[Avodah] Rav Keller's JO article on evolution

[Micha Berger]

I actually have something new to say on the subject, a tweak in my position
due to my thinking about RSCarmy's post. (The ideas below are mine, sparked by
his; I still think the below would try RSC's patience with its reashing
conclusions from oversimplications.)

In the days of the rishonim, there was no concept of science. Instead there
was "natural philosophy". The whole idea of gathering empirical data never
really crossed people's minds. The one semi-exception I could think of was the
addition of epicycles to the neat Ptolmeic universe. But even then noone set
out to collect the data, it was a by-product of following the planets for
astrological purposes. And they just tweaked the popular system, not
consciously tested and experimented.

Aristotle's physics was "simply" a categorization of how people innately think
the world works. We are born expecting an object to continue in roughly a line
until its impetus runs out, then it should curve into a staight fall. A person
who can catch a high pop must know on some level about parabolic trajectories,
but that mis-knowledge is still in all of us. (And in cartoons, BTW.)
Aristotle provided a theory for what people took for granted to be true, and
generalized.

But at no point in the process did people set out to get new data points.

Therefore, rishonim thought of natural philosophy as a subspecie of sevara.
Reason crosses the lines of discipline. A conclusion is based on whatever you
have at hand; experience, mesorah, commonsense postulates, taught material,
and in whatever mixture you want.

Science vs Torah discussions start with the assumption that we have two
conflicting sources of data; not a conflict between Torah data and reason.

It therefore seems to me to be difficult extend the rishonim's positions to
our current science and Torah discussion. Regardless of my debates with
RMShinnar about whether the Rambam limited allegorizations to those compelled
(directly or by implication) about mesorah. Their notion of "natural
philosophy" blends with the idea of necessary by implication from the mesorah
with no clear line to draw between the disciplines. OTOH science is clearly
defined as distinct, because of the experimental process for finding patterns
in empirical data. It is about the conscious collection of non-Torah
postulates.

And thus, the two would be different in kind in my formulation. A rishon could
theoretically assert that requiring philosophy is sevara, and thus inherent in
the Torah, and not a violation of "Toras H' temimah" or the creation of a new
shitah yeis mei'ayin.



The Me'iri I mentioned earlier we were pointed to a couple of years back by
RGStudent, it's on Avos 3:11. There are three kinds of pesuqim: those that
chazal tell us are allegory, those that are literal, and those that are both.
There is no category of "allegory even though chazal didn't tell us" in his
list. RGS didn't make this diyuq, just cited a ra'ayah that there were
allegorical pesuqim.

AFAIK, this and the MN in dispute are the only rishonim we found for when one
may allegorize and when not. But due to the above, even if a rishon were shown
to allow allegorization to accomodate natural philosophy, it would not
convince me he would allow it to accomodate science.


I was also asked off list yesterday how I personally approach the question.

There are two possibilities if some archeological finding seems compelling: it
is correct, or it only seems compelling, but is flawed.

If it actually happens to be correct, I believe that there would be some hint
somewhere inside TSBP that our old understanding was wrong. Some al mi
lismoch.

If the archeology seems compelling, but no such tzad exists, I simply have to
wait  without an answer to see the archeology upshlugged, or the implication
found from within mesorah.

Which is how I feel compelled to accept the peshat of the mabul as history
(not localized orallegorical). Because I see no shitah suggesting otherwise,
only people trying to be meyasheiv it to the archeology. So that leaves me
with a she'elah? I can live with the question. There are many things I don't
know, this one has no halakhah lema'aseh so I am doing okay adding it to the
list.

Perhaps, and I suggested this before, we can extend the Maharal's notion (also
developed by REED in MmE I) of different planes of reality to hold the
question in abayence. The mabul happened, but the scientist lives on the wrong
plane of reality to experience its aftereffects.That would explain why the
human record is full of myths founded in the mabul experience, but the ground
shows nothing. Why people both remember the flood and remember building
societies elsewhere at the time (and before migdal bavel!). And if the ground
had eroded, there would have been no olive tree for the dove to find! The
Torah itself says something was up that would change or eliminate the
archeological record.

But I don't NEED an answer, and thus I do not feel compelled to take a strong
position one way or the other, and certainly not legalos panim baTorah
(acknowledging that "shelo kahalakhah" *might* not apply to aggadita).

Bereishis 1, OTOH, I treat differently only because I believe that even before
Hubble (big bang) and Darwin we had shitos of (1) an old universe (2) or a
process in which dating parts of ma'aseh bereishis is not meaningful without
Hubble (big bang) or Darwin.

There is only one emes. It's not a matter of "sufficient to contradict" as
though we're playing a game and looking to see who has more points. Both
sources of data must be in concert. If they aren't, then obviously I don't
understand one of the other. How am I supposed to predecide which I do not
understand? Nu, so I live with questions.

