[Avodah] Tzinius and the ILG

[Michael Kopinsky]

On 2/25/07, Chana Luntz <chana at kolsassoon.org.uk> wrote:
> Perhaps a more interesting example is encapsulated by the following
> (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer, siman 26, si'if 4):
>
> "Haisha mekudeshes bshlosha drachim: b'kesef, u b'shtar, ou  b'biah, min
> hatorah aval hachachamim asru l'kadesh b'biah mishum pritzus"
>
> Now what does this say about what the torah allows versus prohibits?  As
> in, what was the Torah thinking of, allowing kidushin by way of biah?
> Does the Torah permit pritzus, and it takes chazal to assur it?  Why on
> earth did it not assur kiddushin by way of biah in the first place?
>
> It seems to me reasonably safe to say, based on this example, that the
> fact that something is permitted d'orisa does not necessarily mean that
> the HQBH approves of it (even begrudgingly) - or do you disagree?
>
> Regards
>
> Chana

Is this not a circular proof?  Perhaps there are circumstances when
kiddushei biah is not actually immoral, but the Chachamim decided that
based on societal norms it should be assur?  In other words, perhaps this
is another example (just like slavery, or polygamy) of something that in
an absolute (aka D'oraisa) sense is neutral, but when society began to
view as negative, the Chachamim saw fit to assur it.  The Torah doesn't
approve of Pritzus; just that in the time of Mattan Torah, kiddushei biah
was not parutz.