is the reason why we collected rishonim
who supported the allegorization of midrashim, which is a necessary
component of minimalism. Maximalism is a modern invention.

To rephrase what I said in my earlier post using the distinction I'm
trying out in this one... People can confuse maximalism with Qabbalah
because Qabbalah has many more claims, being as it discusses life and
human action in light of the "space" between Hashem and the beri'ah.
However, they are distinct topics.

Similarly, people can confusion Qabbalah with mysticism because a
Scholasticist can't be a mystic. But those too are also distinct topics.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha at aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabindranath Tagore