[Avodah] Rambam on Metaphors

[Michael Makovi]

R' Rich Wolpoe asked about the difference between yad hashem being
metaphorical and eiyin tachat eiyin (hereafter ETE) *not* being
metaphorhical, within the confines of Rambam's own philosphy.

I'm not sure I fully understand the question, however, but I will
respond to what the question appears to be. As far as I can tell, the
question appears to be: why can we allegorize yad hashem but not ETE?

My understanding:

As far as halakhah goes, Rambam holds it illegitimate to allegorize,
etc. Hazal had a Sinaitic tradition that eiyin tachat eiyin is to be
interpreted in a certain way (Introduction to the Mishnah), and this
is inviolable. (Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner in his hakdama to the Dor
Revi'i would say that even ETE can be overturned as per Hilkhot
Mamrim, but Rambam explicitly denies this possibility in Introduction
to the Mishnah.) Apparently, we have an assumption that in matters of
law, the Torah said what it meant. (Except where tradition declares
otherwise; gezerah shavah, etc.) The Torah did not use allegory, etc.,
in matters of law. The Garden of Eden can be an allegory; the law to
eat kosher cannot be.

But furthermore: Rambam only allegorizes when reason contradicts the
peshat. When reason says nothing, or when reason is uncertain (for
example, Aristotle and Plato on eternity and unformed matter), we go
by the Torah's peshat. When reason yields certain results, and only
then, do we reinterpret the Torah. As Wyschogrod reviewing Fox notes
(Tradition 28:2, 1994),
(Quote) " It is Maimonides who is convinced, as Fox says, "that what
reason finds incorrect and unacceptable cannot be the meaning of
Scripture, no matter what it appears to say." Scripture and rabbinic
texts are thus no obstacle to any doctrine, as long as Maimonides is
convinced that the doctrine is rationally sound. Scripture and
rabbinic texts are subject to interpretation, guided by reason. Where
reason yields uncertain results, Scripture needs to be listened to on
its own terms. But when reason speaks clearly, Scripture must yield."
(End quote)
Wyschogrod then adds an interesting possibility of his own, that
perhaps Rambam's understanding of what reason could prove and not
prove, was itself dictated by what Judaism said. That is, perhaps
Rambam's understanding that eternity of the universe had not been
proven by Aristotle, was itself determined by the Torah's own apparent
belief in creation ex nihilo. In other words, reason and the Torah's
peshat are mutually influential; where reason is certain, the Torah's
peshat must yield, but the Torah's peshat can dictate where reason is
certain and where reason is not.

But the point is that the Torah's peshat yields only when reason is
certain. If anything, reason declares that ETE cannot be literal; as
Hazal note, what if a one-eyed man blinds a two-eyed man, etc.?  If
anything, then, ETE *is* metaphorical, based on both reason and
Hazal's Sinaitic tradition that ETE is not literal. But in most
halakhot, the peshat reigns supreme, because halakhah is different
than narrative and musar and the like, whereas in the latter, reason
can override the peshat.

Michael Makovi