[Avodah] Eilu v'Eilu and Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim

[Micha Berger]

R' Alan Krinsky <adkrinsky at netzero.net> wrote (the post came through to the
digest as an attachment, so I'm including it in its entirety):

: Are the two notions of Eilu v'Eilu and a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim
: essentially identical, two ways of expressing the same idea? Or, do they
: refer to two different ideas? If different, how do the two overlap? Is one
: a more general category, encompassing the other one? Or, is it like a Venn
: diagram where they overlap but both maintain areas beyond the overlap?

: I had assumed that they were identical, that any positions considered part
: of a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim would be also be considered as positions
: falling with the realm of Eilu v'Eilu, and that likewise, if two (or
: more) positions could be appropriately defined as Eilu v'Eilu, then the
: dispute they concerned would also be a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim. Yet,
: perhaps I was mistaken in this assumption?

: I suppose my broader concern is the boundaries of Orthodoxy, and what
: happens when one sizable group considers the positions of another sizable
: group to be beyond the pale. How do we define such disputes in terms of
: Eilu v'Eilu and Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim?

: Let me provide two cases that might help explicate this:

: 1. The institutionalization of girls' Gemara. By this I mean the formal
: teaching of Gemara to girls in a day school setting, as is done in
: Brookline's Maimonides School and elsewhere. As I understand it, many
: rabbinic authorities would hold that although individual girls or women
: could on their own initiative request to study Gemara, that it should not
: be taught, even on an optional basis, in a formalized classroom setting.
: And not only that it should not be done so, but that it is wrong or even
: forbidden to do so, that there is not even a valid halakhic debate here,
: that the position in favor of the practice is really beyond the pale,
: and that we do not have a Machlokes l'Shem Shamayim or a case of Eilu
: v'Eilu here.

: 2. The issue of whether or not Daas Torah extends beyond halakhic
: matters. Do we (are we obligated to) turn to the Gedolei HaDor for correct
: views on such non-halakhic matters as politics and science? Again, my
: impression is that although many Orthodox Jews reject such an expansive
: notion of Daas Torah, many others consider this rejection itself as
: beyond the pale, and that we likewise do not have a Machlokes l'Shem
: Shamayim or a case of Eilu v'Eilu.

: I suppose the two examples could be elements of a single, larger one, as a
: core part of the argument against something like institutionalized girls'
: Gemara is that--regardless of the halakhic merits or issues--it has not
: been embraced by the Gedolei HaDor. One might consider the debate over
: banning Rabbi Slifkin's books as another example. Was that a Machlokes
: l'Shem Shamayim and/or a case of Eilu v'Eilu? What happens when there
: is disagreement within Orthodox circles about how to characterize such
: a dispute? And, finally, as I have read or at least inferred recently
: in writings by Rabbi Nathan Lopes-Cardozo and Rabbi Benjamin Hecht,
: what value are these concepts if one includes only positions with which
: one agrees or at most refers only to differences of nusach or chumrah
: observance? Are not these concepts only meaningful when they encompass
: vehemently argued opposing positions, where one believes strongly that the
: opposing view is incorrect, but retains a certain respect nonetheless? And
: if so, where do we draw the line (because obviously there are limits,
: and we would not want to say anything goes, to include for example a
: debate over whether or not a person can drive on Shabbos)? In a way,
: then, I am asking what the boundaries of an Orthodox pluralism would
: be, and how and who defines those boundaries?  And my worry is that,
: increasingly, the boundaries are being narrowed so severely, that the
: Orthodox community itself is moving further and further away from any
: hope of Jewish unity...

Whether or not it paid to raise the ban...

Compare IM OCh 4:25, where Rav Moshe discusses the notion of Eilu va'eilu as
being limited to machloqes lesheim Shamayim, and his haqdamah to IM, where RMF
is clear that only one shitah is actually truth. In OCh III (pg 303, I forgot
the teshuvah number) RMF similarly writes there is only one emes-dik havarah,
although one should follow one's mesorah of that that is rather than attempt
to recreate it. I have a number of questions on this latter teshuvah, a
different topic for a different post. To get back to our point...

Personally, I find the Maharal's and Rav Tzadoq's models of machloqes more
convincing (and they are NOT identical), and thus drift toward belief that
eilu va'eilu is actually speaking of a pluralistic attitude toward truth.
Still, Rav Moshe makes a distinction between the concepts, and thus I would
not assume they are identical either. Someone can argue lesheim Shamayim and
still exclude my deeply cherished beliefs as one of the "eilu". And, by RMF's
shitah, the qedushah comes from the honest pursuit of amito shel Torah, not
correctness.

So I would answer no, they are not identical.

(See <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/03/eilu-vaeilu-part-i.shtml> and
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2005/03/eilu-vaeilu-part-ii.shtml> for
RMHalbertal, RMRosensweig, and FWIW my opinions on the nature of machloqesin.
Such as what are the Maharal's and Rav Tzadoq's models...)


Any pluralism must be finite, there must be some barrier beyond which I no
longer consider that Orthodox, and doesn't conform to eilu va'eilu. That
barrier itself is the subject of machloqes, and thus to eilu va'eilu, which
leads to a paradox: Can I say "he's also right" when part of his position is
that mine isn't among the right ones?

That paradox is inherent in plurality and not specific to nidon didan. But
then, plurality presumes that conflicting ideas can be true; paradox already
went out the window.

There are objective reasons to say that "Torah and" hashkafos are beyond one's
red line, whether we're speaking of TIDE (as anything but a hora'as sha'ah) or
anyone's definition of TuM. I recognize that even though I adhere to a variant
on that theme (or 4 or 5 variants, depending on mood). IMHO, for this to be a
milkhamta shel Torah, a machloqes lesheim Shamayim, we must distinguish our
knowledge of their position and the basis for it in our mesorah from our
opinion of them as people or a community. The value of a derekh is whether it
increases AYH, one's ability to perform Torah, Avodah and Gemillus Chasadim,
and whether they actually are doing their best to follow the Torah, not
whether or not they applaud my derekh.

The decision of the nature of the machloqes really resides in the people whose
position is in dispute, in choosing our response (as Rabbi Hecht puts it at
<http://www.nishma.org/articles/commentary/slifkinrevisited3.html>).

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha at aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter