[Avodah] Selling whiskey/ bourbon

[Micha Berger]

On Fri, Mar 26, 2010 at 09:19:11PM +0000, RAM kennethgmiller at juno.com wrote:
: There's a whole hour during which we are machmir on eating but meikil
: on owning.

Isn't that logically necessary? It is rare we eat chameitz that no Jews
owns. Wouldn't geneivas aku"m have to be involved?

I think of these dinim in the same terms as harchaqos. Particularly
given "kol ha'okhel matzah beErev Pesach ke'ilu bo'eil arusaso beveis
chamav". It's not that one is an extension of the issur of achilas
chameitz and the other of bal yeira'eh, but both a more viceral distancing
(harchaqah) from chameitz, progressing as we got closer to Pesach itself.

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 07:33:46PM -0400, R Meir Shinnar wrote:
: The discussion between RMB and RZS that minhagim should in some sense
: be possibly universal seems to revolve around the following more
: general issue (and I am sorry to RMB if I misrepresent his position).

To which, on Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 11:45:21PM -0600, R Daniel Israel
replied:
: If the chumra is not to sell chametz, then your analysis holds.  If,
: OTOH, the chumra is not to sell chametz unless there is hefsid merubah,
: we may find that everyone can keep this chumra, however the result will
: in general be that only shopkeepers sell chametz.

What you're describing is that this version of the minhag is that one
can sell taaroves without a hefsed merubah, but chameitz gamur only when
there is a hefsed merubah. So that rather than hefsed merubah trumping
the minhag, it's part of the minhag itself.

The arguments I gave against this were:

1- Today, with refrigeration, mass production and distribution, large
pantries and refrigerators, most homes own more chameitz gamur than
store owners of yesteryear. It's no longer a matter of people having to
buy each day that day's groceries.

2- The storeowner isn't told that he may only sell 95% (or whatever of
his chameitz) as the last 5% aren't merubah.

But in reality, the thought never crossed my mind that the minhag was
that complicated to begin with.

Returning to RMS's post:
: There is a long section (IIRC 10 ma'amar) in Sa'adya Gaon's Nivhar
: be'emunot vedeot where he examines different ethical and religious
: positions - and rejects them because of particularity - because he
: insists that any moral/ethical/religous position, to be defensible as
: a valid position, has to be something that the entire community could
: (at least in theory) adopt - that if a position is only viable because
: it is dependent on other people not adopting it, that is proof that
: the position is not a correct position - even if in practice, only a
: few people actually adopt the position (this is different than the
: Kantian imperative, but it is related)

: That, I think, is in essence what RMB is arguing...

It's likely I'm thinking that way unintentially, given my small exposure
to Kant.

On a conscious level, I was thinking more halachically-legalistically. A
minhag needs for a minhag to be nispasheit and the opposing concept of
ein hatzibur yachol laamod bah. Added to that the notion that minhagim are
ratified, not enacted.

I would be interested in a conversation about the difference between R'
Saadia Gaon's position and Kant's Categorical Imperative.

To start the ball rolling, I think RSG is giving the possibility of
being categorical as a necessary criterion, something true of any moral
choice, but not its *defining* feature.

:-)||ii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Today is the 2nd day
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