[Avodah] early bird specials and ribbis

[Zev Sero]

Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, February 8, 2007 8:37 am, R Zev Sero wrote:


> :> It would seem that it such cases your chiluq would boil down to
> :> an issur on the lashon. Writing:
> :>     Admission: $20, $10 for early birds who sign up by Feb 15th
> :> would be mutar, but writing:
> :>     Admission: $10, $20 for late sign-up after Feb 15th
> :> (or the more common, "at the door") would be assur?

> : Yes, the lashon should match the reality, that they're offering
> : a discount for early payment, not a penalty for late payment.

> But it's kind of arbitrary whether you view the base price as X
> and a discount to Y for early payers or a base price of Y with a
> penalty bringing it up to X for late ones.

The first distinction to be drawn is when the payment is legally
due.  At what point can the recipient sue the payer in BD, demanding
immediate payment?  Once that point has arrived, if the money hasn't
yet been paid it's a debt, and any money that is paid to secure his
agreement to postpone collection is ribbis.  But if that point hasn't
yet arrived, if he's not yet entitled to the money at all, then he is
allowed to offer the payer an inducement to pay early.

That's ikkar hadin.  The next problem is that if the payment is made
*too* early, then it's not obvious that it's early payment for goods
or services to be given or performed later, and what it looks like
is a loan from the payer to the recipient, which the recipient later
pays in kind, with his goods or services, at a lower rate than he
would have given to anyone else.  If this were the reality it would
be ribbis; since it's not the reality, it's not ribbis, but it's
still forbidden because it looks like ribbis.  So there must be some
way for the observer to link the payment to the future transfer of
goods or performance of services.

One example is the early payment of wages: if the work begins
immediately, then it's obvious that the payment was related to the
work, and not simply a loan.   It seems to me that submitting an
application or reservation form is a similar act that visibly
links the payment to the thing for which it is paid.  Some cheques
come with a space to write the purpose of the payment, and it seems
to me that filling that in would also be sufficient to link them.

And of course if it's the norm to pay at that time, then it's also
obvious to the observer that the payment is linked.  The problem
with paying wages before the work even begins is that while it's
normal to give an employee an advance on his wages, it's not at all
normal to give such an advance to a *future* employee, who hasn't
even started working for you, so it appears to be something other
than it is.


> So, you argued two chiluqim, that I can tell:
> 1- Norm.
> 2- Whether the later payer is covering a real cost due to his lateness.

That wasn't an argument, it was an afterthought, a question I threw out
after making my point.  Once the dinner has started, payment is clearly
due, and any delay is completely down to the forbearance and good will
of the shul.  I said that it therefore seems obvious that charging for
such forbearance is forbidden.  But then I asked whether it is quite
that obvious.  Perhaps it's OK, if the surcharge is reasonably related
to the actual cost of collection, rather than to the opportunity cost
or "float" of the sum to be collected.



> Let's talk of a case where the norm is ill defined. Many dinner
> attendees pay for their rubber chicken beforehand, others at the
> door, and many shul members or parents at a school function get
> billed later.

But at what point do they legally owe the money?  If they reserve
and then cancel, do they still have to pay?  If not, then they
don't owe the money yet, and the shul's allowed to induce them to
pay early.


> : If they misdescribe what they are doing, that could be a problem.
> : The lashon on mechirat chametz, otzar bet din, etc., must also
> : be correct, or it could be a problem.
> 
> And my point is that in many situations, both leshonos are equally
> valid descriptions of reality.

In such cases, why shouldn't we look to the lashon to define the
reality?

 

> Is the shul's loss due to paying an accountant to keep track of your
> bill or meals they must overbuy to allow you the option of just
> showing up any more valid a motivation than the shul's loss due to
> not collecting interest from the bank?

Yes, because it's not schar hamtanat hama'ot.  It's just covering
their out of pocket expenses.  Here's another example: IIRC, the
borrower must go to the lender to pay.  Eved loveh le'ish malveh,
and paying a debt is a mitzvah.  Now suppose I owe you money, and
I ask you to come to my home in Brooklyn to collect it, and offer
to pay for your taxi fare.  Would this be ribbis?  I don't think so.
I'm not paying for the privilege of holding on to your money longer
than I should, but for your extra expense and trouble in collecting,
which you aren't legally obligated to incur.  You could have demanded
that I come to you in NJ.  Instead, you were nice enough to come to
me, why should you be out of pocket for that?  Now suppose you do
come, and I discover that I haven't got the money after all; so
I ask you to come back next week, and offer to pay again for that
taxi.  Once again, the payment isn't for the extra week, but for
the extra trip.  It would be the same if I asked for two weeks,
or for two days.  And it would be the same whether the loan was
for $100 or $1000.

-- 
Zev Sero               Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's
zev at sero.name          interpretation of the Constitution.
                       	                          - Clarence Thomas