To my eye, RMShinnar predecided -- the Torah makes no empirical or historical
claims beyond those needed to justify halakhah. Those on the other tzad
predecided -- science can only disprove, not prove, so who knows what will be
considered scientific truth tomorrow? I do not assume I fully understand
either, so I wait.

I believe both must point to the same thing. Until we get there, I do not
assume I know enough of the truth to dismiss either the science or the shitah.
I acknowledge my ignorance, and get on with the lemaaseh.

On Wed, October 11, 2006 11:57 pm, Zvi Lampel wrote:
:From the Introduction to Rabbeynu Saadia Gaon's Full Commentary on the Torah:
:> If I would further clarify this, I would add that it is proper for every
:> person of understanding to always grasp the sefer Torah according to the
:> peshat of the words that is mefursam [conventional/widely-known/familiar]
:> among those who use that language, and [take the meaning that is] used more.

Which would include idiomatic or poetic usage, or even rare but accepted
usage. IMHO, this doesn't touch the inyan of whether "yom" must mean day
rather than era unless we are told.

: For the goal of every written work is that its ideas be wholly grasped by
: those who hear it [read]. The only exception is if the chush (sensory
: perception) or the seichel contradicts that terminology, or if the peshat of
: that terminology clearly contradicts another verse, or contradicts the mesorah
: of the prophets....

A case in the point I was making above, except that I said "rishonim" not
"ge'onim" (although the two seem to carry the same halachic authority in the
eyes of acharonim). Chush and seichel could very well include philosophy, but
not include of all science.

I assume also "the mesorah of the prophets" will raise the same contention
between ourselves and RMShinnar as did the MN. Does this mean "the body of
mesorah as a whole", ie defy some ikkar or shoresh, or does it mean the
mesorah about the particular pasuq?

: RMB and I have had a usually unexpressed disagreement over the "argument from
: silence." If I understand him correctly, when Chazal and/or rishonim say
: nothing about the meaning of a word, nothing can be learned about how they
: understood it. I always maintained, and I submit the original quote from Sefer
: HaIkarrim and now this passage from Rabbeynu Saadia Gaon demonstrates, that
: the primary, conventional understanding of words is the correct way to
: understand them, and is the way to understand how Chazal and/or Rishonim took
: them, unless they state otherwise....

I think it's more like when the ba'alei mesorah say nothing about the meaning
of the word, any peshat meaning is valid, whereas you are limiting it to the
most usual usage. Your way would involve gray area, BTW. If the homonym has
two equally common translations, you obviously can't say one to the exclusion
of the other. So how much more usual need it to be before it qualifies as a
default assumption?

But I am shying away from your position because (leshitas RSRH and I assume
others) homonyms in Hebrew come from the two meanings having a single
underlying commmon theme, and the word's translation really meaning that
theme. The translations are really limiting the broader idea by fitting it
into context and thus coming with different English words (or other
descriptions in the translation) and are not really different translations.

IOW, if yom refers to a time period of a certain sort, and both eras and days
are times period of that sort, neither usage is the more primary translation
-- they are just different assumptions about context coloring the same
translation: "And it was evening and it was morning, one
some-sort-of-time-period." If we take RSSchab's shita, that time period is one
day on the supernal clock, and the pasuq actually begins: "And the Supernal
Light was mixed with Darkness, and it again emerged from that Darkness..."

: RMB (and Rav David Gottleib) have already pointed out that the rishonim would
: not regard archeological-type "proofs" of what existed in the past to be the
: "muskal" RSG and others refer to, and to be in fact inferior means for
: establishing the truth. They therefore would not relinquish the conventional
: meaning of words on such basis.

Not quite. I said that I have no idea how they would regard it, as the idea
never crossed their minds. That's not the same as asserting they would hold
one way or the other -- that's just my guessing, not their shitah.

But there are two other points:

1- Is using an idiomatic translation "relinquishing the conventional meaning"?
If we find the translation elsewhere, I don't see why. IOW, allegory and idiom
are different things, as are idiom and less common but real usage.

2- Does any rishon actually go out and say one may allegorize something
despite his belief that there is no mesorah doing so? To use RMShinar's
example, the Rambam's peshat in parashas Vayeira is based on his presupposing
this was already said by R' Chanina in the medrash. We have no ra'ayah the
Rambam would still have given this novel peshat in the pasuq if it were not
necessary from his peshat in the medrash.

A guten kvitl un a guten yom tov!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             One who kills his inclination is as though he
micha at aishdas.org        brought an offering. But to bring an offering,
http://www.aishdas.org   you must know where to slaughter and what
Fax: (270) 514-1507      parts to offer.        - R' Simcha Zissel Ziv