[Avodah] The Ikkarim and the Limits of O, rerere...dux

Micha Berger micha at aishdas.org
Tue Feb 27 15:12:26 PST 2007


On Tue, February 27, 2007 11:15 am, R Meir Shinnar wrote to Areivim:
: the radbaz (4:187) explicitly rejects labeling as kfira deviations
: from the ikkarim due to reason (presumably faulty reason..)

Agreed.

: I think that Micha's position reflects a dramatic change in the
: notion of what the ikkarim are.  After all, halachic psak typically
: does not presume to determine the truth - but a practical position -
: and therefore studying the other position, even if it is nidche
: lehalacha - remains torah study ( most people still study abaye...)
:
: However, ikkarim represent a statement of the core beliefs about what
: is true - and while psak may determine some practical actions...

Not at all. I'm staying the ikkarim are used in pesaq of what to do lemaaseh.
Who can handle my wine. Which converts should I accept. Who must I just lekaf
zechus.

I am saying that some loose form of them are de facto used in pesaq. Not that
that makes them true or false. But we can't say the ikkarim are open to debate
when we rely on them as "halachic truth".

I would also argue that this was the Rambam's intent, as he includes them in
Hilkhos Teshuvah in defining terms he then uses throughout Mishneh Torah in
these ways. But that's secondary, since I'm talking about pesaq today, not the
Rambam's intent.

While this has social impact, I'm not saying we should use that pesaq to
define the sociological grouping we call O. I'm convinced for Areivim-esque
reasons that we need to foster the existence of "non-observant O Jews", lest
they join communities where traditional halakhah is kept on their agenda.

I'm presenting the notion that we have defined for ourselves normative O
belief and used it lehalakhah. And not dismissing that of there being a home
in the O community for non-normative O Jews.

Nor am I saying that pesaq defines metzi'us, like pechusah mibas 3.

: The problem is the application of halachic methodology to the
: determination of the truth - which is a radical innovation - each
: area has its own rules of logic and thought.  halacha has become the
: predominant mode of jewish expression - but it too has bounds.. Its
: use in philosophy is a problem not only for philosophy - but for
: halacha.

Not at all. I would say that the same is true for pesaq here as whenever we
find a pesaq that contradicts the actual metzius. If we were to disprove one
of the Rambam's ikkarim somehow, we would each apply whatever our version of
that principle is.

: What RMB is representing is something else - many halachic scholars
: don't have philosophic training - and they may truly believe that
: some version of the ikkarim is true and is universally accepted
: (after all, what started the Marc Schapiro article on ikkarim was a
: claim by a noted rosh yeshiva that the ikkarim were true and
: universally accepted as true)...

OTOH, he also quotes this list's membership agreement, and while I'm neither
as bright as him nor as educated in the subject, I am well aware that the
ikkarim enjoy an acceptance today that they hadn't in the past.

Perhaps my whole attitude toward the subject is colored by the emotions caused
by his accusing me (admittedly not by name) of ignorance I do not possess.

: I would note that there are other major implications for this
: position, that few are really willing to make.  If there is a book
: that has opinions that would now be considered kfira - can we still
: study them as torah? ...

The book, or the opinions themselves? And wouldn't studying the opinions help
you understand the sevara of the issue as a whole?

Tangent: is philosophy talmud Torah altogether? The Rambam uses the beraisa
that talmud Torah has three parts: miqra, mishnah, gemara. The only aggadita
possibly included is that which is in miqra. It would seem that machashavah
and science are included in ahavas Hashem (Hil Yesodei haTorah 2), and mussar
is Hil Dei'os, not talmud Torah.

:                         After all, to take a recent example, if we
: believe that belief in the science of hazal is an ikkar - or in the
: age of the universe - what do we do about all other sources?  Do we
: cut out the tiferet yisrael, edit out everything in Hirsch, cut out
: the ma'amar on aggadot hazal??

But it isn't an ikkar. The flipside of accepting the ikkarim as defining which
of my peers I'm to treat one way or the other is that it sets a maximum as
well as a minimum.

Besides, we can learn from the fact that the gemara still quotes Rav Hillel
while telling us his statement requires kaparah that one is supposed to learn
these rejected opinions, just like any other. Perhaps this is a proof to the
Ra'avad.


ON THE OTHER HAND...


Take a look at the opening of the KSA's discussion of Shabbos.

Is he saying that anyone who keeps Shabbos has a chezqas kashrus, and you
don't need to do the impossible -- test another's belief? Or is the KSA saying
that shemiras Shabbos is inherently the dividing line.

This, being a halachic treatment, identifies with the angle of the question I
am speaking of.

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha at aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter




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