[Avodah] Ikkarim Redux

[Meir Shinnar]

On Mar 17, 2007, at 10:35 PM, avodah-request at lists.aishdas.org wrote:

> RMB
> I am not sure what RMS means by "ikkarim", and I am pretty sure he  
> hasn't
> gotten my definition, at least to its full implications.
>
> I said they have halachic import, as they are used to assess people  
> for stam
> yeinam and geirus. Then there is also shechitah. This includes  
> things like
> RASoloveitchik's lenient ruling WRT meshichtzin, which was written  
> in terms of
> the 12 ikkar. In addition to RHS's comment, which wasn't meant as a  
> pragmatic
> pesaq, but was made by a noted poseiq in a prepared public talk.
>

1.  The facts that poskim occasionally frame things in terms of  
ikkarim does not mean that they are actually normative - ikkarim are  
used as a shorthand for the issues of belief - but not in the formal  
sense that you would like to use them in.
2.  RAS psak, to my mind, proves the reverse - in dealing with all  
the people who are ban happy, he says, essentially - that if you take  
ikkarim as defining kfira, they don't violate ikkarim - but doesn't  
go to the next level - that the ikkarim actually define kfira.
3. RHS prepared public talk is, WADR, proof that poskim may be good  
at what they do - but not necessarily at anything else (the MO take  
on da'as torah...) - and the attempt to use halachic categories in  
areas where they don't apply is problematic - whether that is  
politics or philosophy.  As per our discussions, RHS's talk is highly  
morally problematic.
4.  The rambam in hilchot gerut nowhere talks about using all ikkarim  
as part of the gerut process.  Again, the facts that some poskim use  
ikkarim for gerut doesn't mean that they should - nor does it mean  
that they actually mean ikkarim.., as ikkarim are a shorthand.  RMB  
mentioned only one posek he spoke with - RJL, and while RJL nominally  
used "ikkarim", in practice he doesn't.   For stam yeynam too, he  
would have to show sources.  I know many people who will say that the  
yayin of a kofer is assur, and that a kofer is one who denies the  
ikkarim - but know of no posek who actually does this in detail - eg,  
this violates precisely this ikkar, this is the limit......- and this  
is clearly not standard practice.
I would point out, for example, that RM Feinstein, who believed that  
most C rabbis were mehallel shabbat, and therefore viewed them as  
pasul le'edut, accepted the testimony (and marriage) of those known  
to be shomer shabbat - without questioning about ikkarim - even  
though blblical criticism is standard material.  In the end, shmirat  
hamitzvot is determinative...


> IIUC, RMS invokes "lo dak" on the use of language (a point he  
> stressed more in
> previous iterations), and where they do mean the ikkarim bedavka,  
> the poseiq
> involved doesn't know the true breadth of the history involved, and  
> are erring
> on the "metzi'us" behind the ruling.
>
> I am NOT talking about how to define when someone else is to be  
> excluded from
> our community. I do not believe we should be in the business of  
> excluding
> people from a pragmatic perspective, not in the business of judging  
> others
> altogether from a halachic one -- except where necessary.
but ultimately, it is exclusion - and the notion that it is necessary  
is a major hidddush.
>
> Nor am I even talking about much room personal usage. After all, if  
> I honestly
> get to the wrong answer I am not a kofeir, if someone rebels their  
> way there,
> guidelines won't mean much.
as the ultimate issue is determined not by the answer one gets, but  
by how one gets there, the ikkarim are no longer part of halachic  
material
>
> I am speaking specifically of the notion that they are not  
> ignorable because
> halachic questions overlap with aggadic data.
The statement that they do requires proof
>
> Which is why I do not understand RMS's comment:
> ...
> : I find this realm to be quite  unproductive - because the  
> fundamental
> : assertion  -  that the discussion of the ikkarim is subject to  
> halachic
> : methodology - is what needs to be proven.....(and I thought you  
> weren't a
> : brisker...)
>
> When not dealing with the halachic realm, there is no concept of  
> pesaq, and
> any position honestly and accurately derived from the mesorah is  
> valid. I am
> intentionally speaking of the halachic realm, because -- while this is
> tangential to the Rambam's question of who is a Yisrael WRT "kol  
> Yisrael yeish
> lahem cheileq leOhB" -- it is invoked by acharonim to make halachic  
> decisions.
> But if halakhah requires that we treat them differently in these  
> ways, we
> can't simply relegate the ikkarim to one opinion among many -- it's  
> the
> opinion whose major features made it into halakhah.

My argument is that it didn't make it into halacha legitimately - and  
its occurences there reflect either a shorthand or ignorance.

