[Avodah] Abiogenesis

[Michael Makovi]

>>My point is that I don't see why our ability to see the animal's
>>reproduction makes a difference. If lice were invisible, then it'd
>>make sense to say they are kosher. But lice are completely visible -
>>it is only their reproduction that is invisible. And I see no logical
>>reason why invisible reproduction should translate into
>>as-if-spontaneous gneeration.

> This is just a repetition of what you said earlier. I would need an
> explanation of what you disagree with in my subsequent post.
>
> I'm arguing that anything you can't see, doesn't count. Errors in the
> squareness of your tefillin that are below our threshold. The theory
> has nothing to do with biology in particular, this is just one instance.

Sorry about the repetition, but what you are arguing, still makes no
sense to me. Just because they couldn't see the eggs, you pretend they
spontaneously generate? Couldn't I argue that since I didn't see the
guy touch a sheretz, he isn't tamei? Or what if I touch a sheretz with
my eyes closed?

Invisible creatures being kosher seems to me to be a chok, perhaps the
reason being because God can't expect you to magically filter the
bacteria out of your water - it's a feasibility thing. I don't think
it's because my not seeing them per se matters.

But in any case, I simply fail to understand why not seeing their mode
of reproduction = as-if spontaneous generation. The logic is simply
beyond me.

>>Plus, as I said, if Chazal saw lice eggs, then it means the eggs are
>>NOT invisible...

> Again, I see a repetion and no explanation of why you reject my response.
>
> We have no indication they saw the eggs of tola'im; kinim are a different
> thing. As for kinim, which comes up in hilkhos Shabbos and combing,
> not kashrus of maggots, we have no reason to believe that they believed
> all kinim were born the same way.

Sorry, I don't remember which daf of Shabbat this is in, so I can't
check - which are tola'im and which are kinim?

Pending your response, I repeated myself because you didn't answer my
objection yet:

If Chazal could see the eggs (but nevertheless said spontaneous
generation), the invisibility argument fails altogether.
If Chazal could NOT see the eggs, it seems logical they would have
believed there were in fact no eggs to begin with (not invisible eggs;
I'm saying no eggs whatsoever on the planet), and concluded that
mamash spontaneous generation is the truth, in keeping with the
science of the day.
And even if they COULD see the eggs, it seems logical they would have
kept with the science of the day, as they did with so many other
things. Rabbi Slifkin has shown how b'shlama it is to say this sugya
is according to Greek science.

>>Chazal honestly thought there were no eggs, and that spontaneous
>>generation does in fact happen. Either way, the invisibility argument
>>fails, and we are left with mamash true spontaneous generation.

> Chazal's scientific belief is irrelevent if we are only using their
> description of the observable reality regardless of their beliefs about
> its truth. The science of invisible things is simply off topic; it's
> only the experience, not the science. Drop all interest in ontological
> truth and get on with life.

By the same token, their description of observable reality is
irrelevant if we go by scientific belief. It seems to me that it is
more logical to go by what we know, than what we see. If I touch a
sheretz with my eyes closed and my hands numbed with anesthetic, then
drop the sheretz and open my eyes and see the dead sheretz on the
ground, shouldn't I conclude I am in fact tamei?

> If no one ever saw a maggot egg with the naked eye, how do magots emerging
> from meat have any different impact on my quest to perfect my soul and
> come close to G-d whether the eggs are considered or not? My gut tells
> me they come from the meat, and my brain knowing otherwise doesn't change
> me nearly as much.

I'd say, they honestly thought the maggots spontaneously arose from
the meat, just like the gentiles thought! It's not a matter of what
they saw vs. what they knew. The two are the same! They saw maggots
spontaneously arise from meat, so they "knew" maggots do the same!
Knowledge = sight in this case.

>>> Simpler answer: Different bugs are born different ways. Even if they are
>>> similar enough to share a name. (Which I don't think is true here,
>>> anyway beitzei kinim vs tola'im).

>>Simpler? How? To assume they meant two different things, even though
>>they both said the same thing, is simpler? ...

> Of course it is. If one speaks of "fish", "shellfish", "plankton",
> or even "copepods", does one mean a single species?
>
> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

I'm sorry, I fail to understand your point. True, "fish" and
"shellfish" encompass more than one species. But if I say "scaled
finned fish are kosher" and you say "scaled finned fish are kosher",
does it make sense to say that I mean "fish with fins and scales are
kosher" and you mean "fish that you know don't have fins and scales,
but that by optical illusion look like they have fins and scales, are
kosher". This is absurd. If we both say the same thing, we both mean
the same thing. If Chazal and Greek scientists both seem to believe in
spontaneous generation, why pilpul and say Chazal meant something
else? It's much easier to say they both meant the same thing.

Mikha'el Makovi