<html><head><title>[Aspaqlaria] Akrasia</title><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://www.aishdas.org/asp/wp-content/themes/mandigo/style.css" type="text/css" media="screen" /></head><body>Aspaqlaria has posted a new item, '<a href="http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2011/06/akrasia.shtml">Akrasia</a>'<br />
<br />
<p>(Updated with quote from 19 Letters. <a href=#19Letters>Click here</a> to skip to the new material.)</p>
<p>In what part(s) of the human condition does religious experience center? Is the purpose of religion to effect an intellectual change — right thoughts? Is it an emotional affair?</p>
<p>Central to the Mussar perspective is that religion is about akrasia (ἀκρασία). Akrasia is an ancient Greek term that means “lacking command [of oneself]“. As a philosophical term, the question of akrasia was posed by Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras, who asks how it is possible that someone can know that action A to be the best course of action, and yet may end up actually doing something other than A? In Plato’s opinion (which most assume was that of the historical Socrates as well), akrasia can only be the product of ignorance about the realities of the situation, or about what is the person’s best interest. In other words, bad decisions come from ignorance.</p>
<p>Aristotle breaks down the problem into two — a failure of opinion, or a failure of appetite (desires of the body). Rather than being due to ignorance, opinion is subjective, a produce of disposition.</p>
<p>I mention the Greek debate as a backdrop to explaining how I see the Rambam’s position.</p>
<p>First thing to note is that the Rambam, like many of the <em>rishonim</em>, uses the term <em>dei’os</em> where we today speak of <em>middos</em>. I would not assume that every <em>rishon</em> meant the same thing by <em>dei’ah</em>, but I want to argue that in the Rambam’s case, <em>dei’ah</em> reflects knowledge – <em>da’as</em>.</p>
<p><em>Da’as </em>is central to the Rambam’s thought, and how he defines man’s purpose.</p>
<p>In “<a href="http://text.rcarabbis.org" target="_blank">Text & Texture</a>“, the RCA blog, <a title="Text & Texture: articles by R' Alex Sztuden" href="http://text.rcarabbis.org/?author=93" target="_blank">R’ Alex Sztuden</a> suggests <a title="Text & Texture: Possible Answers to Rav Soloveitchik’s 1936 Final Exam in Jewish Philosophy" href="http://text.rcarabbis.org/?p=729" target="_blank">answers from R’ JB Soloveitchik’s writings to questions given on R’ Soloveitchik’s 1936 final exam in Jewish Philosophy</a>. (Thereby showing that these questions were ones R’ Soloveitchik considered during much of his life.) The first question, which had two parts:</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>I.</strong><strong>a. What is the basic idea of the “Intellectualist Theory” of the religious act?</strong></p>
<p>In Halakhic Mind (41-43), the Rav distinguishes between 3 different views of emotional states (and by implication, of religious states):</p>
<p>1. <strong>Emotions are non-cognitive.</strong> They do not express any facts or statements about the world. In a footnote, the Rav cites Hume as a typical example of this view: “Hume denied the intentional character of our emotional experiences: ‘A passion is an original existence…and contains not any representative quality which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick or five feet tall…’” (116, footnote 49).</p>
<p>2. <strong>Emotions have a cognitive component.</strong> In fact, “every intentional act is implicitly a cognitive one…by way of simple illustration, the statement ‘I love my country’ may be broken down into three components: I. There exists a country – predication; II. This object is worthy of my love – valuation; [and] III. I love my country – consummation of the act.” (43). According to the Rav, I. (“There exists a country”) is a statement of fact that is in effect contained by and in the emotion. Emotions are not irrational outpourings of the heart. They make claims about the world.</p>
<p>3. <strong>Emotions are cognitive, but they are confused ideas.</strong> This is the Intellectualist Theory of Emotions (and religious states). “Of course, the intellectualistic school, regarding the emotional and volitional activities as <em>modi cogitandi, </em>had to admit some relationship between them and the objective sphere. Owing, however to the contempt that philosophers and psychologists had for the emotional act which they considered an <em>idea confusa</em>…”</p>
