[Avodah] Knowledge of Good and Bad

[Micha Berger]

On Sat, October 21, 2006 10:23pm, R' Akiva Miller
<kennethgmiller at juno.com> wrote:
: I never meant to reject the idea (based, I believe, on Rambam in
: Moreh Nevuchim 1:2) that prior to eating from the tree, Adam and
: Chava based their decisions on emes/sheker, and that after eating,
: based on right/wrong.

: But there is a great middle area between those extremes. Perhaps I am
: misunderstanding what people mean by "emes/sheker", but I understand
: it to refer to objective fact, leaving no room for opinions or
: emotions.

Except that if Adam and Chavah had to choose, their minds contained
opinions about which was true. There is no indication that they were
omniscient, so their choice was trying to determine the truth.

Similarly emotions. Adam started out lonely, so we know they had emotions.

But in the Rambam's thought, the concept of da'as is at a nexus between
thought and emotion that is central to Aristotilian psychology, but not
in current psychological models. Now we tend to think there is minimal
connection between what we think and how we feel. But the Rambam found a
similarity in the Torah's use of "da'as" for both knowledge and intimacy.

This is actually pretty central to his hashkafah. His whole concept of
personal redeption is based on the inevitability of da'as Hashem leading
to the proper middos. As reflected in how the Rambam named Hilkhos Dei'os.

And so, the Rambam would naturally assume that deciding the truth
determines emotional stance, whereas nowadays we stress the opposite flow:
how emotions color our perception of the truth.

: For example, Chava observed that the fruit of the tree was "tov
: l'maachal". I will concede that this might refer to the objective
: fact of it being edible. But it seems to me more likely that she was
: making a value judgment, that it was not only an edible food, but
: that it was a *good* food, i.e., better than some other foods...

I agree that "good" has non-moral meanings. But what scale is intended
here? Functional -- it was a healthier fruit than others? Aesthetic?

And here's where I am in the dark on the emotion thing. Did the fruit
taste good? If so, did she have a ta'avah for the food, or would a ta'avah
for anything but being a tzelem E-lokim not come until /after/ she ate
the fruit?  Because if she could have a ta'avah for the good taste, it
would introduce negi'os that would color her assessment of the nachash's
version of the story.  But isn't that by definition a yeitzer hara?

And yet I agree with RAM that it:
: is clearly how the Torah uses the word "tov" in reference to the gold
: of Chavilah (2:13), to describe it as above-average in quality.

: What was life like, for people who did have bechirah chafshis, but
: did not yet understand right and wrong? I imagine that they might
: choose, for example, between two equally healthy fruits, but which
: had different tastes. Or perhaps they'd choose between fruit with
: different nutritional strengths. They had emotions, and desires, and
: the ability to choose from among them.

Given what I wrote above, they would choose between competing claims
for which is right. Even if it's always "right" to choose the healthier
fruit (given what you need at the moment), how would Chavah know which
one that is?

Which is why I think that REED's model is consistent with the Rambam's.
REED writes about the fruit internalizing the yeitzer hara. What was once
the snake's job we now carry within ourselves. Leshitas haRambam, as I
have been explaining it, the snake's job was to present an evil as though
it were good, and thus requiring Chava to determine which story was true,
and thereby follow the right choice.

BTW, I wrote another blog entry relating to my stance that functional
good (eg a good pen is one that is easy to write with) is the basis of
moral good.  Someone is behaving morally when they act in accordance
with the function for which Hashem made them.

And on Mon, October 23, 2006 6:54am, RAM wrote:
: The nachash explained, "Eat this, and you'll be like G-d!!!" To
: someone who does not understand right and wrong, but does understand
: benefit and loss, I'd think this would sound like a great idea...
: It is only we, who do understand the idea that disobeying G-d is
: *wrong*, who feel that the nachash's idea was stupid. But that was
: beyond Adam and Chava's comprehension. I think it would have sounded
: pretty reasonable to them.

How? Why would Adam and Chava possibly believe that disobeying the Source
of everything would bring benefit?

: Yes, they were certainly aware that HaShem told them not to eat it,
: but they couldn't fathom the idea that His command makes the act
: inherently *wrong*...

I would suggest the reverse, again placing sechar va'onesh as the cause,
not the effect, of the mitzvah. (Been doing that a lot lately.)

Hashem, in His knowledge of man's function, knows what would make us the
most effective. Onesh is merely the equivalent of what happens to a glass
when you use it to hammer nails rather than hold fine wine. Thus, Hashem
tells us which acts support that function, and which hinder. Functional
good plus Hashem's intended function for man being the basis of moral
good.

But even without such complicated sevaros, I still wonder why Chava would
possibly lack the knowledge that doing G-d's will must in the long run lead
to more benefit than would defying it.

On the linguistic front, we had three suggestions.

Rav YH Henken 1, based on the TT's Tosefes Berakhah:
:> According to Hebrew grammar (semichut), the verse should properly read:
:> "etz da'at tov vera" without a "heh" (and not: "etz hadaat..."). A parallel
:> can be found in Bamidbar (34:2) "baim el haaretz -- (eretz) Canaan," and
:> elsewhere.

So, it's probably not a semichut (good and bad knowledge), as this would
be a rare grammatical construct.

The same could be said of "yeitzer hara".

RYHH 2:
:> Another possibility is to vocalize it differently: "etz hoda'at tov vera."
:> In fact, even without changing the vowels, "lada'at", to know, often is
:> transitive and means "lehodi'a," to make known or promulgate... This is the
:> meaning of the Serpent's statement "You shall be like elohim (judges)
:> yode'ei tov vera."

IOW, the tree which informs people about good and bad.

RLPMinden <phminden at arcor.de> on Fri, October 27, 2006 10:15am:
: I understood it similarly... by understanding "touv vera" as an object...
: Compare the English equivalents - "tree of knowledge good and bad" doesn't
: work, but for a verbal form that doubles as a noun it works: "tree of the
: knowing of good and bad" = "tree of knowing good and bad".

Wouldn't it be "the tree that knows good and bad"?

Before you ask how a tree could know ra, think of "eitz peri" vs
"eitz oseh peri". If the eitz hada'as was the esrog, which is ta'am
eitzo upiryo shaveh, then the tree is truly one that understands the
difference between good and bad.

But in looking at any way of understanding the grammar, we can't ignore
the problem of not really knowing what da'as is: intellectual knowledge,
internalization of facts, emotional dei'os, etc...

Tir'u baTov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Spirituality is like a bird: if you tighten
micha at aishdas.org        your grip on it, it chokes; slacken your grip,
http://www.aishdas.org   and it flies away.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                            - Rav Yisrael Salanter