Every realm has its own rules - and one is on dangerous ground in  
using the rules of the wrong realm.

eg, for a less controversial issue, consider esh on shabbat.  There  
are halachic parameters defining esh.  In assessing new models, one  
applies the halachic definitions to determine whether something (eg,  
incadescent light, fluorecent light, LED) is esh - and clearly,  
whether or not it is physically a fire is not the relevant issue.   
However, one has to understand the physics so one can understand   
which halachic principles apply....- and misunderstanding the physics  
makes the psak problematic.

The ikarim were a set of statements by the rambam that summarized a  
philosophical viewpoint that he thought represented the minimum that  
a Jew needed to know ( the meaning of the arabic term the rambam uses  
does not refer to a blind faith - although does not refer to a  
detailed knowledge).  The decision of their truth or validity,  
according to the rambam, is determined not by halachic methodology -  
but by methods that aim at the truth - and halachic decision making  
is geared at reaching a decision, but not necessarily the truth  
(abbaye isn't wrong - that is the fundamental issue of elu  
ve'elu....) - and modern halachic thinking, with the emphasis on  
leshitato and being yotze as many shittot,  fundamentally accepts  
that every major position reflects a different truth - and halachic  
decision making therefore does not declare that truth to be wrong.

.  That is my statement.  The application of halachic methodology to  
determine what is the minimal set of knowledge - but now formulated  
as beliefs - strikes one as fundamentally wrong - as wrong as  
determining the age of the world by halachic methodology, or as  
determining the proper way to build a bridge by halacha...

Now, this is not a statement a la misinterpreted Mendelson that there  
are no fundamental truths - someone who believes that there is no  
god, or in  a dualistic universe, or that moshe forged the torah-  
would not be accepted in the community, and if asked to explain why,  
a posek might well say the ikkarim.  However, my point is that the  
precise boundary has not ever been closely defined by the ikkarim -  
and there is not that close debate one finds in other areas, such as  
hilchot shabbat.  eg, for the fifth ikkar - there are poskim who hold  
that various piyutim are kfira because of tfila lemalachim.  However,  
I know of no posek who holds that who also holds that those who say  
those piyutim are kofrim - and, for example, the wine (to use the  
halachic example that you gave of why one needed to define ikkare  
emunah) of a chasidische hashgacha is therefore assur, or a ger who  
says them, his gerut is questionable.


It has far more been defined by the sense of rebellion against  
beliefs of the community - and the attempt to preserve the community  
- which is why , sometimes, issues unrelated to the ikkarim are used  
by some.  There is a realization, perhaps implicit, perhaps explicit  
- that while the ikkarim do, in some shorthand, provide a summary of  
important ideas - halachic debate is not the right way to decide  
their details.  It is the wrong methodology.  Halacha does not  
determine truth - it determines obligations.

This is especially true as most poskim, both today but also  
historically, lacked philosphical training - and a posek who lacks  
philosophical training is as ill equipped to pasken on ikkarim as a  
posek who lacks knowledge of physics is to pasken on electricity on  
shabbat.


>
> IOW, I am no Brisker. (In fact, I consider the perpetuation of  
> Brisk into an
> era where there is no culture of "Erev Shabbos Jews" to be the  
> primary problem
> underlying most of the O community's imperfection. Halakhah uber  
> ales only
> works in conscious thought when everything else is provided  
> culturally on a
> preconscious/unconcious/subconscious [don't know the terms well  
> enough to
> choose] level.)
>
> Still, it is only in the halachic realm that the question of  
> mandate has
> meaning. Noting that there is halachic impact means that side of  
> things can't
> be ignored. A Brisker would say it's the only meaningful question.  
> But one
> needn't be a Brisker to say it is an essentual question.
the fact that only in the halachic realm that the question of mandate  
has meaning means here that the question of mandate has no meaning -  
and I think close reading of the halachic literature bears this out.

>
> So, what do I think are the 13 ikkarim as utilized in halakhah? I'm  
> not sure.
> There is plenty of gray area subject to machloqes. But then, we use  
> kezeisim
> as a unit of measure even though the range of possible values is  
> greater than
> a factor of 2 from smallest pesaq to largest. (All of the pesqim I  
> know of are
> larger than archaeological consensus. But I would assume by now  
> someone
> utilized digs on Har haBayis to form a new shitah.)
elu ve'elu divre elokim chaim has never applied to ikkare emunah -  
while it applies in shiure zetim  ( he follows the tzlach's shitta,  
and I follow a different shitta - elu ve'elu.  He follows what I  
think is kfira - that is not elu ve'elu...
The fact one is unable to define what the 13 ikkarim used in halacha  
are means that they are not used in halacha.  It isn't that they are  
subject to machloket - a la size of zetim.  There is a large  
literature that deals with the issue of zetim - and dealing with at  
least some of the other shittotl.  It is that you can't find halachic  
literature that will deal in a comprehensive fashion with the  
machloket on ikkarim and try to set the boundaries, in awareness of  
the existence of other positions.  The grey zone exists because no  
one actually uses them.  It is possible, that as a response to RM  
Schapiro's book, some will try to formulate such a literature - but  
that is no the current norm -nor, I would argue, would such a  
formulation be legitimate.