<p><strong> b. What are the conclusions? Criticism.</strong></p>
<p>The intellectualist theory correctly perceived that emotions were cognitive, but incorrectly assumed that they were inferior forms of cognition, confused ideas. For the Rav, all psychic states are intentional, and religious acts therefore contain a cognitive component, subject to elaboration, refinement and critique on its own terms.</p></blockquote>
<p>As I understand him, the Rambam relates to philosophical knowledge in two ways that we moderns do not.</p>
<p>The Rambam appears to follow the position that Aristotle’s primary focus in answering the problem of akrasia is on our holding bad opinions. Of the three answers to 1b, the Rambam appears to answer “3. Emotions are cognitive.” I think this shows through in his naming “<span style="text-decoration: underline;"><em>hilkhos dei’os</em></span>“, his discussion of what we today call “<em>middos</em>“, words that literally mean “laws of opinions”.</p>
<p>In Litvish and Yekkish derakhim, they define self-completion in ethical, moral, and personal refinement terms. Even<br />
Litvaks, with their/our emphasis on learning, expect the immersion in learning to cause a character change by the <em>miqvah</em>-like experience of learning — not by the knowledge. See the opening chapters of <a title="נפש החיים שער ד פרק א" href="http://he.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%A0%D7%A4%D7%A9_%D7%94%D7%97%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9D_%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%A8_%D7%93_%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A7_%D7%90" target="_blank">Nefesh haChaim cheileq 4</a>. (Yes, that really is an online copy of NhC that those words link to!) This is how R’ Chaim Volozhiner emphasizes the <em>lishmah</em> experience rather than the knowledge gained. Something the Rambam’s approach wouldn’t allow for — the more you know of G-d, the greater your soul. The Rambam describes the hoi paloi whose beliefs never get beyond the 13 principles of <em>emunah </em>as possessing a <em> nefesh qetanah</em>, literally possessing smaller souls. Because it is knowledge, not the experience of ga
ining knowledge, which is essential in the Rambam’s worldview.</p>
<p>See the end of the Moreh for how the Rambam ranks life’s decisions. The lowest level of human perfection is fiscal, then health and temperament, then moral, and highest — intellectual. The Rambam requires that moral and intellectual perfection be intimately linked in order to explain the role of morality in Torah. One isn’t intellectual in order to achieve moral and ethical perfection, one is moral and ethical because only by that similitude to G-d can you complete your knowledge of Him. Quoting Friedlander’s translation of 3:54:</p>
<blockquote><p>The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man: the possession of the highest, intellectual faculties; the possession of such notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regards God. With this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives him true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him immortality, and on its account he is called man.</p></blockquote>
<p>According to Aristotle, the Rambam, and to a lesser extent R’ Saadia Gaon, the goal is knowledge. It’s not just that knowledge prevents akrasia, that the person who knows G-d well will not sin. But it’s the knowledge itself that is the highest perfection. We usually speak about imitating G-d in order to know how one should give <em>tzedaqah</em>. The Rambam would have you give an ani “<em>dei machsero</em>” in order to emulate and thereby better understand the Creator.</p>
<p>Now let’s add in another factor. The Rambam had confidence in philosophical proofs above other forms of justification. This is in contrast to the position of <em>rishonim </em>like R’ Yehudah haLevi and R’ Chasdai Crescas, as well as running against the general trend of contemporary philosophy and the field of psychology. To quote from my post “The Kuzari Proof, part I” (in which I argue that the Kuzari itself argues against the so-called “Kuzari Proof”):</p>
<blockquote><p>Rabbi Prof. Shalom Carmy <a href="../../avodah/vol07/v07n087.shtml#07">posted something similar</a> to Avodah:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">People who throw around big words on these subjects always seem to take for granted things that I don’t.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">The people who keep insisting that it’s necessary to prove things about G-d, including His existence, seem to take it for granted that devising these proofs is identical with knowing G-d.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">Now if I know a human being personally the last thing I’d do, except as a purely intellectual exercise, is prove his or her existence.</p>
