[Avodah] D'rabanan vs. D'oraita

[Michael Makovi]

Was: [Areivim] Loving Israel While in Chutz

> : He mentions that there are differing positions taken by the Meshach
> : Chochma and by Rav Elchonnon Wasseramn z"l as whether gezeirot and
> : takkanot of Chazal have metaphysical import in a similar manner as
> : mitzvot de oreita.
>:
> : R' Allen Gerstl

> See <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/07/safeiq-derabbanan.shtml> for
> my notes and embellishments.
>
> SheTir'u baTov!
> -micha

The Rambam tells us that for a SHOGEG violation of a d'rabanan, we don't need
to do teshuva. My rabbi answered that since a d'rabanan is not an
intrinsic sin, but rather the sin is only in ignoring or defying the
words of the rabbis and rebelling against them, there is absolutely no
sin whatsoever in violating a d'rabanan b'shogeg.

Now, he said, it may be good to do teshuva anyway, because after all,
we want to keep halacha whether or not there's a penalty for
violation, and so you want to be sure you won't repeat the d'rabanan
violation, whether it is truly a sin or not. But in truth, he said,
there's no obligation to do teshuva for a d'rabanan.

First off, this is a rabbi at a Rav Kook yeshiva - which will make
sense in a moment. As R' Micha in his blog post shows, Chazon Ish was
stringent on shemita because he assumed heaven will honor it with a
bumper crop even though it is only d'rabanan. Rav Kook on the other
hand was meikil, apparently because he saw a d'rabanan as not a "real"
thing, following Sefer Me'irat Einayim, who uses shemita in fact as
the example - there will be a bumper crop only in a d'oraita year.
Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner, is is worth noting, in his haTzionut b'Ohr
haEmuna, proves that our shemita is d'rabanan from the fact that there
is no bumper crop.

Now then, I'd follow the model of a d'oraita being intrinsic reality
(and thus safek l'chumrah),
and d'rabanan being pragmatic and human (and thus safek l'kula),
following Meshech Chochmah (as opposed to Ramban, who says Chazal
decided that a safek d'rabanan l'kula; and as opposed to Rabbi Shimon
Schkop, who says Chazal decided that a safek d'oraita l'chumra). BUT,
with a modification by me:

(First, I will remark that though I don't follow Rabbi Schkop's
opinion, it truly is beautiful in its nafka mina: since Chazal decided
that a safek d'oraita is l'chumrah, this fact is itself d'rabanan.
Therefore, a safek safeka is a safek in the d'rabanan of being machmir
on a safek d'oraita - now we have a safek d'rabanan, and so we are
l'kula - in a safek safeka d'oraita!)

(I am also thus going against Rabbi Wasserman that d'rabanans have
intrinsic reality because G-d revealed them to Chazal; and also
against Shulchan Aruch haRav on yom tom sheni that the true supernal
yom tov is a reality that either G-d can connect to or Chazal can
connect to, and either way, a link is a link is a link; and also
against Chazon Ish that when Chazal propose such a link, they cannot
themselves create it, but heaven honors them by creating the link.)

(The careful reader will note I have conveniently summarized every
shita in R' Micha's blog!)

Now then, my modification to Meshech Chochmah:

I don't really like the model of mitzvot having intrinsic effects on
the universe. For example, when I eat treif, or when I put on
tefillin, I don't really think anything spiritual is happening in the
universe. Rather, it's that
1) It affects yourself - it is educational, whether in your knowledge
and intellect, or in affecting your behavior (practicing tzedaka will
make you charitable, etc., as per Sefer haChinuch).
2) It shows loyalty to G-d. As Rav Hirsch near the beginning of Sefer
Bereshit says, our deeds affect the heavens (so to speak) because G-d
sees what we are doing, and His attitude towards us changes
accordingly.

So for me, a d'oraita is not truly intrinsic reality, but only
conventionally so, using "conventional truth" as used by Rabbi Moshe
Shmuel Glasner in his hakdamah to the Dor Revi'i, that anything
decided by Chazal is not really really objectively true, but only
"conventionally true", i.e. it is true insofar only as that it was
Chazal decided, and tomorrow they can decide something else, and that
will then be "true". The only difference then is that a d'oraita
conventional truth will never change (except when Chazal or a posek
change their understanding of that d'oraita), whereas a d'rabbanan
conventional truth can change whenever we have the conditions to annul
it.

(Drashot haRan raises the question of how we can follow Chazal when
they are wrong - he says some say the mitzvot are stam, but for "we"
who say they have real effects in the world, this is troubling. The
Ran answers that the danger of disunity is greater than the danger of
following Chazal erroneously and thus causing real true damage thereby
in an intrinsic-reality mitzvah. I'd simply say that there really is
nothing intrinsic in the mitzvah, so the Ran's point is moot for me.
The only questions are
1) Education, and
2) Loyalty to G-d
Following Chazal when they are wrong obviously don't affect number
two. As for number one, I'd say that if Chazal were wrong here, it
must have been a really borderline case, without an obvious truth. If
so, then probably, there isn't much to be learned there anyway. As
Rambam says, sometimes we have to establish a norm, even though either
way (permit or forbid) is equally plausible. The law has to be
*something*, so we could really almost flip in a coin. In such a
borderline case, any educational value is likely negligible even if we
paskened correctly. And of course, Ran's answer works for me too -
that disunity is worse than real damage from error; we can view
chinuch almost as an intrinsic reality (in your mind), and we can say
that nevertheless, the danger of Jewish disunity is greater than
having a few wrong ideas.)

Therefore, there is nothing truly "intrinsic" in a d'oraita. But we
still find that a d'oraita sin requires teshuva and sometimes a
chatat, etc. I'd simply say that G-d told us that with all Torah
mitzvot, we have to treat them as real realities, and that any
violation, even in error, is still a violation nonetheless, even if
there was no rebellion and no intrinsic damage to anything. So it's
not really intrinsic, but we treat it as such, because it is so
serious.

Whereas with a d'rabanan, there is no reason to pretend it is
intrinsic - humans invented it, so why should we treat it as an
intrinsic reality? It is but a fence, a protection, to what is
"intrinsic", and as such, the only possible sin is in willfully
rebelling. A shogeg sin in a d'rabanan involves no rebellion, and it
does not involve anything "intrinsic".

Ramban says that it is Chazal who decided that d'rabanans would be
safek l'kula, and perhaps it is indeed so.
But all the same, I'd say that perhaps the Torah itself told us (in
Torah She'be'al Pe) this! A d'rabanan is invented by humans and is not
"intrinsic" (whether the intrinsic-ness is truly intrinsic like most
say or simply metaphorically so as I would have it), and so there is
no reason to take it seriously unless it is deliberate. If it is in
doubt, then we are merely concerned that you *might* do something that
*might* bring you to an intrinsic d'oraita sin - every d'rabanan is
already a safek (that you may do a d'oraita sin), and so a doubtful
d'rabanan is automatically a safek safeka!

Mikha'el Makovi