[Avodah] D'rabanan vs. D'oraita

[Micha Berger]

On Thu, Jun 05, 2008 at 11:42pm EDT, Richard Wolpoe wrote:
: FWIW I personally know several frum  Rationalists - including a very
: rational frum Psychotherapist - who find re-incarnation quite rational.

I think a problem is that people tend to conflate a number of very
different distinctions:
    Qabbalah vs Scholasticism
    mysticism vs rationalism
    maximalism vs minimalism

In the days of the rishonim, there were two competing tendencies in
which problems bothered people, and therefore also in how to frame the
answers -- Qabbalah and "Philosophy", by which they meant the use of
Aristotilian and neo-Platonic thought to explain religion (Scholasticism).

Scholasticism is only compatable with rationalism. You wouldn't see much
point in using philosophical tools to understand religion if you weren't
defining religion as something that is to be understood.

I use the word "Scholasticism" rather than the word the rishonim did,
Philosophy, because the mequbalim also used philosophical terms: tzurah,
chomer, atzilus, etc... are all found in Aristotle and Plato as well.
(The Zohar traces that as coming from Yirmiyahu to Socrates, on a trip
to Bavel taken by the latter. FWIW, Wikipedia's entry "Philosophy" notes
the seeds of many elements of Greek Philosophy in the Babylonian text
"Dialogue of Pessimism", including the Socratic Method.)

In contrast, the mystic's faith focuses on the incomprehensible. Religion
that is centered on G-d will have much that is simply beyond
understanding. Rather, the mystic aspires to experience and live religion,
and takes joy, not frustration, in the Divine Mystery.

A rationalist could also believe in experiential religion. Mussar is an
obvious (to me) example. Rav Yisrael defines the goal of life in terms of
perfection of the soul, and perfection of the soul in terms of measurable
attributes of personality and attitude. Mysticism is defined by belief in
mystery causing one to seek experience to the exclusion of understanding.

Thus mystics seek the ecstatic experience and have a "Shir haShirim"
view of life.

In this sense of the term, Breslov is exceedingly mystical. They shun
philosophy. Thinking gets in the way of happiness and thus brings on
despair, which in turn is the road away from productivity in general and
avodas Hashem in particular. The philosophical study of G-d objectifies
Him; and thus interferes with emunah peshutah.

Qabbalah involves many more data points than scholasticism. It teaches of
gilgulim, sephiros, an entire system of olamos and metaphysical causality,
raises issues of parts of the soul, etc, etc, etc... Those could be taken
by a mystic as givens, or by a rationalist as logical consequences of
a few basic postulates. So Qabbalah can be accepted by either the mystic
or the rationalist.

But the number of things Qabbalah requires one to believe makes it sound
like the maximalism vs minimalism distinction would be identical to that
between Qabbalah and Scholasticism. However, what I mean by minimalism is
an unwillingness to accept extraordinory claims. A maximalist would look
at the mesorah, and not even raise questions as to how the universe could
be only 6 days older than civil humanity. The whole world was flooded, and
every species of animal fit on a floor that was 1.4 acres (using CI amos).

But for a rationalist who already found a basis for accepting the reality
of a G-d who can defy nature if He so chooses, maximalism is no less
rationalist than minimalism. Both are fully explanable from the same
first principles. It is no longer an issue of explanatory framework
or which issues bother me, but of whether I believe G-d minimizes His
interferance in the natural order.

Today, it also raises issues of authority. Minimalism requires taking
many more midrashim as necessarily being allegory. Since there is no
formal repository of nimshalim, this requires confidence in autonomy.
Taking words at face value provides far more leadership.


On Fri, Jun 06, 2008 at 08:33am EDT, Rich, Joel wrote:
[Quoting me:]
:> That doesn't help the guy who checked the mezuzah when he was supposed
:> to but because kelapai Shemaya galya that it's pasul, he gets less
:> shemirah. Unless one goes beyond the Ran and says that listening to the
:> chakhamim not only protects, but also provides metaphysical effects.

: That's pretty much the way I've explained it but it's only based on my
: own (very limited) logic - that is, that halachik reality is
: determinative of existential and practical reality, and that halachik
: reality is "kdaat moshe vyisrael" - i.e. halacha as we understand it
: (not as bashamayim) is determinative.  Now, what happens if Rabbi X says
: kosher and Y says treif & followers of each eat from the same pot - I
: suppose the effect (here and bashamayim) is different even though  the
: molecules are the same.

The problem is that although this position makes sense to you or I, it
doesn't help me get to the point of being able to understand, if still
disagree, with those many baalei mesorah who do accord metaphysical
powers to the objects themselves.

Whether Rabbi X vs Rabbi Y is correct depends on how one understands
machloqesin. An eilu va'eilu literalist would say that assuming there
were no errors in process, neither poseiq is really wrong.

I already cited the problem of 2 chatichos shuman, 1 cheilev, if we
understand timtum haleiv as a causal consequence of eating cheilev,
we can't play rov -- and certainly not of all three pieces at three
different times. And yet, it's mutar AFAIK without a warning from anyone.

Now we get into a different realm. If we use a literal eilu va'eilu,
whether as per R' Tzadoq, the Maharal or the constructionist rishonim,
then it would be the pesaq which determines the metaphysical reality
which then causes timtum or not.


On Sun, Jun 08, 2008 at 03:44am GMT, kennethgmiller at juno.com wrote:
: I would that that this applies only if both were Real Rabbis, that is
: to say, with Real Semicha -- which we do not have today.

: Today, they would both be affected the same way, though were can't be
: certain whether it was Rabbi X or Rabbi Y who was correct.

On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 12:04am GMT, kennethgmiller at juno.com further
explained in response to a question from RETurkel:
: But when he answers questions about halacha, he is simply telling us
: that according to his view of things, the halacha ought to be this way
: or that way. He does NOT have the authority to *obligate* us follow this
: halacha or that halacha. That authority is given only to Beis Din. (I
: think it is also given to the Av Beis Din, and I think it is a machlokes
: whether or not an individual Musmach has this authority.)

Who said that an obligation to follow a pesaq makes a pesaq more or less
eilu va'eilu? And if it's divrei E-lokim chaim that such meat is kosher,
why would it cause timtum.

It would seem that you're taking a constructionist position and then
identifying the power to define new din with the power to require others
to follow it.

BTW, I think you must follow the BD of your city even if it's a BD of
hedyotos. In general, I think you're mistaken WRT mara deasra. That might
not be because of halachic process as much as the power of minhag hamqom,
or it might be process, or minhag hamaqom might itself be a key element
of that process.


That's quite a bit of extrapolation from a point I opened by saying I
still don't understand. Take with a grain of salt more than the usual
two or three. The questions it raises should be of value, though.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             When memories exceed dreams,
micha at aishdas.org        The end is near.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - Rav Moshe Sherer
Fax: (270) 514-1507