[Avodah] FW: R Tzadok-TSBP

[Michael Makovi]

> Especially after I've seen what deconstructionism has done in the hands
> of the Reconstructionist (sorry, I couldn't refrain from the wordplay),
> I find it very hard to believe an O poseiq would consider it a worthwhile
> part of the toolset.
>
> R' Micha

Professor Shapiro, ibid., does note at length that Rabbi Haim
Soloveitchik was reticent to pasken, directing people to the dayan of
Volozhin for practical questions. Rabbi Haim was sure that his
hiddushim were true and correct, but he couldn't bring himself to
practically rule that way, against the SA in favor of a novel ruling
of the Rambam's or a novel reading of the Gemara. Faced with the
conflict, he simply chose not to pasken anything.

So if Rabbi Haim was a post-modernist deconstructionist, then rest
easy: he was NOT a poseiq.

Personally, this makes my stomach turn, with all due respect to Rabbi
Haim. I cannot imagine the value of learning that does not lead to
practical halakhah. Rabbi Elias (19 Letters) notes that Rav Hirsch's
concept of lishmah was NOT the Volozhin notion of purely theoretical
lomdut for its own sake, but rather, Rav Hirsch sake that lishmah
meant for the sake of ma'aseh.

Now, not EVERY act of limud has to lead to ma'aseh, but I'd say that
the general goal has to be for ma'aseh. Rav Hirsch in fact studied
Seder Kodashim, as shown in his perush to Sefer Vayikra. But in
general, Rav Hirsch's overarching goal was to apply Torah to the real
practical world. (This ties into TIDE.) Occasional study for pure
theory is fine, as long as the general aim is for ma'aseh.

Similarly, regarding a gentile's being culpable for studying
non-Noahide Torah, the Meiri says that this doesn't mean that he
studies non-Noahide Torah per se, but rather, it speaks of intent: a
gentile is like a kohen if he studies for the sake of doing, and he is
culpable if he studies not for the sake of doing. In general, for the
sake of doing = studying Noahide law, and not for the sake of doing =
studying non-Noahide law, but not always. If a gentile studies for the
sake of doing the Noahide law, but in the process, he happens to study
non-Noahide Torah as well, he is fine. Likewise, if a gentile studies
NOT for the sake of doing the Noahide law, then he is culpable even if
he happens to study Noahide law. The Meiri seems to apply a Hirschian
lishmah to the question of a gentile studying Torah. The content
itself is not important; a Jew's studying Seder Kodashim or a
gentiles' studying any non-Noahide Torah - both are fine, as long as
the general intent is to affect deed.

Professor Shapiro notes that Rambam was extremely insistent on Torah
study being for deed. He quotes Rambam that studying Talmudic
dialectic is useless for most people; people should study the Yad and
the Rif, and should study the Talmud only where the Rif and Yad
contradict, says Rambam. He notes that Rambam says, on one occasion in
his perush to the Mishnah, that we need not be concerned with studying
Beit Shammai's opinion. He quotes Rav Kafih that people in the
yeshivot today would call this am ha'artzut, but that Rambam disagrees
with the yeshivishe view.

I don't think I'd personally go as far with Rambam's view; surely
studying Beit Shammai will help us understand halakhah, so that we
know how to rule elsewhere! But the underlying kernel of Rambam's,
viz. that all study should be practical, highly resonates with me. I
simply think that learning how to think is also practical, if the
thought processes will be later applied to practical halakhah.

So I am very uncomfortable with Rabbi Haim's reticent to pasken. I
have a very one-track mind, and we've seen on these boards previously
that I am unable to comprehend apologetics or altering the truth in
favor of expediency; I simply cannot comprehend these, and I even made
a Freudian slip trying to describe a specific apologeia; I simply
cannot comprehend these. Similarly, the notion of Talmud study that
does not lead ultimately to a better understanding of the practical
halakhah, I simply cannot stomach this notion.

When I'm studying Gemara, for example, I enjoy the Rif, Rambam, and
Shulhan Arukh a million times more than I enjoy Tosafot. (This is also
because I dislike casuistry and dialectics. I remember when there was
a conflict between two sugyot, Tosafot offered several complex
solutions, while Ra'avad on the Rif simply said that one sugya was the
ikkar and overrode the other, and that we'd re-girsa the other to
agree with the first. I am a straight-shooter, and the Ra'avad
satisfied me far more than the Tosafot did.)

My justification of academic study of Torah is simple: if it is
objectively true, then surely, it must have an effect on halakhah. If
it is objectively false, then obviously, it should have no effect,
since it is false anyway. When people say that academic findings are
true but are outside the halakhic process, I simply cannot comprehend
this. I simply cannot comprehend any true knowledge, any true finding,
that does not have practical ramifications. I realize that this goes
against the traditional method, but I simply cannot comprehend any
true finding that is purely theoretical, that is divorced from
practice. It just doesn't fit in my brain.

Michael Makovi