<p>R’ Gil Student <a title="Hirhurim, Proofs of G-d" href="http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2007/04/proofs-of-god.html" target="_blank">posted the following</a> quote from Louis Jacobs, <em>We Have Reason to Believe</em>, pp. 25-26, 28-30 <a href="http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">on Hirhurim</a>:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">Since Kant, these proofs [of God's existence] have been heavily assailed…. Many theologians, nowadays, accept the validity of these refutations and admit that there can be no proof of God in the sense that there can be no proof of a mathematical formula… But they go on to remark that we can be convinced of a thing beyond of a shadow of a doubt by means other than that of mathematical proof. There is no such proof, for instance, of the existence of other human beings beside ourselves, yet we are convinced that they do exist… In other words a distinction must be drawn between <em>proof</em> and <em>conviction</em> — proof is one of the ways to conviction but there are other ways, too…</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">Many have arrived at this conviction as the result of a personal experience which convinces them that God exists. These men would rule out of court the very discussion of whether God exists, for, they would say, if a man is truly in love he does not ask himself if he is in love. The <em>experience</em> of God’s Presence is sufficient…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Combining the Rambam’s emphasis on knowledge and his position that philosophical proof is the surest way to know something, we can see why to the Rambam:</p>
<p><em>1. Emunah </em>is knowing things philosophically.</p>
<p>2. It is through such knowledge that one gains persistence after death, that one enters the World to Come.</p>
<p>Both of these notions are expressed in his introduction to his commentary to chapter <em>Cheileq</em> (Sanhedrin ch. 11), and are made his foundation for making his famous list of 13 Articles of Faith. The <em>mishnah </em>upon which he comments says that “All Israel has a place in the world to come”, and then Maimonides adds that only those who believe these articles, and not just by faith but via philosophical proof, are “Israel” in this context.</p>
<p><em>3. Ahavas Hashem </em>is wanting to know more about Him philosophically. Quoting <em>Yesodei haTorah </em>2:1-2:</p>
<blockquote>
<div dir="rtl">וְהֵיאַךְ הִיא הַדֶּרֶךְ לְאַהֲבָתוֹ, וְיִרְאָתוֹ: בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁיִּתְבּוֹנֵן הָאָדָם בְּמַעֲשָׂיו וּבְרוּאָיו הַנִּפְלָאִים הַגְּדוֹלִים, וְיִרְאֶה מֵהֶם חָכְמָתוֹ שְׁאֵין לָהּ עֵרֶךְ וְלֹא קֵץ–מִיָּד הוּא אוֹהֵב וּמְשַׁבֵּחַ וּמְפָאֵר וּמִתְאַוֶּה תַּאֲוָה גְּדוֹלָה לֵידַע הַשֵּׁם הַגָּדוֹל, כְּמוֹ שֶׁאָמַר דָּוִיד “צָמְאָה נַפְשִׁי, לֵא-לֹהִים–לְאֵ-ל חָי” (<a href="http://www.mechon-mamre.org/i/t/t2642.htm#3">תהילים מב,ג</a>).</div>
<p>And what is the way to love Him and be in awe/fear of Him? When a person contemplates His acts, His amazing and great creations, and his wisdom sees from them that there is no length or end to it, immediately he loves, praises, glorifies, and desires with a great desire to know [His] great Name/Reputation. As David said (Tehillim 42:3), “My soul thirsts for G-d, for the ‘Living’ G-d.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Love comes from and is a draw to knowledge, not an experiential relationship with the Almighty. (See my post on <a title="Aspaqlaria: Emunah Peshutah vs. Machashavah" href="http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2004/11/emunah-peshutah-vs-machashavah.shtml"><em>Emunah Peshutah </em>vs <em>Machashavah</em></a>, on how others balance the philosophical transcendent and the experiential immanent.)</p>
<p>Similarly from the third <em>mitzvah</em> in <em>Sefer haMitzvos </em>(tr. David Guttman):</p>
<blockquote>
<div dir="rtl">היא הציווי שנצטווינו על אהבתו יתעלה שנתבונן ונסתכל במצוותיו ופעולתיו, כדי שנשיגהו ונתענג בהשגתו תכלית התענוג – וזוהי האהבה המצווה [עלינו].</div>