>
> So my claim is limited in both domain (a narrow applicability) and  
> range (a
> wide set of possible outcomes). But I think it still has import. If we
> actually pasqen (e.g.) that Jews who do have messianic beliefs at  
> odds with
> the 12th ikar can't handle our wine, then there really is a line  
> keeping such
> people from ever feeling or being considered fully "there". RAS  
> implies as
> much when he says that meshichtzin don't qualify rather than  
> denying there is
> anything for them to qualify for. We may try to make them welcome,  
> but as
> RMShinnar noted, it will be tough going.

People have paskened many things. There are psakim that people who  
deny aggadot hazal or da'as torah or the authorship of the zohar  
or... are all kofrim - none related to the ikkarim.  everyone has a  
line - but that line is not truly based on ikkarim.

>
> RMShinnar writes "the rambam would have vigorously fought against  
> the idea
> that  universal acceptance implies truth" and "a doxa is quite  
> different than
> statements of hilchot shabbat - and has always been treated  
> differently." But
> I'm talking about "hilkhos Shabbos", not doxology or determination  
> of truth.
> Which is why I feel I am not getting the idea across.
>
> I would then add that one can legitimately derive communal- 
> definitional
> implications from the halachic development, which is closer to the  
> role of
> doxology. Not in the sense of you must believe X to be Y, but in  
> practice, you
> wouldn't be treated by other O Jews the same as most of them  
> without such
> belief.
>
> BTW, R Zvi Pesach Frank required yayin mevushal when having tinoqos
> shenishbe'u at the table, not only rebellious koferim. At an OU  
> program on
> wine and grape juice, RHS recommends being chosheish for this when  
> having
> unobservant seder guests. (Despite RYBS's reluctance to use  
> mevushal for 4
> kosos.)

tinokos shenishbu are an issue for mehallel shabbat befarhesya -  
which is the commonly cited reason for questions about wine.   The  
whole question whether today's non Orthodox have the full din of a  
tinok shenishba, or merely a similarity to it, is one that was  
frequently debated here in the past - but I am not sure that the  
question of ikkarim factors into it - and to the extent that it does,  
it is because the non O may lack truly fundamental beliefs - going  
far beyond any debate over the range of the ikkarm (so again, not  
because they don't fully believe in the 13th ikkar or 12th ikkar)

The fact that the O community does not treat someone as Orthodox is a  
sociological issue rather than halachic - and while RMB is right on  
the sociology, the question whether that is positive or not is a  
different one.  The fact that RHS doesn't follow RYBS is no surprise.


>
> One last question for RMS: Since you don't believe one is supposed  
> to use even
> a loose definition of the ikkarim even in this halachic context,  
> the question
> of the width of opinion is more on yourself. I am saying that there  
> is a
> near-universal consensus around (although not actually at) a  
> certain point.
> What then is a kofeir? Which guests at your table wouldn't you serve
> non-mevushal wine to? If one denies the 13 ikkarim serving in this  
> role,
> doesn't one need to have some other set of beliefs in order to know  
> what to
> do?
As above, I don't deny the existence of  chovot halevavot - but  
question the emphasis on the details.  A universal consensus that  
can't be defined doesn't exist.
(your defnition sounds perilously close to  a known judicial  
definition of pornography ...)
Now, even RM Schapiro would admit that there is universal acceptance  
of some issues - but the resultant set of criteria are actually quite  
small ( IIRC, he brings down a gra in Tikkune Hazohar that requires  
only two items...).  I would argue that any position accepted by any  
major figure is automatically within the techum.  Furthermore,I think  
that the radvaz's position is normative - the essence is the  
motivation and nature of the error - rather than the specific error.   
Errors reached through reason, or education, even faulty - are not  
kfira.

The converse side of focusing on the ikkarim leads to morally  
problematic relations with the rest of am yisrael.  To cite your  
source of RH Schachter's speech, by focusing on the ikkarim, he  
concludes that what does it mean to be a Jew who doesn't believe in  
the ikkarim - one can't sell them hametz on pesach, or use them on a  
shabbes, goy - but would be expected to fight in wars voted on by  
those who believed.   The focus on the ikkarim leads to a distortion  
of our relationship with am yisrael - and we have a greater  
obligation that we act right than that they believe right.

Meir Shinnar

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