[Avodah] Must we agree with the Torah?

[Micha Berger]

In an email of 9 Aug 2013 at 4:11pm EDT, RAM responded to something I wrote:
:> But it's unclear to me that malkhus Shamayim necessarily means a blind
:> "ana avda deQBH" or if it also includes agreeing with what we understand
:> of His Reasons for making that gezeira.

: For a long time I was bothered by the idea that a Metzuveh V'Oseh gets
: more sechar than an Aino Metzuveh. It seemed to me that the volunteer is
: more praiseworthy than the employee or the slave...

Before I get to RAM's point...

I since offered a third type of obedience, but didn't spell out the contrast.
In that paragraph I listed:
1- blind slave-like obedience (ani avdekha ben amasekha)
2- obeying out of agreement with whatever I can understand of His Reasons

But there is also:
3- obeying out of trust that He has His Reasons which I would agree to in
principle, if I could understand them (whether I could, and whether I tried,
aside) and if I were more idealistic.

I focused on the fact that my theology necesssitates my trust that this
is true; AISI, the alternative is believing in a god who could be capricious.

I suggested that "ee ifshi" refered to convincing oneself pork is "ewww"
and not tasty. As RAL was later quoted as saying (barukh shekivanti) an
aesthetic judgment.

But I'm thinking now that requiring #2 (that I like what I see of the
taamei hamitzvos) rather than #3 (trusting that in principle and in the
ideal I would) is also problematic, even if it's not necessarily what
REBA was talking about. My notion in that paragraph quoted in the top
of the email was put poorly, kindly replace it with:
    But it's unclear to me that REBA's reference to malkhus Shamayim
    necessarily means a blind "ana avda deQBH" or if it also includes
    obeying out of trust Hashem has some Reason for making that gezeirah
    that if I were more able to live up to my ideals, and if I had
    opportunity and ability to learn some of the taamei hamitzvah,
    I would agree with.

Anyway, back to what RAM wrote about...

:      Whatever those reasons might be, he would most likely not be doing
: the mitzvah if he didn't see some value in it. As such, there is less
: of a Kiddush Hashem in his actions, as compared to when a Metzuveh does
: the mitzvah, whether he wants to or not. Similarly here: If someone
: does not want to eat pork -- even if that lack of desire results from
: learning taamei hamitzvos -- then his refraining does not demonstrate
: any subservience. The one who does want it but refrains anyway -- he is
: doing a Kiddush Hashem.

I'm not sure I agree with the association of the concept of qiddush
hasheim here. It's a bit more complicated. According to Rashi on "qedoshim
tihyu", qedushah comes from obeying halakhah, in particular the hilkhos
arayos that just preceded it. According to Chazal, though (the Sifra /
Toras Kohanim is older than the mishnah), it's to be separate from things
He permits us. As most people know via the oft-quoted Ramban ad loc
about avoiding being a menuval birshus haTorah. Not by avoiding pork,
but by avoiding that third piece of kugel at the shul qiddush. By the
approach of the Sifra and the Ramban, qeddushah is bedavqa generated by
the eino metzuveh ve'oseh!

Personally, I would flip the whole thing on its head and say the metzuveh
ve'oseh is metzuveh because it's something his soul needs more desperately
than the eino metzuveh does. IOW, he doesn't get more sekhar because
he's metzuveh, he's metzuveh because for him this activity generates
more sekhar!

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Education is not the filling of a bucket,
micha at aishdas.org        but the lighting of a fire.
http://www.aishdas.org                - W.B. Yeats
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