<p>The third <em>mitzvah </em>is that we were commanded to love Him. [Meaning] that we should contemplate and look into His commandments and His actions so that we apprehend Him, thus experiencing [lit: enjoying] the ultimate enjoyment through that apprehension of him. That is the love that we were commanded.</p></blockquote>
<p>4. Providence is a function of how well one knows about G-d. The <em>Moreh </em>(3:17) argues that only people get providence, and (3:18) the borders of who is a person with regard to providence are blurry. Greater knowledge of Hashem earns one more providence. To quote:</p>
<blockquote><p>It is an established fact that species have no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are merely ideas formed in our minds, whilst everything in real existence is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. This being granted, it must further be admitted that the result of the existing Divine influence, that reaches mankind through the human intellect, is identical with individual intellects really in existence…</p></blockquote>
<p>and so on… We’re talking about what the Rambam calls the fourth and highest kind of perfection — knowledge, and in particular knowledge through philosophical proof<a name=19Letters>.</a></p>
<p>I am not alone in finding this problematic, and perhaps alien to the general flow of Jewish Tradition. Here is a quote from R’ SR Hirsch’s 19 Letters of Ben Uziel, Letter 18 (pp 181-182 in R’ Drackman’s translation):</p>
<blockquote><p>This great man [Maimonides -RBR, fn. 1], to whom, and to whom alone, we owe the preservation of practical Judaism to our time, is responsible, because he sought to reconcile Judaism with the difficulties which confronted it from without, instead of developing it creatively from within, for all the good and the evil which bless and afflict the heritage of the father. His peculiar mental tendency was Arabic-Greek, and his conception of the purpose of life the same. He entered into Judaism from without, bringing with him opinions of whose truth he had convinced himself from extraneous sources and — he reconciled. For him, too, self-perfecting through the knowledge of truth was the highest <span class="ubernym uttInitialism" onmouseover="domTT_activate(this, event, 'content', 'The most popular instant messaging service was originally for AOL members only. (<a href="http://www.aim.com">link</a>)','caption', 'AOL Instant Messenger' );"><ab
br class="uttInitialism">aim</abbr></span>, the practical he deemed subordinate. For him knowledge of God was the end, not the means; hence he devoted his intellectual powers to speculations upon the essence of Deity, and sought to bind Judaism to the results of his speculative investigations as to postulates of science or faith. The Mizvoth became for him merely ladders, necessary only to conduct to knowledge or to protect against error, this latter often only the temporary and limited error of polytheism. Mishpatim became only rules of prudence, Mitzvoth as well; Chukkim rules of health, teaching right feeling, defending against the transitory errors of the time; Edoth ordinances, designed to promote philosophical or other concepts; all this having no foundation in the eternal essence of things, not resulting from their eternal demand on me, or from my eternal purpose, and task, no eternal symbolizing of an unchangeable idea, and not inclusive enough to form a basis for th
e totality of the commandments.</p>
<p>He, the great systematic orderer of the practical results of the Talmud, gives expression in the last part of his philosophic work to opinions concerning the meaning and purpose of the commandments which, taking the very practical results codified by himself as the contents of the commandments, are utterly untenable — cast no real light upon them, and cannot go hand in hand with them in practice….</p></blockquote>
<p>Even in halachic process, I would argue the Rambam gives more emphasis to the original intent of a <em>mishnah </em>or statement in the gemara than would other rishonim. E.g. if the gemara’s <em>peshat </em>in a <em>mishnah </em>appears to be a stretch, Rashi on the mishnah will try to justify the stretch. Whereas the Rambam is more likely to minimize the chiddush of the gemara and his Peirush haMishnayos is not likely to give the gemara’s explanation in favor of something more straightforward. <em>Halakhah </em>as science, a truth-seeking enterprise, rather than Rashi’s (or Tosafos’s, or the Tur’s or the Rosh’s or the Mordechai’s or the Raavad’s or…) <em>halakhah </em>as process of <strong>legal </strong>development.</p><br />
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